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This thesis examines the relationships between bonus pay, organisational justice and 
turnover intention across a range of corporate organisations in the UK in order to better 
understand the effect of bonus pay on organisational outcomes. It considers the effects of 
bonus pay on the four distinct scales of organisational justice, the referents selected by 
recipients of a bonus to determine justice, and the subsequent bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention appraisals of participants. It also considers bonus pay as a workplace 
event, both in isolation and in comparison with other events which occur during the research 
period, considering the effects of bonus pay on organisational justice, emotion, social 
exchange relationships and turnover intention, therefore attempting to close gaps in the 
justice literature identified by previous researchers. In the first of two studies, a questionnaire 
based, cross-sectional analysis of bonus pay as an event issued as close as administratively 
possible to the bonus pay announcement in a sample of 599 professionals in corporate 
organisations found that bonus amount has only weak or non-significant relationships with 
justice, satisfaction and turnover intention, and no direct effect on satisfaction or turnover 
intention. Justice scales and bonus satisfaction did predict turnover intention with differing 
direct and mediating effects. This study demonstrated some complex mediating effects of 
different scales of justice, with the type of bonus calculation (whether calculated as an 
absolute amount or as a percentage of salary) playing a role in which types of justice 
mediated bonus pay-satisfaction and bonus pay-turnover intention relationships. Referent 
selection also predicted bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, with the choice of referent 
in bonus situations proving different to those identified in ‘general’ pay situations in previous 
literature. In the second study, an experience sampling investigation using repeat measures 
with 31 participants, results showed that in comparison with events in general bonus pay 
elicited the predominantly negative emotions of anger and disappointment in participants. 
For bonus pay as an event in comparison with other events, organisational justice and social 
exchange predicted variation in turnover intention to a greater extent, demonstrating that 
bonus pay is an event which is particularly important in determining turnover intention. Social 
exchange relationship quality had the strongest direct effect on turnover intention, with 
organisational justice also having a direct effect. Emotional relationships with turnover 
intention depend on the nature of the emotion measure used, as the research finds no direct 
relationship between emotion score and turnover intention for any of the individual events 
under consideration, but positive and negative state affect are directly related to turnover 
intention, with negative state affect mediating the relationship between bonus pay and 
turnover intention relationships (whereas positive state affect does not).  
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
State Affect 
Also called emotion, this is a short-lived affective or emotional state (in 
psychology referred to as Affect).  
Trait Affect 
Underlying and relatively stable emotional state thought to be 
determined by personality traits as well as other experiences. 
Positive State Affect 
Used by some researchers to describe generally positive emotions as a 
broad category. 
Negative State Affect 
Used by some researchers to describe generally negative emotions as a 
broad category. 
Mood 
Mood is not clearly defined, however in this research is is taken to mean 
a medium-term affective state longer lasting than state affect, yet not a 
trait. 
Emotion 
A complex experience of consciousness, bodily sensation, and 
behaviour that reflects the personal significance of a thing, an event, or a 
state of affairs. 
CMR Current mood report 
CWB Counterproductive work behaviours 
OCB Organisational citizenship behaviour 
AET Affective events theory 
OJS Organisational Justice Survey  
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
OJS-8 Short form Organisational Justice Survey  
BSS Bonus Satisfaction Survey  
TIS-6 Short form Turnover Intention Survey  
SERS Social Exchange Relationship Scale  
GEW Geneva Emotion Wheel 
22 
 
ILM Institute of Learning and Management 
CIPD Chartered Institute of Professional Development 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulations 
POS Perceived organisational support 
LMX Leader member exchange 
PANAS Positive and negative affect scale 
INSCO Insurance company 
MEDCO Medical devices company 
ESM Experience sampling methods 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CIM Chartered Institute of Management 
BHPS British Household Panel Survey 
OBM Organisational behaviour modification 
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
SMPI Smallest meaningful pay increase 
RCT Referent cognitions theory 
ML Maximum Likelihood 
REML Restricted Maximum Likelihood 
-2LL -2 Log Likelihood 
ICC Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with understanding bonus pay, the justice processes engaged in 
when bonuses are paid, the affective and social exchange relationship lenses with which to 
view justice, and the relationship between bonus pay and these justice, affective and social 
exchange processes on our intention to leave the organisation. This thesis will follow the 
stimulus (or event), appraisal (or attitude, including both affective and cognitive elements), 
behaviour (or outcome) paths suggested in other justice research (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2013; 
Elfenbein, 2007) to identify specific relationships involving bonus payments, fairness and 
organisational outcomes, and use theoretical frameworks such as affective events theory 
(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Basch & Fisher, 2000), agency theory (Adams, 1965), 
organisational justice (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg et al., 2007), theories of social comparison 
(e.g. Buunk & Gibbons, 2007) and a review of the relevant outcomes in current research  
considering these variables to develop testable hypotheses. In this thesis the definition of a 
bonus system as given by Furnham (2008, p. 282) is: 
 
A system where employees receive a guaranteed weekly or monthly wage, 
plus a financial reward based on their performance is often called a bonus 
system. Performance measures could be based on either the performance of 
the individual, a group (e.g. team or department) or the whole organization. 
 
The thesis aims to contribute to the broad subject of pay research which is an under-
researched area in personnel psychology (Shaw & Gupta, 2015), perhaps surprising given 
that pay is an important motivational factor with base salary and benefits rated the second 
most important motivator for employees (behind the intrinsic enjoyment of the job) (ILM, 
2013). The thesis specifically focusses on bonus pay as a remuneration strategy, seeking to 
contribute to the evidence that bonuses are both a motivator (leading to increased 
satisfaction and performance), yet can also be a cause of dissatisfaction and employee 
turnover (ILM, 2013). It also seeks to investigate the effects of fairness (or organisational 
justice) as a mediator in bonus pay situations, as this is proposed by many theorists and 
researchers to be a reason why increased pay can lead to decreased satisfaction and 
performance (Colquitt, 2001). The reactions and attitudes of employees towards salary 
payments are different to attitudes towards bonus payments leading to a differential impact 
on motivation (CIPD, 2015), therefore by focussing on bonus pay the thesis seeks to add to 
the current body of research into pay, which has tended in general to focus on salary as a 
form of payment (Grund & Hofmann, 2019). Many organizations make use of different types 
24 
 
of performance-related pay systems. The design of such systems can differ in terms of who 
is included (in which positions and on which levels), how performance is measured, and 
which incentives are used (money, stock etc.), yet they are all based on the general idea that 
employees should be motivated to work harder because they see the connection between 
job performance and reward. This premise has been researched, but often with contrary 
findings. Nevertheless, a bonus system remains a popular mechanism for directing 
behaviour towards outcomes, with 94% of British organisations offering a financial incentive 
to staff above their annual salary to improve performance (ILM, 2013). This thesis aims to 
understand whether the payment of these financial incentives has the desired organisational 
effect (to improve outcomes), or whether this payment acts as a signal of injustice which 
serves to increase counterproductive work behaviours (Colquitt et al, 2013). 
 
This research addresses three sets of relationships designed to offer clarity into the 
psychological mechanisms surrounding bonus pay. These relationships consider the 
theoretical underpinnings of reactions to bonus pay and are directed at current gaps in 
existing research. The common elements of these relationships are that they involve bonus 
pay as a workplace event, they consider bonus pay in the context of organisational justice 
appraisals (where these justice appraisals are triggered by a bonus payment), and that they 
consider the effect of bonus pay on an employee’s intention to leave the organisation. 
Organisational justice is pertinent to this research as it represents an attempt to 
operationalise fairness in the organisational context, one of the main contemporary social 
concerns with bonus pay. Greenberg (1990, p. 400) provides a description of organisational 
justice research as ‘attempts to describe and explain the role of fairness as a consideration 
in the workplace’. The first set of relationships in this thesis concern the amount of bonus 
pay, and whether it is the amount of bonus or the subsequent justice appraisals which have 
a greater association with both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. The second set of 
relationships concern the social comparison referents used upon receipt of a bonus and 
looks at the relationship between referent selection and justice appraisals, and the mediating 
effect of the selection of social comparison referent on bonus pay and bonus satisfaction and 
bonus pay and turnover intention relationships. The third set of relationships consider bonus 
pay as an event in the context of other workplace events and seeks to understand how 
bonus pay (both as an event in itself, and in comparison to other events identified occurring 
in the workplace during the research period) relates to both emotional and social exchange 
quality appraisals, and how these in turn relate to specific components of justice and 




It is perhaps surprising that bonus pay has received little attention in psychology research 
given the prevalence of bonus as an issue in the media and political sphere (e.g. Dale, 2009; 
Butler, 2015), and the increase in the instance of bonus pay as a component of total pay with 
bonus pay increasing significantly in some sectors of the economy (Forth et al., 2014).  
In the existing literature there is some measure of disagreement and no clear conclusions 
provided into whether bonus pay forms an effective means of reward and motivation. 
Economics theories such as agency theory, supported by broad panel data (e.g. Pouliakas & 
Theodossiou, 2009), suggest that bonuses are an effective payment method to improve 
performance. These findings are often questioned by psychological theories and research 
(e.g. Gneezy, 2004) which suggest that mediating constructs such as organisational justice 
introduce a limit to the effectiveness of bonus pay in increasing performance, as fairness 
concerns override the motivational effects of bonus pay once inequality or inequity becomes 
too great. Although justice as a psychological construct is well understood and researched, 
the context of bonus payment as an event which triggers a justice appraisal has not been 
widely researched. Situational justice and satisfaction relationships in the circumstances of 
bonus pay are under-researched (Shaw & Gupta, 2015; Wu & Wang, 2008), with the 
available literature generally limited to single industries such as hospitality (e.g. Wu & Wang, 
2008) or organisational populations such as executives (Bruce et al., 2007; Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003). 
 
While ‘pay’ in general is often considered in research and salary as a form of pay has 
received attention, there is value in considering the specific situation of bonus pay. 
Researchers report a number of differences in the psychological mechanisms used in 
appraising salary and bonus payment (Grandey, Tam, & Brauburger, 2002), meaning that 
pay research considering salary may not be generalisable to bonus pay situations. Social 
comparison theories which underpin justice theories explain the central need that in order to 
make a justice appraisal a relevant referent must be selected against which to form a 
comparison. These same social comparison theories suggest that different referents are 
chosen in different situations introducing the possibility that different referents are used by 
employees in salary increase and bonus pay situations, leading to different perceptions of 
justice (Grund & Rubin, 2017). This is consistent with research demonstrating that there are 
differential situational reactions both attitudinally and behaviourally to bonus pay and salary 
(Tremblay, Sire, & Balkin, 2000). The use of referents in determining justice appraisals 
regarding pay has been investigated by several researchers, but there is little research 
considering the referents selected in the specific instance of bonus pay (e.g. Law & Wong, 
1998; Larkin et al., 2012; Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). There is an opportunity therefore to 
contribute to the existing research by considering the social comparison referents selected in 
26 
 
bonus pay situations, and to consider the relationship between referent and both justice and 
satisfaction appraisals. In the remainder of this chapter this thesis will set out the chapter 
structure for the reader and give a brief overview of the contents of each section. The thesis 
begins by considering the rise of bonus pay as a remuneration strategy, the reasons why 
bonus pay is used and why it is becoming increasingly popular. This chapter then outlines 
the scope of this thesis, and the variables included in the research. Though only a brief 
introduction is provided in this chapter, the thesis introduces the broader subjects germane 
to the thesis which will be addressed by the literature review in the next chapter.  
 
In Chapter 2 the thesis considers the theoretical basis for and research related to financial 
incentives in general and bonus pay specifically. It first considers agency theory, the 
economic theory underpinning bonus pay, and seeks to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of using agency theory as a foundation for understanding reactions to bonus 
pay. It considers research on the central question behind the effectiveness of agency theory, 
namely ‘do financial incentives work when directing behaviour towards an outcome’ and 
considers the literature which supports the relationship between financial incentives and 
outcomes (and specifically bonus pay and performance in its various measures) and the 
literature which questions this relationship. In this chapter the thesis also reviews the 
evidence considering the relationships between the amount of pay and performance, pay 
dispersion and inequality before considering the relationships between pay, organisational 
justice and organisational outcomes, before finally arriving at a review of the social 
comparison literature in pay appraisals. Interrogating this research in some depth the thesis 
is able to identify the need for considering the two lenses for viewing justice (namely social 
exchange relationship quality and emotion lenses) and the outcomes linked to these distinct 
lenses. Using these themes this thesis identifies gaps in the research related to bonus pay 
and justice which will help to formulate relevant hypotheses. It also reviews the research 
where justice has mediated pay and outcome relationships in existing literature, and 
provides reasons why using this mediating framework for viewing bonus pay is effective. 
Throughout the literature review the thesis will provide a summary of the hypotheses drawn 
from existing research which will in turn form the bases of the research investigations 
included in this work. These hypotheses fall into two distinct areas, the first being where pay 
has been researched but bonus pay has not, and where investigating bonus pay as a 
specific form of remuneration adds to the current body of literature. The second being where 
emotional and social exchange relationships related to justice are concerned, and where 
methodological and practical limitations have prevented these being researched as co-




In Chapter 3 the thesis begins to outline the research methods employed. This chapter 
demonstrates how each of the hypotheses (developed from the review of the extant 
literature) fit into three separate proposed sets of relationships which are consistent with 
current theories of pay, justice, satisfaction and organisational outcomes. While this thesis 
specifically looks to answer hypotheses related to bonus pay, the research also considers a 
range of potential workplace events in order to understand not only the absolute effects of 
bonus pay, but the effects of bonus pay in relation to other workplace events. The variables 
and paths in the proposed sets of relationships are described later in this introduction. There 
are natural linkages and established relationships across these variables which become 
apparent in Chapter 2, and a review of the existing research indicates that the inclusion of 
these constructs is well-founded. Each of the hypotheses developed in this thesis are 
mapped to these sets of relationships, which allows for the consideration of potential 
research methods to effectively test them. In Chapter 3 the thesis therefore begins to outline 
the research design and methods used to test the hypotheses and the paths in the 
relationships between variables, providing an overview of the research methods which are 
then expanded upon for each of the two separate investigations in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the method (in Chapter 4) and results (in Chapter 5) for the first 
of the two research investigations designed to investigate the hypotheses and relationships 
in this thesis. The first investigation (a cross sectional investigation) addresses the first and 
second set of relationships forming this research, the first set of relationships considers 
bonus pay (as an amount) and the relationships between bonus pay, organisational justice 
(including the distinct scales of procedural, distributive, interpersonal and informational 
justice), bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. The second set of relationships considers 
bonus pay (as an amount), social comparison referents, organisational justice (including the 
distinct scales of procedural, distributive, interpersonal and informational justice) and bonus 
satisfaction. As the variables in these two sets of relationships are similar (with only referents 
added to the second set of relationships), they can be included in a single research design, 
outlined in Chapter 4.  
 
In Chapters 6 and 7 the thesis describes the method (in Chapter 6) and results (in Chapter 
7) of the second of the two investigations which make up this research. The second 
investigation (an experience sampling investigation) addresses the third set of relationships 
which consider bonus pay as an event (both in its own right and in the context of other 
workplace events), organisational justice, emotion, social exchange relationship quality and 
turnover intention. By considering a number of workplace events the investigation considers 
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not only the nature and strength of the relationships for bonus pay, but also the relative 
relationships for bonus pay as an event in comparison to other workplace events.  
 
Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the findings of both research investigations. This chapter 
addresses the aims of the research and the outcomes in light of these aims. It provides a 
discussion of the implications of the findings and evaluates the research both on the basis of 
theoretical contribution and the methods used. Rather than focusing narrowly on the 
hypotheses developed and investigated in earlier sections, this chapter also considers 
specific relationships and paths in the analysis which are interesting to our current 
understanding of bonus pay and pay in general. The chapter closes by suggesting potential 
directions for future research (of which many are opened due to both the findings in this 
research and the broad array of variables investigated). In Chapter 9 the thesis offers final 
conclusions related to the research. Having set out the broad direction and chapter structure 
in this introduction, this section now continues to outline the scope of this thesis (including 
the justification for focusing on bonus pay as a subject), and the variables included in the 
research in more detail.   
 
1.1. The Rise of Bonus Pay 
 
Bonus pay has become a common fixture in the general organisational and political 
discourse. As bonuses become a more popular feature of remuneration strategies more 
attention naturally falls on them, with questions raised as to their role and efficacy in 
incentivising performance. Spending on bonuses amounted to an average of 3.1 percent of 
total compensation budgets in 1991, but by 2017 that share rose to 12.7 percent (Cohen, 
2018). More companies are choosing bonuses over salary increases as they offer more 
flexibility if organisational performance decreases. Salaries are difficult to cut, but a bonus 
can be decreased year on year without as much impact on employee perceptions of 
decreasing pay, increasing their use by companies who seek to maintain a more flexible 
overall wage bill (Greeley, 2018). Given the increased incidence of bonus pay, reward 
practitioners would be forgiven for assuming that there is clear evidence that paying a bonus 
has a clear and identifiable influence on both individual and organisational performance. In 
fact there is conflicting evidence. While there are clear arguments for the role of bonus pay 
in reward strategies as bonus pay directs effort towards clearly defined goals, there are also 
counter-arguments related to both the behaviour bonus pay incentivises and also effective 
organisational functioning. It is difficult to draw clear conclusions as bonus pay remains one 
of the most under researched dimensions of pay (Bruce et al., 2007). Pay itself is considered 
29 
 
by many to be an under researched area of organisational life, with Ledford and Heneman 
(2011, p. 2) noting that pay is often a ‘widely implemented, poorly understood and under 
researched human resource practice’. The goal of this thesis is to contribute understanding 
to this growing remuneration practice by investigating bonus pay. Firstly, it may help to 
understand why companies continue to pay bonuses given the relatively scant evidence for 
their effectiveness. 
 
1.2. Reasons for Bonus Pay 
 
As this thesis will demonstrate in subsequent sections reviewing the current literature, the 
hypothesis that bonus pay is effective has support from extant research, especially when 
directing effort and attention towards carefully defined programmable outcomes. There are 
significant positive relationships between bonus pay and a range of outcomes in the 
literature, including task performance, organisational citizenship behaviours and job 
satisfaction. Perceptions of a link between bonuses and performance are strong, with 84% of 
respondents to annual pay surveys believing that bonuses are a powerful tool to encourage 
high performance (Hays, 2012). This may explain why the use of bonus pay is both 
prevalent and growing. In a cross-sector 2013 poll the Institute of Learning and Management 
found that 94% of organisations offered a financial incentive to staff above their annual 
salary (ILM, 2013), though these bonuses are often limited to particular roles and levels, 
such as managers (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990) and executives (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
Using broad panel data from the British Household Panel Survey from 1998 to 2003, 
Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009) report that 30.5% of participants from an annual sample 
of around 10,000 individuals in 5,500 British households report receiving rewards based on a 
measure of company performance (such as a bonus, profit related pay or occasional 
irregular commissions). The chartered institute of management (CIM, 2016) in their survey of 
105,000 managers in 425 organisations report that 57% of managers received a bonus in 
the year 2015-2016 (compared to 54% in the previous year), and that on average this bonus 
is worth 17% of managers pay packages (with CEO and director bonuses worth 38% of their 
pay package). Bonuses can therefore represent a significant portion of an employee’s total 
reward. 
 
The two main reasons employers report for paying a bonus are to keep staff and to reward 
performance (ILM, 2013). Over half (57%) of respondents to the Hays Bonus Satisfaction 
Survey (Hays, 2012) stated that they would leave their organisation if their bonus did not 
meet their expectations. Paying bonuses to retain employees (or talent) is a practice 
prevalent in many industries (Cosack, Guthridge, & Lawson, 2010), and may also account 
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for an increased use of bonus pay in reward strategies, especially as critical skills are often 
rare and competition for ‘talent’ therefore becomes fierce. These talent retention arguments 
introduce a link in the research between the amount of bonus paid and turnover intention, 
though this link requires further investigation. The main reason why bonuses are paid is not 
to keep employees, but to reward performance (Hays, 2012). Bonus pay is perceived as an 
efficient means to manage performance in employment relationships as it aligns the goals of 
all involved parties. It has been argued that performance related pay and bonus pay are an 
integral element of ‘high performance workplace practices’, which have been found to be 
positively related to a host of positive outcomes including productivity, profitability and job 
satisfaction (Bauer, 2004). Expectancy-based theories of psychology predict that work 
attitudes are derived in part from the rewards produced by performance (Lawler & Porter, 
1967), and that both performance and the rewards obtained are valued outcomes (Judge et 
al., 2001; Brown & Sessions, 2003). The link between bonus pay and performance is not 
however always clear. In research by the Chartered Institute of Management (CIM, 2016), 
the authors found that 23% of underperforming managers receive a bonus, indicating that 
bonuses are often paid despite poor performance, not as a result of high performance.  
 
There is evidence that bonuses do not motivate employees, or that aspects of performance 
related pay may diminish productivity and reduce satisfaction. The Institute of Learning and 
Management (ILM, 2013) found that only 13% of employees said they are motivated by a 
bonus. The Hays Bonus Satisfaction Survey (Hays, 2012) reports that 69% of employees 
are dissatisfied with their bonus. Some researchers have suggested that job satisfaction is 
intrinsically linked to the relative pay status of an employee rather than the amount of pay 
received (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Ferrer & Carbonelli, 2005; Clark et al., 2008), and that the 
demoralising dispersion and variability in pay that can come with bonus systems can 
negatively influence work attitudes. This is supported by evidence considering social 
comparison in the workplace, which suggests it may not be the amount of pay received but 
pay in comparison with chosen others which has an impact on outcomes (Greenberg, 
Ashton-James, & Ashkanasy, 2007). Paying a bonus to underperformers may influence 
fairness perceptions, which can subsequently harm performance (Colquitt, 2001). Similarly, 
evidence exists which positions bonus pay not as an incentive but as a signal to help an 
employee understand their social exchange relationship with their employer (e.g. Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996). Bonus schemes may also encourage workers to ‘game’ the 
compensation system to their advantage by multitasking (Baker, 1992) or by engaging in 
rent-seeking behaviour aimed at influencing the subjective evaluations of line managers 
(Prendergast, 1999). Paying differential bonuses to team members can also undermine 
collaboration and teamwork and reduce employee innovation (Kohn, 1993). Using team-
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based bonus schemes may dilute individual performance as a result of free-riding 
(Holmstrom, 1982). Given these contrary findings in literature, it will benefit this thesis to take 
a closer look at the evidence behind whether financial incentives, and bonus pay in 
particular, really do positively influence beneficial workplace outcomes. Firstly, given the 
breadth of potential subjects which intersect with this topic it will help to set out a clearer 
scope for the thesis. 
 
1.3. Scope of this thesis 
 
Bonuses are shown to have little or no effect on commitment and performance for all but a 
small minority of staff (ILM, 2013), and paying bonuses leaves more people dissatisfied than 
satisfied (Hays, 2012). This minority incentivised by performance related bonuses are also 
defined by their work characteristics. They tend to work in jobs that lack intrinsic motivators, 
are more likely to dislike their job, less likely to get satisfaction from their work, or less likely 
to feel treated well by their employer (ILM, 2013). In the absence of intrinsic motivators, an 
extrinsic motivator in the shape of a bonus may be required to incentivise performance. 
Despite this, bonuses are growing in popularity as a reward strategy. It is difficult, however, 
even given the depth of a doctoral thesis to consider all elements of bonus pay, therefore the 
scope of this thesis must be limited to address areas of interest both theoretically relevant 
and underserved by current research. Though surveys exist suggesting a direct relationship 
between bonus pay and turnover intention (e.g. Hays, 2012), there is little extant academic 
research which considers this relationship. An understanding of whether social comparison 
and fairness (or organisational justice) appraisals mediate the bonus-satisfaction and bonus-
outcome relationship is also central to this research and is a set of relationships not well 
understood. Justice perceptions are suggested by some researchers to mediate the 
relationship between both pay and satisfaction and pay and turnover, yet these mediating 
relationships have not been extensively researched in the literature, let alone in the specific 
context of bonus pay as a form of pay.  
 
Having concentrated the scope of this research on bonus pay, justice, bonus satisfaction 
and turnover intention this thesis can now begin to understand complimentary variables for 
inclusion which have a strong theoretical basis and would help to address gaps in the 
existing research. The inclusion of justice as a variable offers a number of different avenues 
of potential research. The different components of organisational justice (found to have 
differential relationships with satisfaction in general pay situations) are not well understood in 
bonus specific situations. This work can contribute to the existing literature by considering 
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relationships between bonus pay, bonus satisfaction, turnover intention and the different 
scales of distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational justice (as defined by 
Colquitt, 2001). This will add to the existing body of knowledge by investigating in the bonus 
context which scale of justice has the strongest association with satisfaction and allow us to 
compare across bonus and general pay research. There is also an opportunity to address 
one of the common methodological failures in justice research. Justice is proposed to have 
both a social exchange relationship quality effect as well as an affective (emotional) effect. 
These components have been identified in meta-analysis (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001), yet 
have not been researched as co-occurring phenomena to understand their relative effects. 
As this thesis will demonstrate in the literature review in Chapter 2, more than one justice 
researcher has identified this gap and suggested potential ways to address it (Colquitt, 2012; 
Greenberg et al., 2007).  
It has been suggested that this gap in the current understanding of justice is due to 
methodological and experimental issues, but experience sampling techniques now offer a 
means to test these relationships. As this technique involves understanding deeper 
workplace experiences by gathering data over longer time periods, it offers the opportunity to 
understand the relative effects of social exchange relationship and emotion on turnover 
intention over a period of time. This method also allows for the investigation of bonus pay in 
more detail not only as an isolated event which elicits a justice response, but also in relation 
to other events which may occur in the workplace over the experience sampling period. This 
will add to the existing body of literature considering workplace events as the inclusion and 
treatment of bonus pay as a workplace event is reasonably novel. The subsequent 
emotional and attitudinal responses elicited by considering bonus pay as a workplace event 
also offers an opportunity to understand the relative effect of bonus pay as an event in the 
context of a number of other workplace events, and so understand which has the stronger 
association with both justice and turnover intention. 
 
A final area for inclusion in the scope which has strong theoretical links to justice and is 
underserved by current research in the context of bonus pay (though not in the context of 
pay in general) is social comparison processes. There is scant research into the social 
comparison processes used by recipients of a bonus, and the relationship between these 
social comparisons and perceptions of justice. Classical justice and fairness theories 
suggest that comparison processes must exist in order to decide whether something is or is 
not fair by comparing one’s own outcomes with that of a referent. Whilst investigating justice 
perceptions related to bonus pay, this thesis will also therefore add to the current body of 
research considering referent selection in bonus pay situations. This is theoretically 
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consistent with social comparison theories, another area underserved in current literature. 
With whom recipients of a bonus compare their award has received little interest, though the 
subject of comparisons with ‘general’ pay situations has been researched in some depth and 
these social comparisons have been shown to be strongly associated with justice 
perceptions. Together these focus areas provide the scope of this thesis and help to narrow 
the attention on theoretically sound yet underserved areas in current bonus and justice 
research. The final section of this chapter shows the variable catalogue developed to cover 
this scope.  
 
1.4. Variable catalogue 
 
The variable catalogue is taken directly from the scope described in the previous section and 
is shown in Table 1. It details the variables included in the research. The measures for 
assessing these variables are discussed in more detail in the overview of the methods used 
for the investigations in Chapter 3 of this thesis. At this stage the thesis provides a summary 
of the variables to be included in the scope of the research. This not only clarifies the scope 
but also provides a useful guide during the literature review, the purpose of which is to 
provide a summary of both the theoretical bases for anticipating relationships between the 
variables, and the relevant literature related to these variables and their relationships.  
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Table 1.  

























Participant ID Participant identification number 
Gender Gender of the participant 
Position Managerial position 
Age Participant age 
Date Date of completion of the information 
Time Time of completion of the information 
Bonus Pay Amount of bonus paid 
Salary The amount paid in salary to provide context for the bonus 
Bonus Satisfaction Satisfaction with the bonus awarded 
Turnover intention Intention to leave the organisation 
Organisational Justice Justice (or fairness) perceived by participants 
Distributive Justice Justice related to the amount received 
Procedural Justice Justice related to the process followed in allocation 
Interpersonal Justice Justice related to the treatment received 
Informational Justice Justice related to the transfer of information 
Social Exchange 
Relationship Quality 
The quality of social exchange relationships, one of the lenses 
through which justice can be viewed 
Emotion type Type of emotion felt by participants 
Emotion strength Strength of emotion felt by participants 
Emotion score 
Transformed emotion variable incorporating both emotion state 
and strength in a single variable 
Positive state affect 
Variable used to describe the strength of positive emotion 
experienced by participants 
Negative state affect 
Variable used to describe the strength of negative emotion 
experienced by participants 
Workplace events Events (various) which happen in the workplace 
Positive trait affect Baseline levels of positive affect occurring in participants 
Negative trait affect Baseline levels of negative affect occurring in participants 
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2. Relevant Literature 
 
To understand the relationship between financial incentives, justice and organisational 
outcomes, it is important to investigate their theoretical bases. Surprisingly, given the 
increasing uses of bonus pay in compensation and incentive systems they are one of the 
most under-researched areas in human resource management and personnel psychology 
(Shaw & Gupta, 2015). There remains sufficient volume, however, if a scan in undertaken of 
the economics, psychology, management and human resources literature to draw some 
related conclusions. This is especially true if the research extends to pay and justice, as 
organisational justice is one of the most widely researched fairness constructs over recent 
times and so a wealth of evidence supports it (Colquitt, 2001). To effectively structure this 
review of the relevant literature, it first considers a review of the fundamental theories of 
bonus pay, that of agency theory, which begins to dictate principal-agent relationships in 
contracts. This then leads to a broader review of the evidence behind financial incentives 
(and bonus pay in particular) and performance. As fairness and justice are recurrent themes 
in the pay for performance literature, the review provides an overview of the research 
considering pay dispersion, inequality and the unintended consequences of violating 
fairness norms, reflecting on the evidence behind organisational justice and both 
organisational and individual outcomes. This focus on justice leads to a deeper 
understanding of the social comparison referents selected in pay appraisals (and in 
particular bonus pay appraisals) and the effects of these selected referents on justice and 
outcomes. This review naturally leads to a deeper understanding of justice as a construct, 
which encompasses both social exchange relationship and the often more neglected 
emotional components of justice. An investigation into emotional and social exchange 
relationship mechanisms of justice finally leads to a consideration of the specific emotions 
which result from justice appraisals (and justice appraisals where pay is concerned) and the 
effect of these emotions on outcomes.  
 
2.1. Agency Theory 
 
In economics incentive-outcome relationships are largely believed to be governed by agency 
theory. Agency theory provides an overarching theory of incentives, and is directed at the 
agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), 
who performs that work. The assumptions of agency theory are that agents are motivated by 
self-interest, are rational actors, and are risk averse. Principals therefore use incentives as a 
control mechanism to motivate agents to align behaviour (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). 
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Various mechanisms may be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the 
principal, such as piece rates, commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, or fear of firing. 
As the principal is buying the agents behaviour, then a contract which is based on behaviour 
is more efficient in the case of complete information. Less programmable tasks require 
increased use of variable pay, as the roles inherently involve more risk for the principal as 
they cannot easily monitor agent behaviour (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996). When 
outcome uncertainty is low, the cost of moving risk to the agent is low (and therefore 
outcome-based contracts are attractive). When outcome uncertainty increases, however, it 
becomes increasingly more expensive to move risk to the agent as they will require more 
pay for undertaking a riskier enterprise (Shavell, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979). At its most 
simplistic level, the model of agency theory therefore becomes the trade-off between the 
cost of measuring and monitoring agent behaviour and the cost of measuring and monitoring 
outcomes and transferring risk to the agent. 
 
This for many explains the increase in the role of bonus pay in broader remuneration 
strategies, as theorists argue that work has become less programmable over time as these 
programmable tasks become automated or outsourced (Fast-Berglund et al., 2013). As there 
is limited information available to the principal they are uncertain whether the agent has 
behaved as agreed. The principal therefore has two choices, to monitor the behaviour of the 
agent through increased investment of information systems (such as more effective reporting 
procedures or increased layers of management), or to contract based on the outcomes of 
the agents behaviour (Demski & Feltham, 1978). Agency theory is therefore concerned with 
resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency 
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and the 
second understands that it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is 
actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 
1993; Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2003). Outcome-based contracts are proposed to be effective 
in curbing agent opportunism as such contracts align the preferences of agents with that of 
principals because the rewards for both depend on the same actions, and therefore conflicts 
of interest between principals and agents are reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because 
principles cannot oversee agents, or observe their behaviour (especially in modern complex 
shareholder owned organisations, where instead governance forums are developed to act 
on behalf of shareholders), they ‘rely on imperfect surrogate measures, which can lead the 
agent to displace his behaviour toward the surrogates in order to appear to be behaving well’ 
(Mitnick, 1992, p. 79). This can lead to actors ‘gaming’ the system by effectively 
manipulating the rules of the system in order to gain an advantage over others. Shapiro 
(2005) raises the example of teachers. As student assessment scores are used to monitor 
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teachers, some teachers (executing an agency role for their supervisor principals) spend 
their time teaching students how to excel on assessments, rather than teaching based on 
substance or critical thinking skills (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). 
 
The central tenet of agency theory is that outcome-based pay will align the goals of the 
principal and agent and reduce the incidence of misconduct and self-dealing, both 
considered agency costs. Research shows, however, that potential rewards for managers 
and executives (contrary to agency theory) may not provide sufficient incentive to promote 
behaviours consistent with both principal and agent benefit, but can rather provide incentive 
to cheat, commit fraud or act in other ways to achieve the level of organisational outcome 
which triggers an individual’s bonus payment (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). The authors 
demonstrate that higher levels of performance-based reward substantially increased the 
incidence of executive misrepresentation of corporate financial records. In addition, the 
authors reveal that monitoring practices typically considered measures of ‘good governance’ 
(including independent board members and institutional stock ownership) have no 
effectiveness in deterring this misconduct. Whatever the potentially positive effects these 
governance practices may possess, the authors suggest that they may be overwhelmed by 
the motivating power of incentive pay, whose effect is shown to be dramatically non-linear. 
As an example, a firm that pays over 92% of total CEO compensation as a benefit 
dependant on firm performance has nearly a 40% chance of an accounting restatement in a 
subsequent 10-year period (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Furthermore, this type of misconduct, 
once discovered, has a dramatically negative impact on subsequent firm performance 
(Harris, 2007). Financial misrepresentation leads to diminished financial performance, and 
this detrimental performance impact is observable not only in the typical short-term stock 
price fluctuation that analysts expect, but also in the ongoing and long-term impaired 
operational profitability of the organisation. 
 
A primary theoretical critique is that an agency-based view of compensation generally 
embodies an under socialised view, accepting actors as self-interested and largely immune 
to social relations; a critique often laid at the feet of economic theories (Kahneman, 2003; 
Camerer & Malmendier, 2007). According to a predominantly psychological critique, the view 
taken by agency ignores the social structures, such as the workplace, within which 
behaviour takes place, disregarding the influence of variables other than economic 
incentives and information asymmetries on behaviour in organisations (Lubatkin, 2005). 
Agency theory considers only the relationship between the principal (who pays) and the 
agent (who receives) and does not consider the other effects present when these agency 
decisions are made. These effects may include the inequality which arises as a result of 
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agency relationships, the justice effects present where it becomes apparent that one agency 
relationship may be perceived as unfair to those who are able to observe that relationship 
(but may not be directly involved), or the effects where the outcomes related to agency 
relationships are not met, but the reward is still received (Camerer & Malmendier, 2007). 
While agency theory is fundamental to the increase in incidences of bonus pay, the agency 
model often fails to explain sufficiently the pay structures evident in some organizations 
(Garen, 1994; Conyon, 2006). An example often cited by critics involves executive pay (e.g. 
Devers et al., 2007). Selected researchers have pointed to a breakdown in agency theory 
when executive pay is concerned, as boards with dispersed membership cannot bargain 
effectively and executives wield substantial influence over their pay arrangements, often with 
a view to decouple pay from performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Total compensation for 
executives has risen steadily during the past three decades (Mishel et al., 2007) while wages 
in general have stagnated (Dash, 2006; Miller, 2006; Swanson & Orlitzky, 2006). In one 
decade alone in the US (1990 to 2000) CEO pay rose from 100 times that of the ‘rank and 
file’ workers to somewhere between 350 and 570 times (Harris, 2009). This rise was mainly 
due to the use of bonus schemes and stock options available only to executives (Hall & 
Murphy, 2003; Rynes & Gerhart, 2000). By considering the evidence as to whether pay has 
a direct effect on performance in more detail this thesis will be able to determine whether 
agency relationships have the intended effects, or whether other mediating effects are 
present which lead to a breakdown in the agency relationship. 
 
2.2. Financial incentives and Outcomes 
 
If the underlying tenets of agency theory are to be followed, the literature should coalesce 
around a common view that financial incentives have a positive relationship with desired 
outcomes. In reality the literature is mixed, with a body of research supporting the hypothesis 
that incentive pay is positively related to positive organisational outcomes such as increased 
performance and increased incidence of organisational citizenship behaviours, and a body of 
research considering the counterproductive behaviours associated with incentive pay. 
Linking financial reward to performance is designed to reduce agency problems in the 
absence of information. This aligns the interests of shareholders and management, 
eliminating the problem of moral hazard and increasing organisational performance in favour 
of their joint interests. There are clear pieces of research which support this theoretical 
model; that paying for outcomes is one of the most effective tools in improving productivity in 
organisations. In research comparing the performance effects of three forms of incentive 
(money, social recognition and feedback), Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) found that money 
had the strongest positive effect on performance, followed by social recognition and 
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feedback. The authors note, however, that situational factors may be important in this study 
as it was conducted in the manufacturing industry in an organisation with low wages where 
money may have a high instrumental value. In a related meta-analysis investigating 
incentives and performance (Condly, Clark, & Stolovitch, 2003), the effect of three distinct 
incentive types on performance improvement was researched (financial, non-financial such 
as restaurant coupons, and intangible incentives such as recognition and public praise). The 
authors found that performance gains from financial incentives were more than double those 
from non-financial or intangible incentives, though non-financial incentives were difficult to 
categorise in terms of benefit as they include gifts such as meals and holidays; items whose 
benefit is difficult to evaluate fully and may have different instrumental value to different 
recipients.  
 
Performance related pay improves performance, at times dramatically, when job outputs are 
readily observable, however when jobs contain task complexity or involve outcomes that are 
difficult to assess (which some argue now describes the core of jobs; Fast-Berglund et al., 
2013), performance related pay may harm performance in both the short and long term 
(Condly et al., 2003). Similar research has attempted to define performance in more granular 
terms, and has investigated the impact on both subjective quality of work and quantity of 
work in relation to financial incentives (Mason & Watts, 2009). Interestingly, quantity of work 
increases with financial incentives but not quality. The authors propose that this is due to an 
anchoring effect, whereby workers who are paid more also perceived the value of their work 
to be greater, and thus are no more motivated than workers paid less. The performance 
outcomes considered in current pay research will be considered later in this chapter as the 
thesis begins to isolate outcomes for inclusion in the research investigations. Condly et al. 
(2003) also found a significant learning curve effect on performance for the introduction of 
monetary incentives in the workplace. Short term incentives (under a month in duration) 
were associated with gains averaging 20%, whereas beyond six months gains averaged at 
over 40%, demonstrating that it may take time for the impact of incentives to be accepted 
into the group culture, or as highlighted in a wide-ranging review into performance related 
pay in the public sector, this may be the time required for gaming behaviours to be learned 
and adopted by agents within the system (Hasnain, Manning, & Pierskalla, 2012). 
 
The majority of economists and managers believe that performance related bonuses help to 
increase worker effort (Engellandt & Riphahn, 2004). This viewpoint is largely supported by 
research using aggregate panel data and industry production functions. Such studies have 
identified a modest positive correlation between productivity gains and the use of 
performance related bonus payments in samples within Chinese industry (Groves et al., 
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1994), Japanese industry (Jones & Kato, 1995), and in the panel data of a Swiss-based 
multinational company (Engellandt & Riphahn, 2004). There is broad evidence in economics 
research which supports the basic premise that financial incentives work in workplace 
contexts when it comes to directing effort towards outcomes (e.g. Gibbons, 1998; 
Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Pokorny, 2008). Individual bonuses increase job 
performance in part because employees see their time and effort being rewarded 
(Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999). Considering all pay for performance methods, 
from piece rates to profit sharing to bonuses, individual-based incentive schemes can lead to 
improved employee outcomes (Parent, 1999; Green & Haywood, 2008). They can provide 
employees with important feedback on their performance and productivity, which in turn can 
lead to increased motivation and positive behavioural effects (Gibbs et al., 2004; Hackman & 
Oldham, 1976). Research by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004) and Kahn and Sherer (1990) 
found a productivity enhancing effect of bonus payments, though in both of these studies 
performance is contingent on other factors such as variability of performance ratings over 
time and a high degree of competition in the internal labour market. Using US data, 
Heywood and Wei (2006) also support the finding that all types of performance related pay 
(bar piece-rates) yield greater job satisfaction relative to salary as a form of pay. A potential 
deficiency of the study conducted by Heywood and Wei (2006) is that they only focus on the 
discrete difference in job satisfaction between workers receiving performance-related pay 
and those on alternative schemes. Thus, treating this performance pay as a binary concept, 
they ignore the fact that worker performance and satisfaction may vary according to the 
magnitude of incentives.  
 
Other research into incentives has demonstrated a complex relationship between 
performance and pay, adding depth to the binary view taken by Heywood and Wei (2006). 
This research suggests that it is not simply a case that performance related pay improves 
performance, but that the amount of pay plays a critical role. As suggested by a series of 
field experiments performed by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000, p. 802), ‘for all positive but 
small enough compensations, there is a reduction in performance as compared with the zero 
compensation, or, better, with the lack of any mention of compensation’. Nevertheless, the 
authors found that once levels of compensation are large enough pay is related to better 
performance than in the ‘no incentive’ case (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). This non-linear 
relationship is seen in the results of numerous pieces of pay for performance research and is 
often summarised as a ‘non-monotonic relationship’ which suggests that as pay increases, 
effort or performance sometimes increases and sometimes decreases. This non-linear 
relationship between worker effort and both positive and negative incentives (e.g. bonuses 
or fines, respectively) has subsequently been termed the “W effect” of incentives (Gneezy, 
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2004). This “W effect”, however, has yet to be fully supported by other researchers, though 
they also find a complex and non-linear relationship between pay and forms of performance. 
Pokorny (2008), for example, finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between effort levels 
and incentive intensity. This finding has garnered some support, primarily due to the nature 
of the ‘tipping point’ this appears to represent between increasing effort levels in line with 
incentive intensity, followed by a reduction in effort as incentive intensity continues to rise. 
This supports a complex and nuanced view of the relationship between outcomes and 
incentives which requires further investigation, and suggests that the relationship between 
incentives and outcomes, rather than being linear, are more complex in nature (though the 
actual shape of relationship differs in the current research). 
 
One of the weaknesses of both the Gneezy (2004) and Pokorny (2008) research is that both 
studies involve an experimental approach using student respondents in a laboratory 
environment, and so the findings may have limited ability to be generalised in broader cases. 
Their findings showing a non-linear, complex relationship are, however, supported in other 
studies using broad data sets to interrogate organisational outcomes and attitudes. Using job 
satisfaction as a proxy for performance, Pouliakas (2010) considered 10 waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) over 10 years and found that after controlling for individual 
fixed effects (such as ability or motivation) which may introduce bias into payment schemes, 
job satisfaction is only found to rise in response to ‘large’ bonus payments. The authors also 
conclude that revoking a bonus from one year to the next is likely to have a detrimental 
effect on performance, and that over time job satisfaction tends to diminish as employees 
potentially adapt to the payment of bonuses using anchoring mechanisms. The author 
suggests that “generous” rewards are more likely to foster positive attitudes towards work 
among male employees who work in skilled occupations within the non-unionized private 
sector of the economy. Another example of the non-linear motivation effect of incentives can 
be found in the field study of Marsden et al. (2001), who highlights that although a large 
number of workers in their sample experienced a deterioration of workplace relations and 
cooperation following the introduction of bonus pay, this form of performance related pay 
motivated those who received above average payments.  
 
Whilst some research has shown bonus pay to have a positive effect on job satisfaction and 
performance (e.g. Lazear, 2000; Paarsch & Shearer, 2000), others have posited that 
bonuses erode workplace cohesion and can be detrimental to performance and satisfaction. 
In UK-based research, findings demonstrate that the effect of bonus payments on 
performance is more complicated than simply saying it has beneficial or non-significant 
effects. Green and Heywood (2008) and Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009) use the British 
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Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to investigate the impact of performance-related bonuses 
on a set of facets of job satisfaction. They show that although bonuses and profit-sharing 
schemes result in higher mean job satisfaction, the effect of individual-specific performance 
related bonuses diminishes once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. The 
authors suggest that individual differences such as ability, levels of ambition, education and 
motivation may raise an individuals’ expectation of what they are likely to receive from their 
jobs, thus depressing their experienced satisfaction. They also suggest that other differences 
such as equity sensitivity and perceptions of injustice may combine with unobserved aspects 
of the pay system (such as links with performance management process or balances with 
other aspects of reward policies) to explain differences in satisfaction. Equity sensitivity 
proposes that individuals have different preferences for equity and thus react in different 
ways to perceived equity and inequality (Allen & White, 2002). The thesis will discuss how 
equity theory and justice theories relate in a later section.  
 
Other researchers have similarly suggested that perceptions of injustice due to bonus pay 
are a factor in reducing job satisfaction and performance as they serve to erode workplace 
cohesion (e.g. Gabor, 1990; Gagne & Forest, 2008). Individual bonus pay is proposed to be 
a major source of justice evaluations (Jasso, 2006). It may be therefore that justice plays a 
mediating role in the relationship between bonus amount and satisfaction, as described in 
later hypotheses in this thesis. This is certainly an area worthy of further investigation and is 
underserved in the current literature. As equity theory suggests, the impact of a bonus award 
is likely to depend not only on the appraisal of the amount received, but also on the extent to 
which the pay distribution is judged to be fair or equitable (Bloom, 1999; Grant, Christianson, 
& Price, 2007). This effect may also go some way to explain the non-linearity in the 
relationship between pay level and satisfaction proposed by previous research. Despite pay 
rising, this does not necessarily mean that satisfaction rises in tandem, especially if the 
recipient perceives the pay of others rising in inequitable proportion. This may potentially 
lead to the inverse U-shaped relationship found in the research by Pokorny (2008) or the W -
shaped relationship found by Gneezy (2004). If bonus awards are considered equitable to a 
point, and inequitable after this point, with the change in direction indicating the point where 
this change of appraisal occurs from ‘equitable’ to ‘inequitable’ then this could lead to a more 
complex relationship between amount of bonus and satisfaction with the bonus.  
 
There are a number of potential reasons this change in appraisal may occur, for example at 
certain pay levels different social comparison referents may be used to determine equity 
appraisals therefore leading to different satisfaction appraisals (Bordia & Blau, 1998). 
Similarly, as bonus pay increases this may lead to different appraisals in inequality of pay 
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(with pay increasing to a level where inequality becomes a concern), which in itself may 
cause rapid changes in satisfaction appraisals (for example when pay falls above or below 
the median for the peer group; Card et al., 2012). One problem with bonuses seems to be 
the informational effect of bonus pay on the organisation. Other than to motivate effort, 
bonus pay provides employees with important information related to the social system. 
Bonus systems often tell people what is valued, expected and important in the particular 
setting (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Pfeffer, 1997). They also offer a person a view of an 
individual’s position in the social hierarchy in relation to their peers, influencing processes of 
self-appraisal and perceptions of self-worth (Garnder, Van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004). If one of 
these informational effects is to inform an individual of their relationship within the social 
hierarchy of an organisation (or their position and worth relative to others), then it may not be 
the absolute amount of bonus received but the amount relative to salient others which 
matters in determining satisfaction. These appraisals may provide a potential explanation for 
discontinuities in the relationship between pay amount and satisfaction which determine the 
non-linearity of the relationship found in previous research. Social comparison and justice 
relationships will be considered in more detail later in the thesis as the research seeks to 
explain associations between bonus pay, justice and outcomes. Researchers have also 
suggested deeper physiological reasons why increasing bonus pay may be associated with 
changes in attitude, with increased bonuses linked to decreased cognitive control and 
attentional focus (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012). For now, the thesis 
considers research which provides evidence against paying for performance. There are a 
number of investigations which find at best no relationship between bonus pay and 
outcomes, and in some cases an increase in counterproductive work behaviours with an 
increase in pay. 
 
2.3. Findings questioning reward-performance links 
 
The effectiveness of paying a bonus as an outcome-based reward is accepted often without 
consideration of whether or not it works in practice (Garen, 1994). While the summary of the 
research supporting performance-based pay has shown that outcomes are often non-linear 
and can be complex depending on both outcome (for example quantity versus quality), the 
payment method (for example piece rates versus group bonuses) or the payment amount 
(with too little bonus acting as a disincentive), evidence exists that bonuses can have a 
negligible and sometimes detrimental impact on performance. Some researchers have, in 
fact, had difficulty demonstrating any positive link between incentive pay and improved 
organizational performance (Mishra et al., 2000; Murphy, 1999). More recently, researchers 
have argued that incentive pay in the form of bonuses may be counterproductive, and that 
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they actually decrease performance (Blasi, Kruse, & Bernstein, 2003; Yermack, 2006). 
Given the increasing incidence of bonus pay as a form of incentive, with the introduction of 
the payment system in sectors as diverse as healthcare (Cromwell et al., 2011) and 
education (Goodman & Turner, 2013), the relationships between performance and financial 
incentives are surely well established in extant academic research? In fact, research 
remains somewhat contradictory. In healthcare, for example, results linking bonus payments 
to care quality outcomes are at best mixed, with some researchers finding ‘little rigorous 
evidence’ of the success of performance related bonus schemes in improving care quality 
(Scott et al., 2011, p. 1). Other healthcare commentators identify performance related 
bonuses to administrators as a key driver in the falsification of records and data, 
incentivising fraud rather than care performance (Nocera, 2010). Similarly in education, 
where in school districts such as New York in the US the introduction of performance related 
bonuses to teachers has had little effect on specifically targeted outcomes such as student 
achievement (Goodman & Turner, 2013). This finding has been repeated in other academic 
literature focussing on teacher performance incentives, where evidence suggests there is no 
evidence for improvements in academic performance following the payment of a bonus 
(Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Fryer, 2011).  
 
Although classical economics research considering broad data sets sometimes reveals a 
positive relationship between bonus pay and performance, much of this literature fails to 
control for a number of highly plausible alternative interpretations of the results such as 
relationships between bonus pay policies and other organisational policies and practices 
which effect performance (Mattson, Torbiorn, & Hellgren, 2014). In contrast, psychological 
research (which relies more on individual-level employee data rather than aggregated panel 
data) often reveals a negative relationship between bonus pay and positive mediating and 
outcome variables. Taylor and Pierce (1999) in cross-sectional research found that an 
outcomes-based bonus had a negative effect on staff members’ organisational commitment 
and perceived organisational support, particularly among high-performing employees. The 
authors report that the bonus system and its administration result in a perception of 
unfairness and had a demoralising effect, a finding supported in other psychological studies 
(e.g. Marsden & Richardson, 1994). Other researchers have demonstrated that the 
allocation system is important in providing financial incentives for performance. The 
procedure used for distributing incentives has a significant association with levels of 
performance attained, demonstrating that procedural fairness perceptions may play a 
noticeable part in moderating the bonus-performance relationship (Mason & Watts, 2009). 
Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) investigated two distinct incentive allocation systems, one 
which was a routine pay for performance model, and one which apportioned incentives 
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systematically based on an organisational behaviour modification (OBM) approach. The 
OBM model outperformed routine pay for performance more than three-fold (37% 
improvement against 11% improvement). Procedural justice is, as the thesis will discuss in 
later sections, a key part of the theoretical underpinnings of organisational justice, and so 
this finding is perhaps not surprising, and is supported by many justice theorists who point to 
reward distribution processes and systems being as important or more important than the 
amounts distributed in directing behaviour and outcomes (e.g. Colquitt, 2001; Tremblay et 
al., 2000). 
 
There is a range of research which supports the hypotheses that providing financial 
incentives to direct behaviour sometimes has a perverse effect, reducing the effort provided 
by employees and adversely influencing workplace behaviour (e.g. Mason & Watts, 2009). 
Evidence supports the idea that bonus systems often only reward observable goals, 
neglecting those which are more creative and constructive in the long run (Kerr, 1975) and 
that individually based rewards can reduce the incentive to cooperate (Lazear, 1989) and 
tend to create internal organisational conflict (Gabor, 1990). Rewarding individual employees 
with a bonus can produce negative outcomes by eroding workplace cohesion (Drago & 
Turnbull, 1988) as employees become reluctant to share information with others even at the 
expense of reduced output and diminished quality of work (Lazear, 1989). When bonus pay 
is used relative comparisons at the individual level create competition which results in 
decreased trust, sharing and teamwork (Bloom, 1999; Gardner, 1999; Grant et al., 2007). 
Researchers have demonstrated, for example, that tournament-based compensation based 
on bonus pay can lead to decreased helping behaviour and increase the potential for 
sabotaging other workers (Drago & Turnbull, 1988). In addition, there are now a number of 
experimental studies indicating that financial incentives may be counterproductive by acting 
as a signal of employer distrust (e.g. Falk & Kosfeld, 2006) by undermining reciprocity-based 
voluntary cooperation (e.g. Fehr & Gachter, 1998), or by acting as a visible indicator of 
injustice or inequity in the workplace (Tremblay et al., 2000). Several reviews indicate that 
bonuses could be particularly detrimental to outcomes when the task is intrinsically 
interesting enough and when the task is complex enough that flexible thinking is needed 
(Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2009; Gagné & Forest, 2008; McGraw, 1978). These findings 
extend to a significant body of work in psychology which demonstrates how explicit financial 
incentives can be associated with decreased motivation and reduced task performance, 
widely referred to as the cognitive evaluation or ‘motivation crowding’ hypothesis (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985; Frey & Jegen, 2001). According to this theory, once it is acknowledged that 
individuals derive a measure of intrinsic satisfaction from a task or activity, explicit rewards 
that are perceived as controlling devices or as indicators that the employment relationship is 
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a market exchange are likely to diminish job satisfaction and performance (Kreps, 1997, p. 
363). Using financial incentives has been shown to result in reduced effort in a number of 
settings including when collecting donations for charity (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000), when 
donating blood (Titmuss, 1970) and when paying taxes (Frey, 1997). 
 
One of the mechanisms by which bonus pay is thought to improve performance is generally 
thought to be through an enhancement of cognitive goals (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). 
Being motivated implies directing behaviour towards a goal, and bonus pay is thought to 
enhance a person’s ability to direct their behaviour to accomplish these cognitive goals 
(Aarts et al., 2014). In support of this theory, many researchers have shown that goal-
directed motivation improves a wide range of cognitive-control functions (Jimura, Locke, & 
Braver, 2010; Krawczyk, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). A 
number of researchers have, however, found results inconsistent with these positive 
cognitive-control enhancing effects of rewards, with some research suggesting a negative 
effect of bonus pay on cognitive functions such as attentional focus (e.g. Braem, Verguts, 
Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Sasaki, Nanez, & Watanabe, 
2010). It has been proposed that individual differences in levels of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine may play an important role in the effects of motivation on cognitive control (Mobbs 
et al., 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Steenbergen et al., 2009). Dopamine has long 
been known to play an important role in reward and motivation (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; 
Robbins & Everitt, 1992). More recent research has supported this proposition. Aarts et al. 
(2014) studied the effects of bonus payments on cognitive control within a range of subjects 
with varying capacity for dopamine synthesis. The authors found that in people with a high 
baseline capacity for dopamine synthesis, a promised bonus might overdose the 
dopaminergic system, thereby impairing rather than improving cognitive control (Aart et al., 
2010). In contrast, increased dopamine processing caused by anticipated reward would lead 
to more optimal cognitive control in people with low baseline dopamine levels, in accordance 
with the inverted-U shape of the function relating cognitive control to dopamine level (Cools 
& D’Esposito, 2011).  
 
Whilst cognitive control and dopamine synthesis are not a focus of this thesis, it is important 
to consider as it may provide an alternative explanation of the relationship between bonus 
pay and satisfaction. Research in other satisfaction domains, for example body satisfaction 
(Webster & Tiggerman, 2003) and life satisfaction (Ash & Huebner, 2001) have suggested 
that cognitive control is strongly related to satisfaction. Interestingly, this inverted-U shaped 
function relating cognitive control to dopamine level is also found in research by Pokorny 
(2008) considering the amount issued as a financial incentive and performance. This may be 
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one of the reasons the literature provides recurrent examples where bonus pay is suggested 
to improve performance only up to a point, when other factors come into effect which serve 
to reduce the effectiveness of bonus pay. In the majority of cases in the literature (e.g. 
Gneezy, 2004; Pouliakas, 2010; Pokorny, 2008) the literate demonstrates a non-linear 
relationship between performance and pay, and typically a relationship which is non-
monotonic. There are theoretical reasons for this, as there are factors which are theorised to 
mediate the pay-performance relationship. The non-linearity is proposed at least in part to be 
due to relative social comparisons and justice effects (Bloom, 1999; Grant et al., 2007). 
These effects are within the scope of this thesis. Research considering the dynamics 
between pay and pay satisfaction has shown both direct and mediated relationships 
between the constructs, with suggestions that justice at least partially mediates the 
relationship between pay and pay satisfaction, a relationship addressed in later hypotheses. 
For this research, though the exact relationship between bonus pay and bonus satisfaction 
cannot be predicted and varies in the literature, this thesis can hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction. 
 
The findings in previous research would suggest an expectation that the null hypothesis is 
supported. This means that as bonus pay increases, a linear increase in bonus satisfaction 
is not expected, but rather a more complex relationship where bonus pay may rise yet 
satisfaction may fall. While this thesis has identified potential reasons for this (including the 
effects of social comparison and justice) which fall within the scope, it is important first to 
provide an overarching hypothesis related to the nature of the pay for performance 
relationship. The thesis will discuss the evidence related to potential mediating constructs in 
later sections, including inequality, inequity, social comparison and organisational justice 
which have been demonstrated to mediate pay for performance (and pay for satisfaction) 
relationships in existing research (Grant et al., 2007). First it provides a summary of the pay 
for performance literature considered in the preceding sections. 
 
2.4. Pay for Performance Summary 
 
There are still disagreements regarding the real relationship between bonus pay, motivation 
and performance (Pfeffer, 1997). While research has found indications of increased 
motivation and improved performance associated with bonus pay under some conditions 
(e.g. Engellandt & Riphahn, 2011; Kahn & Sherer, 1990), there is also research showing no 
or even negative relationships between bonus pay and both individual and organisational 
outcomes. On one hand, bonuses have been found to have a positive relationship with work 
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outcomes including increased productivity, effort, performance, and job satisfaction (e.g. 
John & Weitz, 1989; Lazear, 2000; Parent, 1999; Paarsch & Shearer, 2000). On the other 
hand, researchers have found that individual incentives such as bonuses are often 
surprisingly ineffective in increasing employee morale and productivity (Ariely, Gneezy, 
Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009), may instead incentivise negative work behaviours or harm 
outcomes and can act as a signal to an employee of how they are viewed by the 
organisation, rather than directing behaviour (Bloom, 1999; Gardner, 1999; Grant et al., 
2007). Given the ambiguous empirical evidence of the effects of bonuses, organisations 
making use of these kinds of remuneration systems take an imminent risk of obtaining 
unintended effects. One problem with bonuses seems to be the informational effect of bonus 
pay on the organisation. It appears from existing literature that while bonus pay is designed 
to motivate employees, it can also act as a trigger for social comparison and lead to 
appraisals of inequity, inequality or injustice. Given these other roles bonus systems play in 
organisational life, it is important to consider these relationships. If one of these informational 
effects of bonus pay is to inform an individual of their relationship within the social hierarchy 
of an organisation, or their position and worth relative to others, this thesis must begin to 
consider the evidence related to pay dispersion, inequality, inequity and performance. In 
these situations, the evidence suggests that it may not be the absolute amount of bonus 
received but the amount relative to salient others (and hence the distribution and dispersion 
of pay) which better explains outcomes. In the following sections this thesis therefore begins 
to consider this evidence.  
 
2.5. Pay dispersion and Outcomes 
 
As the research into pay and outcomes matures distinct avenues of research begin to open. 
One of the clearest avenues is the investigation of pay dispersion and outcomes. This 
avenue seeks to understand pay disparity and the differences in pay in organisational 
groups, and how this drives organisational dynamics. This has gained prominence in the 
national focus in recent years, with mandated action introduced to organisations in the UK to 
better understand pay dispersion in specific groups (for example the Gender Pay Gap; Blau 
& Kahn, 2007). Pay dispersion and performance offers an interesting lens providing insight 
into inter-organisational reference points and social comparison processes. Researchers 
have suggested a distinction between informational and incentive effects related to bonus 
pay, and potential interactions between the two effects (Pfeffer, 1997; Pokorny, 2008). 
Considering pay dispersion may help to explain these effects, as it is proposed that this 
particular avenue of research demonstrates why pay for performance is sometimes effective 
(when pay dispersion is warranted and acceptable), and why it sometimes produces 
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counterproductive outcomes (when pay dispersion leads to perceived undeserved inequality 
which directs behaviour away from outcomes). Research generally supports the idea that for 
workers with a degree of job complexity more wage dispersion is associated with improved 
performance, but only up to a point. After this the relationship changes direction and more 
dispersion is associated with lower performance, indicating an optimal level above which 
organisational factors such as perceived fairness may outweigh economic factors such as 
level of individual pay (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller, 1999). The findings are consistent with 
the hypothesis that too little inequality is harmful for productivity due to a lack of incentives, 
but there exists a justice or fairness constraint which leads to inefficient outcomes when 
inequality becomes too large. Similar to the evidence for positive relationships between 
bonus pay and performance there is contrasting evidence in the literature, as this thesis will 
discover.  
 
The relationship between pay dispersion and outcomes appears to be at least partially 
dependent on organisational conditions and the type of work employees are engaged in. In 
highly independent jobs pay dispersion which results from bonus pay can have positive 
influences on performance (e.g. Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 
2009). In these jobs internal comparison can be difficult, with equity monitoring rules such as 
an understanding of differential inputs difficult to apply. In areas where closer working 
relationships exist, and where inputs can be readily assessed, the evidence points to some 
contrary findings. In jobs where teamwork is required, when there is a visible difference in 
performance related inputs between team members Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart (2012) argue 
that pay inequality does not lead to pay inequity in certain conditions. For example, if the 
variance in skill between individuals or the amount of effort provided is transparent then 
inequality will not be perceived as inequity or lead to a breach of fairness rules. Other 
research supports this assertion and highlights a mechanism by which pay for performance 
reveals underlying changes in returns due to skill differences (for instance where 
technological change rewards those who are able to best adapt), which in turn leads to more 
wage inequality (Lemieux, MacLeod, & Parent, 2009). These researchers have typically 
approached dispersion through the lens of equity theory, explaining that inequality of pay 
and inequity are not the same construct, and that inequality only has an effect on 
performance when the proportionality to performance relevant inputs cannot be assessed 






Research in technology and construction industries shows that where high pay disparities 
exist within groups, even when inputs are readily observable, collaboration is diminished 
(Siegel & Hambrick, 2005; Grund & Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008). This can have especially 
serious impacts in modern technology-driven industries as there is a considerable 
requirement for teams to coordinate and collaborate across divisions or functions (Grund & 
Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008). Many researchers have found that in an interdependent setting 
pay dispersion is detrimental to aggregate performance (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; 
Harrison & Klein, 2007; Kepes et al., 2009), though contrary to the assertions of Trevor et al. 
(2012), these authors find that pay dispersion is detrimental to performance even if the 
dispersion is clearly tied to inputs. These authors suggest that this is because pay dispersion 
is sometimes associated with increased competition and dysfunctional team dynamics. 
Though this competition can sometimes improve individual performance it can also harm 
effectiveness when group performance is considered.  
 
Economics research into wage inequality across organizations in the United Kingdom, 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Germany has shown relatively little support for the 
idea that wage inequality contributes to poor performance directly (Braakmann, 2008). As 
with research considering pay and performance (e.g. Pokorny, 2008) and cognitive control 
and performance (Aarts et al., 2014), Braakman found a more complex relationship, 
suggesting an inverse-U-shaped relationship between wage inequality and performance. 
This suggests that inequality is associated with an increase in performance up to a point, but 
too much inequality can be associated with a decrease in performance. In Braakmann’s 
work, the author explicitly suggests fairness as a mediating variable contributing to this 
relationship, with fairness concerns over-riding incentive effects at the apex of the suggested 
relationship. This thesis will discuss the fairness literature in more detail in section 2.7. This 
may indicate that fairness appraisals are not only be governed by equity rules alone, where 
inputs and outputs are monitored, but may involve a more complex relationship involving 
subjective preferences amongst employees and other factors such as allocation rules and 
organisational processes used to distribute rewards which lead to inequality (Kepes et al., 
2009). The majority of pay systems have idiosyncrasies which mean that they use subjective 
judgement and bias as well as objective performance data when allocating rewards (Kepes 
at al., 2009). This again brings into focus procedural elements of justice, and allocation rules 






The negative relationship between pay inequality and performance has been replicated in 
various industries and activities. Studies in the United States involving baseball teams 
(Bloom, 1999) have shown that dispersion in pay (rather than amount of pay) has significant 
negative impacts across outcome measures for both individual players and the organisations 
they play for. Player performance was negatively related to more hierarchical pay dispersion, 
as were all measures of organisational performance (for example league position, turnover, 
profit). The authors also found that a player’s position in the pay distribution moderated the 
pay dispersion-individual performance relationship, perhaps lending support for theories 
which suggest the importance of pay in indicating organisational social exchange 
relationships and the position of individuals in the social hierarchy (Pfeffer, 1997). 
Researchers have found evidence in the construction industry that pay level can 
communicate an individual’s value to the organisation, therefore influencing performance via 
the psychological processes of self-evaluation (Gardner, Van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004). The 
authors found that within their sample although there was no statistically significant 
relationship between change in pay and performance, pay level was significantly related to 
both organisation-based self-esteem and performance. The research demonstrates that 
employees who receive higher amounts of pay feel more highly valued by the organisation. 
Those who feel highly valued are in turn rated as higher performers.  
 
Another possible mechanism Gardner, Van Dyne, and Pierce (2004) suggest as a cause for 
the relationship between pay level and performance is that of perceptions of organisational 
justice. If participants perceived high pay levels as being fair and low pay levels as being 
unfair, this could produce the positive effects of pay level on performance, via justice 
perceptions. Though these two mechanisms (self-evaluation and justice) have been 
considered for pay level, there is a need to investigate them for other forms of pay such as 
bonus pay. This research is a good example of findings which are unable to clearly explain 
reasons behind the pay level-performance relationship, and so suggest multiple potential 
causes. It may, for example, be the case that fairness is not triggered by the amount in pay 
an individual receives relative to others (as suggested by Braakmann, 2008), but by the 
subsequent understanding of their status position in the social hierarchy which pay offers an 
individual, and which in turn leads to a negative self-evaluation and subsequently reduced 
satisfaction and performance (Gardner, Van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004). 
 
As the research suggests, the relationship between pay dispersion and organisational 
performance is a complex one and has yet to reach any level of consensus. Some research 
suggests that there is no uniform relationship between wage dispersion and performance as 
it is dependent on the specific circumstances that a company faces (Jirjahn & Kraft, 2007). 
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There are a wide variety of moderating variables which must be taken into account, including 
the industrial relations regime, the incentive scheme used, whether other incentives are used 
instead of money (for example promotions in lieu of money where rank-order tournament 
theory is used within companies), and organisational values and norms. Jirjahn and Kraft 
(2007) do, however, support the findings in general pay and performance research that pay 
dispersion is associated with positive productivity effects where work is clearly 
programmable (or where there is little room for gaming the system), where social 
comparison processes are difficult, or where there is greater mutual monitoring and 
inequality is not seen as inequity for those ‘deserving’ of increased pay due to differences in 
effort or skill (Lallemand, Plasman, & Rycx, 2004). Other researchers suggest that this offers 
an incomplete view of pay inequality focussed too strongly on outcomes over processes, 
norms and values. In situations where piece-rates are paid for non-complex activities the 
inputs and outputs of others could be monitored reasonably easily. In more complex 
situations organisations must enact different processes and policies for rewarding different 
populations of the workforce. Frey, Benz, and Stutzer (2004) emphasize that workers are 
often not only concerned with the outcomes of performance related pay, but also with the 
ways these outcomes are determined. Their research suggests that team members may 
accept unequal wages if the process of determining pay accords with procedural fairness 
norms. Differential rewards based on skills and ability, or alternatively based on seniority and 
length of service may accord with such norms in certain situations (Lluis, 2005). These 
situational allocation rules may mediate pay and performance relationships to a greater 
extent that simple equity rules (Mason & Watts, 2009). As it appears that fairness may be 
more complex than simply monitoring equity rules and involve the monitoring of more 
complex allocation rules, it will add value to consider this literature on fairness, equity and 
justice in more detail and begin to investigate the depth of research concerning bonus pay, 
organisational justice and outcomes. First, due to the breadth and depth of justice research, 
it will benefit the development of clear hypotheses to narrow the attention on specific 
organisational outcomes to consider in this research.  
 
2.6. Organisational Outcomes Considered in Existing Research 
 
In order to effectively begin to address the scope of this thesis, it will be helpful to discuss 
the nature and types of workplace outcomes available for inclusion in this research. Given 
the range of outcomes available it will help at the outset of the development of hypotheses to 
understand the previous outcomes considered in pay and justice research. In practice (as 
with most researchers) an ideal solution would be to study in-situ performance as a result of 
bonus pay. This is, however, practically difficult. While bonus pay is relatively straightforward 
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to capture, outcomes are more difficult to identify and assess. Both task performance and 
cognitive performance have been studied in-situ in workplace settings (e.g. Cote & Miners, 
2006) but this type of research has generally used supervisor ratings of both cognitive and 
task performance which in other research have been shown to be open to bias and error 
(Stauffer & Buckley, 2005). In some organisational contexts task performance is measured 
directly (such as piecework situations or other repeatable process-driven work), however 
these tend to be situations where outcomes are programmable or where clear and 
consistent performance indicators are in place (Boyce, 2011). Other outcomes considered 
by justice researchers include organisational citizenship behaviours, counterproductive work 
behaviours, turnover intentions and differing types of performance (cognitive, task and 
general). Which outcome-based variables to include in this research will need to be carefully 
examined. 
 
In some places the pay for performance literature considered thus far uses organisational 
outcomes, performance, performance improvement, effort, productivity, turnover (or turnover 
intention), behaviour (in terms of organisational citizenship behaviour, counterproductive 
work behaviour and behaviour in itself), quality, satisfaction and specific malpractice such as 
fraud and falsifications of records as outcomes of research which are theoretically relevant. 
Many of these outcome variables can be discounted as areas of focus by simply considering 
the nature of the outcome, its frequency of occurrence, ease of identification and 
consistency as an outcome across organisations. An outcome is also sought which is 
relevant to a wide range of individuals to test the interpersonal and intrapersonal effects. In 
this way outcomes such as fraud, falsification of records and various counterproductive work 
behaviours can be discounted. Similarly, any research should retain construct validity 
overall, and so outcomes considered should have been demonstrated to have relationships 
in extant literature with the majority of the areas under investigation. In terms of these 
parameters, only a few outcomes and measures are theoretically consistent and empirically 
supported. In the initial positioning of bonus pay, three main reasons were provided for using 
this type of incentive; performance (or directing effort and attention towards goals), retaining 
employees (and so influencing the decision to leave), or to differentially reward skill or 
superior ability (which may in themselves be independent of performance consistent with 
talent arguments). Performance (as demonstrated in the literature related to pay for 
performance) is difficult to standardise and comes in many different measures, retention (or 
its mirror variable voluntary turnover) supports the suggestions of Hay (2012) that bonus is 
strongly related to intention to quit. It may be possible to assess superior ability, though there 
is little evidence in the literature for this outcome as a measure. By considering the outcome 
variables found in the literature related to these three categories this thesis can therefore 
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provide some justification for choosing turnover intention as a proxy outcome for inclusion in 
this research. 
 
The performance outcome variables in research consistent with bonus pay, justice, 
emotions, social exchange and social comparisons include quantity of work and subjective 
quality of work (e.g. Mason & Watts, 2009; Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002; Bandura, 1986; 
Schelling, 2006), effort or effort levels (e.g. Engellandt & Riphahn, 2004; Mason & Watts, 
2009; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), and value delivered to the 
organisation (e.g. Lallemand, Plasman, & Rycx, 2004; Van Reenen, 1996; Gardner, Van 
Dyne, & Pierce, 2004), often also referred to as productivity. While turnover is not well 
researched in terms of the actual number of people leaving the organisation, turnover 
intentions are regularly included as a proxy outcome throughout current research (e.g. 
Grandey et al., 2002; Loi, Hang‐Yue, & Foley, 2006; Colquitt et al., 2013; Harr & Spell, 2009; 
Sturman & Short, 2000; Tett & Meyer, 1993). Whilst there are inconsistencies in the 
measurement of performance (and the type of performance) across the existing literature, 
and little evidence linking bonus pay to superior ability in the workplace, the research 
incorporating turnover intention is therefore relatively broad. Turnover intention is 
theoretically relevant as keeping employees is one of the critical reasons bonus pay has 
become more popular as a remuneration strategy in recent years (Hay, 2012). As a 
construct it can be incorporated into research methods relatively easily, and measurement is 
not invasive in terms of impact in a workplace setting (and therefore may provide benefit 
when recruiting participants). There are, however, some clear drawbacks to using turnover 
intention. Whilst it is easier to conduct situational research using a composite measure this 
can introduce common method bias. There is also a nuanced view in the literature relating to 
turnover intention as to whether it is an accurate predictor of turnover behaviour (or voluntary 
turnover). Some researchers have shown that there is a strong association between 
intention and actual turnover (e.g. Parasuraman, 1982) however others have raised the 
more fundamental objection that turnover intention and turnover behaviour are not the same, 
and although research has suggested the constructs are correlated (and sometimes highly 
so) they are different constructs related to different organisational variables (Cho & Lewis, 
2011; Goodman et al., 2015). Goodman et al. (2015) suggest that other variables (such as 
specific management practices) may predict turnover to a greater extent than aggregated 
turnover intention, questioning the relative strength of the turnover intention relationship. 
This introduces a limitation in the research which will (with others) be discussed at the end of 




In the next section the thesis will continue to review outcomes of the pay for performance 
argument and begin to discuss the fairness, equity theory and justice literature in more 
detail. Fairness and organisational justice are at the forefront of the reasons suggested by 
authors for the non-linear relationship between pay and performance and are cited as the 
critical factor in understanding pay dispersion and performance relationships. While equity 
rules are used by some authors (e.g. Trevor et al., 2012) to understand pay dispersion, 
others appear to point to procedural fairness rules as a mediating variable between pay 
dispersion and performance (e.g. Mason & Watts, 2009; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). 
Traditional equity rules (e.g. Adams, 1965) govern inputs and outputs to a transaction, but 
not procedural elements of that transaction, or other elements such as informational and 
interpersonal elements influencing social exchange relationships. In the next section the 
thesis therefore considers the evidence behind justice in more detail, especially as ‘fairness’ 
or it’s organisational construct comparator ‘organisational justice’ is often given as a reason 
for dissatisfaction in both pay and pay dispersion situations, and a key reason why 
employees leave their jobs if the bonus is perceived to be unsatisfactory (Hay, 2012; 
Kollowe, 2015; Dale, 2009).  
 
2.7. The focus on fairness 
 
One of the major ways in which media, politics, economics and psychology converge is in 
their focus on perceptions of fairness (or justice as its organisational correlate) as a critique 
of the negative consequences of financial incentives (and specifically bonus pay) and 
performance (Ashthana, 2010; Guth & Van Damme, 1998). Research has shown that when 
making decisions people care about fairness, even when there is no personal impact, and 
that these fairness perceptions can influence attitudes and outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
One critique of agency theory is that as a theory it deals only with relations between salient 
actors and ignores the effects pay decisions have on a broader set of organisational actors. 
The incentive effects may be limited to salient actors to agency relationships (Gomez-Mejia 
& Balkin, 1992), but informational effects of bonus pay are not limited to those party to the 
transaction. Instead informational effects may be salient to members throughout the 
organisation (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller, 1999). This can be seen in situations where (as 
an example) the pay of a chief executive officer of an underperforming organisation (arrived 
at through the negotiations of an agency relationship) is published, leading to potential 
information effects and fairness perceptions across the organisation (Wade et al., 2006). In 
this way agency relationships may exist between the principal and the agent, but fairness 
judgements may be derived by members of the organisation in general, which makes 
fairness a useful construct for exploring the wider effects of bonus pay. Researchers have 
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summarised that in terms of all arguments against increased inequality of pay (and 
specifically the sizable increase in executive pay) in organisations, the mechanism with the 
most validity when comparing the various outcomes is that of organisational fairness and 
justice (Harris, 2009). Using agency theory as a dominant framework for explaining pay for 
performance relationships ignores this mechanism. 
 
Fairness is so important to people that they are often willing to pay out of their own pocket to 
punish those perceived as acting unfairly (Kahneman et al., 1986). Organisational members 
often use less overt means of punishment which manifest as adverse behaviours, increased 
resistance, or negative performance (Shaw et al., 2002; Cowherd & Levine, 1992). Research 
has shown that when lower-level managers perceive that they are underpaid relative to 
executives, they are more likely to leave the organisation (Wade et al., 2006). Significant 
relationships have been found between organisational justice and organisational 
commitment (Malmir et al., 2013; Barling & Phillips, 1993), levels of cooperation and 
effectiveness within teams (Sinclair, 2003; Moorman, 1991), withdrawal behaviours (Blakely, 
Andrews, & Moorman, 2005), intent the leave the organisation (Roberts, Coulson, & Chinko, 
1999), accident rates, safety violations, product quality and productivity (Shaw et al., 2002; 
Cowherd & Levine, 1992). Research is generally supportive of the position that as 
perceptions of fairness increase, so do the levels of organisational citizenship behaviours 
(OCBs) demonstrated in the workplace, and as perceptions of fairness decrease, incidences 
of counterproductive work behaviours rise (Blakely, Andrews, & Moorman, 2005).  
 
Research exists in both the economics and psychology literature aimed at understanding the 
differential impacts of incentive effects versus informational (and specifically relational 
fairness) effects of pay for performance systems in the workplace. There are three main 
reasons why employees care about fairness: instrumental reasons (because it helps them to 
control desired outcomes), relational reasons (it helps people to assess their standing and 
acceptance in a group), and moral reasons (because it is simply the right thing to do) (Martin 
& Bennett, 1996). There have been moves in economics and psychology to understand the 
differential impacts of incentive effects of pay versus informational (and specifically relational 
fairness) effects. Relational reasons would imply the availability of information about a 
reference ‘group’, whereas moral (and ethical) reasons for fairness may imply dispositional 
values related to fairness. This definition broadens our understanding of bonus systems as 
having incentive and information effects (Baiman & Rajan, 1995) to include moral and ethical 
effects (Martin & Bennett, 1996). This research is supported by studies which demonstrate 
that dispositional values (such as equity sensitivity) moderate the relationship between 
justice perceptions and attitudes and behaviours such as commitment and performance 
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(Organ & Ryan, 1995; Blakely et al., 2005; Pazy, Ganzech, & Davidov, 2006). These 
dispositional values can also be seen in economics games which test perceptions of fairness 
between salient actors and the decision making influenced by fairness perceptions. In 1982 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze introduced the Ultimatum Game, whereby two people 
are involved (the principle and respondent), and the principle asked to split a financial sum. 
The split can then be accepted or rejected by the respondent. In their research, more than 
30% of respondents rejected the amount, primarily due to fairness concerns and violations. 
Other research has supported this finding using the ultimatum game and various innovations 
(e.g. Lamichhane et al., 2014). The ultimatum game is often thought to be the starting point 
for all economists who wish to test the importance of nonmonetary components of utility in 
driving behaviour, a finding widely accepted to be contrary to predictions of agency theory 
(Anderson et al., 2011). Human social decision making in situations of inequity is viewed by 
some researchers as a competition between the norms of fairness and self-interest (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Pfeffer, 1997). Behaviours which reflect fairness 
norms over self-interested behaviour are hypothesised by some to reflect our values for 
social norms and inequity aversion (Fehr & Gintis, 2007).  
 
As this thesis has demonstrated in the discussion of the pay for performance literature 
earlier in this review, fairness as a construct is often operationalised in different ways in 
research. Much of the research into ‘fairness’ in the workplace is based on equity theory, 
which uses a social exchange framework to evaluate fairness (Adams, 1965). According to 
Adams, the main concern of people is not the absolute level of outcomes (for example the 
level of bonus), but whether those outcomes are fair. In equity relationships fairness is 
determined by assessing one’s level of contribution or ‘inputs’ (e.g. effort, performance) to 
one’s outcomes (e.g. bonus pay) and then by comparing that ratio with the ratio of a 
comparison ‘other’ or referent. Although this comparison of input-outcome ratios lends equity 
theory an objective component (though this may be the case only if both inputs and outputs 
are readily assessable), equity theory is clear that this appraisal process is entirely 
subjective in its operation (Adams, 1965). Using equity lenses as a basis for understanding 
fairness perceptions is reasonably common practice in research considering pay, with 
relatively current research employing this strategy (e.g.  Lemieux et al., 2009; Trevor et al., 
2012). There are however limitations to this approach which have led to subsequent 






2.7.1. Introducing Organisational Justice 
 
Greenberg (1990, p. 400) provides a description of organisational justice research as 
‘attempts to describe and explain the role of fairness as a consideration in the workplace’. As 
a construct it seeks to incorporate a broader set of allocation rules than traditionally 
governed by equity theory, for example allocation based on need, norms or equality 
(Leventhal, 1976). Organisational justice extends input-output resource allocation (referred 
to as distributive justice) to include the perceived fairness of decision-making procedures (or 
procedural justice; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) the interpersonal treatment people receive 
during situations where fairness appraisals are made (interpersonal justice; Bies & Moag, 
1986) and the perceived fairness of explanations of allocation used during the process 
(informational justice). The combination of field and laboratory research into organisational 
justice has led to it becoming one of the most frequently researched topics in human 
resource management and organisational behaviour over the past three decades 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Rather than consider traditional equity rules recent 
research has tended to use the broader construct of organisational justice, not only because 
it offers greater granularity as to why fairness is an issue, but it also offers greater validity 
and reliability as a measure (Colquitt et al., 2013). The research has accelerated post-
millennium following a range of meta-analytical studies (e.g. Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002). The incidence of articles in 
academic journals related to organisational justice supports this. Whereas a PsycINFO 
search on justice in organisational psychology and human resource management journals 
yields over 600 articles from 1975 to 1999, the same search from 1999 to 2010 yields over 
1,600 journal articles (Colquitt et al., 2013). The dimensions of organisational justice and 






The fairness and the transparency of the processes by 
which decisions are made. 
The degree to which the people affected by a decision are 
treated with dignity and respect. 
Explanations provided to people about why procedures 
were used, or resources distributed. 
Fairness associated with outcomes decisions and distribution 
of resources. 
Figure 1. Organisational Justice Components. Source: Colquitt (2001). 
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2.7.2. Organisation Justice and Outcomes 
 
Due to the volume of research incorporating organisational justice, there is a wealth of 
evidence supporting relationships between justice perceptions and organisational attitudes, 
behaviours and outcomes (Lee, 1995; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999). There is also a 
wealth of evidence suggesting that the lack of predictable relationship between the amount 
paid and satisfaction with pay is at least in part to be due to relative social comparison and 
justice effects present in the workplace (Bloom, 1999; Grant et al., 2007). Research 
considering the dynamics between pay and pay satisfaction has shown both direct and 
mediated relationships between the constructs, with non-monotonic relationships between 
pay and pay satisfaction suggested in part to be due to the mediating effect of justice 
attitudes. Across the literature, however, there appear different effects for differing scales of 
justice.  Distributive justice has been found to correlate significantly and moderately (r > .5) 
with attitudes such as outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organisational commitment, 
trust and outcomes such as withdrawal behaviours. Moderate significant relationships have 
also been found in research between distributive justice and organisational citizenship 
behaviours, negative workplace reactions and employees’ evaluation of both supervisor and 
organisational authority (Colquitt et al., 2001). Procedural justice demonstrates similar 
relationships to distributive justice, though the effects are generally smaller in magnitude 
(Colquitt et al., 2001). Both interpersonal and informational justice demonstrate stronger 
relationships with organisational citizenship behaviours and evaluation of authority than 
procedural or distributive justice components, though they are less strongly related to 
outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction and organisational commitment (Colquitt et al., 2001).  
It is important to note however that this research largely considers pay in general rather than 
bonus pay as a specific form of remuneration. Consequently, there is a need for research 
considering the relationships between bonus pay, social comparison processes, justice and 
organisational outcomes. 
 
There is a growing volume of literature on the role of justice perceptions in decisions and 
processes related to pay, pay systems and pay inequality. Research has demonstrated 
significant relationships between organisational justice and pay satisfaction (Folger & 
Konovsky, 1989; Lee, 1995; Colquitt, 2001) and has also found evidence that pay dispersion 
within the workplace directly impacts performance through the mediating variable of 
organisational justice (Shaw et al., 2002; DeConinck & Stilwell, 2004). Interestingly, there 
has also been research conducted into justice perceptions and type of pay (Tremblay et al., 
2000), though this research is limited when compared to that including ‘pay’ as a general 
term. In a sample of Canadian employees participants clearly distinguished between pay 
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satisfaction and satisfaction related to benefits (in which bonus pay is included as a 
component). The authors found that distributive justice perceptions are better predictors of 
pay satisfaction than procedural justice perceptions, but that this result is reversed for benefit 
satisfaction, where procedural justice perceptions are better predictors than distributive 
justice perceptions. This indicates that pay and benefits (such as bonus payments) are 
appraised differently by employees (Tremblay et al., 2000). It is worth noting however that 
the findings of this research are based on a largely female sample where wages fall into the 
lower pay brackets, and so may not be representative of the broader workforce (perhaps 
explaining why pay and benefits are treated differently if pay has lower instrumental value). 
‘Benefits’ are also grouped and investigated as a broad concept, and while they include 
bonus pay, they also include other benefits available to employees. This finding of the 
different value of different dimensions of reward has however been supported by other 
justice researchers (e.g. DeConinck & Stilwell, 2004; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001; Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-Mejia, 1995) who suggest that pay 
is a multidimensional construct involving different dimensions such as pay level, pay 
increase, pay structure, benefits and pay administration, each proposed to have validity, and 
each exerting a different effect on outcomes. The reasons for these differences are 
suggested to be partly based in social exchange relationships. When a procedure is viewed 
as indicating a positive, high status relationship it is judged to be fair (Tyler & Degoey, 1995). 
People value procedural indications that let them know that they have a positive standing 
within the organisation often more highly than perceptions of pay equity. Bonus pay is 
suggested as being one such means of judging the social exchange relationship, but as 
suggested by Tremblay et al. (2000, p. 270) bonuses have received limited attention when 
considering these relationships as ‘studies of organisational justice have, for the most part, 
been limited to considerations of the pay level and pay increase dimensions’. The authors go 
further and suggest that the lack of focus on bonus pay as a form of remuneration is 
‘surprising when one considers the growing importance of employee benefit costs in overall 
employee compensation packages’ (Tremblay et al., 2000, p. 270). It would be useful, 
therefore, to add to the current body of knowledge by investigating these relationships. 
Because of this weight of evidence there is value in considering bonus pay as a specific pay 
dimension in justice research. This thesis can suggest further hypotheses related to 
organisational justice which are supported in previous pay research, but have received 
limited attention when extended to situations of bonus pay: 
 
H2a and 2b: Organisational justice as a result of bonus pay is positively related to (a) 




As well as considering pay as an absolute measure, research has also been conducted into 
organisational justice and wage inequality in pay situations. In this context wage inequality 
refers to the extent to which wages are distributed unevenly within a population (Moretti, 
2013). Braakmann (2008) found an inverse-U-shaped relationship between wage inequality 
and performance, seeming to support other findings where an organisational threshold which 
is crossed where inequality becomes an organisational justice issue sufficient in magnitude 
or effect to change from being a motivator to harming motivation (Braakmann, 2008). This 
offers further support for the suggestions made in the fairness research of the existence of a 
‘tipping point’ when norms of fairness and self-interest intersect, where the mediating effect 
of justice on pay for performance relationships becomes critical (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). 
Because of these recurrent suggestions of justice as a mediator in pay – outcome 
relationships, further hypotheses can be developed related to this research into bonus pay 
and outcomes. Justice in pay situations has been shown to mediate both pay and 
satisfaction relationships and pay and turnover intention relationships (Tremblay et al., 2000; 
Colquitt et al., 2001) therefore from both a theoretical perspective and consistent with 
previous research findings this thesis can expect a similar mediating relationship for bonus 
pay. Previous research has suggested that bonus pay is a source of justice perceptions and 
that bonus pay exerts an effect on both satisfaction (Grant et al., 2007) and turnover 
intention (Mason & Watts, 2009; Hay, 2012). Consequently, it would add to the current body 
of pay research to investigate these relationships for bonus pay as a specific form of 
remuneration. This thesis therefore suggests a further hypothesis: 
 
H3a and 3b: Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between a) bonus 
amount and bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
 
As the balance of previous pay research has suggested that distributive justice better 
predicts pay satisfaction than other justice scales (e.g. Day, 2011; Folger & Konvsky, 1989; 
Colquitt et al., 2001) this also suggests that different scales of justice will have different 
predictive abilities when related to bonus satisfaction. There are theoretical reasons to 
expect that distributive justice will better predict bonus satisfaction tracing back to the 
original inception of organisational justice as a theory which is predicated on decisions made 
in the judicial system. In these situations, studies show that a defendant’s reactions to the 
outcomes or satisfaction with verdicts were more strongly predicted by distributive justice 
than other justice scales (Tyler, 1984). Procedural justice is a stronger predictor of system or 
institutional characteristics. Studies in the organisational setting have also supported this 
view that distributive justice is a stronger predictor of specific, shorter term personal 
outcomes (such as satisfaction with bonus pay) than procedural, interpersonal or 
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informational justice (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Tremblay et al., 
2000), which more strongly predict longer term relationships with institutions or their 
representatives (such as commitment or trust; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). This finding 
speaks to the definitions of both distributive and procedural justice, with distributive justice 
seeking to explain how individuals react to the amount and form of compensation they 
receive compared to procedural justice which examines the reactions of individuals to the 
procedures used to determine compensation (Tremblay et al., 2000). This is thought to 
explain why satisfaction with some longer-term elements of reward such as benefits (as a 
general term), holidays or pensions are suggested to be more closely predicted by 
procedural justice. These outcomes are thought by some to be associated with group 
affiliation and become more valuable over time. As an employee invests more time in the 
organisation, these benefits can become more valuable, therefore the procedures governing 
the use of these benefits may become more important as the employee may not experience 
the outcome of the reward for some time (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). Contrary to this 
distributive justice reflects the fairness related to allocation of resources, which may be 
shorter term in nature and is clearly apparent when bonuses are distributed.  
 
Existing research has shown that distributive justice accounts for more variance in pay 
satisfaction dimensions than other justice components (Day, 2011). Folger and Konvsky 
(1989) found distributive justice was a better predictor of pay satisfaction than procedural 
justice perceptions and explained more variance in pay satisfaction than did procedural 
justice. McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) studied the relationship between distributive justice 
and procedural justice on personal and organizational outcomes and found that distributive 
justice is a stronger predictor of two personal outcomes (pay satisfaction and job 
satisfaction) compared to procedural justice, which more strongly predicted commitment. In 
another study, distributive justice relating to pay and rewards was found to be a stronger 
predictor of job satisfaction and turnover intentions than other justice components (Harr & 
Spell, 2009). The volume and range of research using organisational justice as a construct 
allows this thesis a breadth of literature related to pay, though there is a shortage of justice 
research related to bonus pay as a specific form on remuneration. Consequently, there is a 
need for research considering justice reactions to bonus pay more broadly and considering 
the specific types and strength of justice associated with bonus pay as a form of 
remuneration.  
 
Whilst there is evidence that distributive and procedural justice reactions are differentially 
important when different pay methods are used (Tremblay et al., 2000), there is precedent in 
pay research for believing that distributive justice will be more effective in predicting pay 
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satisfaction. In general, the findings in the current literature show that distributive justice is 
more strongly related to pay satisfaction and task performance than procedural justice 
(Tremblay et al., 2000; Colquitt et al., 2013). Procedural justice regarding pay provides a 
better explanation of organisational citizenship behaviours and commitment (Colquitt et al., 
2013; Martin & Bennet, 1996; Tremblay et al., 2000). One of the weaknesses of the research 
considering distributive and procedural justice is that much of the research predates the 
work of Colquitt et al. (2001) which suggests the four-factor approach to justice 
(incorporating distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational justice). In the work of 
Folger and Konovsky (1989), Cowherd and Levine (1992) and Tremblay et al. (2000) only 
distributive and procedural justice are considered. Procedural justice typically also includes 
elements of communication and elements of interpersonal treatment associated with the 
process used in allocation of rewards. It is therefore questionable whether the construct of 
procedural justice used in these investigations is a distinct construct consistent with that 
described by Colquitt et al. (2001), or whether the construct used is an amalgam of 
procedural, interpersonal and informational justice. Because of these findings, however, this 
thesis can develop a further hypothesis which is supported by existing research: 
 
H4: Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice components. 
 
The justice literature has matured to an extent that there are a number of available avenues 
of research which would build on the current knowledge. The increasing popularity of 
fairness and justice as a research topic and the variety of related variables means there are 
many potential opportunities to gain a deeper understanding of the current justice literature. 
These include research investigating dopamine synthesis in justice relationships (Aarts et 
al., 2014), the neural pathways involved with in justice appraisals (with heightened activity 
recorded during fMRI investigations in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Lamichhane et 
al., 2014), evolutionary gene theory and its application to justice (Liu & Lu, 2016), the relative 
personality traits associated with justice appraisals (Törnroos et al., 2019) and further work 
on broadening the situational justice responses to workplace events (Cropanzano & 
Ambrose, 2015). The opportunity for this thesis to address many areas of research means 
more careful targeting of the scope of this research. The contribution to theory of this thesis 
falls into two distinct areas which will inform the remainder of the literature review. Firstly, the 
thesis seeks to test hypotheses drawn from the research on pay to see whether these 
relationships hold for bonus pay as a specific form of remuneration. Secondly, the thesis 
seeks to venture into new territory by considering the emotional reactions to bonus pay, and 
the relative effects of emotion and social exchange relationship quality components of justice 
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on organisational outcomes. Therefore, a careful consideration of this literature (and the 
gaps in the research identified in the literature) is required. In the next section this thesis will 
review the research investigating the relationships between social comparison mechanisms 
and organisational justice. This is an area where there is a body of research for pay, but little 
research for bonus pay. Consequently, there is an opportunity to add to the knowledge in 
this area by investigating these relationships. The review will then continue to focus on 
outcomes in the literature concerned with justice, emotion and social exchange relationships, 
and begin to outline hypotheses which contribute to the current knowledge in these areas. 
 
Although social aspects of justice have been examined throughout the current body of 
research, there are also identified weaknesses in theoretical equity-derived models. Adams 
(1965) equity theory which stipulates that for a state of equity to exist between two parties 
they must receive some appropriate rate of return in social exchange defined in terms of the 
ratio of outcomes relative to inputs compared to the corresponding ratio of some referent 
other. Adams himself raised concerns about the limitation in his theory to specify the form or 
use of these referent others (Adams & Freedman, 1976). To counter this limitation, it is 
therefore important to further investigate the fundamental role social comparison plays in the 
formation of justice appraisals in pay situations. In some cases, equity judgements are 
based more strongly on social comparison than general expectations (Austin, McGinn, & 
Susmilch, 1980), and even when objective information is available on which to judge 
performance considerable weight is placed on social comparisons in decision making where 
rewards are considered (Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2006). In this context, fairness implies that 
rewards are allocated in a manner that effectively balances the interests of a range of 
different actors (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). Comparisons with relevant others is a matter 
which flows through the majority of pay research. Relational reasons for justice highlight how 
well an employee is valued and their standing in the group, similar in nature to the concept of 
the informational effect of incentives discussed earlier (Bies & Moag, 1986). Naturally then it 
becomes relevant to this discussion of bonus pay and justice to consider social comparison 
mechanisms and referent choice in more detail, particularly to investigate the depth of 
research already considering social comparison in bonus pay and justice situations 





2.8. Justice and Social Comparison 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising given the importance of referents in a significant number of social 
exchange theories and the rise of justice as an avenue of research in literature that there is a 
growing body of work concerned with justice perceptions and reference choice. Justice 
evaluations are made via the use of justice principles, and these typically involve evaluations 
of justice against specified reference points (for example, the size of my bonus is exactly 
what I deserve) (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2015). Complexity emerges as it is suggested that 
different elements of justice may use different reference points in order to come to a 
decision, and that often multiple reference points are used. Researchers have suggested 
that though distributive justice is considered relative to another person, procedural justice is 
sometimes evaluated against abstract moral standards (Greenberg, 2002), which has made 
the selection of referents across justice components difficult to assess. The argument for 
these two referent selections has largely led to the maintenance of a distinction between 
procedures and outcomes in justice research considering referent selection. This argument 
has come under some scrutiny in recent years however, with some researchers claiming that 
all justice components are really a type of outcome and therefore will have a social 
comparison mechanism attached (Greenberg, 2002). An employee may suffer less injustice 
at a lack of ability to voice concerns if the same lack of ability exists for everyone, for 
example, whereas if some employees were able to voice concerns then it is likely that more 
injustice would be perceived as they offer a clear emergent reference group. 
 
There are relatively few investigations into the social comparisons used in justice 
evaluations, and in the main these studies are restricted to laboratory situations using 
students as participants and so may not be generalisable (Folger et al., 1979; Ambrose, 
Harland, & Kulik, 1991; Grienberger, Rutte, & van Knippenberg, 1997). Ambrose et al. 
(1991) found that social comparisons did not influence perceptions of procedural justice, and 
that procedural justice ratings were largely determined by the favourability of outcomes 
obtained, though when this study was replicated by Grienberger et al. (1997) the 
researchers found that procedural justice is defined relative to a social standard or set of 
norms. This finding is supported by Greenberg (2002) who suggests that contrary to initial 
suggestions social comparison is important for determining all components of justice. 
Specifically, in the case of pay, social comparison forms the underlying psychological 
process that transforms useful information on others’ incomes into self-evaluations which 
explain why some people are more (or less) satisfied with their earnings or why they 
consider their earnings as more (or less) fair (Greenberg, 2002). Social comparison 
researchers have highlighted organisational justice as a ‘potentially fruitful area in which to 
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develop further the role of social comparison processes’ (Greenberg et al., 2007, p. 23). 
Certainly if people select different referents situationally, and in doing so arrive at different 
fairness conclusions it would add depth to the literature to consider co-occurring appraisals 
regarding referent choice and justice perceptions for specific organisational events such as 
when a bonus is paid (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). The research of Greenberg (2002) suggests 
that decisions concerning pay fairness cannot be made, in fact, without comparison to the 
pay of others. This thesis will therefore delve further into the literature concerning referent 
selection and pay, considering the individual referents and referent groups used by 
employees in pay appraisals, the types of pay and different reference points used in 
appraisals concerning these types of pay, and the impact of the selection of these reference 
points on attitudes and outcomes where pay is involved. The thesis will show that while the 
research considering social comparison and pay is reasonably broad, the research 
considering bonus pay as a specific event which draws social comparison is weak. Instead, 
the literature appears to assume that referents selected in pay contexts are the same 
independent of the type of pay. This may lead to false assumptions, as this thesis has 
demonstrated previously that justice attitudes to pay in the form of salary and bonus are 
different (Tremblay et al., 2000), and it is possible that it is the choice of referent in these 
different situations which influences these different attitudes. 
 
2.8.1. Social comparison, referent selection and pay  
 
An understanding of the social comparison process is crucial to reveal how individuals 
evaluate themselves and others in a set condition (Law & Wong, 1998; Gerlach, Levine, 
Gesine, & Struck, 2006; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006). Individuals, when evaluating their 
own rewards, compare themselves with others, whether these are colleagues, family, 
friends, or abstract referential standards (Goodman, 1974). Where pay and justice 
appraisals are considered, there exists a range of research into the referents used in the 
decision-making process for these judgements. In an investigation into referent selection and 
distributive justice involving groups of employees representing hourly workers, lower-level 
managers and the top three levels of management, researchers found that pay comparisons 
influence justice perceptions and exist across all levels of the organisation. The authors 
suggest that within an organisation there may be multiple reference points used by 
individuals when making pay comparisons (Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Gerlach et al., 2006). 
Similar research conducted by Wade et al. (2006) demonstrates that although similar others 
are most likely to be chosen as referents, upward comparisons are frequently made in order 
to determine one’s relative performance against standard setters, and position in the social 
hierarchy, even when these comparisons may be ego deflating (Nosanchuk & Erickson, 
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1985; Wheeler et al., 1982). Thus, people in organisations may use more senior colleagues 
as referents to help understand their own pay and performance in the context of the broader 
organisation (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). Research has shown how aspects of the situation or 
organisation may act to prime these judgments by making certain information more readily 
available. Kulik and Ambrose (1992), for instance, noted that when certain informational 
categories become accepted as available and relevant, these categories may become 
cognitively salient such that comparisons are routinely made. If it becomes the norm within 
an organisational setting to compare pay with that of executives or the CEO (whose 
remuneration may be published in the case of some organisational structures) then this will 
become an accepted and relevant comparison point. Within the broader society, as the issue 
of pay and bonuses gains media coverage and demands more attention, it is possible that 
the availability of information (such as the pay packages of bankers, MPs, supermarket 
executives and CEOs published widely in the media; Butler, 2015; Treanor, 2015) may 
therefore allow more employees to identify aspects of pay and pay referents as cognitively 
salient.  
 
The choice of referent against which to compare individual pay is not dependent solely on 
information availability. Dornstein (1988) suggests that the choice of referent (or referents) is 
dependent on two factors, one being the availability of information about referent categories 
and the other being the perceived relevance of these categories, a finding supported by 
others (Law & Wong, 1998; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). This introduces two potential areas of 
investigation, the available information about referents and the importance of those referents 
to decision making in justice appraisals. Because of these constraints some have suggested 
that referent choice is naturally limited, perhaps to as few as one or two referents in number 
(Oldham et al., 1982), yet this has not received a great deal of support in literature. Instead, 
researchers tend to point to a range of categories of referent from which an individual 
chooses, based on this availability of information and perceived relevance. Blau (1994) 
suggests a model of referent selection with five comparison points: social, historical, market, 
organisational and financial, with the potential of one or more referents coexisting in these 
categories. A selection of research seeks to identify the specific referents people choose 
when making pay comparisons. Goodman (1974) found during an investigation of 217 
managers that respondents in the main tended to use multiple classes of referents when 
making pay comparisons. The most common choice of referent included people in a similar 
job in the same organisation (consistent with target similarity arguments introduced earlier in 
this thesis; Major & Forcey, 1985), members of a professional society, friends and 
neighbours and both media and corporate reports on earnings. The author found that when 
evaluating their pay people also used referents related to the work system (for example 
68 
 
structural and administrative aspects of the pay system or normative expectations learned 
over time), and referents related to the self (for example the ability to maintain a familial 
standard of living or input/output ratios of the current job in relation to previous jobs) 
(Goodman, 1974).  
 
More recent research into pay referent selection adds support to the ‘many referents 
hypothesis’ (Schneider, 2010; Mayraz et al., 2009; Clark & Senik, 2010). These authors 
suggest that the working sphere (colleagues and members of the same profession) tend to 
be the most important point of reference in deriving satisfaction from pay comparisons, 
whereas neighbours are the least important. Others have supported the view that the 
majority of employees use multiple referents when comparing their pay with others 
(Dornstein, 1988; Goodman, 1974; Hills, 1980; Brown, 2001; Bygren, 2004; Koop & 
Johnson, 2012). Referents selected (in order of frequency) are typically co-workers, 
managers, subordinates, market rates and those in similar positions in other companies.  
When multiple referents are investigated co-workers in general are found to be the most 
relevant referent in pay and justice appraisals (Brown, 2001; Clark & Senik, 2010). 
Schneider and Schupp (2010) found that out of nine potential pay referents ‘colleagues’ and 
‘people of the same profession’ were rated as the most relevant referents when making 
justice appraisals related to pay. Bygren (2004) suggests that earnings of similar others in 
the same occupation and labour market are most influential in comparisons, a finding 
supported by other researchers (Loscocco & Spitze, 1991; Williams, 2006). Law and Wong 
(1998) found that, consistent with previous research, the majority of participants use multiple 
referents when comparing their pay with others. Using an inferential approach, regression 
weights with colleagues (β = 0.33), family and close friends (β = 0.29) and supervisors (β = 
0.22) are statistically significant. A direct interpretation is that colleagues are the most 
important referent in determining pay level satisfaction, with family and close friends, and 
supervisors also important referents in determining pay satisfaction. Interestingly a 
proportion of referent researchers suggest that referent choice may be event-driven and 
situational (e.g. Schneider & Schupp, 2010; Law & Wong, 1998) indicating that the choice of 
referent in pay situations may not be the same as the choice of referent in bonus situations. 
The authors suggest that not only are reference points dependent on the event, they also 
predict outcomes differentially. They found that, for example, a person who uses an external 
referent will be more likely to leave the organisation than one using an internal referent if the 
comparison is unjust (Scholl et al., 1987), and that the choice of internal or external referent 
may be dependent on the workplace event which leads to the comparison. This provides an 
opportunity to add to the current research on referent selection by considering the referents 
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chosen in bonus pay situations, as there is little social comparison research which 
investigates this form of remuneration. 
 
A significant portion of the social comparison literature tends to focus on factors affecting the 
choice of referent selection such as level of professionalism, role (Goodman, 1974; 
Summers & DeNisi, 1990), work group membership (Ambrose & Kulik, 1988), mobility 
opportunities (Dornstein, 1988) and similarity of the referents (Major & Forcey, 1985; Major & 
Testa, 1989). There is also a growing body of work considering situational factors in referent 
selection (e.g. Oldham, Kulik, Stepina, & Ambrose, 1986), and in particular the different 
workplace events which are associated with social comparison processes. While these 
events are reasonable broad, there is little research into referents in bonus specific 
situations. In a rare case Ockenfels, Sliwka, and Werner (2010) considered bonus 
payments, referent selection and their relative effects on job satisfaction in samples of US 
and German employees in the same company. The authors found that if a manager’s bonus 
falls behind the co-worker referent, self-reported job satisfaction is significantly reduced, and 
falling behind the referent had a much stronger effect on satisfaction than being ahead of the 
referent. This research is, however, limited as it only considers two classes of referent, co-
workers (those in the same company at the same level) or managers (those in the same 
company at a higher level). Previous referent research into pay has considered many more 
classes of referent, and considering the range of research there are many more classes of 
referent available for inclusion. The issue of which referents are selected in bonus pay 
situations has received little attention, and no clear-cut picture emerges for the differential 
selection of reference groups. It is proposed that this lack of clarity is in the main due to the 
unavailability of income information for various groups (Schneider, 2010).  
 
Referent researchers have also suggested that the choice of referent is stable over time. 
Kulik and Ambrose (1992, p. 233) argued that referent stability was the result of the 
determinants of referent relevance, ‘because personal characteristics are a primary 
determinant of referent relevance, the total set of relevant referents might be relatively stable 
over time.’ Which referents are chosen therefore depends on who is doing the choosing. 
Major and Forcey (1985) suggest that the degree to which unfairness is perceived is 
determined by the relevance to the self of the comparison target. A number of personal 
characteristics have been shown to have an effect on referent choice. People maximize 
similarity in wage comparisons by preferring same sex and same job over cross sex and 
combined sex wage information (Major & Forcey, 1985). Gender, age and organisational 
tenure can affect referent choice. Kulik and Ambrose (1992) argue that as people age, they 
are more likely to make self-comparisons because there are fewer people of their age group 
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with which to make comparisons. Early in an individual’s career, comparisons to other 
inexperienced employees within the same company may be most appropriate. Individuals 
with longer tenure are more likely to have acquired more information about employees both 
within and without their own organisations. Hills (1980) found that low tenure was associated 
with historical comparisons, with employees more likely to use past pay. Employees with 
long tenure were less likely to make market comparisons and more likely to make 
comparisons within their organisation (Hills, 1980). Position in an organisation was found by 
Oldham et al. (1986) to be important in referent choice. Upper salary echelon employees 
tend to use external referents to a greater extent as a consequence of higher labour mobility 
and access to information. Goodman (1974) investigated a number of factors related to 
referent choice in pay satisfaction appraisals and found that educated employees were more 
likely to use external referents than employees with less education. This is congruent with 
the assumption that inter-organisational mobility is less for lower educated employees 
(Breen et al., 2007). Additionally, individuals with lower salary levels are more likely to select 
inside referents than those with higher salaries. Individuals also differ greatly in the degree 
and strength to which they compare themselves with others, and don’t apply social 
comparisons evenly (Schneider & Valet, 2013; Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Wheeler, 2000). 
Researchers even speak of a ‘disposition towards social comparisons’ (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). In all of this pay research, however, it is interesting to note that the authors focus on 
salary rather than on forms of variable, outcome-based pay such as bonus pay. 
 
Theoretically, Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Mui (1995), Nickerson and Zenger (2008) and 
Larkin et al. (2012) have focused on various negative effects associated with workplace 
social comparison involving pay policies which incentivise individuals. Most of this research 
has, however, considered whole pay systems (of which bonuses are a component) rather 
than specifically considering bonus pay. The research typically assumes that the referents 
chosen by employees are the same in merit or bonus pay than in general pay situations. In 
these theoretical models (e.g. Larkin et al., 2012) the authors argue that social comparison 
costs reduce the effectiveness of individual performance-based pay because of the 
psychological costs of introducing injustice into an organisation. This perceived injustice 
offsets the effort benefits of performance-based pay and introduces additional costs. In 
terms of referent choice made when bonus payments are issued, Folger’s (1987) referent 
cognitions theory (RCT) was predicated on experiments using bonuses, with students given 
experimental credit as a bonus and asked to make judgements on their perceived levels of 
justice related to two referents. This theory was also amongst the first to add specific 
instances of procedural justice and also to note an important affective component in justice 
appraisal and so was important in developing our current understanding of organisational 
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justice. Referent cognitions theory is nowadays, however, seen as a conceptual bridge 
between equity and justice theories as it fails to include aspects of interpersonal justice and 
informational justice and so is considered limited by justice theorists (Cropanzano et al., 
2011). Various researchers have provided support for the importance of social comparisons 
in pay and justice evaluations. This research generally shows that individuals who earn less 
compared to similar others are more likely to perceive their earnings as unjust compared to 
those who earn more or equal amounts and are therefore more likely to reduce effort or 
leave the organisation (for examples see Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012; Liebig, Sauer, & 
Schupp, 2012; Schneck, 2013). Consequently, there is a need for research considering 
bonus pay as a specific form of pay and referent selection in determining satisfaction with a 
bonus. Consistent with findings in traditional pay research considering referent selection, 
and addressing the issue found in previous literature that the choice of referent can be 
associated with satisfaction judgements we can hypothesise that: 
 
H5: a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants when 
engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. b) The referent selected as 
being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those in the same 
company at the same level. 
 
There are some basic limitations to the current research on pay and referent selection. 
Studies in general consider only one dimension of pay satisfaction, that of pay level, and do 
not consider other dimensions such as pay rise, bonus or benefits (Heneman & Schwab, 
1985; Scarpello, Huber, & Vandenberg, 1988). Consequently, there is a need for research in 
this area. This thesis has already discussed research which demonstrates that different 
referents are chosen depending on the situation considered (Scholl et al., 1987), and the 
choice of referent (or referents) may influence conclusions about the fairness of work 
arrangements (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). It may therefore be salient to consider the distinct 
situation of bonus pay (as opposed to the more common research representing salary or 
general pay) which has been shown to raise distinct attitudes when compared to other pay 
methods. The choice of referents is also generally limited in current research with at best five 
referent groups included in current methodologies, though many more groups available 
when aggregating referents used across research. There is therefore an opportunity to 
combine research into justice and bonus pay with research including referents used in social 
comparison mechanisms to better understand their effects. The biggest challenge to the 
majority of studies considering peer effects of pay is the inability to actually observe or 
assess social comparison occurring in pay situations, but instead having to infer it from 
available data or rely on retrospective analysis (Gartenberg & Wulf, 2014). This may be one 
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reason why research investigations involving referent selection in bonus specific situations is 
rare, as conducting research specifically into bonuses requires access to participants during 
a specific organisational context and with participants willing to share personal and 
confidential information. Specifics of social context influence justice evaluations, and social 
comparisons within these contexts are viewed as a central mechanism that helps individuals 
to evaluate themselves (Goodman, 1974; Schneider & Valet, 2013). In cases of bonus pay, 
where individual self-evaluations may generate organisational and personal sensitivity, 
research considering these evaluations may be difficult to undertake. 
 
Having outlined the relationships in pay and justice research where it would be useful to 
investigate bonus pay as a specific form of remuneration, and where investigating 
relationships related to bonus pay will add to the current body of research, this thesis can 
now consider affective (or emotional) reactions to bonus pay. The remaining sections review 
the current state of play in justice research, which has tended to coalesce around two 
distinct viewpoints from which to consider justice relationships, the emotional viewpoint and 
the social exchange relationship viewpoint. In the following sections this review highlights the 
evidence behind these two viewpoints and considers some of the theoretical and practical 
limitations which have prevented emotion and social exchange as being treated as 
dependent phenomena. While there is research considering emotional reactions to pay, and 
the relationship between these emotional reactions and both justice and organisational 
outcomes, and also research considering social exchange relationship quality aspects of 
justice and their relationship with outcomes, there is little research considering these two 
lenses as co-occurring and inter-related. This is an area where there is a clear opportunity to 
contribute to the current understanding of organisational justice as a construct. It is also an 
area and where other factors such as workplace events come into consideration, as different 
workplace events elicit different emotions and influence social exchange differentially. By 
considering bonus pay as one such workplace event this thesis can begin to understand not 
only the effects of bonus pay on justice, but the emotional and social exchange effects of 
bonus pay in relation to other workplace events. 
 
 2.9. Organisational Justice, Affect and Social Exchange 
 
Organisational justice is an attitude towards the behaviour of the organisation or actors 
within the organisational setting (Greenberg, 1987), and so consistent with current research 
on attitudes will have affective (or emotional) as well as cognitive components when 
directing behaviour towards outcomes (Eagley & Chaiken, 1993). As organisational justice 
research has progressed and grown in stature and depth, the literature has settled around 
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two reasonably distinct (though some research would suggest complimentary and 
interactional) lenses to view the construct. The first of these lenses concerns justice as a 
‘cognitive’ indicator of social exchange relationship quality, and the second involves viewing 
justice as affective, in that employees ‘feel’ justice as an emotion (Barclay & Kiefer, 2019; 
Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011). Justice research has tended to focus on one or 
another of these two lenses, however this thesis will show in the following sections that there 
have been a number of calls for researchers to combine these two lenses using more 
sophisticated research methods. This is a clear gap in the current justice research which this 
thesis seeks to address. 
 
2.9.1. The two lenses for viewing justice 
 
Social exchange relationship quality has become the dominant viewpoint for explaining 
justice effects (Colquitt, 2008). The construct explains how different types of benefits are 
exchanged according to various rules and how such exchanges foster high quality 
relationships (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Some authors have proposed that achieving 
‘fairness’ in a justice sense causes employees to redefine their working relationship as one 
of social exchange, with effort and performance serving as an exchangeable resource (e.g. 
Moorman, 1991; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). This resource exchange is often conceptualised 
as a trade in reciprocate behaviours (Aryee et al., 2002; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Wayne, 
Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002). The mechanism by which positive reciprocal behaviours 
(such as task performance and organisational citizenship behaviours) are thought to be 
elicited is through improved quality of social exchange relationships, operationalised in 
research with constructs such as trust, commitment, perceived organizational support 
(POS), and leader–member exchange (LMX) (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008; Colquitt et al., 
2013). In this view differences in performance levels take on a voluntary element as 
employees increase or decrease their reciprocity (Colquitt et al., 2013). This view is 
supported by Greenberg & Scott (1996), who suggest that justice is a means of judging the 
quality of the social exchange relationship between individuals, which in turn then predicts 
subsequent positive or negative behaviour, and Skitka et al. (2003) who reviewed justice 
effects (both procedural and distributive justice) on negative (or deviant) behaviours such as 
sabotage, and positive behaviours such as organisational citizenship behaviours. Skitka et 
al. (2003, p. 334) considered both social exchange and affect lenses in their research and 
closed their arguments with a call to arms for more a more integrated and complete 
treatment of justice, stating  that ’although we have learned much about the psychological 
dynamics of how people form a justice judgment, and the consequences of a judgment that 
something is just or unjust, there is a serious need for developing theories and approaches 
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that allow for a better integration of these relatively distinct and important components and 
consequences of justice reasoning’. This thesis now therefore sets out to address some of 
these existing gaps in the research by focusing on both emotional and social exchange 
relationship components of justice. This provides some important background to the 
question concerning what aspect of justice has the strongest association with outcomes as a 
result of bonus pay; emotional or social exchange relationship aspects. 
 
The alternative research lens for viewing justice perceptions is that of emotion. Justice 
perceptions come with an emotional component as well as a social exchange relationship 
component (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano’s (1999) investigation of 
justice and emotion (in this case using a range of distinct emotions) revealed main and 
interactive effects of justice and outcome favourability on the four emotional states of 
happiness, pride, anger, and guilt. To explain the effects of justice on emotion, the authors 
drew on appraisal theories such as Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). 
This theory of affect argues that events trigger distinct appraisal processes giving rise to 
specific emotions. Even a subconscious level of awareness and processing is sufficient to 
bring a stimulus into the emotional process, and this does not necessary encompass 
complete cognitive appraisal (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Garcia-Prieto, Bellard, & Schneider, 
2003). Consistent with affective events theory, an individual therefore has the potential to 
feel organisational justice before they fully process it cognitively, and this emotional process 
can determine behaviour. While this implies that reactions to affective events may be sub-
conscious, the majority of research into the area of affective events theory uses reflection 
techniques to investigate salient events in the workplace, assuming that the participant is 
fully conscious of their own emotional states and resulting behaviour (e.g. Basch & Fisher, 
2000; Boudens, 2005). These techniques would assume that participants are fully conscious 
of their own states post-event and have sufficient recall to accurately categorise them. While 
this may introduce a limitation into the research as it may not always be the case that 
emotions are easily able to be recalled, the alternative involves measurement techniques 
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess emotion through neural 







Figure 2. Conceptual model of suggested integration of justice, social exchange, and affect. CWB 
counterproductive work behaviour; LMX leader–member exchange; OCB organizational citizenship 
behaviour; POS perceived organizational support. Adapted from Colquitt et al. (2013). 
 
 
The proposed relationships between these two distinct lenses, as conceptualised by Colquitt 
et al. (2013), are shown in Figure 2. Researchers have begun to devote more attention to 
the affective components of justice, with a meta-analysis by Barsky and Kaplan (2007) 
producing results consistent with the view that both state- and trait-level affect can influence 
one’s perceptions of justice. State and trait level negative affect are both negatively 
associated with interpersonal, procedural, and distributive justice perceptions. Conversely, 
positive state and trait affect are linked to higher ratings of interpersonal, procedural and 
distributive justice. In this research positive affect describes positive emotions and negative 
affect describes negative emotions, without being specific about the emotions researched, a 
limitation in this research as distinct emotions have been shown to lead to different attitudes 
(Weiss et al., 1999). There has been research into emotion and injustice, with findings 
suggesting a positive relationship between the level of perceived injustice and the magnitude 
of the negative emotions felt by employees (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007), perhaps as expected. 
In later work the authors provide a model which attempts to explain the role of state and trait 
affect at various stages of justice appraisal (Barksy, Kaplan, & Beal, 2011). They conclude 
that organisational injustice is generally an affect laden and subjective experience which 
stems from the interplay of work and non-work experiences as well as through mood and 
emotions. In trying to indicate the direction of causality in these relationships (i.e. does affect 
form a precursor to justice perceptions) Lang, Bliese, Lang, and Adler (2011) tested 
longitudinal cross-lagged effects between organisational justice perceptions and employee 
negative affect and found that symptoms of negative affect impact subsequent justice 
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perceptions. Thus, affect can also serve as an antecedent to organisational justice 
perceptions, perhaps indicating a complex, feedback-laden experience.  
 
2.9.2. The evidence for social exchange relationship and affect mechanisms 
 
There is evidence for both social exchange relationship and affective mechanisms mediating 
justice - outcome relationships in the literature. In a meta-analysis of justice literature 
considering both of these lenses, Colquitt et al. (2013) show that indicators of social 
exchange relationship quality mediate the relationships between organisational justice and 
reciprocate behaviour, including performance. That premise lies at the core of concepts of 
justice and social exchange (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008), and is supported by other justice 
research (e.g., Masterson et al., 2000; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). In the Colquitt et al. 
(2013) meta-analysis, two findings in particular stand out. First, although justice dimensions 
have an indirect effect on organisational citizenship behaviours (OCB) and task performance 
through social exchange relationship quality, no such effects were observed for counter-
productive work behaviours (CWB). These results support the viewpoint that OCB and CWB 
are not directly opposing ends of the same continuum (Dalal, 2005). CWB may arise from an 
altogether different source, not dependant on social exchange relationship quality. The 
second finding to stand out is that the results revealed direct effects of justice on behaviour 
that were not mediated by social exchange relationship quality. Three of those direct effects 
centre on CWB. Procedural, distributive, and informational justice have negative direct 
linkages with CWB. The research suggests that justice appears to relate to outcomes for 
reasons more complex that explained by social exchange relationship quality alone. The 
informational justice – OCB relationship also seems to be explained by some other 
mechanism. Such results suggest that, even if social exchange theory is the most 
predictively valid lens for viewing justice reactions, it should not be the only lens (Colquitt et 
al., 2013).  
 
When this thesis considers the literature using the emotional lens applied to justice, research 
generally shows that justice is positively related to positive affect, and negatively related to 
negative affect, but only moderately so in both cases (Barclay & Kiefer, 2014; Colquitt et al., 
2013). The strength of relationship is similar for positive and negative affect, indicating that 
justice makes people feel positive emotion to an equal extent that injustice makes them feel 
negative emotion, supporting findings in other affect research (e.g. Rupp & Spencer, 2006). 
The research also found that some justice – behaviour relationships were mediated by affect 
(e.g. Barclay & Kiefer, 2014; Colquitt et al., 2013). In research considering different scales of 
justice, Colquitt et al. (2013) found that the relationships between procedural and distributive 
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justice and task performance were mediated by positive affect. Similarly, the relationships 
between both procedural and distributive justice and OCBs were mediated by positive affect 
and negative affect (though to a lesser extent by negative affect). Interestingly, the research 
also found significant indirect effects of procedural, distributive, and interpersonal justice on 
CWB through state affect (Colquitt et al., 2013). The structural equation modelling results 
showing standardised estimates related to both social exchange quality and positive and 
negative affect are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. It may be that the relationship between 
justice and CWBs is not as cognitively focussed as exchange-based explanations would 
suggest but is instead explained by more spontaneous affect induced deviance, 
characterised by the ‘action tendencies’ or pre-cognitive behaviours proposed by Elfenbein 
(2007). Where justice is concerned this would suggest that appraisals of injustice will be 
associated with negative emotional responses (as per previous research), though consistent 
with affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) this research would also suggest 
that appraisals of justice will be associated with positive emotional responses as fair 
treatment is believed to promote a number of individual goals related to self-regard, 
belonging and meaning (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Consistent with the meta-analysis of 
Colquitt et al. (2013) this thesis can therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H6a-6b: Organisational Justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are positively 
related to (a) positive emotions and negatively related to (b) negative emotions. 
 
Although throughout their analysis Colquitt et al. (2013) treat social exchange relationship 
and affective lenses of justice as alternative ways to view justice effects, they also note that 
this is in the main due to methodological limitations in the way current research treats social 
exchange as a relatively stable construct (with assessment typically conducted using cross-
sectional survey data) and emotion as a transient property (with assessment typically 
conducted using experience-sampling methods). The authors propose that there is potential 
value in ‘integrating exchange-based research on justice with affect-based research on 
justice, something that unfortunately remains all too rare’ (Colquitt et al., 2013, p. 213). This 
is an important departure point for the remainder of this literature review. The relationships 
between social exchange relationship, emotion and outcomes are less well understood in 
terms of the direction and magnitude of interaction as they are rarely researched 
concurrently. The process of engaging in social exchange can trigger a number of emotions 
ranging from pride and gratitude to anger and shame (Lawler & Thye, 1999). Viewing the 
relationship from the other direction, the positive and negative emotions elicited by discrete 
events may also go on to change perceptions of social exchange relationship quality 
(Ballinger & Rockman, 2010). Such changes may become long lasting to the degree that the 
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emotion elicited becomes encoded in memories of the events (Ballinger & Rockman, 2010). 
Moreover, one’s own behaviours may influence social exchange quality and emotion in a 
feedback mechanism. One’s own behaviour can trigger a number of self-focused emotions, 
including pride and guilt (Lazarus, 1991), as can one’s own internal interpretation of the 
events (Elfenbein, 2007). There are therefore theoretical reasons to expect a complex 
relationship between social exchange relationship quality and emotion. It would be useful 





Figure 3. Meta-analysis findings showing strengths of relationships with social exchange quality. 




Figure 4. Meta-analysis findings showing strengths of relationships with Affect. 
Source: Colquitt et al. (2013). 
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In order to examine the distinct relationship effects of affect and social exchange detailed in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, a new state-like view of social exchange relationships, emotion and 
justice as co-existing temporal phenomena must therefore be developed to address the 
design boundaries of treating social exchange as a stable construct, and emotion as 
transient and diffuse. Social exchange relationship quality perceptions could be built into 
experience-sampling methodologies, given that past research has revealed daily within 
person variation in both justice and reciprocate behaviours (Dalal, Lam, Weiss, Welch, & 
Hulin, 2009; Loi, Yang, & Diefendorff, 2009). Fox et al. (2001) successfully gathered work-
based emotion over a 30-day period (with scales assessing enthusiasm, pride, happiness, 
anger, fear, and sadness) and investigated the effects of these on traditionally stable social 
exchange based constructs such as trust and commitment. There are a number of other 
areas in the emotional literature where emotion and constructs thought to be more stable like 
commitment and trust have been successfully researched using diary studies (e.g. Côté & 
Morgan, 2002; Shaw, Duffy, Mitra, Lockhart, & Bowler, 2003). There would appear to be no 
limitation to incorporating social exchange relationship quality into this form of research. 
There is scope to build on current research by considering extensions to the work of Colquitt 
et al., (2013) which has to date formed the most complete meta-analysis of justice research. 
One particular avenue for investigation exists - to understand in more detail the inter-
relationships between emotion, social exchange relationship quality, organisational justice 
and organisational attitudes and outcomes such as turnover intention, which although 
researched separately in some depth have received limited attention in research as co-
occurring dynamics. 
 
Considering organisational justice as an attitude-based construct, the majority of research 
has focused on cognitive aspects (Weiss, 2002) involving rational appraisal mechanisms 
(e.g. Locke, 1969; Hulin, 1991). The cognitive and behavioural aspects of job attitudes are 
relatively well researched, and better developed than their affective dimensions. Spector 
appears to agree, commenting, ‘today most researchers tend to focus attention on cognitive 
processes’ (1997, p. 2). Brief also argued that the cognitive perspective has dominated 
research into job attitudes. In appraising current measures of attitudes, Brief concluded that, 
‘Organisational scientists often have been tapping the cognitive dimension while slighting or 
even completely excluding the affective one’ (1998, p. 87). Cognitive models demonstrate 
validity, but they do not explain the majority of the variance in attitudes (Weiss, 2002). 
Similarly, dispositional sources of job attitudes, though important, do not fully explain 
individual attitudes such as differences in levels of job satisfaction or organisational justice 
perceptions (Ilies & Judge, 2002). It is thought, therefore, that much of the variation in 
attitudes may be due to variation in emotion (Fisher, 2002). Researchers are beginning to 
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suggest that considering dynamic affective states in attitude formation may offer a valuable 
tool to explain both within-person and across-person variation in attitudes to constructs such 
as organisational justice (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Research from related areas suggests that 
the effect of emotion at work on job attitudes will be strongest when job attitudes are 
assessed at the same time as is emotion and weaker when measurement of these concepts 
is separated. This implies that predictive validities decline as the predictor and criterion 
become more temporally remote (Hulin, Henry, & Noon, 1990). Memories decay, some 
rather quickly, and as memories decay the emotions carried with them fade as well (Altmann 
& Gray, 2002). Collectively, these arguments support the expectation that momentary 
emotion will impact job attitudes the strongest when the two concepts are assessed 
contemporaneously. 
 
2.9.3. The role of affect in justice appraisals 
 
There is a limited body of research demonstrating the importance of affect (or emotion) in 
determining job attitudes, however there appears important distinctions in the affect-attitude 
literature. The most heavily researched of the types of affect studied appears to be trait 
affect, or the general level of positive or negative emotion considered to be an individual’s 
‘baseline’ level (Greenberg et al., 2007). For the purposes of this thesis and to limit the 
research in scope it will not investigate trait affect, preferring instead to focus on state affect, 
though this research will measure it and control for it as previous investigations have 
suggested a significant link between trait affect and emotion (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Moods 
are also discussed in the justice literature, though these are generally taken to be either 
positive or negative and are typically treated as longer term emotional states than those 
described by distinct emotions. Emotions in the literature are sometimes treated as polar 
states and described as ‘positive state affect’ or ‘negative state affect’ by some justice 
researchers (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001), though they are also investigated by some 
researchers as distinct emotions. The research of Colquitt et al. (2001) groups all negative 
emotions together, and all positive emotions together into broad categories of affect, and so 
misses differences due to the type or strength of specific emotions which have been 
uncovered by other researchers (e.g. Mikula et al., 1998). The majority of the research 
available focuses on trait affectivity and its links to job satisfaction (e.g., Watson & Slack, 
1993). Meta-analysis considering broad evidence indicates that both trait positive affect and 
trait negative affect are related to job attitudes such as job satisfaction (Connolly & 
Viswesvaran, 2000). The processes by which changes in trait affect results in changes in job 
attitudes are still not entirely clear, however researchers continue to demonstrate a 
relationship between trait affect, state affect and job attitudes (Brief, 1998; Brief & Weiss, 
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2002). The main mechanism thought to underpin this relationship is that people with 
dispositional trait negative affect are more likely to experience negative emotions, which in 
turn influences their job attitudes negatively. People with trait positive affect are more likely 
to experience positive emotions, which positively influences their attitudes towards their work 
(Judge & Ilies, 2004). Emotions influence a range of cognitive and attitudinal processes 
including task motivation, social behaviour, analytical reasoning, problem solving, decision-
making, and creativity (Isen & Baron, 1991; Forgas, 1992; George & Brief, 1996; Staw & 
Barsade, 1993; Staw et al., 1994). The research generally indicates that the greater the 
frequency and strength of emotion the stronger the outcome (both positive or negative 
respectively). 
 
Research has suggested that the mediation effect described above is only partial, and that 
other mechanisms may also mediate the trait affectivity – job attitudes relationship. It may be 
the case that affective traits also influence cognitive interpretations of events or stimuli at 
work, meaning that one’s cognitive assessments of job situations (perhaps both directly and 
indirectly through emotions) are influenced by level of trait affect. Because trait positive 
affect is more strongly related to job attitudes than negative affect, trait positive affect may 
play a stronger cognitive role in evaluations of job attitudes than negative affect. This 
confirms the need to control for this variable in research. Such an interpretation is consistent 
with theories and findings in basic attitude research which suggests that individuals in whom 
positive emotions has been induced engage in different cognitive processes than do those in 
whom no such state emotions have been induced (Judge & Ilies, 2004). Researchers have 
suggested that emotion may be a major influence on social cognition (Hinsz et al., 1997) and 
can have a direct informational role on inferences and conclusions made by individuals 
(Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Positive emotions appear to reduce 
systematic processing of information, such that individuals are more susceptible to heuristic 
cues (Worth & Mackie, 1987). Moreover, positive emotions might optimistically bias the 
processing of information (Shaller & Cialdini, 1990), which may also reinforce the 
maintenance of positive emotions. Emotional states inform us about states of the world that 
either do or do not require careful monitoring or processing, and so help us to direct attention 
to where it is most required (Frijda, 1986; Schwarz, 1990). Although the impact of positive 
emotions on cognitive processing is somewhat established in literature, the link between 
negative emotions and cognitive processes is less studied, and the results are more 
ambiguous (Eagley & Chaiken, 1993). Positive affective states signal a benign and 
unproblematic situation, and individuals in positive affective states perceive the situation as 
uncomplicated, while negative affective states indicate that a situation is troublesome, 
characterised by disappointment or threat, which renders it risky to rely on one's default 
82 
 
routines (Bless et al., 1996). This makes the study of emotion particularly suited to situations 
such as bonus pay as they offer an organisational event which is carefully planned in terms 
of the timing and type of announcement, and both important and salient enough to the 
recipient to generate an emotional response (Mikula et al., 1998). 
 
The relationship between emotions and social exchange relationship quality has also 
received attention from researchers. This represents a distinct move away from the 
traditional focus on structural determinants of exchange outcomes, although it returns to the 
work of the early exchange theorists (e.g. Adams, 1965) who suggest emotions play a part in 
fairness judgements in exchange relationships. Much of the empirical work on social 
exchange relationships investigates how the social structure influences the outcomes of 
exchange, however a newer thread of research has begun to explore the emotional 
consequences of social exchange processes and the role that certain emotions play in the 
structuring of exchange relationships. Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2000) have developed 
Relational Cohesion Theory to explain how emotional responses to exchange relationships 
influence exchange outcomes. Molm et al. (2000) have likewise explored the role of 
emotions in exchange, but focus more on emotion as an outcome of exchange rather than 
emotion as a factor influencing exchange outcomes. There is evidence that the process of 
forming social exchange relationships is associated with distinct positive and negative 
emotions (e.g., interest, fun, excitement, and comfort, frustration, annoyance, anxiety, and 
fear) (Tse & Dasborough, 2008). In complimentary research, investigators have suggested 
that the emotions generated by discrete affective events may go on to change perceptions of 
social exchange relationship quality moving forward (Ballinger & Rockman, 2010), 
supporting the suggestion earlier in this thesis of a potentially complex and interactional 
relationship between social exchange relationship quality and emotion which is worthy of 
further investigation.  
 
Although there are researchers who have questioned the necessity of investigating 
emotional mediation for cognitive and behavioural effects of injustice, largely as behavioural 
effects hold more value for researchers (e.g. Sprecher, 1992; Tajfel, 1982), more recent 
research has suggested that perceived injustice is an important dimension in emotion-
antecedent appraisal, and suggests a central motivational role for emotions as a necessary 
condition for action to restore equity (Mikula et al., 1998). This ‘distress mediation 
hypothesis’ (Mikula et al., 1998, p. 770) is supported by research suggesting that 
experiencing injustice is accompanied by symptoms of physiological arousal including 
increased skin conductance (Markovsky, 1988) and higher blood pressure (Hassebrauck, 
1991). Justice researchers have noted that injustice not only elicits negative emotional 
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reactions, but rather that ‘such situations can produce widely different emotions’ (Mikula et 
al., 1998, p. 781). Despite this assertion the research into emotion (or affect) and justice is 
sparse, though throughout the justice literature there have repeatedly been calls to examine 
distinct emotional states related to injustice (e.g. Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983; Greenberg et al., 
2007). Some authors (notably Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2015; Weiss et al., 1999) have 
suggested that justice in certain situations can be thought of as an affective event in itself, 
though we will see in a review of the affective events literature later in this thesis that there 
are some problems with this suggestion. Affective events theory posits that proximal events 
elicit justice appraisals, rather than the appraisal itself representing an affective event. We 
will consider affective events theory in more detail in later sections, and suggest hypotheses 
that bonus pay can be treated as an affective event. 
 
The research which exists investigating justice and emotion typically uses adjective 
checklists to self-report levels of contentment (positive affect) versus distress (negative 
affect) (Colquitt et al., 2013). Justice theories frequently discuss anger and guilt as the most 
likely emotional responses to perceptions of justice, depending on whether the injustice is 
advantageous or disadvantageous to the perceiver (Adams, 1965). The fact that these two 
emotions are identified specifically by Adams (1965) as results of justice appraisals is in 
itself problematic. Although anger and guilt are both forms of negative affect, they are 
responsible for very different work behaviours. Because anger is considered to be an “other-
focused emotion,” as opposed to guilt which is a “self-focused” emotion, anger is more likely 
to be linked to employee retaliation (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002), 
whereas guilt is more likely to result in reconciliation attempts by the employee (Tangney, 
1995). Considering these emotions as similar affective responses can therefore lead to 
inaccuracies in understanding the behavioural outcomes related to these specific emotions. 
Similarly research considering the mediating effects of two negative emotions, anger and 
sadness, found that anger mediates the relationship between fairness and aggressive 
behaviour whereas sadness does not (Chow et al., 2008) though this research is limited in 
the context of this thesis as it is not workplace based and does not consider a broader range 
of emotions. 
 
There has been increasing attention on the nature of the emotions elicited in justice 
appraisals in recent years, with literature suggesting that injustice can elicit a range of 
qualitatively different emotions. Researchers have found that various emotions are elicited in 
unjust situations, described as anger, disgust, sadness, fear, guilt, rage, indignation, 
surprise, helplessness, envy and shame (Mikula et al., 1998). By understanding the specific 
emotional responses as a result of justice appraisals this thesis can better understand 
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‘typical’ reactions to justice, and therefore be in a better position to predict behavioural 
outcomes. Mikula et al. (1998, p. 770) also explored the frequency of emotional responses 
from participants, noting six clear categories of response described as (in order of 
decreasing frequency) ‘anger, rage and indignation; disappointment, feeling aggrieved; 
surprise; physical symptoms of arousal and stress; helplessness, depression; and envy’. The 
predominance of negative emotional responses seems to support previous research which 
suggests that negative emotions predominate in justice situations, seemingly supporting the 
position that for every winner in unjust situations, there are many losers (Lipkus, 1992).  
 
Considering emotion and justice research more broadly suggests that anger is the most 
common emotion to be elicited in justice and fairness research. In workplace research 
(though considering a novel approach where employees are asked to identify the cause of 
anger responses in the workplace), the majority of those studied identified ‘unjust treatment’ 
as the primary source of anger (Fitness, 2000). Justice is even embedded in the definition of 
anger by some researchers, with Gibson and Callister (2010) offering four points of 
distinction with which to separate anger from other negative emotions. First, the authors 
point out that anger is a discrete emotion with universally recognisable expressions with 
specific types of physiological reactions (Gibson & Callister, 2010). Second, anger is a social 
emotion that is often generated in response to the actions of others and, as such, it is often 
directed at others (Averill, 2012; Gibson & Callister, 2010). Third, anger serves a social 
function of signalling to the individual that a justice violation has occurred, and in this way, 
anger acts as a transaction between the individual and his or her environment. And fourth, 
anger episodes usually begin with work-related events, which result in what Gibson and 
Callister (2010) identify as the three primary causes of anger; perceptions of fairness and 
justice, goal interference, and interpersonal conflict. These four distinctions lend further 
support to the research of this thesis as this research considers both specific work-related 
events (in this case bonus pay) and also perceptions of justice. There exists specific 
research on the connection between anger and justice perceptions identifying justice as the 
most common cause for workplace anger, often prompting counterproductive behaviour 
toward the offending parties (Barclay & Kiefer, 2019; Mikula et al., 1998; Clayton, 1992; 
Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008; Averill, 2012; Weiss et al., 1999). For this thesis the consistent 
findings in research related to justice which suggest that anger is the most frequent emotion 
elicited as a result of justice appraisals lead to the hypothesis that: 
 
H7: Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice perceptions 




In terms of the extant research regarding the discreet emotions elicited when a bonus is 
issued there is limited evidence. This is perhaps surprising given the suggestion by some 
researchers that ‘treatment or events considered as unjust are amongst the most powerful 
elicitors of intense emotions’ (Mikula et al., 1998, p. 780). There have been some moves to 
identify the discreet emotions present in situations where incentives are used, for example in 
field experiments by Falk and Ichino (2006) the authors found that workers compare their 
performance related incentives with those of referents and feel emotions like pride or 
frustration in cases of relative success or failure respectively. Economics researchers 
considering the influence of emotions on productivity have suggested that joy or pride are 
felt when successful in obtaining bonus payments, and frustration or anger when 
unsuccessful in beating the standard required for bonuses (Kräkel, 2008), though these are 
assumptions rather than outputs of emotional research obtained during bonus pay events. 
There are some examples of research considering the relationship between affect and 
bonus pay, though these are largely limited to laboratory investigations. In one piece of 
research Carver (2006) used a methodology where participants were led to believe that by 
performing well at a task they could obtain a bonus, but then failed to do so, eliciting 
emotions described as anger, sadness and frustration. In terms of financial incentives acting 
as an emotion-inducing event, there appears more research into general pay and pay raises 
than the issuance of bonuses consistent with other types pay for performance research.  
 
As justice is proposed to have an affective component, it is interesting to note in the work of 
both Falk and Ichino (2006) described above and Greenberg et al. (2007) that the authors 
suggest a link between affect and social comparison processes. Certain workplace emotions 
such as envy result in a set of attitudes and behaviours resulting from ‘an employee’s loss of 
self-esteem in response to a reference others obtainment of outcomes one strongly desires’ 
(Vecchio, 2000, p. 162). Social comparison therefore becomes an additional mechanism to 
consider in emotion and justice research. Greenberg et al. (2007) continue to note that 
‘further theoretical refinement and empirical research in the field would be a wise investment’ 
with respect to social comparisons and affect. The authors suggest that affective events 
theory (AET) may hold promise as a lens for viewing emotional reactions to social 
comparison, echoing Cropanzano and Ambrose (2015) and Weiss et al. (1999). In particular, 
the authors note that ‘affective reactions to social comparisons serve as exemplars of 
mechanisms underlying AET given that events (upwards or downwards social comparisons) 
generate emotional reactions that then have attitudinal and behavioural consequences’ 
(Greenberg et al., 2007, p. 27). Due to these convergent views on the important role 
emotions play in justice appraisals, this thesis may benefit from a review of the literature 
investigating the association between emotions and organisational outcomes. 
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2.9.4. The relationship between affect and organisational outcomes 
 
As well as trait affect, there is now a realisation that emotion contributes significantly to our 
work attitudes and these relationships are often stronger than trait affect relationships with 
attitudes and outcomes. Fisher (2002) found that emotion was more strongly correlated with 
job satisfaction than was trait affect, meaning that short term emotions tend to have a 
stronger relationship than longer-term dispositional feelings with attitude formation. The 
relationship between emotion and job attitudes is difficult to study as it requires analysis of 
job attitudes using dynamic research designs, as emotions are generally short lived, 
transitory states. Weiss, Nicholas, and Daus (1999) used an experience sampling 
methodology in which managers’ ‘mood’ was sampled four times a day to investigate the 
relationship of affective experiences with job satisfaction. The authors found that ‘mood’ at 
work and job cognitions contribute to job attitudes additively. In the research of Weiss, 
Nicholas et al. (1999) the operationalisation of mood suggests some confusion in the 
definitions of emotion, affect and mood, as the measurement instrument used for ‘mood’ (the 
current mood report or CMR; Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990, p. 7) asks for how participants are 
‘feeling right now’ and offers a list including ‘happy’, ‘sad’ and ‘distressed’ which are also 
considered emotions by some researchers (e.g. Miller et al., 1996). The research by Weiss, 
Nicholas, et al. (1999) was undertaken in a single organisation with voluntary participation, 
and so generalisability may be limited.  
 
Ilies and Judge (2002), in a study which measured job attitudes and mood using a time-
sampled technique found that mood and job attitudes were related both within and across 
individuals. The authors also found that within-individual variance comprised 36% of the total 
variance in job satisfaction, meaning that mood at work accounted for more than a third of 
the variance overall, a substantial amount. This is variance that would be missed with the 
typical between-subjects design and highlights the importance of within-subject research 
designs when investigating the relationship between affect and organisational outcomes. 
The research of Ilies and Judge (2002) was conducted across three separate organisations 
and so offers some generalisability, but the lack of experience sampling tools capable of 
assessing co-occurring emotions lead the authors to use the PANAS (Watson et al., 1998), 
an instrument designed for assessing trait affectivity rather than mood or emotion (and so 
offering questionable validity in this approach). The findings that mood influences attitudes 
do not indicate that the magnitudes of mood and cognitive effects on attitudes are similar. 
There is contrary evidence for this in literature with some researchers suggesting that the 
relationship between affect and attitudes is stronger than that of cognitive beliefs and 
attitudes (e.g. Weiss, 2002), and some finding otherwise (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2013). This 
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relationship appears to be dependent on the workplace event which has elicited the emotion 
(Basch & Fisher, 2000), the strength and type of emotion (Weiss, 2002), the type of attitude 
researched (Colquitt et al., 2013) and the organisational context under research (Ilies & 
Judge, 2002). In order to effectively set the scope of our research methods we therefore 
must look to include these variables in our measures, yet also constrain some elements 
such as the type of attitude to research and the organisational context to better understand 
these paths.  
 
Situational dynamic research into emotion and attitudes is becoming more popular (Fisher, 
2002; Ilies & Judge, 2002; Weiss, Nicholas, et al., 1999). Traditional research considering 
emotion was cross-sectional, where a single assessment of affect is related to a similar 
‘slice’ of employee attitudes. This approach treats affect and attitudes as reasonably stable 
constructs, yet research shows that both emotion and attitudes change over time exhibiting 
substantial short-term variability (Ilies & Judge, 2002; Weiss, Nicholas et al., 1999). This 
correspondence can only be realised and investigated when affect and attitudes are 
analysed dynamically so that their temporal co-variation can be considered. Grandey et al. 
(2002) used a diary methodology to research emotion and underlying trait affect on 
workplace behaviours. Trait positive affect was related to overall positive emotion 
experienced over the research period (in this case two weeks), although this relationship did 
not reach traditional levels of significance. Dispositional trait negative affect was a significant 
predictor of overall negative emotion at work, with some negative emotions such as anxiety 
and sadness being more strongly related than others (e.g. anger). This confirms the need to 
control for trait affect in potential research designs. Having increasing incidences of negative 
emotion over the two-week period significantly predicted intentions to leave the job, which 
creates a link in the current research with our chosen outcome variable of turnover intention. 
The authors of the research suggest that looking at just positive versus negative emotions 
may be misleading, and that individual emotions should be researched to understand the 
breadth of attitudinal reactions to the range of emotions elicited. Negative emotions such as 
anger, sadness, and anxiety had different patterns and strengths of relationships with 
turnover intentions (Grandey et al., 2002). This study is important as it not only suggests that 
dispositional trait affect is significantly related to shorter-term emotion, but also suggests that 
distinct emotions hold different relationships with turnover intention. 
 
As demonstrated in preceding sections, there are some authors (e.g. Mikula et al., 1998; 
Greenberg et al., 2007) who have already suggested investigating emotion in justice 
relationships as a fruitful path for future research. Others have suggested potential 
frameworks for viewing justice as an emotional event, suggesting theories such as affective 
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events theory (AET) offer a valuable framework for considering justice appraisals 
situationally (Weiss et al., 1999). It will perhaps add value at this stage of this thesis to 
consider AET in more detail. Affective Events Theory (AET) proposes that organisational 
events are proximal causes of affective reactions, stating that ‘things happen to people in 
work settings and people often react emotionally to these events. These affective 
experiences have direct influences on behaviours and attitudes’ (Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996, p. 11). Research exists suggesting that justice is in itself an affective event 
(Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2015) and that reactions to episodes of social comparison can be 
affective events (Greenberg et al., 2007), however this research appears to neglect the 
proximal environmental causes of these reactions. Episodes such as bonus pay offer a 
discrete organisational event or stimulus and so may lend themselves well to affective 
events theory as a framework for investigation. In previous research affective events 
research has been predicated on changes in the environment such as sensory stimuli (e.g. 
noise, aromas; Isen & Baron,1991), characteristics of the work environment (e.g. acts of 
customers, supervisor interactions; Basch & Fisher, 2000) pay system reform (e.g. Tenhiala 
& Lount, 2013) and episodes of conflict or violation of norms (e.g. Boudens, 2005) as 
discernible events. It is relevant to our research if we view the payment of a bonus as an 
affective event which elicits an attitudinal effect such as a justice appraisal which in turn 
leads to an outcome, and additionally exerts a direct effect on that outcome (for example 
discretionary performance, workplace behaviours or turnover intention). This thesis will 
therefore consider affective events theory and its applicability in justice and pay situations in 
more detail in the following section. From this definition, however, and considering the 
evidence this thesis can suggest a further hypothesis: 
 
H8a and 8b: Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an 
affective event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a direct affective 
relationship on turnover intention and (b) a unique effect above and beyond that of 
social exchange relationship quality on turnover intention. 
 
Bonus pay is a discernible organisational event and therefore reactions to this event should 
be testable. Pay has been included in previous research as an effective event (e.g. Tenhiala 
& Lount, 2013), therefore there is no theoretical reasons why this research would expect 
bonus pay to not elicit similar direct emotional effects on turnover intention. Studies have 
been conducted to test different parts of the proposed AET model (e.g., Bash & Fisher, 
2000; Grandey et al., 2002; Saavedra & Kwun, 2000), however very few studies have been 
conducted to test the model fully (e.g., Fisher, 2002). In Fisher’s study, although the event-
emotion-behaviour model was tested, a substantial taxonomy of work events was not 
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included among the study measures. Instead, job characteristics such as autonomy, task 
identity, skill variety and task significance were examined in terms of their relation to 
employee affective experiences and work attitudes and behaviours. In those studies that 
effectively assessed work events more broadly work attitudes and behaviours are typically 
excluded, and event-emotion relationships examined instead (e.g., Bash & Fisher, 2000). 
This thesis will now consider in more detail how affective events theory offers us a useful 
framework for viewing stimulus, attitude and behaviour pathways in psychology, and look at 
how justice can be integrated into an appropriate research methodology. 
 
2.9.5. Affective Events Theory as a Framework for Justice 
 
A different means of approaching affect–behaviour relations is to accept the short term, 
state-like nature of affect and examine the association between varying momentary 
emotions and attitude or behaviour variability over time (Fleeson, 2001). This approach 
requires the adoption of the view that attitudes and behaviour (if we can characterise 
performance and other outcomes as behaviour in themselves; Gilbert, 1998) as with 
emotion, can be identified as a discreet ‘episode’ which is time-based (Beal, Weiss, Barros, 
& Macdermid, 2005). In this sense behaviour episodes refer to natural units of activity 
organised around goals, personal strivings, or desired states (Barker, 1963; Craik, 2000). 
Specifically, Barker (1963, p. 10) claimed that performance episodes ‘have as their common 
feature, behaviour that is directed toward a single end state or goal’. Behaviour episodes are 
complementary to this discussion linking emotion to attitudes such as justice and satisfaction 
and outcomes such as turnover intention (if considered as a proxy outcome) as they provide 
a within-person structure to complement the transitory nature of emotion. They help this 
thesis to consider workplace behaviour in the context of Affective Events Theory (AET, 
Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) which proposes that organisational events are proximal causes 
of affective reactions. These affective reactions are then associated with a host of employee 
attitudes and organisational behaviours.  
 
The possibility of meaningfully distinct affective experiences at work has been generally 
ignored by researchers (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Burke et al., 1989). These moment-to-
moment or one-off events at work elicit different affective reactions, which in turn influence 
both attitudes and behaviours differentially (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Watson (2000) 
discusses that negative events which induce stress are more likely to influence negative 
emotions whereas positive events such as social interaction are more likely to impact 
positive emotions. He noted, ‘negative mood increases in response to various types of 
unpleasant events and aversive stimuli, whereas positive mood states are much more 
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responsive to pleasant events’ (Watson, 2000, p. 63). Due to the clear research describing 
affective components of justice, and the research suggesting positive events lead to positive 
emotions and negative events negative emotions, this is further support for hypotheses 6a 
and 6b as described earlier in this thesis. Although workplace events and reactions are 
difficult to measure due to their transitory nature, researchers have provided support for the 
hypothesised relationship predicted by AET between specific events, momentary affect at 
work and attitudes such as job satisfaction, organisational commitment and intention to quit 
(Fisher, 1998; Boudens, 2005; Tenhiala & Lount, 2013). In attempting to understand the 
impact of pay (and bonus pay in particular) on employee attitude and behaviour, affective 
events theory may offer a valuable lens for viewing the issue of bonus pay as an affective 
event, eliciting emotions which then have an influence of subsequent attitudes, decisions 
and outcomes. The research into bonus pay as a distinct affective event is scarce, perhaps 
surprising given the prevalence of bonus pay in the broader public agenda and its increasing 
use as a form of pay. Although some researchers have investigated factors which seek to 
explain how employees react to pay in both distribution and process, they have largely 
ignored how an employee’s emotional reaction towards one’s pay impacts outcomes 
(Salimaki & Lount, 2008; Tenhiälä & Lount, 2013).  
 
Affective event theory has in the past included organisational rewards or punishments (Brief 
& Weiss, 2002), but this has typically involved asking participants to comment on broad 
aspects of pay and reward, rather than treating specific instances as emotion-inducing 
events (which subsequently influence judgements, attitudes and behaviours). Nevertheless, 
a view of pay as an affective event is gaining traction in some research areas. Recent 
research by Mitra, Tenhiala, and Shaw (2016) considered pay system reform as an affective 
event and described certain conditions for affective events. The authors suggest that for pay 
to be considered an affective event employees must assign psychological meaning to the 
sum or circumstances surrounding the pay event. The treatment of pay as an affective event 
by Mitra et al. (2016) offers a potential framework to view bonus pay as an organisational 
event, and the proposed role of justice in pay and performance relationships offers a 
construct with which to test mediating relationships suggested in previous literature. This 
framework also provides a useful means for testing the interactions of affective and social 
exchange relationship effects of justice (pointed out as a fruitful avenue of investigation in 
previous research; Colquitt et al., 2013; Greenberg et al., 2007). This thesis has considered 
the literature viewing justice as affective in some detail in previous sections and has 
highlighted research suggesting a link between justice, affect and turnover intention. It will 
add value at this stage to address the alternative lens used by researchers to view justice, 
that of social exchange relationship quality. A review of this literature will help the reader to 
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understand not only the types of social exchange relationships considered by previous 
authors, but also some of the determinants of social exchange relationships and the 
relationships found in previous research related to pay, justice and outcomes.  
 
2.9.6. Justice and Social Exchange 
 
As explained earlier in this section, researchers have suggested that organisations exist as 
independent social actors capable of justice or injustice (Trevino & Bies, 1997). In this view 
the ‘organisation’ is loosely defined and considered a single entity. This has recently been 
expanded, with researchers now suggesting a range of potential organisational actors 
against which social exchange relationship quality judgements are made, with the potential 
that these judgements co-exist. The target similarity model developed by Lavelle, Rupp, and 
Brockner (2007) suggests that perceptions of justice related to a given target will best predict 
social exchange quality with that target, which will in turn best predict reciprocation toward 
that target. This ‘target’ as per Lavelle et al. (2007) is consistent with social comparison 
theories outlined earlier in this thesis. In order to further understand social exchange 
relationships in more detail, it may be worth at this stage considering the sources and types 
of social exchange relationships in the literature and the evidence for the importance of the 
construct. Overall research suggests that employees face two main sources of injustice in 
social exchange relationships in the workplace, the immediate supervisor or manager (as 
this is a source of influence over important outcomes such as pay raises or promotional 
opportunities), and the organisation as a whole. Research has in particular found justice 
perceptions influence both supervisor- and organisation-related outcomes via the mediating 
variables of leader-member exchange and perceived organisation support (Masterson et al., 
2000). Leader member exchange (LMX) is defined as the quality of the relationship between 
the supervisor and his or her employee (e.g. Graen & Scandura, 1987). Perceived 
Organisational Support (POS) reflects the quality of the relationship between the employee 
and the broader organisation by measuring the extent to which employees believe that the 
organisation values their contributions and cares about their welfare (Eisenberger, 
Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986).  
 
Both LMX and POS develop through employees’ assessments of their treatment by either 
supervisors or the organisation, and employees subsequently use their judgments of social 
exchange relationship to estimate their levels of fairness (Masterson et al., 2000). The 
constructs describing social exchange relationships have grown in recent years, with a range 
of variables now proposing to describe social exchange relationship quality in the literature, 
including satisfaction (Weiss, 2002), trust (Aryee et al., 2002) and commitment (Van 
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Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006). Other researchers, however, argue that these constructs do 
not accurately represent social exchange relationships. This thesis will return to Blau’s 
(1964, p. 88) original concept, which describes social exchange relationships as ‘an 
exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at 
least two persons’. There will be a review of specific measures for assessing social 
exchange relationship quality in later chapters, but it is important to note that some credible 
academics (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2014) suggest that many measures of social exchange 
relationship quality (including measures of LMX, POS and trust) possess content validity 
problems when used to operationalise social exchange relationships, either because they 
are one-sided statements which don’t identify a relationship, or because they seek to assess 
antecedents or consequences of social exchange relationships rather than the relationship 
itself (Colquitt et al., 2014).  
 
The evidence in the literature for associations between social exchange relationship quality 
and organisational attitudes and outcomes is broad. In general this is a more strongly 
researched relationship than emotion and organisational attitudes and outcomes. Research 
links between social exchange relationship quality and justice have led to some authors to 
suggest that ‘the reason fairness perceptions appear to influence work-related attitudes and 
behaviours lies in the quality of employees social exchange relationships’ (Masterson, Lewis, 
Goldman, & Taylor, 2000, p. 8). Individuals often think of their employing organisations as 
independent social actors capable of justice or injustice (Trevino & Bies, 1997). It has been 
proposed that employees perceive fairness as a contribution which enhances the quality of 
their relationship in the workplace. This contribution in turn allows employees to reciprocate 
in ways that preserve the social exchange relationship, with improved performance or other 
citizenship behaviours (Wayne et al., 2002). Greenberg and Scott (1996) suggest in fact that 
justice is a means of judging the quality of the social exchange relationship between 
individuals, which in turn then predicts subsequent positive or negative behaviour. A series 
of researchers (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Konovsky, Villanueva, & O’Leary, 2001; Lee, 
1995; Moorman, 1991) have suggested that organisational justice facilitates the formation of 
social exchange relationships, with an increase in justice perceptions leading to an increase 
in perceptions of the quality of social exchange relationships. As a consequence of these 
relationships individuals are more or less likely to increase their job performance, engage in 
organisational citizenship behaviours (OCB) or leave the organisation, with a decrease in the 
quality of social exchange leading to poorer performance or increased turnover, and an 
increase in the perception of social exchange leading to increased performance, 
organisational citizenship behaviour or a reduction in turnover intention (Niehoff & Moorman, 
1993; Wayne et al., 2002, Colquitt et al., 2001). The evidence shows that as social exchange 
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relationship quality increases, so do outcomes such as performance (both task and cognitive 
performance) and organisational citizenship behaviours (Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002; 
Colquitt et al., 2013). The literature also tends to demonstrate that as social exchange 
relationship quality increases, the incidences and seriousness of counterproductive work 
behaviours decreases (Colquitt et al., 2013) as do intentions to leave the organisation (Van 
Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006). These consistent findings in the literature related to 
organisational justice, social exchange relationship quality and outcomes such as turnover 
which suggest a further hypothesis: 
 
H9: Organisational justice is positively related to social exchange relationship quality, 
which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention. 
 
As the meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2013) discusses, social exchange is typically the 
dominant lens for explaining justice effects on performance (Colquitt, 2008), yet this 
dominance to some extent fails to consider the evidence into the predictive effects of social 
exchange relationships versus emotions on organisational outcomes. The relationships 
between social exchange quality (measured by POS, LMX, trust and commitment) and task 
performance have been shown by some researchers to be stronger than the relationships 
between task performance and both positive and negative state affect. The relationships 
between state affect and both organisational citizenship behaviours and counterproductive 
work behaviours, however, have been shown to be stronger than those between social 
exchange relationship quality and these behaviours (Colquitt et al., 2013). Interestingly, 
where justice is concerned, the relationships between certain scales of justice (e.g. 
distributive justice) and negative state affect are also stronger than the relationships between 
distributive justice and social exchange relationship quality (Colquitt et al., 2013), perhaps 
indicating that some elements of justice and some organisational outcomes are predicted 
more by social exchange relationship quality than by state affect, and some predicted more 
by state affect than social exchange quality. 
 
Forgas and George (2001) have demonstrated that emotions can influence both judgement 
and relationships involving social exchange and that positive emotional states may increase 
desirable employee attitudes. Colquitt et al. (2013) describe a relationship between justice, 
social exchange relationship quality and affect in Figure 2 with complex relationships 
between the three constructs, with social exchange mediating affect-outcome relationships, 
and affect mediating social exchange-outcome relationships. Similarly, Colquitt et al. (2013) 
suggest that the relationship between justice and social exchange relationship quality is at 
least partially mediated by affect, and the relationship between justice and affect is at least 
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partially mediated by social exchange relationship quality, though this model is yet to be 
tested empirically by the authors. Emotions also play a role in social exchange relationships, 
a factor which has not gone unnoticed in literature, with Lawler and Thye (1999, p. 218) 
stating ‘we believe that emotional dynamics have a more central role in social exchange than 
typically assumed’. Emotions are part of and can alter the context of exchange as well as be 
caused and produced by the exchange process and the associated outcomes (Lawler & 
Thye, 1999). There is a growing body of research which indicates that emotions do in fact 
shape social judgments (e.g. Bower, 1991; Isen, 1987). Considering how these findings 
relate to this research this thesis can therefore suggest an additional hypothesis: 
 
H10: The relationship between justice and both social exchange relationship quality 
and turnover intention is at least partially mediated by positive or negative state 
affect. 
 
This literature review has provided an overview of the existing research related to pay (and 
bonus pay specifically), organisational justice, social comparison, emotion, social exchange 
relationship quality and organisational outcomes. Throughout the review the thesis has 
identified limitations related to specific theories and research investigations. In order to draw 
these limitations together a summary will now be provided. This summary is designed not 
only to highlight areas of weakness in the current body of research, but also to inform the 
research designs in the investigations designed to address the hypotheses developed during 
this literature review. 
 
2.10. Limitations in the Current Literature 
 
There are a number of limitations identified in the research considering workplace events, 
justice and turnover intention. The construct of organisation justice is well established, with 
measures of justice showing strong validity and reliability under proper research conditions. 
It has been shown to mediate the relationship between pay and organisational outcomes in 
previous research and is suggested to be an effective measure of fairness in an 
organisational setting. As this thesis is concerned with fairness and the mediating effects of 
justice on the relationship between bonus pay and turnover intention it is a valuable 
construct as it has demonstrated validity when used alongside pay (though predominantly 
pay in the form of salary) and turnover intention in previous research. There are, however, 
flaws in the existing literature which should be taken into account, including limitations 
concerning the events researched which lead to justice appraisals and the methods and 
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techniques used in existing research. This thesis will now discuss these limitations in more 
detail.  
 
The research considering different types and class of event in current literature is generally 
limited and is grouped into several (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories 
(Brief & Weiss, 2002). Few of these events have been researched through the specific lens 
of organisational justice, though there exists a narrow range. These include events such as 
achievement, recognition, giving of more responsibility, and advancement (Herzberg, 
Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959), supervision, policy and process conflict (Hart, Wearing, & 
Headley, 1994) and leaders, workgroup characteristics and organisational rewards or 
punishments (Brief & Weiss, 2002). A consolidation of the literature into workplace events 
reveals a substantial range of potential events to include in research (as will be discussed in 
the method section for the experience sampling investigation in Chapter 6) though perhaps 
due to the potential volume of workplace events these are typically limited in research to a 
maximum of eight events which means that more salient workplace events which lead to 
justice appraisals may be missed (Basch & Fisher, 2000). Different situations or events are 
associated with referent selection, satisfaction and justice appraisals (Scholl et al., 1987; 
Buunk & Gibbons, 2007) therefore considering justice as an attitude in absence of the event 
which is associated with the appraisal can be seen as problematic (to say that a situation or 
event is unfair refers to that specific situation or event). Emotion researchers are quite clear 
that different types of events are also associated with different emotions (Izard, 1991). The 
events that elicit the emotion of anger are quite different from those that cause joy, and fear 
is associated with different events than pride or envy. It may therefore be that for a range of 
identified events which occur in the workplace there are different referent choices, emotional 
responses and judgement processes, leaving the scope of research potentially vast. In the 
specific situation of justice appraisals made as a result of a bonus (as a workplace event) 
this literature review has demonstrated a lack of research in this area, and the research 
which does exist tends to use laboratory studies or is limited to the use of students as 
participants. Where bonus pay as a situation is researched in workplace environments it 
tends to be limited to single workplaces (e.g. Ockenfels et al., 2010) or limited to particular 
organisational groups (Tremblay et al., 2000) which limits the generalisability of the findings.  
 
Although the four elements of justice (distributional, procedural, interpersonal and 
informational) have been covered in some detail in existing research there are often 
inconsistencies in the constructs used to describe these scales, with procedural justice often 
including items related to communication and treatment which are better suited to other 
justice scales (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). Research considering 
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reactions to pay fairness is often laboratory-based (e.g. Gneezy, 2004), classroom-based 
(e.g. Pokorny, 2008), conducted using simulated environments (e.g. Guth et al., 1982), or 
focused on specific events (e.g. Fisher, 1998). These pieces of research are not only limited 
in their generalizability to workplace events, but also limited in their generalisability to 
employees as they typically use students as participants, and sums (i.e. pay amounts) which 
may not represent a realistic amount to an employee. This may be important given the non-
linearity in the reactions to pay when differential amounts are concerned demonstrating that 
pay amount is also associated with attitudes and outcomes (Gneezy, 2004). There is also a 
failure within the justice literature to treat justice as a momentary and intense phenomenon. 
The definition of justice as having an emotional component would suggest this is the case, 
yet the majority of justice research treats it as a relatively stable construct and assesses it 
through cross-sectional methods (e.g. Tremblay et al., 2000). Although there exists research 
into the role of workplace events as justice-triggering work factors, the research is often 
methodologically limited, and the research has ‘contributed little to understanding the 
production of moods and emotions at work’, (Brief & Weiss, 2002, p. 287). As the research 
tends to neglect these emotional lenses of justice, it also fails to properly investigate the 
determinants of justice. Justice theories point to both social exchange relationship quality 
and affective lenses as components which have an association with attitudes and outcomes, 
yet research has yet to consider these lenses as co-existing phenomena. Justice 
researchers have differences of opinion as to whether it is emotional or social exchange 
factors which influence outcomes to the greatest extent, and these relationships remain to 
be tested for the same event (as identified by both Colquitt et al., 2013 and Greenberg et al., 
2007). 
 
Much of the social exchange relationship research is workplace-based, with empirical 
studies typically operationalised by constructs which seek to appraise the quality of social 
exchange related to both individuals at work (e.g. leadership, managers), and the 
organisation (e.g. levels of organisational support). This research includes mediating 
variables such as leader-member exchange, commitment, trust, perceived organisational 
support and psychological contract fulfilment (Colquitt et al., 2014). Many of these variables 
possess content validity problems when used to operationalise social exchange 
relationships, either because they are one-sided statements and don’t necessarily identify a 
relationship, or because they seek to assess antecedents or consequences of social 
exchange relationships rather than the relationship itself (Colquitt et al., 2014). Research into 
social exchange relationship quality has largely sought to investigate the ‘event, social 
exchange relationship quality, reciprocal behaviour’ causal string, using cross-sectional self-
report scales (e.g. Masterson et al., 2000; Tekleab et al., 2005). This policy-capturing 
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method brings a number of research limitations. Firstly, the cross-sectional data precludes 
any inference of causality. Secondly is the limitation in considering social exchange as a 
stable construct when applied to employment relationship. In a stable employment 
relationship characterised by high levels of fairness and trust, researchers concede that a 
social exchange model may predominate (e.g. Aryee et al., 2002). However, in an 
employment context characterized by low levels of fairness and trust, the employment 
relationship may undergo a qualitative change and an economic exchange relationship may 
take primacy (Aryee et al., 2002). The nature of using cross sectional research therefore 
assumes a relationship characterised by high levels of fairness and trust, which may not be 
the case for many employees. Social exchange-based research largely treats social 
exchange as a reasonably stable construct over longer timescales. In fact some definitions 
of social exchange have the long-term focus of the construct embedded in them, for example 
drawing on Blau’s (1964) descriptions, Colquitt et al. (2014, p. 604) used the following 
definition for social exchange relationships: ‘A more invested relationship between an 
employee and his/her [supervisor/organisation] that is based on, and motivated by, 
obligatory exchanges of unspecified favours and benefits, over an open-ended and long-
term time frame’. These two methodological starting points have historically led to different 
techniques in assessing social exchange and affective components of justice. Thirdly, the 
reliance of the majority of researchers on self-report measures (though some researchers 
have successfully used supervisor-ratings) suggests that the results could suffer from 
common method variance. It is common in social exchange research to use a number of 
measures for perceived organisational support (POS), leader member exchange (LMX), 
commitment and trust, whilst also asking for self-reported outcomes measures including task 
performance, job satisfaction and turnover intentions (Loi, Hang‐Yue, & Foley, 2006; Colquitt 
et al., 2013; Aryee et al., 2002). Whilst some researchers support their work with 
confirmatory factor analyses and an analysis of correlations to investigate shared variance 
among self-report constructs, there are others who do not. Fourthly is the ‘dominance effect’, 
which refers to the reliability of the perceived pay differential for different referents due to 
either information availability or measurement error. These factors can combine in research 
to offer limitations to the findings. 
 
Although there have been some attempts to understand discrete emotional consequences of 
workplace events (e.g. Basch & Fisher, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999) the research is limited in 
this area both in volume and in scope. Whilst research into workplace events has 
incorporated the assessment of emotion this is limited in the types of event included (as 
discussed above), and typically does not consider the strength of emotions (e.g. Brief & 
Weiss, 2002; Basch & Fisher, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). There is also a shortage of research 
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considering the co-occurrence and interactional effects of social exchange relationship 
quality and affective components of justice (Greenberg et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2013), 
and the mediating effects of emotions and social exchange relationship on justice - turnover 
intention relationships. There exists evidence for some of these relationships, yet little where 
bonus pay is concerned and little which looks at the full path. These limitations have in the 
past been suggested to be caused by limitations in measurement techniques available to 
researchers in assessing emotions and social exchange relationships dynamically, however 
due to the treatment of attitudes and behaviours as more state-like in nature this avenue of 
research can now be opened (Colquitt et al., 2013). There remain disagreements regarding 
the real effects of bonuses on outcomes (Pfeffer, 1997) at least in part due to differences in 
research methods used by researchers, and the failure to control for a number of plausible 
interpretations of causality (Mattson, Torbiorn, & Hellgren, 2014). Affective reactions to 
bonus payments due to the short-term nature of emotions must be captured shortly after 
issuance of a bonus payment, introducing potential limitations in methodology used. In 
empirical studies this involves having access to a sufficiently broad sample of the workforce 
at a time often deemed particularly sensitive in organisational life.  
 
The research methods used in referent choice are largely based around choosing referents 
from a list numbering up to nine (e.g. Schneider & Schupp, 2010), or using policy capturing 
methods (e.g. Lee & Martin, 1991). A proportion of research has involved developing a list of 
possible referents, then asking respondents to choose the ones they use from this list (e.g.  
Ambrose & Kulik, 1988; Stepina & Perrewe, 1991). A limitation of this approach is that the 
authors tend to assume that the most frequently cited referent is the most important referent, 
which may be misleading as referents chosen infrequently may be more important to 
outcomes than those chosen more frequently. These reasonably static methods also fail to 
accommodate findings which support the hypotheses that there are situational elements of 
referent choice (e.g. Kulik & Ambrose, 1992), and people do not apply social comparison 
evenly (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001). Ronen (1986) used a policy capturing method and 
asked respondents to rate their pay satisfaction and indicate how satisfied they were 
compared to a) other employees in the same organisation performing a similar job, and b) 
others outside the organisation doing a similar job. Correlation coefficients between pay 
satisfaction and these two referents were used as indicators of relative importance of the two 
referents. Lee and Martin (1991) used the same policy capturing approach in food retail 
chains but employed various referents including part-time workers, those in competitor 
companies, and those in heavy industries such as automobile or steel which form alternative 
possible places of work. Respondent’s general pay satisfaction ratings were regressed on 
the respondents pay satisfaction relative to the referent groups, and the regression weights 
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were interpreted as the relative importance of the different referents. This approach, along 
with clear directions to participants’ that the referent selected should be the most important 
to decision making (rather than frequency of selection) was the favoured approach after 
reviewing potential methods (Lee & Martin, 1991). Previous researchers have noted the 
limitations related to common method and dominance as outlined above and have designed 
methods to address these. Law and Wong (1998) used an innovative policy-capture 
approach to put participants into a hypothetical but realistic scenario and asked how satisfied 
they would be given the scenario. Since actual pay differences were used instead of 
perceived pay differences with respect to different referent groups, predictor variables in the 
regression analysis were not perceptual measures. They would therefore not have common 
method variance with the perception of pay satisfaction. The dominance effect is also 
controlled for by informing the respondents of the actual average pay for different referent 
groups directly, removing the requirement for respondents to estimate values. This offers 
two potential solutions, though it may prove difficult in reality to inform respondents about 
average pay for groups in the organisational setting if this is not a common practice.  
 
Of the potential solutions to address these limitations identified in the literature many 
researchers suggest that experience sampling offers a potential avenue, as well as offering 
a chance to close a significant gap in research related to bonus pay (e.g. Dalal et al., 2009; 
Fisher & To, 2012; Colquitt et al., 2013; Greenberg et al., 2007). It is a method strongest 
when used proximal to events, and so when emotions remain stronger in the memory 
(Gartenberg & Wulf, 2014). Experience sampling methods have begun to introduce an 
element of the ‘here and now’ into social exchange and justice research and may offer a 
positive way forward in investigating the co-occurrence of attitudes and affect. Research 
using experience sampling as a methodology has revealed daily within person variation in 
justice and reciprocal behaviours (Dalal et al., 2009; Loi, Yang, & Diefendorff, 2009; Fisher & 
To, 2012) and could potentially be extended to include social exchange relationship and 
emotion measures. Similar research has investigated event, affect and behaviour 
relationships, successfully operationalising real time feedback using repeated measures 
methods at multiple intervals during the day (Miner, Glomb, & Hulin, 2005; Yong & Sooshin, 
2014; Dimotakis, Scott, & Koopman, 2011). There appears an opportunity to build on current 
research by incorporating experience sampling techniques to investigate workplace events 
(and in particular bonus pay as a workplace event), justice appraisals, affect and social 
exchange quality and their relationship with turnover intention. Though the limitations in 
research and methodology are well reasoned, this opportunity to extend extant research has 
not gone unnoticed. Using similar arguments to this thesis, Colquitt (2012, p.6) considers a 
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range of evidence and comes to a similar conclusion as to the need for further research as 
this thesis, with his summation being: 
 
‘Research integrating justice and affect should begin to explore whether emotions 
mediate justice effects when more cognitive mediators are also modelled. Existing 
research has been more focused on identifying and clarifying the justice emotion 
linkages, omitting the kinds of mediators that would flow out of more cognitive 
justice theorizing. Do positive and negative emotions mediate the relationships 
between justice and behavioural reactions when mediators like trust and felt 
obligation are also modelled? Examining this question requires the integration of 
more cognitive theories, such as social exchange theory with more affective 
theories, such as affective events theory. One challenge in conducting such 
research is balancing the differing time horizons for emotion-based mediators and 
cognition-based mediators. Studies that examine the mediating effects of trust or 
felt obligation would typically be between-individual studies of either a cross-
sectional or longitudinal nature. Because emotions are short-term feeling states, it 
may be inappropriate to operationalize them in such studies... scholars could utilize 
ESM studies to model within-individual changes in emotions as a function of daily 
justice experiences.’ 
 
In the past there have been reasonable methodological limitations to research considering 
the broad scope of event-to-outcome responses, but experience sampling methods (ESM) 
have proved successful in examining affective reactions (Yong & Sooshin, 2014), including 
reactions related to workplace events (Fisher & To, 2012). Given this understanding of the 
approaches available to overcome methodological limitations in extant literature, this thesis 
can begin to build a number of conceptual paths between the variables under investigation 
to test the hypotheses laid out in this chapter. While this thesis began by suggesting a 
‘stimulus, attitude and outcome’ pathway to view organisational events such as bonus pay, 
justice appraisals and proxy-outcomes such as turnover intention, during this review of the 
available literature this has become more specific, now encompassing additional constructs 
such as social exchange relationship quality, social comparison mechanisms and emotion. 
Given the scope of the hypotheses outlined in this thesis it would add value at this point to 
develop the approaches required to test these hypotheses.  By considering specific paths 
evident in theory and also suggested in previous research this thesis can also more clearly 
define research methods which are able to address each of the specific hypotheses 
described in this thesis in turn.  
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The previous chapter offered an understanding of the basic areas that underly this thesis in 
the existing literature, namely pay for performance, bonus payments (and financial 
incentives in general), organisational justice, social comparison, social exchange relationship 
quality, affect (both trait and state) and organisational attitudes and behaviours (eventually 
limiting this broad area to the variable of turnover intention). The section closed by 
identifying gaps and limitations in the existing research, and beginning to discuss ways to 
close these gaps. This chapter sets out the direction of the research investigations in this 
thesis. It begins by summarising the distinct hypotheses the research is designed to 
address. It then develops three coherent figures describing the relationships between the 
variables based on the current research considered in the review of the literature. Finally, 
this chapter identifies where in these figures the hypotheses related to this research fit, and 
begins to consider these figures as a framework for explaining the research methods 
selected for testing the hypotheses, which this thesis will explain later in this section. 
 
3.2. Summary of hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses to be addressed in this thesis are summarised below: 
 
H1: Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction. 
 
H2a and 2b: Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and 
negatively related to (b) turnover intention. 
 
H3a and 3b: Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between (a) bonus 
amount and bonus satisfaction and (b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
 
H4: Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction and turnover 
intention than procedural, interpersonal and informational justice components for 
bonus pay conditions. 
 
H5a and 5b: (a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants 
when engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. (b) The referent 
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selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those in 
the same company at the same level. 
 
H6a and 6b: Organisational Justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are positively 
related to (a) state positive affect and negatively related to (b) state negative affect. 
 
H7: Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice perceptions 
triggered as a result of bonus pay. 
 
H8a and 8b: Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an 
affective event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a direct affective 
relationship on turnover intention and (b) a unique effect above and beyond that of 
social exchange relationship quality on turnover intention. 
 
H9: Organisational justice is positively related to social exchange quality, which in 
turn is negatively related to turnover intention. 
 
H10: The relationship between justice and both social exchange relationship quality 
and turnover intention is mediated by positive or negative state affect. 
 
This thesis will now present figures explaining the suggested relationships between variables 
described by these hypotheses. This will help with further understanding of the proposed 
types and directions of relationships between variables, and also help to consider research 
methods to address these relationships.  
 
3.3. Development of Three Figures Explaining Relationships Between Variables 
 
Taken as a whole there are a number of areas of investigation in terms of bonus pay as a 
distinct emotion-eliciting event, and in terms of the pathways related to justice, emotions, 
attitudes and behaviours. While the scope of this thesis is broad, separating it into three 
distinct figures to be addressed allows for the explanation of a set of complex variables in 
more manageable relationships. It also allows the consideration of research methods which 
would be more suited to addressing the different relationships and hypotheses. The specifics 
and details of the research methods used will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. Firstly, in order to consider how potential research areas may be related this thesis 
has outlines figures related to the research which are consistent with current theoretical 
bases and research findings. It is important to separate these areas of research as they 
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come from different theoretical viewpoints and to test them may require different methods. 
The first figure, Figure 5, describes the direct and mediated relationship between bonus pay, 
the types of organisational justice and attitudes such as bonus satisfaction and turnover 
intention. The figure is underpinned by the relationships discussed in Chapter 2 (Elfenbein, 
2007; Eagley & Chaiken, 1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Colquitt et al., 2013; Tremblay 
et al., 2000). This figure addresses relationships between variables included in hypotheses 1 
to 4. In testing these hypotheses this thesis can also explore the strengths of relationships in 
this model, and in particular the relationships with the four distinct scales of justice; 













H1 Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction 
H2a,b Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and negatively 
related to (b) turnover intention 
H3a,b Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between a) bonus amount and 
bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
H4 Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice components 
 
Figure 5. Outline of the first figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, organisational 




















Figure 6 describes the relationships concerned with bonus pay and the social comparison 
referents selected by recipients when a bonus is paid. Different referents are proposed to 
influence justice perceptions to different extents consistent with the research outlined in the 
literature review, therefore there is a need to test the relationships with a range of referents. 
This would serve to investigate findings consistent with general pay research that referent 
selection will be an important determinant of both justice perceptions and bonus satisfaction. 
This figure will also allow the testing of hypotheses 5a and 5b (multiple referents will be very 
important to the majority of participants when engaging in social comparisons on receipt of 
their bonus. The referent selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction 
will be those in the same company at the same level). The use of similar variables in the first 
two sets of relationships (shown in Figures 5 and 6) will inform the research methods used in 












H5a,b (a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants when 
engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. (b) The referent selected 
as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those in the same 
company at the same level 
 
Figure 6. Outline of the second figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, social 




















Figure 7 describes the affective and social exchange relationships which are proposed in the 
literature to mediate the justice-outcome pathways. The direction and interaction of some of 
these linkages may require testing as, for instance, there is evidence for emotions preceding 
justice appraisals (Colquitt et al., 2013). This figure addresses hypotheses 6 to 10, involved 
with emotion and social exchange relationships. These hypotheses are labelled on each of 













H6a,b Organisational justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are positively related to 
(a) state positive affect and negatively related to (b) state negative affect 
H7 Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice perceptions 
triggered as a result of bonus pay 
H8a,b Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an affective event 
as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a direct affective relationship 
on turnover intention and (b) a unique effect above and beyond that of social 
exchange relationship quality on turnover intention 
H9 Organisational justice as a result of bonus pay is positively related to social 
exchange quality, which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention 
H10 For bonus pay the relationship between justice and both social exchange 
relationship quality and turnover intention is at least partially mediated by positive 
or negative state affect 
 
Figure 7. Outline of the third model showing proposed workplace event, organisational justice, social 



















The majority of relationships covered by the three figures are included in our hypotheses, 
however by also investigating other path relationships in the figures this thesis can close 
gaps in the research identified in the literature review. At this point however it is clear from 
the relationships shown in Figures 5, 6 and 7 that the variables in the first two can potentially 
be included in a single research design as they contain relatively stable constructs, involve 
measures related to bonus pay, justice and bonus satisfaction, and each of the hypotheses 
can be tested using a cross sectional design (as long as the deployment method is 
coincident with bonus pay). This thesis will therefore aim for a single method to enable 
investigation of the first two sets of relationships. The third set of relationships requires an 
alternative method as it involves assessing different workplace events and measures of 
affect and may be required to be administered using a repeated measures approach. As this 
third figure includes assessment of emotions then this may require more advanced methods 
as emotions are unstable and short-lived in nature (Weiss, 2002). As there are distinct 
relationships and paths described in this investigation the thesis will provide an overview of 
the research design in the next section. For each of the research designs more detail 
regarding the methods, measures and participants will be provided in later chapters as this 
thesis addresses each investigation in turn. 
 
3.4. Description of Research Design and Methodology 
 
This section develops the research strategy and provides an overview of the research 
methods to be used to investigate the hypotheses and relationships outlined in Figures 5, 6 
and 7. Firstly the section considers the strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches used in previous research. It then considers the key decisions which are 
required in defining approaches and narrows down options for research methods by 
considering clear strengths and weaknesses related to distinct approaches. Finally, the 
section explains the methods for testing each of the relationships in Figures 5, 6 and 7, 




The purpose of this research is to contribute to the growing literature on organisational 
justice by considering perceptions of justice related to bonus pay within an organisation. The 
thesis seeks to understand the underlying psychological processes present in appraisals 
surrounding bonus pay and to test the role of justice as a mediating variable in pay for 
performance relationships. The research seeks to add to existing knowledge in a number of 
ways. The first is to consider bonus pay in the context of a social comparison process, where 
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the bonus pay announcement acts as a trigger for engaging in social comparison processes 
with selected referents, from which justice appraisals and satisfaction judgements are made. 
There are currently gaps in existing research considering the referents chosen by 
participants upon payment of the bonus, and the relationship between this referent selection 
and satisfaction with a bonus. The research investigates whether justice perceptions or 
bonus amount (both in real terms and as a percentage of salary) are more important in the 
formation of satisfaction appraisals related to a bonus. It also investigates which types of 
organisational justice (distributive, procedural, informational and interpersonal) are more 
important in determining satisfaction judgements related to bonus pay.  
 
The thesis also contributes to existing research into bonus pay by considering bonus pay as 
a workplace event in comparison with other events. It investigates both social exchange 
relationship quality and emotional reactions to bonus pay (described as the two lenses for 
viewing justice in the existing literature), a need identified by previous researchers 
(Greenberg, 1990). The research investigates these lenses concurrently as a result of bonus 
pay as an event in isolation, as well as in comparison with other workplace events. Such 
events previously covered in research include acts of management, receiving recognition 
(Basch & Fisher, 2000) and incidences of conflict (Boudens, 2005) and the thesis uses a 
taxonomy of similar events found in current research to understand the relative magnitude 
and direction of effects. In this way the thesis contributes to the current body of research into 
workplace events to understand the impact of bonus pay relative to these events, and 
addresses the question posed by current researchers (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 
1990) asking what matters more to attitudes and outcomes as a result of justice appraisals, 
recipients emotions or the changes to their social exchange relationship quality? It is 
understood from the literature that reactions to each workplace event may be different. The 
thesis therefore investigates the differences in justice, emotion, social exchange relationship 
quality and turnover intention due to these distinct events, thereby further testing the basis of 
affective events theory and adding to the research in this area. 
 
3.4.2. Research Methods 
 
Two distinct quantitative research methods were used to conduct the research, with different 
methods used for each of the investigations. The two methods in combination address all of 
the relationships identified in Figures 5, 6 and 7 and address each of the hypotheses 
identified in the literature review and summarised earlier in this chapter. The first method 
addresses the relationships in Figures 5 and 6. A cross-sectional approach was preferred for 
a number of methodological reasons. Firstly, testing the relationships described in Figures 5 
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and 6 does not require a repeated-measures approach as all information can be gathered at 
a single point in time and emotion is not included as a variable. Secondly cross-sectional 
methods can generate a sufficient sample size to fully test the relationship between bonus 
amount and bonus satisfaction. Thirdly, the data gathered includes demographic data, bonus 
and salary data, data related to referents used and also justice, bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention data. Previous researchers point to a number of benefits of cross-sectional 
designs (which are also considered drawbacks when using other techniques such as 
experience sampling methods), including a lack of need to limit variables to improve 
participation rates (Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). By using a cross sectional 
approach some considerations must be taken into account in the research design, such as 
when to issue the questionnaire as perceptions of justice can change over time due to 
memory bias, and how to issue the questionnaire to meet with the requirements of a broad 
participant base. These questions will be considered in the detailed method sections for 
each of the investigations in this thesis. 
 
To fully research the variables and relationships included in Figure 7 an alternative method 
must be employed. Cross sectional methods do not fully support the assessment of emotion 
or reactions to different events in the workplace. They also do not allow for the assessment 
and identification of causality, which longitudinal methods can help to address. For this type 
of investigation, a repeated measured method is preferred such as experience sampling 
(Scollon et al., 2003). Previous authors have suggested experience sampling methods 
(ESM) as a potentially fruitful method for assessing the coincidence of social exchange 
relationship quality and affective reactions to justice (e.g. Colquitt, 2012). ESM is a more 
suitable technique for investigating those variables either concerned with affect (or emotion) 
and social exchange relationship quality or for investigating different workplace events as it 
allows for the investigation of the effect of these events or emotions on outcome and 
predictor variables. ESM also, however, comes with limitations such as the need to limit the 
number of variables in any measures to improve ongoing response rates (Scollon et al., 
2003). The second investigation will therefore use this method to gain a deeper 
understanding of the relationships in Figure 7, and to assess the differential effects of 
emotion and social exchange relationship for different workplace events including the 
specific event of bonus pay. While there are benefits to researching these relationships for 
bonus pay as an event, the addition of other workplace events will support the testing of 
hypothesis 8 (bonus payment will be a work event which can be considered an affective 
event as per the tenets of AET). It will also allow the research to investigate the emotional 
reactions associated with bonus pay in comparison with other events in the workplace, and 
allow this thesis to investigate the relative social exchange relationship quality and affective 
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relationships for a range of events and so draw more complete conclusions in terms of their 
association with turnover intention. 
 
If the research is separated into two clear pieces to address these three sets of 
relationships, it is possible to explain the approaches used to investigate each of these 
relationships in more detail and provide justification for the research methods based on the 
balance of needs of ESM to limit variables as outlined in previous research, with the need for 
a sufficient sample size to be able to fully investigate bonus amount – bonus satisfaction 
relationships. In order to address each of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 the thesis 
therefore uses two distinct methods. The first method is cross sectional, with a questionnaire 
issued to participants as soon as administratively possible after the announcement of the 
bonus to reduce memory bias. This method addresses the relationships and hypotheses in 
Figures 5 and 6 outlined earlier in this section, and is designed to capture demographic data 
as well as data related to the variables of bonus pay, organisational justice (both as an 
aggregated construct and as the individual scales of distributive, procedural, interpersonal 
and informational justice), bonus satisfaction, turnover intention (to test hypotheses H1 – H4) 
and social comparison referent (to test hypothesis H5). The second method is a repeated 
measure, experience sampling design using a diary format and addresses the relationships 
described in Figure 7. This method is designed to capture participant demographic data, 
data on the workplace events participants experience during the research period (a period 
during which the participants bonus is announced), organisational justice, social exchange 
relationship quality, emotion and turnover intention. This design allows for the investigation 
of relationships outlined in Figure 7 for bonus pay as an event, and also allows for the 
comparison of the effects of bonus pay as an event with other events experience over the 
research period. By using the same time period this provides a consistent organisational 
context during which events occur. This method allows the testing of hypotheses H6 – H10.  
 
In the next chapter a partition will be created in this thesis. Chapter 4 will outline the method 
for the cross-sectional investigation considering the variables of Bonus Amount, Referent 
Selection, Organisational Justice (including the distinct scales of distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice), Bonus Satisfaction and Turnover Intention designed 
to address the relationships outlined in Figures 5 and 6 in this chapter. Chapter 5 will outline 
the results of this investigation. In a similar vein, Chapter 6 will consider the experience 
sampling method used to investigate relationships identified in Figure 7, those between 
workplace events (including Bonus Pay as a distinct event), Organisational Justice, Emotion, 
Social Exchange Relationship quality and Turnover Intention. Each of these two chapters 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) will discuss the research designs in more depth, providing details 
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of more granular elements of the design such as their appropriateness, participants, the 
measures employed and data collection and analysis techniques. Each chapter outlining the 
method is followed by a chapter sharing the results of each investigation (in Chapters 5 and 





4. Study 1: Bonus Pay, Referent Selection, Organisational Justice, Bonus Satisfaction and 
Turnover Intention 
 
In order to effectively demonstrate the relationships which form a part of this study (the first 
of two which together address the hypotheses in this thesis), Figures 8 and 9 describe the 
two sets of variables, paths and hypotheses to be addressed by this investigation. The thesis 
will describe the method used to investigate these relationships over the following section, 















H1 Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction 
H2a,b Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and negatively 
related to (b) turnover intention 
H3a,b Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between a) bonus amount and 
bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
H4 Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice components 
 
Figure 8. Outline of the first figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, organisational 






























H5a.b (a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants when 
engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. (b) The referent selected 
as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those in the same 
company at the same level. 
 
Figure 9. Outline of the second figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, social 




The first of the investigations included in this research considers the relationships between 
bonus pay, organisational justice, satisfaction with the bonus paid, and turnover intention. 
The research seeks to understand the relationship between the amount paid in bonus (both 
in terms of absolute amount and as a percentage of the recipient’s salary) and both bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention and investigates which predictor variable has the 
strongest association with turnover intention; organisational justice, satisfaction with the 
bonus or the amount paid in bonus. Distinct components of organisational justice are 
included in the investigation (distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational) to 
explore which is the most effective in predicting bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. In 
this method the thesis also investigates the referents chosen by participants when engaging 
in justice appraisals related to bonus pay. Although these relationships are described in a 
separate figure in the research outline (Figure 9), the similarity of variables and relationships 
in this figure when compared with Figure 8 allows for the development of a single research 
design which will address both of these sets of relationships. The hypotheses this research 


















H1: Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction. 
 
H2a and 2b: Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and 
negatively related to (b) turnover intention. 
 
H3a and 3b: Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between a) bonus 
amount and bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
 
H4: Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice components for bonus pay conditions. 
 
H5a and 5b: (a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants 
when engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. (b) The referent 
selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those in 
the same company at the same level. 
 
 
4.2. Appropriateness of the Research Design 
 
In order to investigate the range of research relationships and hypotheses using a 
controllable set of measures, to allow for the standardisation of information and to generate 
a sample size sufficient for effectively analysing the relationships, a quantitative survey 
approach was used with a cross-sectional sample. A survey approach was chosen as it does 
not require control over participant actions, and mainly focuses on contemporary events 
(such as bonus pay). It is an approach which also allows participants to remain anonymous, 
and so is suitable for attracting participants in bonus research where there may be some 
reticence in disclosing personal information such as the amount received. Table 2 illustrates 




Table 2.  
Different strategies used for investigating research questions (source: Yin, 1984) 
 
    






    Experiment How, Why Yes Yes 
Survey How, What, Where, How 




How, What, Where, How 
Many, How Much 
No Yes/No 
History How, Why No No 
Case Study How, Why No Yes 
        
 
A cross sectional survey design, though not ideal for developing a view of cause-and-effect 
relationships, offers a number of strengths for this proposed investigation. The study 
provides only a snapshot of analysis, yet the nature of a bonus payment is that it is typically 
announced periodically, and at this point (or as close to this point as possible to ensure 
accuracy of appraisal, and that the research is not relying on distal memories of events) data 
can be gathered. Unlike in experimental design (where there is an active intervention by the 
researcher to produce and measure differences), cross-sectional designs focus on studying 
and drawing inferences from existing phenomena, with groups selected based on existing 
differences in the sample. It is therefore well suited to assess workplace events such as 
bonus pay. Cross-sectional studies are capable of using data from a large number of 
subjects and unlike observational studies are not geographically bound. The method allows 
for the estimation of the prevalence of an outcome of interest because the sample is usually 
taken from the whole population. As the technique typically uses surveys to gather data, it is 
also relatively easy to administer to a broad number of participants using a standardised 
approach and so can test complex relationships such as the hypothesised non-linearity of 
the relationship between bonus pay and bonus satisfaction. Amongst the limitations of cross-
sectional methods are the fact that researchers using this method can only employ a 
relatively passive approach to making causal inferences based on findings, results are time 
bound (and there is the possibility that results would be different if another bonus period was 
chosen), they give no indication of a sequence of events involved in the bonus pay-to-
attitudes pathway, and there is no potential follow up to the findings to test the downstream 
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impacts of proximal attitudes to bonus pay, such as whether turnover intention actually 
results in turnover.  
 
4.3. Research Design  
 
A cross-sectional survey was administered to participants no more than 24 hours after the 
announcement of their bonus so as to accurately capture perceptions and reduce memory 
bias. When investigating processes in bonus research in more detail, this research identified 
two distinct appraisal events; when information regarding the bonus is announced (the 
bonus announcement), and when the bonus is paid (the bonus payment). The bonus 
announcement is more salient to this research as this is when the initial appraisal for 
determining justice is made. This was therefore used as the trigger for the measure, 
subsequently revealing a snapshot of effects immediately following the announcement of the 
bonus (or as close as administratively possible). Participants were recruited from 
organisations the author worked with as a management consultant between the years 2015 
and 2018. As a management consultant working in the human resources function within 
large corporate organisations the author had access during this period to executives and 
managers able to provide consent for access to organisational databases (in order to identify 
participants) and to provide sponsorship and engagement aimed at driving participation in 
the research. The organisations involved in the research (from which participants are drawn) 
represent a range of public and private sector organisations with employee numbers ranging 
from 25,000 to 80,000. As the research is designed to be as generalisable as possible the 
research was approached as if sampling the UK bonus earning workforce.  
 
Using standardised approaches for understanding sample sizes and estimating the UK 
bonus earning workforce as 10.2 million (taking 32% of the UK working population of 31.8 
million in 2017) (Attwood, 2017; Office for National Statistics, 2017) a sample size of at least 
384 is required to achieve a 95% confidence level at a confidence interval of 5. This provides 
the scale of cross-sectional survey which would need to be administered (Kirby et al., 2002). 
A variety of ‘rules of thumb’ exist regarding minimum sample sizes, the most common 
positing at least 10-15 data points per predictor parameter in a model; e.g. with three 
predictors such as location, colony and infection intensity, 30 to 45 experimental units would 
be required (Field, 2013). For regression models (e.g. ANOVA), with P predictors, the 
recommended minimum sample size proposed is ‘50 + 8P’ to adequately test the overall 
model, and ‘104 + P’ to adequately test each predictor of a model (Green, 1991). 
Alternatively, with a high level of statistical power (using Cohen’s (1988) benchmark of 0.8), 
and with three predictors in a regression model: i) a large effect size (> 0.5) requires a 
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minimum sample size of 40 experimental units; ii) a medium effect size (approximately 0.3) 
requires a sample size of 80; iii) a small effect size (of circa 0.1) requires a sample size of 
600 (Miles & Shevlin, 2001; Field, 2013). We will therefore aim for a sample size of more 
than 600 participants in order to satisfy the conditions of both Kirby et al. (2002) and Field 
(2013). 
 
The type of sampling strategy used was non-probability, convenience sampling. The sample 
was both purposive and haphazard (therefore proving inexpensive, efficient, and convenient) 
as it consisted of volunteers and thus relied on the willingness of employees to respond and 
participate (Cozby, 2009). There was no way to estimate and ensure that the probability of 
each element of the population was represented in the sample, as well as no guarantee that 
each element had some chance of being included because it was voluntary. This may 
therefore limit the generalisability of the findings (Cozby, 2009). While there are a number of 
strengths to having access to multiple workforces to conduct this research (all of whom are 
paid differential bonuses based on differential performance practices and systems), there 
are also drawbacks. Representativeness of the sample should be strong given the diverse 
nature of respondents, but it is difficult to understand intra-individual differences in justice 
appraisals if each procedure and organisational context and climate is different. These 
contexts and climates may at least partially govern allocation rules, interpersonal interactions 
and information sharing practices and therefore influence justice appraisals. This research 
must take it as unimportant the actual processes for distributing and communicating bonuses 
and focus more on the individual appraisals of these events. The purpose of the research is 
not to test interpersonal justice reactions to the same process, but rather to test the general 
intrapersonal psychological appraisal mechanisms triggered by the event of the bonus 





In order to develop an effective methodology using appropriate measures, a pilot study was 
conducted using 50 participants in the single function of a professional services organisation. 
Participants were recruited directly by email through work networks. The pilot was designed 
to test and validate the communication, administration, measures and analysis techniques 
proposed for use. In the pilot study the independent variable under investigation is amount of 
bonus paid, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of salary. The inclusion of bonus as 
a percentage of salary is an attempt to include a measure of bonus related to a ‘starting 
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point’ as a reference amount as detailed by Mitra et al. (2016). Mediating variables are 
referent selection, organisational justice (using the distinct scales of distributive justice, 
procedural justice, informational justice and interpersonal justice) and bonus satisfaction. 
The dependent variable is turnover intention. In order to replicate the study over time a 
consistent process and repeatable cross-sectional survey design was used. The sample was 
limited to those who receive an annual bonus, with all employees paid in a one-off payment. 
The bonus amount is in excess of 5% of a participant’s annual salary, and so represents an 
amount identified in literature as a ‘smallest meaningful increase’ as discussed by Mitra et al. 
(2016). The survey was administered on the day of the bonus announcement, with 
instructions to complete the survey within a strict timeframe of 24 hours after the 
announcement of the annual bonus received by each employee. Co-ordination was therefore 
required between annual bonus processes in the organisations from which participants were 
recruited and the process used to deploy the survey. In order for ease of distribution and 
response, the survey was hosted online using a commercially available, cloud-based 
software as a service (SaaS) provider. The survey was distributed by email to each 
participant via a link embedded in an email on the day of the bonus announcement, marked 
urgent, requesting immediate response to the survey. The email sent by the researcher 
contained a link to access the survey, along with text reminding participants of the purpose 
of the study and reinforcing the confidentiality of any information submitted. Microsoft outlook 
was used as the email application for distribution of the communications, which enabled pre-
formatted communications materials to be copied into each email sent to participants. This 
proved efficient as Microsoft outlook was also the email application used by all participant 
organisations in the research proper, therefore the same materials and formats were able to 
be re-used for all participants.  
 
Following completion of the pilot study an initial analysis of the results was conducted and 
feedback solicited from participants. Upon analysis of the results correlations between 
measures of bonus satisfaction and distributive justice proved to be high (r = 0.88, p < 0.01) 
which combined with feedback from participants suggested that items in these measures 
were not substantially distinct in terms of their description of separate constructs. Both 
measures were however retained in their original structure following a detailed factor 
analysis showing that a single item was of concern, but loaded comparatively onto both 
measures. Some questions were reworded to harmonise the language used across 
measures, but items retained their original structure and meaning. Communications were 
also improved due to feedback from pilot study participants which suggested that the 
questions the research is seeking to answer, instructions for completion and links to the 
survey (including the call to action) be made clearer and highlighted in the communications. 
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The updated engagement materials were tested with a selection of pilot study members who 
confirmed that the changes improved the materials. The materials were then saved for 
distribution to participants in the full investigation and are included in Appendix 1 in Chapter 




In order for the survey to be generalisable and in order to recruit sufficient participants, it was 
held open until there were sufficient participants to reach confidence levels and intervals 
(targeted at 600). Participants were sourced and recruited through personal and professional 
networks, in organisations with which the author worked as a management consultant 
between April 2015 and November 2017. This allowed the author access to the 
organisational stakeholders and data (such as email addresses and bonus characteristics) 
required to effectively recruit participants. Participants were generally from middle manager, 
senior manager or technical specialist positions in various functions (for example human 
resources, finance, strategy, information technology) of corporate organisations across 
industries such as healthcare, retail, logistics, utilities, energy and gas and financial services. 
All participants have access to internet-based questionnaires, both via laptop PCs and 
internet-enabled smartphones issued by the employing organisations. The number of 
organisations represented totals more than 20, though participants were not asked to self-
identify organisation for confidentiality purposes (as for some organisations the number of 
participants is limited). The target population for the study consisted of salaried, full-time 
employees aged 18 or over who had worked for their employer for more than 12 months (as 
required by many of the participant organisations to receive a bonus). The sponsors ensured 
the use of organisational databases to apply filters to potential participants to ensure these 
parameters were met. The participants were selected for four reasons:  
 
a) all participants receive an annual bonus in excess of 5% of their annual salary, and 
so receive a sum considered in excess of a ‘smallest meaningful pay increase’ (or 
SMIP) as described by Mitra et al. (2016).  
b) bonus pay is contingent on performance or a defined job outcome.  
c) access to participants as co-workers over the period of a bonus announcement 
meant administration could be simple, briefings held where possible, and response 
rates and disclosure accuracy for those asked to participate reasonably high. 




In total 1368 people were contacted via email during the period the study was open 
(between April 2015 and November 2017). A total of 620 participants (45.3%) completed the 
survey within 24 hours of their bonus announcement over a four-year period (meeting our 
participant requirement of 600), with each annual round of bonuses during this period 
forming another ‘window’ to recruit participants. The author received 243 responses from 
potential participants who missed the 24-hour completion window. These responses were 
excluded from the analysis. A further 31 people responded to the email declining to 
participate as they did not wish to disclose their salary or benefits. Twenty-one of the 620 
participants could not be included as their surveys were only partially completed, leaving 599 
participants where responses had sufficient quality (43.8%). Processes for recruiting and 
engaging participants were standardised over the four-year period to ensure a consistent 
process and experience for participants (with communications included in Appendix 1). In 
the first year in April 2015 (discounting the pilot study, after which some items and 
communications materials were reformatted) 86 people participated in the survey. In 
November of 2015 a further 92 people participated. The participant rate until closure of the 
survey in November 2017 is included in Table 3. All participants from the same organisation 
completed the survey at the same point in time, meaning that the increase in participants 
over time was due to the recruitment of participants from additional organisations rather than 
the recruitment of additional participants from the same organisation. This ensured that 
participants were unique in the survey and that there are no repeat measures issued to the 
same participants. The response rate (43.8%) is acceptable given the short timescales for 




Table 3.  
Participant recruitment to cross sectional survey from April 2015 to November 2017 
 
   Date Cumulative Participants  Additional Participants 
   April 2015 86 86 
November 2015 178 92 
April 2016 294 116 
November 2016 381 87 
April 2017 469 88 
November 2017 620 151 
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4.6. Instruments and Measures 
 
Due to the diverse nature of the constructs under investigation, it was necessary to create a 
consolidated questionnaire from a battery of existing measures. Participants completed 
demographic details of gender (male or female) and position (whether a manager or non-
manager). Participants then provided information related to their annual salary in the year of 
bonus, and the annual bonus earned in that year (to the nearest thousand pounds). 
Participants then completed sections of the questionnaire in which they a) identified the 
importance of referents used in their appraisal (using nine referents as per research by 
Bordia & Blau, 1998), b) completed the organisational justice scale (OJS; Colquitt, 2001), c) 
completed the bonus satisfaction scale (BSS; Sturman & Short, 2000) and d) completed the 
turnover intention scale (TI-6; Bothma & Roodt, 2013). Whilst in their own right the language 
and syntax of the measures identified above are different, in the combined questionnaire 
items were reformatted and reworded (following feedback during our pilot study) in order to 
harmonise the items to reduce the cognitive effort required to complete the survey. Details of 
these individual measures which combine to make our full questionnaire are provided in the 
next sections. 
 
4.6.1. Referent Selection Measure 
 
In terms of the referents which participants select when social comparisons are made 
regarding a bonus payment, Blau (1994) identified five pay referent dimensions: historical, 
financial, organisation, market and social. Blau further refined this list in subsequent 
research to 9 referent items which forms to date the most complete list of referents to be 
researched in the extant literature, detailed in Table 4 (Bordia & Blau, 1998). To prevent the 
confusion identified in previous research (e.g. Law & Wong, 1998), where participants are 
asked to rate the frequency of choice of referent and this is then taken as a proxy for 
importance, participants in our research were asked directly to answer the question ‘which 
referent is important to you in order to judge whether your bonus is fair?’. The level was 
measured using a 5-point response scale, where 1 = not important; 2 = less important; 3 = 
neutral; 4 = important; and 5 = very important. This method is consistent with previous 
research (Blau, 1994; Scholl et al., 1987) though it tackles directly some of the weaknesses 
identified in previous research (e.g. Law & Wong, 1998) in confusing frequency of selection 
with strength of importance where referents are concerned. While in Table 4 the summary of 
referents has identified the part of the organisation ecosystem to which the referent is related 
(e.g. internal – same level; external; historical), in the measure used in practice these labels 
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were not included. The actual wording of the items used is shown in the full questionnaire in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 4.  




      
1 'what other people in this company at my job level are paid' (internal - same level); 
2 'what other employers are paying for my kind of work' (external); 
3 'what this company promised it would pay me' (system); 
4 'the cost of living' (cost of living); 
5 'what I have been paid in previous jobs' (historical); 
6 'what I think I am worth' (personal); 
7 'what others in this company at a higher job level than mine are paid' (internal - 
higher level); 
8 'the pay of others in this company who are below my job level' (internal – lower 
level); 
9 'my friends' pay' (friends). 
 
 
4.6.2. Organisational Justice Measure 
 
Organisational justice perceptions were assessed using the organisational justice model 
developed by Colquitt (2001) and operationalised in the organisational justice scale (OJS, 
Colquitt, 2001). The item consists of 4 scales (procedural justice, distributive justice, 
interpersonal justice, informational justice) with 20 items in total and has been positioned by 
justice researchers as amongst the most effective measures of organisational justice in 
current use (Colquitt, 2001; Shibaoka et al., 2010). Previous research has found alpha levels 
to be acceptable for the measure, with the four factors (distributive justice, procedural 
justice, interpersonal justice and informational justice) returning alpha levels of 0.95, 0.86, 
0.90, 0.93 respectively (Colquitt & Rodell, 2011). As recommended by Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994), an alpha of .70 was used as the cut-off point to estimate internal 
consistency reliability. The items were modified slightly to suit use in bonus conditions and 
context, which involved minor changes in syntax and wording. All items use a 5-point Likert–
type scale with anchors of 1 = to a small extent and 5 = to a large extent. The measure has 
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been used in field research with success and has been shown to be reliable and valid 




Table 5.  
Organisational Justice Scale items. Source: Colquitt, (2001) 
 
   
Item Justice Type Summary 
    
  The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at your (outcome). To what extent: 
 1 Procedural  Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those procedures? 
2 Procedural Have you had influence over the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? 
3 Procedural Have those procedures been applied consistently? 
4 Procedural Have those procedures been free of bias? 
5 Procedural Have those procedures been based on accurate information? 
6 Procedural Have you been able to appeal the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? 
7 Procedural Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards? 
  The following items refer to your (outcome). To what extent: 
1 Distributive Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your work? 
2 Distributive Is your (outcome) appropriate for the work you have completed? 
3 Distributive Does your (outcome) reflect what you have contributed to the organisation 
4 Distributive Is your (outcome) justified, given your performance? 
  The following items refer to (the authority figure who enacted the procedure). To what extent: 
1 Interpersonal  Has (he/she) treated you in a polite manner? 
2 Interpersonal Has (he/she) treated you with dignity? 
3 Interpersonal Has (he/she) treated you with respect? 
4 Interpersonal Has (he/she) refrained from improper remarks or comments? 
  The following items refer to (the authority figure who enacted the procedure). To what extent: 
1 Informational Has (he/she) been candid in (his/her) communications with you? 
2 Informational Has (he/she) explained the procedures thoroughly? 
3 Informational Were (his/her) explanations regarding the procedures reasonable? 
4 Informational Has (he/she) communicated details in a timely manner? 




4.6.3. Bonus Satisfaction Measure 
 
Satisfaction with lump-sum bonus was assessed using an extension of the Pay Satisfaction 
Questionnaire (PSQ) as proposed by Sturman and Short (2000). The measure consists of 4 
items measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very 
satisfied, with respondents indicating their satisfaction with 4 statements describing their 
lump sum bonus. These statements are shown in Table 6. Sturman and Short (2000) have 
demonstrated that the instrument exhibits reliability, and both convergent and discriminant 
validity, and captures unique variance beyond well-used measures of pay satisfaction such 
as the PSQ (Sturman & Short, 2000). The four elements assessed by the complete PSQ 
have demonstrated Cronbach’s alpha above the allowed threshold of 0.7 in previous 
research, with alpha levels of 0.96, 0.94, 0.90, and 0.90 returned for pay level, benefits, 
raise, and structure/administration satisfaction factors respectively (Sturman & Short, 2000). 
This is supported by other research using the PSQ and finding similar levels of reliability 
(e.g. Heneman & Schwab, 1985; Judge & Welbourne, 1994). While in Sturman and Short 
(2000) the measure (as an extension of the PSQ) was not given a clear name, this thesis 
refers to the measure as the bonus satisfaction scale (BSS) throughout. 
 
 
Table 6.  




    
1 I am satisfied with my most recent bonus 
2 I am satisfied with the influence that others have on my bonus 
3 I am satisfied with the bonuses I have typically received in the past 








4.6.4. Turnover Intention Measure 
 
Turnover intention was assessed using a six-item measure (the turnover intention survey; 
TIS-6) as shown in Table 7 (Bothma & Roodt, 2013). The TIS-6 measures participant 
responses using Osgood’s (1964) semantic differential technique of bipolar 5-step response 
scales defined by two opposites (e.g., never - always; to no extent - to a very large extent; 
highly unlikely - highly likely). The overall reliability of the TIS-6 (α = 0.80) is acceptable for 
use. Bothma and Roodt (2013) also established that scores returned using the TIS-6 
significantly relate to work engagement, work-based identity, burnout, helping behaviour, 
work alienation and task performance. These findings confirm previous research conducted 
by Bakker and Demerouti (2007), Bakker et al. (2004), Demerouti et al. (2000) and Schaufeli 
and Bakker (2004) linking turnover intention to work engagement, burnout and both task and 
job performance, hence supporting our use of this measure as a proxy for performance. In 
previous research the TIS-6 has been shown to significantly distinguish between leavers and 
stayers within an organisation thereby confirming its criterion-predictive validity (Bothma & 
Roodt, 2013). The scale was selected for this study because of its reliability and validity and 
its proven use in similar methods.  
 
Table 7.  




    
1a How often are you frustrated when not given the opportunity at work to achieve 
your personal work-related goals? 
2a How often have you considered leaving your job? 
3a How often do you dream about getting another job that will better suit your personal 
needs? 
4b How likely are you to accept another job at the same compensation level should it 
be offered to you? 
5c To what extent is your current job satisfying your personal needs? 
6d How often do you look forward to another day at work? 
 
    a - Scale: 1 = Never to 5 = Always  
    b - Scale: 1 = Highly unlikely to 5 = Highly likely  
    c - Reverse coding used. Item mean scale 1 = To a very large extent to 5 = To no extent.   
    d - Reverse coding used. Item mean scale 1 = Always to 5 = Never.    
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4.6.5. Combined Questionnaire 
 
The total combined questionnaire consists of an initial section to capture demographic 
variables, a section to capture both bonus payment and salary numerically, and 5-point 
Likert-type scales related to referent importance, organisational justice, bonus satisfaction 
and turnover intention. Each of the measures vary in terms of syntax and scale descriptions, 
though each uses a 5-point Likert-type scale to bring some consistency to the overall 
questionnaire. Excluding survey questions related to demographics, salary and bonus 
amount, the questionnaire consists of 36 items in total (though the addition of demographic 
variables increases this number to 41). Each item has been altered slightly from the original 
wording in order to apply more closely to a bonus pay context and to harmonise the 
language used throughout the questionnaire, however the original intent of each item is 
maintained. The full set of items used in the final survey is included as Table 8. 
 
Table 8.  
Full 41-item questionnaire including demographic variables 
   
Item Variable Question 
   
 
Demographic Variables 
1 Gender  Selection of male / female 
2 Position Selection of manager / non-manager 
3 Salary Please enter your salary to the nearest thousand pounds 
4 Bonus Please enter the bonus you will receive to the nearest thousand pounds 
Which referent is important to you in order to judge whether your bonus is fair? 
5 Referent 1 What other people in this company at my job level are paid 
6 Referent 2 What other employers are paying for my kind of work 
7 Referent 3 What this company promised it would pay me  
8 Referent 4 The cost of living 
9 Referent 5 What I have been paid in previous jobs 
10 Referent 6 What I think I am worth  
11 Referent 7 What others in this company at a higher job level than mine are paid 
12 Referent 8 The pay of others in this company who are below my level 
13 Referent 9 My friends pay 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following in relation to your bonus: 
14 Procedural  I have been able to express my views and feelings during the procedure 
15 Procedural I have had influence over the bonus arrived at by those procedures 
16 Procedural The bonus procedures been applied consistently 
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17 Procedural The bonus procedures have been free of bias 
18 Procedural The procedures were based on accurate information 
19 Procedural I have been able to appeal the bonus arrived at by those procedures 
20 Procedural The procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards 
21 Distributive My bonus reflects the effort I have put into my work 
22 Distributive My bonus is appropriate for the work I have completed 
23 Distributive My bonus reflects what I have contributed to the organisation 
24 Distributive My bonus is justified, given my performance 
25 Interpersonal I have been treated in a polite manner 
26 Interpersonal I have been treated with dignity 
27 Interpersonal I have been treated with respect 
28 Interpersonal The bonus issuer has refrained from improper remarks or comments 
29 Informational The bonus issuer has been candid in communications with me 
30 Informational Procedures related to my bonus have been explained thoroughly 
31 Informational Explanations regarding the procedures were reasonable 
32 Informational Details have been communicated in a timely manner 
33 Informational Communications have been tailored to individuals' specific needs 
34 Bonus Sat I am satisfied with my most recent bonus 
35 Bonus Sat I am satisfied with the influence that others have on my bonus 
36 Bonus Sat I am satisfied with the bonuses I have typically received in the past 
37 Bonus Sat I am satisfied with how my bonus is determined 
38 Turn Inten How often are you frustrated when not given the opportunity at work to achieve 
your personal work-related goals? 
39 Turn Inten How often have you considered leaving your job? 
40 Turn Inten How often do you dream about getting another job that will better suit your 
personal needs? 
41 Turn Inten How likely are you to accept another job at the same compensation level should 
it be offered to you? 
42 Turn Inten To what extent is your current job satisfying your personal needs? 
 







4.7. Data Collection 
 
The data was collected via a survey hosted on a commercially available software as a 
service (SaaS) survey tool (Google forms). The tool was chosen due to the balance of 
effectiveness, cost, scalability, access (with response possible both by personal computer 
and mobile phone), compatibility with organisational systems, and ability to output in usable 
formats. Screenshots of the data entry platform with formats for the Likert scale are shown in 
Figures 10 and 11. The survey form data was entered in March of 2014, one month prior to 
the official opening of the research. The same survey was used for the full duration of the 
research to ensure consistency. Participants were selected by requesting the details of the 
individuals who met the selection criteria from the head of function (detailed in section 4.5). 
Each head of function with whom the author worked in the capacity as a management 
consultant during the research period was asked for their sponsorship to conduct the 
research in their accountable function. This sponsorship also meant agreeing to provide 
access (either directly or through a nominated person within the function) to data including 
the contact details of each of the individuals in the function who met the selection criteria. 
This prevented sponsorship in some organisations as the heads of function felt unable to 
provide this data to a third party for research purposes given internal policies. The data 
collected from those who chose to participate was typically provided in a password protected 
worksheet in Microsoft excel as an export from the human resources database of the 
participating organisation. Individual participants were then contacted directly by email. This 
therefore limited the selection approach in each case to all available employees who met the 
selection criteria within the accountability of the head of function approached for sponsorship 
in that instance. No issues were encountered with company information services being 
unable to access the survey tool, and this was tested before administration in each 
organisation. The data was downloaded as a comma-separated value (.csv) file from the 
survey tool and converted into an excel file to further screen participant responses for 
incomplete surveys and surveys where participants may have answered the same for each 





      
 




     
 







4.8. Data Analysis 
 
The results were consolidated into a single spreadsheet, converted to a comma-separated 
value (CSV) file, and both saved as an Excel worksheet (Microsoft excel version 1805) and 
uploaded into SPSS (Version 20) where statistical analyses were performed. Details of the 
statistical procedures applied to each of the hypotheses outlined in Figures 8 and 9 are 
shown in Table 9. This will bring some clarity as to how each of the hypotheses was tested 
using the collected data set. Specific analysis steps and outcomes are described in more 
detail in the results chapter (Chapter 5). 
 
 
Table 9.  
Hypotheses and proposed statistical procedure to be used 
 
   
Hypothesis Variables Statistical Procedure 
      
H1 Bonus amount, 
Bonus Satisfaction 
• Correlation analysis  
• Plot of amount and satisfaction and analysis of best fit 
H2a & 2b, 







• Hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
• PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2017) 
H5a & 5b Referent Selection • Frequency tests 
• Exploratory / confirmatory factor analysis  





5. Results of Study 1: Cross-Sectional Study 
 
In Chapter 5 this thesis presents the results of the cross-sectional investigation. This 
investigation is designed to address the relationships identified in Figures 8 and 9 in Chapter 
4. In this chapter the thesis considers both general findings and investigates the hypotheses 
which the research is designed to address (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 as detailed in Section 4.1). 
This chapter begins by providing the reliability of the measures used in the investigation, 
followed by the descriptive statistics associated with the investigation. The thesis then uses 
the data analysis methods described in Table 9 to describe the nature of the relationships 
investigated in this research. Whilst providing an overview of the relationships more 





Turning to the data's reliability and validity, Bryman and Cramer (1992) recommend that the 
result should be .8 or above, however test results from previous studies have shown that this 
level is not always attained and that anything above 0.7 is considered acceptable for most 
research purposes (Allen & Bennet, 2012). Cronbach’s alpha for each of the measures 
within the 39-item questionnaire proved acceptable. The organisational justice scale 
(Colquitt et al., 2001), returns a value for alpha of 0.91, with each of the scales within the 
measure also returning acceptable values of alpha (for procedural justice alpha is 0.75, for 
distributive justice 0.98, for interpersonal justice 0.91 and informational justice 0.78). The 
bonus satisfaction survey (Sturman & Short, 2003) returns an alpha of 0.86, which is 
acceptable. The turnover intention scale (Ti-6, Bothma & Roodt, 2013) returns an alpha of 
0.89. Though minor increases in reliability can be achieved by removing items in both the 
bonus satisfaction survey and the turnover intention scale, as the reliability is already 
acceptable and removing items will only lead to a minor increase in Cronbach’s alpha, the 
decision was made to maintain the original item structure of the measure. All analyses are 
therefore based on participants’ responses to the full questionnaire (as shown in Table 8).  
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis of both demographic data and the 
variables under investigation across all participants (N = 599) are reported in Table 10. 
Considering all participants, 54% are male (N = 323) and 46% are female (N = 276). The 
salaries paid to participants return a wide range; the mean salary paid to participants is 
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£59,300 (SD = 21,600), the minimum amount paid is £14,000, and the maximum is 
£124,000. The median value for salary is £56,000, indicating that as the median and mean 
are reasonably close (in relation to the range) salary is close to a symmetrical distribution. 
Due to a slight positive skew frequencies are higher at lower salaries than higher salaries, 
which is perhaps to be expected given the percentage of those in organisations being paid 
more than £59,300 compared to those paid less than £59,300 (those earning more than 
£50,000 are in the top 5% of earners; Office of National Statistics, 2017).  
The mean bonus amount paid to participants is £5,310, representing 8.95% of the mean 
salary (SD = 2.08). The range of bonus paid is £1,000 to £26,000. Bonus amounts exhibit a 
strong positive kurtosis. Whilst a natural heuristic in thinking of bonuses may be to associate 
higher pay with higher bonuses, an interrogation of the 5 participants with the highest bonus 
payment (in terms of amount, rather than percentage of salary), shows an average salary of 
£65,400, and an average bonus of £23,400 (35.8%). Considering the percentage of salary 
which is paid as a bonus (mean = 9.37%, SD = 7.04), there is a similarly shaped distribution 
as for bonus pay (in terms of amount). There is a high standard deviation indicating a large 
variation of bonus paid as a percentage of salary in the participant group. 
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Statistic Std. Error 
Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error  
Sex 1 2 1.00 1.46 .50 .16 .10 -1.98 .20 
Position 1 2 2.00 1.66 .47 -.68 .10 -1.54 .20 
Salary 14 124 56.00 59.30 21.60 .50 .10 -.35 .20 
Bonus 1 26 4.00 5.31 3.93 2.08 .10 5.05 .20 
Percentage 2.11 67.65 7.14 9.37 7.04 3.06 .10 13.87 .20 
R1 – same level 1 5 4.00 3.76 1.44 -.81 .10 -.88 .20 
R2 – other employers 1 5 2.00 2.10 1.21 .89 .10 -.37 .20 
R3 – company promise 1 5 4.00 3.09 1.74 -.11 .10 -1.77 .20 
R4 – cost of living 1 4 1.00 1.53 .81 1.74 .10 2.67 .20 
R5 – previous jobs 1 5 2.00 2.40 1.16 .226 .10 -1.30 .20 
R6 – self worth 1 5 4.00 3.52 1.41 -.76 .10 -.83 .20 
R7 – higher job level 1 5 4.00 3.77 1.27 -.96 .10 -.27 .20 
R8 – lower job level 1 5 2.00 2.58 1.10 .54 .10 -.62 .20 
R9 – friends pay 1 5 2.00 2.09 1.20 .76 .10 -.85 .20 
Procedural Justice 1.57 5.00 3.14 3.15 .64 .36 .10 -.31 .20 
Distributive Justice 1.00 5.00 2.50 3.04 1.13 .30 .10 -1.49 .20 
Interpersonal Justice 1.75 5.00 4.00 4.10 .73 -1.05 .10 1.51 .20 
Informational Justice 1.40 5.00 3.20 3.13 .72 .30 .10 -.37 .20 
Organisational Justice 2.00 5.00 3.25 3.35 .63 .36 .10 -.67 .20 
Bonus Satisfaction 1.50 5.00 2.50 2.94 .92 .52 .10 -.85 .20 
Turnover Intention 1.00 5.00 3.00 3.08 .85 -.20 .10 -.78 .20 




Interrogating the means, standard deviations and the shape of the probability distribution for 
the scales within the measure allows for several direct observations to be drawn using the 
data in Table 10. These can be summarised for each of the groups of variables in the 
research (i.e. referents, justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention). Considering firstly 
the referents chosen by the participants:  
 
• R7 - ‘What others in this company at a higher job level than mine are paid’ returned 
the highest mean (mean = 3.77, SD = 1.27), with 75.2% of participants answering 
‘important’ or ‘very important’ to the importance of this choice of referent to 
perceptions of fairness. This is followed by  
• R1 – ‘What other people in this company at my job level are paid’ (mean = 3.76, SD 
= 1.44), with 71.1% of participants answering ‘important’ or ‘very important’, and 
• R6 – ‘What I think I’m worth’ (mean = 3.52, SD = 1.41), with 69.6% of participants 
answering ‘important’ or ‘very important’ to the importance of this choice of referent to 
perceptions of fairness. 
  
The referents participants tended to disagree with as a comparison point are: 
  
• R4 – ‘The cost of living’ (mean = 1.53, SD = 0.81), with 91.9% of participants 
selecting ‘not important’ or ‘less important’ to perceptions of fairness,  
• R9 – ‘My friend’s pay’ (mean = 2.09, SD = 1.20), with 72.5% selecting ‘not important’ 
or ‘less important’, and  
• R2 – ‘What other employers are paying for my kind of work’ (mean = 2.10, SD = 
1.21), with 72.8% of participants ‘not important’ or ‘less important’ of this choice of 
referent to perceptions of fairness.  
 
Considering other referents included in the research offers perhaps a more nuanced view of 
selection rather than simply considering the numbers of participants who find these referents 
important to their fairness perceptions. Consider for instance R3 – ‘What this company 
promised it would pay me’ (mean = 3.09, SD = 1.74). By interrogating the histogram for this 
referent we can see that participants are broadly split, and that the histogram is somewhat 
symmetrical, but with 33.1% of participants choosing ‘not important and 34.9% choosing 
‘very important’. The shape of the distribution is clear if considered in light of the dynamic of 
the employment relationship and may indicate the frequency in which bonus promises are 
made by organisations to employees. It is unlikely that an employee would have a referent 
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point of a promise if no promise was made, however if a promise was made this would 
naturally form the basis of a trust relationship between the employer and employee. The 
frequency histograms for each referent selection are shown in Appendix 2, Figure 40. This is 
important information in pursuant of testing hypothesis 5a and 5b (a. multiple referents will 
be very important to the majority of participants when engaging in social comparisons on 
receipt of their bonus. b. The referent selected as being most important in determining bonus 
satisfaction will be those in the same company at the same level), which will be considered 
later in this section. The remaining means and standard deviations, along with data for 
skewness and kurtosis are detailed in Table 10.  
 
Turning to organisational justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention the scale means 
and probability distributions can be investigated to draw direct observations.  
 
• The strongest perception of justice returned by participants is interpersonal justice 
(mean = 4.10, SD = .73), followed by procedural justice (mean = 3.15, SD = .64), 
informational justice (mean = 3.13, SD = .72) and distributive justice (mean = 3.04, 
SD = 1.13). Perceptions of justice are generally positive for interpersonal justice with 
perceptions of other forms of justice close to the mid-point of the scale. There is 
greater variation in distributive justice than other justice scales. 
• The mean returned for bonus satisfaction, unlike justice scales, is slightly negative in 
terms of participants’ perceptions (mean = 2.94, SD = .92). The distribution of this 
measure is positively skewed, and the standard deviation indicates a large variation 
in the participant group concerning their levels of satisfaction with their bonus.  
• The mean returned for turnover intention is slightly higher and positive (mean = 3.08, 
SD = .84) with a smaller standard deviation than both distributive justice and bonus 
satisfaction.  
• There is a slight negative skew to the data, and the kurtosis value returned for both 
bonus satisfaction and turnover intention is negative and indicates a ‘light-tailed’ 
dataset.  
 
Frequency histograms for each of the organisational justice scales (procedural, distributive, 





5.3. The underlying factor structure of the questionnaire 
 
To investigate the underlying structure of the composite questionnaire, data collected from 
all 599 participants were subjected to principle axis factoring with promax rotation. Prior to 
running the principle axis factoring, examination of the data indicated that each variable 
considered was sufficiently normally distributed. The factor analysis was conducted on all 
items of the questionnaire for two purposes. Firstly, consistent with the procedures of Blau 
(1994) and Goodman (1974), performing a factor analysis on referent selection (using 
referents 1-9) can indicate whether participants select multiple referents and can also 
indicate which referents tend to be grouped together when making comparisons. Secondly, 
using this procedure this thesis aims to investigate the underlying structure of the battery of 
measures combined to form the combined cross-sectional questionnaire. A review of the 
measures used would suggest the proposed four-factor structure of the organisational justice 
survey (procedural, distributive, informational and interactional justice), and the single-factor 
structures of each of the bonus satisfaction survey (BSS) and the turnover intention scale 
(TIS-6) would combine to give us 6 factors. Conducting an exploratory factor analysis will 
indicate whether this is the case. 
Following performance of the principle axis factoring, twelve factors (with eigenvalues 
exceeding 1) were identified as underlying the 39 items. In total these factors accounted for 
around 64% of the variance in the questionnaire data. Oblique (promax) rotation of the 
factors yielded the factor structure given in Table 11. The first factor accounted for 27% of 
the variance in the data, the second accounted for 7% and the third for 5%. The remaining 
variance is provided in Table 11. Although there are twelve factors, these can be grouped 
based on the data they represent. Seven of the components returned by the analysis 
(components 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10 and 12) relate to the measures present in the questionnaire 
(the OJS, BSS and TIS-6). Three of the components (components 5, 8 and 11) returned by 
the analysis relate to referent selection. The remaining two components (components 7 and 
9) relate to bonus amount and demographic variables. It is interesting to note that there is 
some variance in the underlying structure of the composite measure of the OJS, BSS and 
TIS-6. The BSS and Distributive Justice factors load heavily onto component 1, with this 
component appearing to measure bonus satisfaction, as we would broadly define it. The 
factor structure related to these two measures and how they may to a single component 
requires more investigation. Turnover intention items load onto component 2, with 
component 2 solely representing items from the TIS-6 measure. Interpersonal justice items 
load heavily onto component 3. This component can therefore be safely aligned to 
interpersonal justice. Whilst if the remaining factor structure of the Colquitt (2001) OJS 
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measure is to be followed we would expect two remaining justice factors, one related to 
informational justice, and one procedural justice, in fact the remaining factor structure in the 
analysis yields four components, with two related to procedural justice (components 4 and 
10), and two related to informational justice (components 6 and 12). On further investigation 
of the items aligned to each component it can be seen that component 4 represents fairness 
and standard of procedures (fairness), and component 10 the ability to have influence over 
the outcomes (voice). Similarly, component 6 represents the sufficient explanation of 
procedures (clarity), and component 12 contains items predominantly focused on efficacy of 
communication (communication). The initial measure each item is taken from is also shown 
in Table 11 to indicate the primary source of the items which load most heavily onto each 
factor. 
 
5.3.1. Factor Structure of Bonus Satisfaction and Distributive Justice 
 
As items related to distributive justice and bonus satisfaction each load onto a single 
component in the exploratory factor analysis, further investigation was conducted to ensure 
discriminant validity of these measures. Each of the four items of the distributive justice 
measure (DJ1 to DJ4) and the four items of the bonus satisfaction survey (BSS1 to BSS4) 
were subjected to principle axis factoring with promax rotation, with two fixed factors to 
extract. Inspecting the factor matrix (shown in Table 12) having forced the items to load onto 
two factors provides a clearer understanding of the discriminant validity. The analysis shows 
that the factor structure for the two measures is relatively distinct, with the exception of the 
first item of the bonus satisfaction survey (I am satisfied with my most recent bonus). This 
item loads strongly to both factors (though the item slightly favours an alignment with the 
factor associated with distributive justice). In this case there is not compelling evidence to 
change the item structure of the measures, though it is worth noting that the first item of the 
bonus satisfaction measure could effectively sit within each of the distributive justice or 
bonus satisfaction measures. This may identify a limitation in the analysis if certain aspects 
of distributive justice (e.g. DJ4; my bonus is justified, given my performance) and certain 
aspects of bonus satisfaction (BSS1; I am satisfied with my most recent bonus) load to a 
similar degree on the same factor. It is perhaps a little more comforting to note that the 
remaining items each load more distinctly onto one of these factors, and so provide sufficient 
support for the existence of two separate constructs being measured in distributive justice 




Table 11.  






No. Measure Item Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
18a DJ2 My bonus is appropriate for the work I have completed 0.97            
17a DJ1 My bonus reflects the effort I have put into my work 0.96            
30b BSS1 I am satisfied with my most recent bonus 0.96            
19a DJ3 My bonus reflects what I have contributed to the organisation 0.95            
20a DJ4 My bonus is justified, given my performance 0.92            
33b BSS4 I am satisfied with how my bonus is determined 0.84            
31b BSS2 I am satisfied with the influence that others have on my bonus 0.81            
38c TIS5 To what extent is your current job satisfying your personal needs?  -0.86           
35c TIS2 How often have you considered leaving your job?  -0.83           
39c TIS6 How often do you look forward to another day at work?  -0.83           
37c TIS4 
How likely are you to accept another job at the same compensation 
level should it be offered to you? 
 -0.82           
36c TIS3 
How often do you dream about getting another job that will better suit 
your personal needs? 
 -0.80           
34c TIS1 
How often are you frustrated when not given the opportunity at work 
to achieve your personal work-related goals? 
 -0.41           
22a IntJ2 I have been treated with dignity   0.90          
23a IntJ3 I have been treated with respect   0.89          
24a IntJ4 The bonus issuer has refrained from improper remarks or comments   0.85          
21a IntJ1 I have been treated in a polite manner   0.84          
13a ProcJ4 The bonus procedures have been free of bias    0.91         
14a ProcJ5 The procedures been based on accurate information    0.82         
16a ProcJ7 The procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards    0.75         
12a ProcJ3 The bonus procedures been applied consistently    0.70         
7 Referent7 What others in this company at a higher job level than mine are paid     0.85        
1 Referent1 What other people in this company at my job level are paid     0.82        
8 Referent8 The pay of others in this company who are below my job level     0.59        
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3 Referent3 What this company promised it would pay me     -0.53        
6 Referent6 What I think I am worth     0.32        
27a InfoJ3 Explanations regarding the procedures were reasonable      0.98       
26a InfoJ2 Procedures have been explained thoroughly      0.92       
   Bonus Percentage       0.94      
   Bonus Sum       0.91      
5 Referent5 What I have been paid in previous jobs        0.77     
9 Referent9 My friends' pay        0.57     
4 Referent4 The cost of living        0.52     
  Earnings         0.99    
  Position         -0.54    
11a ProcJ2  I have had influence over the bonus arrived at by those procedures          0.65   
15a ProcJ6 I have been able to appeal the bonus arrived at by those procedures          0.53   
10a ProcJ1 
I have been able to express my views and feelings during the 
procedure 
         0.48   
2 Referent2 What other employers are paying for my kind of work           0.75  
29a InfoJ5 Communications have been tailored to individuals' specific needs            0.64 
28a InfoJ4 Details have been communicated in a timely manner 
           0.55 
25a InfoJ1 The bonus issuer has been candid in communications with me            0.54 
32b BSS3  I am satisfied with the bonuses I have typically received in the past 




            
 
 Percentage of Variance accounted for by each component: 27.3 6.9 5.3 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.5 1.7 1.6 1.2 
 
Note:  N = 599  
a – item taken from OJS; b – item taken from BSS, c – item taken from TIS-6 
Measure item refers to the item in the original measures from which the item is taken with DJ – distributive justice, ProcJ – procedural justice, IntJ – interpersonal 




Table 12.  
Oblique factor loading matrix for distributive justice and bonus satisfaction 




No. Measure Item Question 1 2 
17a DJ1 My bonus reflects the effort I have put into my work 0.95 0.10 
19a DJ3 My bonus reflects what I have contributed to the organisation 0.92 0.16 
18a DJ2 My bonus is appropriate for the work I have completed 0.90 0.28 
30b BSS1 I am satisfied with my most recent bonus 0.83 0.80 
20a DJ4 My bonus is justified, given my performance 0.81 0.31 
32b BSS3 I am satisfied with the bonuses I have typically received in the past 0.36 0.84 
33b BSS4 I am satisfied with how my bonus is determined 0.13 0.97 
31c BSS2 I am satisfied with the influence that others have on my bonus 0.22 0.70 
 
Note:  N = 599  
a – item taken from OJS; b – item taken from BSS, c – item taken from TIS-6 
Measure item refers to the item in the original measures from which the item is taken with DJ – distributive 
justice, ProcJ – procedural justice, IntJ – interpersonal justice, InfoJ – informational justice, BSS – bonus 
satisfaction survey, TIS – turnover intention survey, Referent – choice of referent 
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Table 13.  
Correlations between variables along with significance level 
 Sex Position Salary Bonus Perc R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 ProcJ DistJ InterJ InfoJ Org J BSS TIS-6 
Sex 1                     
Position .14** 1                    
Salary -.22** -.56** 1                   
Bonus -.17** -.36** .49** 1                  
Perc -.06 -.05 -.06 .80** 1                 
R1 -.09* -.04 .04 .07 .06 1                
R2 -.10* -.09* .06 .01 -.02 -.06 1               
R3 .01 -.07 -.00 .01 .03 -.46** .34** 1              
R4 -.01 .01 -.03 .02 .05 -.31** .13** .07 1             
R5 -.02 -.01 .01 -.02 -.04 -.26** .35** .06 .40** 1            
R6 -.15** .01 .03 .03 .01 .16** .27** -.07 -.02 .32** 1           
R7 -.09* -.02 .00 .03 .03 .76** -.01 -.34** -.30** -.18** .28** 1          
R8 -.04 .02 -.05 .03 .07 .47** .04 -.26** -.07 .06 .19** .53** 1         
R9 .07 .03 .02 -.00 -.01 -.29** .21** .09* .33** .44** .04 -.31** -.04 1        
ProcJ .04 -.00 -.01 .07 .10* -.05 .04 .18** -.12** -.02 .07 .00 -.06 -.07 1       
DistJ .01 .02 -.04 .01 .05 -.09* .03 .21** -.18** -.16** .06 -.04 -.10* -.13** .51** 1      
InterJ -.02 .05 .07 .10* .07 .03 .01 -.00 -.09* -.15** .11** .10* -.03 -.14** .36** .34** 1     
InfoJ .02 .02 -.02 .06 .11* -.06 .01 .20** -.08 -.10* .11** .03 -.04 -.05 .63** .53** .42** 1    
OrgJ -.03 .04 -.02 .07 .11** -.04 .03 .21** -.15** -.15** .12** .00 -.08 -.13** .78** .84** .66** .82** 1   
BSS .01 -.01 -.02 .05 .09* -.07 .03 .25** -.21** -.18** .04 -.03 -.13** -.19** .62** .89** .38** .62** .85** 1  
TIS-6 .00 .03 .03 -.06 -.11** -.09* -.01 -.11** .19** .16** -.06 -.16** -.03 .16** -.47** -.55** -.38** -.46** -.62** -.59** 1 
N = 599, *p < .05., **p < .01. 
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Figure 12. Outline of the first figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, organisational 
justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. 
 
 
Performing a correlation analysis (with results shown in Table 13, along with significance 
levels) can provide some indication of the interactions between the variables under 
investigation and will provide some guidance for areas of focus in later analyses. There are 
significant relationships between gender, position, salary and bonus amount, with gender 
weakly positively related to position (r = .14, p < .01) and weakly negatively related to salary 
(r = -.22, p < .01) and bonus amount (r = -.17, p < .01). This indicates that there are fewer 
women in management positions (a finding confirmed by t-test results in later analysis), and 
that women are both paid less and have smaller bonuses on average than men in this study. 
Position has a moderate negative relationship with both salary (r = -.56, p < .01) and bonus 
(r = -.36, p < .01) indicating that managers are paid more and receive higher bonuses than 
non-managers. Salary is moderately positively related to bonus (r = .49, p < .01.) indicating 
that in general as salary increases in value so does bonus pay.  
 
There are other interesting findings related to both salary and bonus pay. Other than with 
bonus amount, salary is not significantly correlated with any of the variables under 
investigation (referent selection, justice, satisfaction or turnover intention). Bonus amount is 
significantly related to bonus as a percentage of salary as would be expected (r = .80, p < 
.01), and interpersonal justice (though this positive relationship is weak; r = .10, p < .05). 
Bonus paid as a percentage of salary offers us perhaps an alternative view of these 
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pay. There are significant positive relationships between this variable and organisational 
justice (r = .11, p < .01), procedural justice (r = .10, p < .01), informational justice (r = .11, p < 
.05) and bonus satisfaction (r = .09, p < .05), though as can be seen these relationships are 
weak. There is a significant negative relationship between bonus as a percentage of salary 
and turnover intention (r = -.11, p < .01) indicating that while bonus as a percentage of salary 
increases, turnover intention decreases, though this relationship is also weak. 
 
5.5. Testing Hypothesis 1: Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus 
satisfaction. 
 
Plotting bonus amount (in terms of absolute amount) and bonus satisfaction on a chart 
enables testing of the relationship between the two variables to see whether there is support 
for this hypothesis. Results shown in Table 13 demonstrate that the relationship between 
bonus amount in absolute terms and bonus satisfaction is weak and non-significant (r = .05, 
p > .05). Interrogating Figure 13 demonstrates that there is difficulty in identifying any 
relationship between bonus amount (measured in thousands of pounds) and bonus 
satisfaction (measured by the bonus satisfaction scale; Sturman & Short, 2000), let alone 
drawing a linear relationship through the plots. Rather than support either the W-shaped or 
the inverse U-shaped relationship found by Gneezy (2004) and Pokorny (2008) respectively, 
investigating the scatter plot in Figure 13 does not offer any indication of a relationship or 
pattern. Whilst the drawing of an interpolation line is possible for this relationship, a line of 
best fit is not. 
 
 
Figure 13. Scatter plot showing bonus satisfaction (BSS, Y-Axis) against Bonus as an absolute 
amount (Measured in £ 000, X Axis) 
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In a similar way the relationship between bonus amount as a percentage of salary and 
bonus satisfaction can also be investigated. The relationship between these two variables is 
stronger than the relationship between bonus as an absolute amount and bonus satisfaction, 
though it is still weak (r = .09, p < .05). This relationship does however reach traditional 
levels of significance. A plot of bonus as a percentage of salary (%, X-axis), and bonus 
satisfaction (measured by the bonus satisfaction scale, Sturman & Short, 2000, Y-axis) 
again offers little support in understanding the direction of the relationship let alone 
indications of linearity. This is shown in the scatter plot in Figure 14. Bonus amount does not 
demonstrate a linear relationship, or any relationship, therefore the results do not provide 
support for hypothesis 1 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Although there are more 
cases which cluster around the bonus level of 5-10 percent of salary (consistent with median 
level bonus pay in this research) the distribution of participants across bonus satisfaction 
scores is broad, and appears to be independent of bonus amount, either in absolute terms or 
when considered as a percentage of salary. Relationships between demographic variables 
and justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention also reveal some interesting analyses. 
Justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention are not significantly related to gender, 
position or salary. These relationships can be further tested by applying an independent 




Figure 14. Scatter plot showing bonus satisfaction (BSS, Y-Axis) against Bonus as a percentage of 
salary (Measured in %, X Axis) 
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5.6. The role of bonus amount and organisational justice in bonus satisfaction appraisals 
 
To understand how much of the variance in the dependent variable of bonus satisfaction is 
accounted for by each predictor variable, beyond that already accounted for by other 
predictor variables, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was employed. Assumptions 
and data checks for normal distribution, univariate outliers, normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity of residuals were met, and multivariate outliers and multicollinearity were 
not of concern. Each of the variables was entered into the hierarchical regression model in 
an order consistent with the literature discussed in the review, which suggests a pathway 
between pay, justice and subsequent satisfaction appraisals. Table 13 demonstrates 
correlations between gender, position, salary and bonus, therefore these variables are 
added in the first step (and therefore are controlled for in subsequent steps). In the next step 
bonus pay is added, followed by the individual scales of procedural justice (step 3), 
distributive justice (step 4), interpersonal justice (step 5) and informational justice (step 6) in 
turn. The results of each step in the model are detailed in Table 14. When all variables are 
added into the hierarchical multiple regression model the analysis returns an 𝑅2 of 0.830 
(F(8,590) = 360.872.898, p < 0.001). The predictor variable with the largest standardised 
regression estimate when all variables are added to the model is distributive justice (β = 
0.72, p < 0.01), followed by procedural justice (β = 0.17, p < 0.01) and informational justice 
(β = 0.13, p < 0.01). These three variables are the only predictor variables to reach 
traditional levels of significance. The effect size, as calculated by Cohen’s f2 is small. 
 
To understand the differential variance accounted for by procedural and distributive justice 
(when one variable is added having controlled for another), the same analysis was 
conducted with steps three and four reversed, so that distributive justice was added to the 
regression equation before procedural justice. This was done to fully test the differential 
effects of both procedural and distributive justice. Steps one and two return identical results 
to those in the analysis detailed above. In step three of the analysis distributive justice was 
added to the regression equation and accounted for an additional significant 77.5% of the 
variance in bonus satisfaction, ∆𝑅2 =  0.775, ∆𝐹(1, 593)= 2110.355, 𝑝 < .001. In step four 
procedural justice was added to the equation and accounted for an additional significant 4% 
of the variance in bonus satisfaction, ∆𝑅2 =  0.039, ∆𝐹(1, 592)= 129.769, 𝑝 < .001.  The 
remaining two steps (the addition of interpersonal justice and information justice) return the 
same analysis as shown in Table 14. This would indicate that distributive justice and 
procedural justice together account for 81.5% of the variance in bonus satisfaction, with 
77.5% of the variance accounted for by distributive justice. These differences in the relative 
effects of distributive and procedural justice would be missed without reversing these steps. 
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Table 14.  
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (𝛽) regression coefficients for each predictor in a hierarchical 
multiple regression model predicting bonus satisfaction 
      
Variable        𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] SE B 𝛽 ∆𝑅2        ∆𝐹 (𝑑𝑓) 
      
Step 1      
Gender -.059 [-.210, .092] .077 -.032   
Position  -.038 [-.227, .151] .096 -.019   
Salary -.002 [-.006, .002] .002 -.046 0.002 0.410 (3,595) 
Step 2      
Gender -.045 [-.197, .107] .077 -.025   
Position  -.018 [-.208, .172] .097 -.009   
Salary -.003 [-.007, .001] .002 -.068   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.018 [-.002, .021] .010  .039 0.005 3.034 (1,594) 
Step 3      
Gender -.054 [-.172, .063] .060 -.030   
Position  -.027 [-.174, .120] .075 -.014   
Salary -.002 [-.005, .002] .002 -.037   
Bonus (Absolute amount)  .002 [-.013, .018] .008  .011   
Procedural justice  .907 [ .818, .996]** .045  .635 0.400 399.385 (1,593) 
Step 4      
Gender -.017 [-.081, .048] .033 -.009   
Position  -.041 [-.122, .040] .041 -.021   
Salary  .000 [-.002, .002] .001 -.003   
Bonus (Absolute amount)  .004 [-.004, .013] .004  .019   
Procedural justice  .334 [ .277, .392]** .029  .234   
Distributive justice  .617 [ .585, .650]** .017  .760 0.415 1374.170 (1,592) 
Step 5      
Gender -.015 [-.079, .050] .033 -.008   
Position  -.048 [-.129, .033] .041 -.025   
Salary  .000 [-.002, .002] .001 -.007   
Bonus (Absolute amount)  .004 [-.005, .013] .004  .017   
Procedural justice  .322 [ .263, .381]** .030  .226   
Distributive justice  .611 [ .578, .645]** .017  .753   
Interpersonal justice  .042 [-.006, .089] .024  .033 0.001 2.999 (1,591) 
Step 6      
Gender -.012 [-.075, .051] .032 -.007   
Position  -.045 [-.125, .034] .040 -.023   
Salary -.000 [-.002, .002] .001 -.001   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.004 [-.005, .012] .004  .015   
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Note: N = 599. CI = confidence interval, R2= 0.830 
Dependent Variable: Bonus Satisfaction (BSS) 




5.7. Testing hypothesis 4: Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction 
than procedural, interpersonal and informational justice components. 
 
The thesis can investigate this hypothesis by considering the standardised regression 
coefficients in Table 14 for the relationships between individual scales of justice (as 
independent variables) and bonus satisfaction (as the dependent variable). The analysis 
shows that the strongest standardised estimate between bonus satisfaction and justice 
components is distributive justice (β = 0.72, p < 0.01), followed by procedural justice (β = 
0.17, p < 0.01) and informational justice (β = 0.13, p < 0.01) which both have markedly 
weaker relationships. Distributive justice also accounts for a significant 77.5% of the 
variance in bonus satisfaction (∆𝑅2 =  0.775, ∆𝐹(1, 593)= 2110.355, 𝑝 < .001), with 
procedural justice accounting for the next highest proportion at 4% (∆𝑅2 =  0.039, 
∆𝐹(1, 592)= 129.769, 𝑝 < .001). Though as the thesis will demonstrate in the next section 
the relationships between justice scales and turnover intention are more comparable, for the 
case where bonus satisfaction is the dependent variable then distributive justice is a far 
stronger predictor than other justice scales, thus providing support for hypothesis 4. 
 
  
Procedural justice  .245 [ .180, .309]** .033  .171   
Distributive justice  .587 [ .553, .621]** .017  .722   
Interpersonal justice  .010 [-.038, .058] .024  .008   
Informational justice  .161 [ .101, .221]** .030  .126 0.008 27.974 (1,590) 
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5.8. The role of bonus amount, organisational justice and bonus satisfaction in turnover 
intention appraisals 
 
To estimate the proportion of variance in turnover intention that can be accounted for by 
bonus amount, organisational justice (in the scale forms of distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal and informational) and bonus satisfaction a hierarchical multiple regression 
was performed (with results shown in Table 15). As in previous analysis, prior to interpreting 
the results several assumptions were evaluated. First, stem and leaf plots and boxplots 
indicated that each variable in the regression is close to being normally distributed, and free 
from univariate outliers. Second, inspection of the normal probability plot of standardised 
residuals as well as the scatterplot of standardised residuals against standardised predicted 
values indicated that the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of 
residuals were met. Third, multivariate outliers were interrogated by considering 
Mahalanobis distance. Initially the critical 𝑥2 for 𝑑𝑓 =  7 (at ∝ = 0.001) of 24.322 was 
exceeded by 14 cases (with the maximum distance of 86.872). Subsequent analysis and 
removal of cases in order to achieve a data set where multivariate outliers were not of 
concern left N = 559. Fourth, relatively high tolerances for both predictors in the regression 
model indicated that multicollinearity would not interfere with the ability to interpret the 
outcome of the regression analysis.  
Similar to the analysis where bonus satisfaction is the dependent variable, each of the 
variables was entered into the hierarchical regression model consistent with a pathway 
between pay, justice, satisfaction and subsequent turnover intention appraisals. Once again 
gender, position and salary variables are added in the first step (and therefore are controlled 
for in subsequent steps). This is followed in order by bonus amount (step 2) and then the 
scales of distributive procedural justice (step 3), procedural justice (step 4), interpersonal 
justice (step 5), informational justice (step 6) and bonus satisfaction (step 7). The results of 
each step in the model are detailed in Table 15. When all predictor variables are added into 
the hierarchical multiple regression model together they explain 41% of the variance in 
turnover intention, 𝑅2 = 0.410 (F(9,589) = 45.541, p < 0.001). To understand the differential 
variance accounted for by procedural and distributive justice (when one variable is added 
having controlled for another), the same analysis was conducted with steps three and four 
reversed, so that procedural justice was added to the regression equation before distributive 
justice. This was done to fully test the differential effects of both procedural and distributive 
justice on turnover intention. Steps one and two return identical results to those in the 
analysis detailed above. In step three of the analysis procedural justice was added to the 
regression equation and accounted for an additional significant 22.8% of the variance in 
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turnover intention, ∆𝑅2 =  0.228, ∆𝐹(1, 593)= 177.037, 𝑝 < .001. In step four distributive 
justice was added to the equation and accounted for an additional significant 12.5% of the 
variance in turnover intention, ∆𝑅2 =  0.125, ∆𝐹(1, 592)= 116.627, 𝑝 < .001.  The remaining 
two steps (the addition of interpersonal justice and information justice) return the same 
analysis as shown in Table 15. This would indicate that distributive justice and procedural 
justice together account for 35.3% of the variance in turnover intention, with 30.5% of the 
variance accounted for by distributive justice. Bonus satisfaction, in comparison, accounts 
for 1.7% of the variance once the effects of justice have been taken into account. The 
predictor variable with the largest standardised regression estimate when all variables are 
added to the model is bonus satisfaction (β = -0.31, p < 0.01), followed by interpersonal 
justice (β = -0.17, p < 0.01), distributive justice (β = -0.14, p < 0.05), and procedural justice (β 
= -0.13, p < 0.01). These four variables are the only predictor variables to reach traditional 
levels of significance. The effect size, as calculated by Cohen’s f2 is small. 
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Table 15.  
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (𝛽) regression coefficients for each predictor in a hierarchical 
multiple regression model predicting turnover intention 
      
Variable        𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] SE B 𝛽 ∆𝑅2        ∆𝐹 (𝑑𝑓) 
      
Step 1      
Gender  .054 [-.084, .193] .071  .032   
Position   .103 [-.070, .277] .088  .058   
Salary  .003 [-.001, .007] .002  .078 0.005 0.959 (3,595) 
Step 2      
Gender  .042 [-.097, .181] .071  .025   
Position   .085 [-.089, .259] .089  .048   
Salary  .004 [ .001, .008] .002  .100   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.017 [-.036, .002] .010 -.078 0.005 3.067 (1,594) 
Step 3      
Gender  .021 [-.095, .136] .059  .012   
Position   .098 [-.047, .243] .074  .055   
Salary  .002 [-.001, .006] .002  .061   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.011 [-.027, .004] .008 -.053   
Distributive justice -.413 [-.463, -.363]** .025 -.554 0.305 264.306 (1,593) 
Step 4      
Gender  .029 [-.083, .141] .057  .017   
Position   .099 [-.041, .239] .071  .056   
Salary  .002 [-.001, .005] .002  .058   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.007 [-.022, .008] .008 -.032   
Distributive justice -.312 [-.368, -.255]** .029 -.418   
Procedural justice -.339 [-.439, -.239]** .051 -.259 0.048 44.494 (1,592) 
Step 5      
Gender  .019 [-.090, .128] .056  .011   
Position   .136 [-.001, .274] .070  .077   
Salary  .003 [ .000, .006] .002  .079   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.005 [-.019, .010] .008 -.021   
Distributive justice -.281 [-.338, -.225]** .029 -.377   
Procedural justice -.278 [-.378, -.178]** .051 -.212   
Interpersonal justice -.217 [-.298, -.137]** .041 -.188 0.029 28.096 (1,591) 
Step 6      
Gender  .018 [-.091, .127] .056  .011   
Position   .135 [-.003, .272] .070  .076   
Salary  .003 [ .000, .006] .002  .077   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.004 [-.019, .010] .008 -.020   
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Note: N = 559. CI = confidence interval, R2= 0.410 
Dependent Variable: Turnover Intention (TIS-6) 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
  
Distributive justice -.270 [-.329, -.212]** .030 -.363   
Procedural justice -.244 [-.356, -.132]** .057 -.186   
Interpersonal justice -.203 [-.286, -.120]** .042 -.176   
Informational justice -.071 [-.174, .033]** .053 -.060 0.002 1.798 (1,590) 
Step 7      
Gender  .014 [-.093, .122] .055  .009   
Position   .122 [-.014, .258] .069  .069   
Salary  .003 [ .000, .006] .002  .076   
Bonus (Absolute amount) -.003 [-.018, .011] .007 -.016   
Distributive justice -.102 [-.202, -.003]* .051 -.137   
Procedural justice -.174 [-.289, -.058]** .059 -.132   
Interpersonal justice -.200 [-.283, -.118]** .042 -.174   
Informational justice -.025 [-.129, .080] .053 -.021   
Bonus Satisfaction -.287 [-.425, -.148]** .070 -.312 0.017 16.526 (1,589) 
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5.9. Testing Hypothesis 2a and 2b: Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus 
satisfaction and negatively related to (b) turnover intention. 
 
The direction of the relationship between the scales of organisational justice and both bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention can be tested by considering the estimates detailed in 
Tables 14 and 15. There are positive relationships between bonus satisfaction and 
distributive justice (β = 0.72, p < 0.01), procedural justice (β = 0.17, p < 0.01), interpersonal 
justice (β = 0.01, p > 0.05) and informational justice (β = 0.13, p < 0.01), though the 
relationship between bonus satisfaction and interpersonal justice does not reach traditional 
levels of significance. There are negative relationships between turnover intention and 
distributive justice (β = -0.14, p < 0.05), procedural justice (β = -0.13, p < 0.01), interpersonal 
justice (β = -0.17, p < 0.01), and informational justice (β = -0.02, p > 0.05), though the 
relationship between turnover intention and informational justice does not reach traditional 
levels of significance. The thesis therefore finds support for hypotheses 2a and 2b, as all 
scales of organisational justice are positively related to bonus satisfaction, and negatively 
related to turnover intention.  
 
This finding is consistent with previous justice research considering pay, including the 
findings of Colquitt et al. (2013) and Tremblay et al. (2000). Typically, however, interpersonal 
and informational justice relationships are stronger in this research than in previous general 
pay research (though each in turn predicting bonus satisfaction and turnover intention 
uniquely). Each of these variables predicts bonus satisfaction (in the case of informational 
justice) and turnover intention (in the case of interpersonal justice) to a similar degree as 
procedural justice, whereas in previous research the relationship between procedural justice 
and outcomes tends to be stronger than that between interpersonal and informational scales 
of justice and outcomes. These differential relationship strengths between bonus pay and 
pay in general would seem to add support to the literature (including DeConink & Stilwell, 
2004 and Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-Mejia, 1995) which points to a different appraisal 
mechanism between pay and bonus pay, both with incremental validity on satisfaction. The 
directions of these relationships are perhaps to be expected, as an increase in justice 
perceptions should be associated with an increase in satisfaction, and also with a decrease 
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5.10. Testing hypothesis 3a and 3b: Organisational justice will mediate the relationship 
between a) bonus amount and bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover 
intention 
 
Traditional approaches to mediation such as the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) argue 
that for mediation to occur a significant correlation must exist between the predictor variable 
(bonus amount/percentage) and the dependent variable (bonus satisfaction/turnover 
intention). Recent approaches such Hayes (2017) employ bootstrapping however, which 
negates the requirement for this significant correlation. The analysis used in this thesis will 
therefore use this approach, employing the PROCESS macro for SPSS (version 3.4, Hayes, 
2017) to understand the potential mediating effects of justice (in terms of organisational 
justice as an aggregated scale and the individual scales of procedural, distributive, 
interpersonal and informational justice) on the relationships between bonus amount (both in 
terms of absolute amount and as a percentage of salary) and both bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention. These relationships are summarised in Figures 15 and 16, with 
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Table 16.  
Direct, mediating and indirect standardised regression weights along with significance levels for relationships outlined in Figure 15. 















          
Bonus (% of salary) – Organisational justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.718** .106** .847** .003 .090 .036 .021 .161 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Organisational justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.720 .074 .848** -.004 .063 .035 -.006 .131 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Distributive justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.781** .073 .881** .028 .064 .037 -.005 .138 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Procedural justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.407* .087* .633** .038 .055 .030 -.005 .112 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Interpersonal justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.146** .076 .372** .064 .028 .013 .003 .053 Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Informational justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.397** .103* .627** .028 .064 .025 .016 .114 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Distributive justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.782** .019 .882** .043* .017 .034 -.048 .084 No Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Procedural justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.405** .083* .636** .006 .053 .026 .004 .104 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Interpersonal justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.143** .096* .375** .023 .035 .016 .003 .068 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Informational justice – Bonus 
satisfaction 
.397** .060 .628** .022 .038 .024 -.007 .084 No Mediation 
Note: N=599, *p < .05.  **p < .01.  CI = 95, Number of bootstrap samples = 5000  
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Table 17.  
Direct, mediating and indirect standardised regression weights along with significance levels for relationships outlined in Figure 16. 















          
Bonus (% of salary) – Organisational justice – 
Turnover intention 
.386** .106** -.615** -.045 -.065 .026 -.120 -.015 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Organisational justice – Turnover 
intention 
.385** .074 -.618** -.030 -.046 .026 -.098 .003 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Distributive justice – Turnover 
intention 
.316** .073 -.552** -.070* -.040 .023 -.086 .004 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Procedural justice – Turnover 
intention 
.241** .087* -.480** -.069 -.042 .022 -.085 .002 No Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Interpersonal justice – Turnover 
intention 
.162** .076 -.388** -.081* -.030 .014 -.057 -.002 Mediation 
Bonus (% of salary) – Informational justice – Turnover 
intention 
.218** .103* -.456** -.064 -.047 .018 -.084 -.012 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Distributive justice – Turnover 
intention 
.315** .019 -.556** -.066 -.010 .022 -.054 .033 No Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Procedural justice – Turnover 
intention 
.238** .083* -.483** -.036 -.040 .020 -.079 -.002 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Interpersonal justice – Turnover 
intention 
.157** .096* -.390** -.039 -.037 .017 -.070 -.004 Mediation 
Bonus (£ 000) – Informational justice – Turnover 
intention 
.216** .060 -.459** -.049 -.028 .017 -.063 .007 No Mediation 
Note: N=599, *p < .05.  **p < .01.  CI = 95, Number of bootstrap samples = 5000  
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An analysis of the standardised estimates in Tables 16 and 17 delivers some interesting 
findings. While the results show that organisational justice (as an aggregated measure) 
mediates the relationships between bonus amount as a percentage of salary and both bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention, it does not mediate the relationships between bonus 
amount as an absolute amount and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. There is 
therefore partial but not full support for hypotheses 3a and 3b. Organisational justice does 
mediate the relationship between a) bonus amount and bonus satisfaction and b) bonus 
amount and turnover intention, but only when bonus as a percentage of salary is used as an 
independent variable. There is no support for a mediating relationship if bonus as an 
absolute amount in used in the appraisal. These results are interesting as they suggest that 
if the recipient of a bonus considers their bonus pay in the context of their total pay (i.e. 
considering bonus pay as a percentage of their salary) then different psychological 
mechanisms may be employed in order to determine satisfaction with their bonus and 
turnover intention than if the recipient of the bonus considers their bonus pay as an absolute 
amount. In one mechanism justice is a mediating variable, and in the other justice does not 
play a mediating role. 
 
Interrogating the potential mediating effects of different scales of justice also produces some 
interesting insights. Neither procedural nor distributive justice mediate the relationships 
between bonus as a percentage of salary and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. 
Interpersonal justice and informational justice do, however, mediate these relationships. 
Distributive justice does not meditate the relationship between bonus as an absolute amount 
and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention, whereas procedural justice does mediate 
these relationships. Similarly, interpersonal justice mediates the relationships between 
bonus as an absolute amount and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, whereas 
informational justice does not. This suggests a differential mediating role of each justice 
scale. Distributive justice does not mediate any of the relationships in the analysis, whereas 
interpersonal justice plays a mediating role in each of the relationships in the analysis. Both 
informational and procedural justice play a mediating role in certain relationships but not all 
relationships, with informational justice mediating relationships between bonus as a 
percentage of salary and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, and procedural 
justice mediating the relationships between bonus as an absolute amount and both bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention. 
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Table 18.  
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (𝛽) regression coefficients and squared semi partial correlations (𝑠𝑟2) for each predictor in a regression model 
predicting organisational justice scales. 
 
             
 Procedural Justice Distributive Justice Interpersonal Justice Informational Justice 
Variable 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 
             
Bonus (% of Salary)  .008 [.001, .015]* .086 .007 .012 [-.001, .025] -.073 .005 .008 [.000, .016] .076 .006 .010 [.002, .019]* .103 .011 
             
Bonus (Amount) .007 [-.014, .028] .040 .001 -.029 [-.066, .008] -.100 .004 .017 [-.007, .041]* .093 .003 -.010 [-.033, .014] -.053 .001 
             
             
 
Note: N = 599. CI = confidence interval 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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5.11. Completing the Path Model 
 
In order to understand the full set of path relationships in the research, a standard regression 
analysis was conducted considering the relationships between bonus (both as an absolute 
amount and as a percentage of salary) and all four scales of justice. These results are 
shown in Table 18. There are significant though weak relationships between bonus as a 
percentage of salary and both procedural (β = 0.09, p < 0.05), and informational justice (β = 
0.10, p < 0.05). There is a significant but weak relationship between bonus as an absolute 
amount and interpersonal justice (β = 0.09, p < 0.05). There are no significant relationships 
between bonus amount (either as a percentage of salary or an absolute amount) and 
distributive justice. Combining these results with the outcomes of previous hierarchical 
multiples regression analyses where both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention act as 
dependent variables (summarised in Tables 14 and 15) allow for the completion of the path 
model in Figure 17. This diagram allows for the investigation of standardised estimates 
between bonus pay (as an absolute amount), justice scales and both bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly no direct significant relationships exist between bonus amount and 
either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. Similar to bonus satisfaction, distributive 
justice does not maintain any significant relationship with bonus amount (surprising because 
distributive justice at least theoretically is partially defined by the amount received in an 
exchange relationship). Bonus satisfaction is significantly related to procedural, distributive, 
and informational justice scales and turnover intention. There is no significant relationship 
between interpersonal justice and bonus satisfaction. Interpersonal justice in itself 
demonstrates interesting relationships. This justice scale is significantly related to both 
bonus amount and turnover intention and is the only justice scale not to demonstrate a 
significant relationship with bonus satisfaction. In terms of relationships with turnover 
intention, bonus satisfaction is the strongest predictor (β = -0.31, p < 0.01), followed by 
interpersonal justice (β = -0.17, p < 0.01) and distributive justice (β = -0.14, p < 0.05). 
Though there is a significant relationship between informational justice and bonus 
satisfaction, not such relationship exists between informational justice and turnover intention, 
indicating that appraisals related to bonus satisfaction and turnover intention are made using 
different scales of justice as the bases.
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Note: *p < .05.  **p < .01. 
 
 










































Figure 18. Outline of the figure showing proposed relationships between bonus pay, social 
comparison referent, organisational justice and bonus satisfaction. 
 
 
There are multiple significant relationships between referents selected, as shown in Table 
13. To identify some more the more interesting relationships which are in-line with findings in 
other referent research, R1 – ‘What other people in this company at my job level are paid’ is 
significantly positively related to R7 - ‘What other people in this company at a higher job level 
than mine are paid’ (r = .76, p < .01) and R8 - ‘The pay of others in this company who are 
below my job level’ (r = .47, p < .01) indicating that there are moderate to strong 
relationships between referents internal to the company which may suggest that if 
participants choose an internal company referent as being important to their perceptions of 
fairness (e.g. R1) they are then also more likely to use other internal referents than, for 
example, to go outside of this group and couple an internal company referent with a self-
referent such as R6 – ‘What I think I am worth’ (r = .16, p < .01). This is consistent with the 
research of Nosanchuk and Erickson (1985) and Wheeler et al. (1982) who show that while 
similar others are more likely to be chosen as referents, upwards comparisons are also 
frequently made in pay decisions. It is also consistent with pay research (e.g. Goodman, 
1974) which suggests multiple referents are used in pay comparisons. This is thought to be 
a mechanism by which an individual tests their own pay in the context of the broader 
organisation (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992) and therefore arrives at an understanding of self-worth 



















There are also significant negative relationships between referents, which indicate that if 
certain referents are chosen then it is less likely that others are chosen. As an example R1 – 
‘What other people in this company at my job level are paid’ is significantly negatively related 
to R3 - ‘What this company promised it would pay me’ (r = -.46, p < .01), R4 - ‘The cost of 
living’ (r = -.31, p < .01), R5 – ‘What I have been paid in previous jobs’ (r = -.26, p < .01) and 
R9 – ‘My friends pay’ (r = -.29, p < .01). This would indicate that as participants choose 
certain referents, they are less likely to choose others. As an example, if R1 - ‘What other 
people in this company at my job level are paid’ is chosen, participants will then be less likely 
to choose R3 – ‘What this company promised it would pay me’, with a moderate negative 
relationship. Whereas R1 (What other people in this company at my job level are paid) is 
significantly moderately negatively related to R3, R5 and R9, R2 (What other employers are 
paying for my kind of work) is significantly moderately positively related to R3, R5 and R9. If 
R1 is selected participants are less likely to select R3 – ‘What this company promised it 
would pay me’, whereas if R2 is selected participants are more likely to choose R3 – ‘What 
this company promised it would pay me’. Further referent relationships are detailed in Table 
13, with underlying relationships of the factor structure of referents detailed in Section 5.3 
and Table 11.  
 
5.13. Structure and frequency of referents selected 
 
Three factors were identified as underlying the nine referent choices in the measure, as 
detailed in Table 11. These three factors (components 5, 8 and 12) account for 12.6% of the 
variation in the data, with each component accounting for 5.2%, 4.1% and 3.3% respectively. 
On further investigation of the referent items aligned to each component the results show 
that component 5 relates to referents inside the same company at similar, higher and lower 
levels or to the bonus promise made by the company (internal referents). Component 8 
relates to friends pay, pay in previous jobs and the cost of living (referents related to 
accessible information or information referents). Component 12 relates to what other 
employers are paying, and what I think I am worth, which indicate external market referents. 
These groups are important as they form the blocks which will be added to the hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis in subsequent analysis, and are consistent with the findings of 
Blau (1994), Goodman (1974), Law and Wong (1998) and Gerlach et al. (2006) amongst 
others suggesting referents in this analysis are grouped into three distinct factors - internal 
referents, information referents and market referents. While considering the factor structure 
of the measure allows for the interrogation of referent groupings, it does not effectively allow 
for the testing of hypotheses 5a and 5b (as referents may be in the same group though their 
importance to fairness perceptions is rated differently). In order to test hypotheses 5a and 5b 
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the importance of referent must be considered, as well as a regression analysis to 
understand the effect of referent choice on bonus satisfaction. 
 
5.13.1. Frequency and importance of referent 
 
A frequency analysis of the responses to the referent section of the questionnaire shows that 
of the 599 participants in the research, 272 suggested that more than one referent was ‘very 
important’ in order to judge whether the bonus is fair (in comparison 383 participants 
suggesting that more than one referent was ‘important’). A single participant suggested that 
8 referents were ‘very important’ in order to judge the fairness of their bonus award, a single 
participant suggested that 7 referents were ‘very important’, 6 participants suggested that 6 
referents were ‘very important’, 5 participants suggested that 5 referents were ‘very 
important’, 25 participants suggested that 4 referents were ‘very important’, 91 participants 
suggested that 3 referents were ‘very important’, 143 participants suggested that 2 referents 
were ‘very important’, 162 participants suggested that 1 referent was ‘very important’ and 
165 participants suggested that no referents were ‘very important’ in order to judge the 
fairness of the bonus award. This suggests that hypothesis 5a (that multiple referents will be 
very important to the majority of participants when engaging in social comparisons on receipt 
of their bonus) is not supported as the majority of participants (54.6%) suggested that either 
no referents or a single referent is very important in determining the fairness of the bonus 
award. In order to test whether these frequencies are significant, a chi-square goodness of fit 
test was performed. The results indicate a significant difference between the frequency of 
participants choosing multiple referents classed as ‘very important’ compared to participants 
not using multiple referents (X2 =5.05, N = 599, df = 1, p < 0.05) providing additional support 
for the null hypothesis. This analysis does not however allow for the testing of hypothesis 5b 
(that the referent selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be 
those in the same company at the same level).  
 
5.14. Testing hypothesis 5a and 5b: a) Multiple referents will be very important to the 
majority of participants when engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. b) 
The referent selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be those 
in the same company at the same level. 
 
In order to test the importance of the choice of referent in the development of bonus 
satisfaction appraisals (and so test hypothesis 5b) a hierarchical multiple regression was 
performed, with bonus satisfaction (as measured by the Bonus Satisfaction Survey; Sturman 
& Short, 2000) as the dependent variable, and referents added as predictor variables in 
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blocks consistent with the results of the factor analysis in Table 11. Assumptions related to 
normally distribution, univariate outliers, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of 
residuals were tested and met. Similarly, multivariate outliers were not of concern, and 
relatively high tolerances for predictors in the regression model indicated that 
multicollinearity would not interfere with the ability to interpret the outcomes of the regression 
analysis. Gender, position and salary are added in the first step (and therefore are controlled 
for in subsequent steps). In the next step referents inside the same company at similar, 
higher and lower levels and the bonus promise made by the company are added (referents 
R1, R3, R7 and R8, or component 5 in the factor analysis). In step three referents related to 
friends pay, pay in previous jobs and the cost of living (R4, R5 and R9, or component 8 in 
the factor analysis). In step 4 the remaining referents related to what other employers are 
paying, and what I think I am worth are added (component 12 in the factor analysis). The 
results of each step in the model are shown in Table 19. Component 5 (noted as internal 
referents in the factor analysis) accounts for 8.5% of the variance in bonus satisfaction 
(∆𝑅2 =  0.085, ∆𝐹(4, 591)= 13.795, 𝑝 < .001), component 8 (or information referents) 
accounts for an additional 6.5% of the variance in bonus satisfaction (∆𝑅2 =  0.065, 
∆𝐹(3, 588)= 15.147, 𝑝 < .001), and component 12 (or external market referents) accounts 
for an additional 1.5% of the variance in bonus satisfaction (∆𝑅2 =  0.015, ∆𝐹(2, 586)= 
5.312, 𝑝 < .001). When all predictor variables are added to the model they together account 
for 17% of the variance in bonus satisfaction (𝑅2 =  0.168, 𝐹(12, 586)= 9.849, 𝑝 < .001). The 
effect size, as calculated by Cohen’s 𝑓2 is small.   
 
Considering the results of the hierarchical multiple regression, the referent which forms the 
strongest positive significant predictor of bonus satisfaction is ‘What the company promised 
it would pay me’ (β = 0.267, p < 0.01) followed by ‘what I think I am worth’ (β = 0.140, p < 
0.01), with ‘the cost of living’ (β = -0.156, p < 0.01), and ‘my friends pay’ (β = -0.137, p < 
0.01) forming the strongest negative significant predictors. The referent representing those in 
the same company at the same level does not have a significant predictive relationship with 
bonus satisfaction and is weaker in terms of its predictive ability than the majority of other 
referents. The results therefore suggest that the second part of this hypothesis is not 
supported, and therefore these investigations find no support for hypothesis 5a or 5b. The 
majority of participants do not suggest that multiple referents are very important to their 
fairness perceptions when engaging in social comparison. Rather than ‘those in the same 
company at the same level’ being the most important referent in determining bonus 
satisfaction, other referents play a more substantial role. These relationships will be 
investigated in the following section.  
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Table 19.  
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (𝛽) regression coefficients for each predictor in a hierarchical 
multiple regression model predicting bonus satisfaction 
Note: N = 599. CI = confidence interval, R2= 0.168 
Dependent Variable: Bonus Satisfaction (BSS) 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.
      
Variable        𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] SE B 𝛽 ∆𝑅2        ∆𝐹 (𝑑𝑓) 
      
Step 1      
Gender -.059 [-.210, .092] .077 -.032   
Position  -.038 [-.227, .151] .096 -.019   
Salary -.002 [-.006, .002] .002 -.046 0.002 0.410 (3,595) 
Step 2      
Gender -.045 [-.191, .107] .074 -.024   
Position   .032 [-.151, .215] .093  .017   
Salary -.001 [-.005, .003] .002 -.027   




 .075 [-.002, .151] .039  .117   
(company promise)  .154 [ .108, .200]** .024  .292   
(others at higher level)  .016 [-.069, .101] .043  .023   
R8 (others at lower level) -.103 [-.179, -.026]** .039 -.124 0.085 13.795 (4,591) 
Step 3      
Gender -.043 [-.185, .098] .072 -.024   
Position   .028 [-.149, .206] .090  .015   
Salary -.001 [-.005, .003] .002 -.023   




 .020 [-.056, .096] .039  .031   
(company promise)  .141 [ .096, .186]** .023  .268   
(others at higher level) -.042 [-.126, .043] .043 -.058   
R8 (others at lower level) -.048 [-.124, .028] .039 -.058   
R4 (cost of living) -.191 [-.286, -.095]** .049 -.167   
R5 (previous jobs) -.052 [-.122, .018] .035 -.066   
R9 (friends pay) -.105 [-.172, -.039]** .034 -.138 0.065 15.147 (3,588) 
Step 4      
Gender -.016 [-.157, .126] .072 -.008   
Position   .014 [-.162, .191] .090  .007   
Salary -.001 [-.005, .003] .002 -.026   




 .011 [-.065, .088] .039  .018   
(company promise)  .141 [ .092, .189]** .025  .267   
(others at higher level) -.066 [-.152, .020] .044 -.092   
R8 (others at lower level) -.046 [-.121, .029] .038 -.055   
R4 (cost of living) -.177 [-.273, -.082]** .049 -.156   
R5 (previous jobs) -.092 [-.168, .016]* .039 -.117   
R9 (friends pay) -.104 [-.170, -.038]** .034 -.137   




-.011 [-.078, .055] .034 -.015   
6 (what I think I’m worth)  .092 [ .036, .147]** .028  .140 0.015 5.312 (2,586) 
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Table 20.  
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (𝛽) regression coefficients, and squared semi partial correlations (𝑠𝑟2) for each referent as a predictor in a regression 
model predicting organisational justice 
Note: N = 599. CI = confidence interval 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
             
            
 Procedural Justice Distributive Justice Interpersonal Justice Informational Justice 
Variable 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 𝐵[95% 𝐶𝐼] 𝛽 𝑠𝑟2 
             
What other people in this 
company at my job level 
are paid  
-.022 [-.082, .039] -.049 .001 -.090 [-.195, .015] -.114 .005 -.074 [-.142, -.006]* -.150 .008 -.049 [-.116, .018] -.099 .003 
             
What other employers 
are paying for my kind of 
work 
-.014 [-.065, .038] -.026 .000 -.018 [-.072, .107]  .018 .000 .031 [-.027, .089] .051 .002 -.047 [-.104, .010] -.078 .004 
             
What this company 
promised it would pay me 
 .071 [.035, .108]**   .196 .025  .114 [.051, .177]**  .177 .020 -.012 [-.053, .029] -.030 .000 .098 [.057, .138]** .240 .037 
             
The cost of living -.100 [-.174, -.026]** -.125 .012 -.209 [-.337, -.081]** -.147 .017 -.006 [-.089, .077] -.007 .000 -.021 [-.103, .061] -.023 .000 
             
What I have been paid in 
previous jobs 
.012 [-.046, .071]  .023 .000 -.163 [-.264, -.063]** -.169 .016 -.115 [-.180, -.049]** -.188 .020 -.090 [-.154, -.025]** -.146 .012 
             
What I think I am worth  .036 [-.006, .077]  .080 .005  .120 [.048, .192]**  .151 .017 .078 [.031, .124]** .155 .018 .088 [.042, .135]** .176 .023 
             
What others in this 
company at a higher job 
level than mine are paid 
 .031 [-.038, .100]  .062 .001 -.015 [-.134, .103] -.017 .000 .074 [-.003, .151] .131 .006 .068 [-.008, .144] .120 .005 
             
The pay of others in this 
company who are below 
my job level 
-.027 [-.084, .030] -.047 .002 -.019 [-.118, .080] -.019 .000 -.039 [-.103, .025] -.061 .003 -.011 [-.075, .052] -.017 .000 
             
My friend’s pay -.024 [-.074, -.026] -.046 .002 -.065 [-.151, .022] -.069 .004 -.044 [-.100, -.012] -.075 .004 .013 [-.042, .069] .023 .000 
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5.15. The relationship between referent selection and organisational justice 
 
Further multiple regression analyses were conducted in order to estimate the proportion of 
variance in organisational justice (all four scales or procedural, distributive, interpersonal and 
informational as measured by the OJS) that can be accounted for by referent selection (with 
results shown in Table 20). All four assumptions (as detailed in the above section) were 
satisfied by the data set prior to conducting the analyses. In combination, referent selection 
accounted for a significant 6.4% of the variability in procedural justice, 𝑅2 =  0.064, adjusted 
𝑅2 = 0.049  𝐹(9, 558)= 4.178, p < 0.01, a significant 12.2% of the variability in distributive 
justice, 𝑅2 =  0.122, adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.108  𝐹(9, 582)= 8.493, p < 0.01, a significant 6.6% of the 
variability in interpersonal justice, 𝑅2 =  0.066, adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.051  𝐹(9, 582)= 4.334, p < 
0.01, and a significant 9.3% of the variability in informational justice, 𝑅2 =  0.093, adjusted 
𝑅2 = 0.078  𝐹(9, 582)= 6.224, p < 0.01. Conducting a similar regression analysis with turnover 
intention as the dependent variable also allows an understanding of the amount of variance in 
turnover intention accounted for by referent selection. In this analysis referent selection in 
combination accounted for a significant 9.3% of the variability in turnover intention, 𝑅2 =  
0.093, adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.078  𝐹(9, 558)= 6.23, p < 0.01. The significant standardised estimates 
between referents and justice (all four scales) and bonus satisfaction are shown in Figure 19. 
It can be seen from this figure that the strongest significant relationships exist between the 
referent of a company promise and informational justice (β = 0.24, p < 0.01) and procedural 
justice (β = 0.20, p < 0.01). This is perhaps to be expected as if a promise is made there is 
typically both an informational component (with a promise forming an effective communication 
episode) and a procedural component (where the promise may be encapsulated in a policy or 
organisational process). Also interesting to note is that unlike in previous research considering 
referents used in pay situations, others in the same organisation at a higher level or lower 
level are not significantly related to bonus satisfaction or justice, and others at the same level 
only have significant relationships with interpersonal justice (β = -0.15, p < 0.05). 
 

























Note: *p < .05.  **p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 19. Significant standardised regression coefficients for the relationships between referent 
selection, justice and bonus satisfaction. 
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It may be important to note at this stage of this research that there may be alternative 
explanations for the results relating referent choice to both justice and satisfaction. As 
suggested by the review of the literature, in order to form an appraisal related to social 
comparison referents two conditions are required to be met; information must be available on 
referent groups, and the referent must be relevant to the comparison (Schneider, 2010; 
Dornstein, 1988). As this thesis has tested the importance of the referent group to fairness in 
bonus pay situations, and has not tested whether information is readily available there is a 
clear limitation in the findings of this research. It may be that some referents (for example 
‘others in the same company at a higher level’ are actually more relevant to bonus 
comparisons than others, but the lack of significant relationships represents a lack of available 
information on this group rather than importance as a comparison point in determining bonus 
satisfaction and justice appraisals. This is a potential limitation in this element of the research 
which could be the focus of future investigation. 
 
5.16. The relationship between bonus amount and referent selection 
 
To assess the size and direction of the relationships between bonus amount, bonus amount 
as a percentage of salary and referent selection, a bivariate correlation was carried out. 
Kendall’s tau-b indicated the presence of only weak correlations between both bonus 
amount and bonus as a percentage of salary and referent selection. There are no significant 
relationships between bonus amount or bonus as a percentage of salary and any of the nine 
referents. This would indicate that referents are chosen based on factors other than the 
amount of bonus pay. This is consistent with previous research, in that more stable factors 
such as level of education, position and seniority within the organisation, as well as 
information availability have tended to form the bases of referent selection criteria (e.g. 
Goodman, 1974; Scholl et al., 1987; Dornstein, 1988). The finding that different referents are 
chosen in different situations does not appear to extend to different situations involving 
amount of bonus pay. There may be various reasons for this, including those identified by 
Dornstein (1988) related to information availability and relevance. As the amount of bonus 
pay increases, this does not make new information available on others in the workplace, 
neither does this ensure the increased relevance of each referent. This is in itself an 
interesting novel finding regarding bonus pay. The Kendall’s tau-b correlations between 
bonus amount, bonus as a percentage of salary and referent selection are shown in Table 
21. 
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Table 21.  
Kendall’s tau-b correlations between bonus amount, bonus as a percentage of salary and referent selection along with significance levels 
 
 Bonus BonPerc R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 
Bonus 1.00           
BonPerc .58** 1.00          
R1: What other people in this company at my job level are paid .06 .04 1.00         
R2: What other employers are paying for my kind of work .01 -.02 -.11** 1.00        
R3: What this company promised it would pay me .03 .03 -.44** .30** 1.00       
R4: The cost of living .01 .03 -.31** .31** .11** 1.00      
R5: What I have been paid in previous jobs -.04 -.04 -.24** .33** .04 .38** 1.00     
R6: What I think I am worth .02 .01 .15** .22** -.05 -.02 .24** 1.00    
R7: What others in this company at a higher job level than mine are paid .01 .00 .67** -.03 -.33** -.24** -.15** .27** 1.00   
R8: The pay of others in this company who are below my job level .02 .05 .41** .06 -.25** .01 .07* .17** .46** 1.00  
R9: My friend’s pay .00 -.01 -.26** .23** .11** .33** .38** .02 -.30** -.01 1.00 
            
Note: N = 599 
 
           
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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5.17. Gender and Position Differences 
 
Preliminary assumptions testing indicates that scores for male and female participants, and 
managers and non-managers are reasonably normally distributed across the variables in this 
research (justice, bonus satisfaction, turnover intention, earnings, bonus amount and bonus 
as a percentage of salary). Consequently, Welch’s t-test was used to compare male (N = 
323) and female (N = 276) participants average scores across variables. These scores are 
reported in Table 22, along with the mean, standard deviation, degrees of freedom and 
effect size (represented as Cohen’s d) for each variable. The t-test is significant for only 
three variables, position (whether manager or non-manager), bonus amount, and salary. 
There are no significant differences between the genders of participant in justice, bonus 
satisfaction or turnover intention measures. These significant differences in gender suggest 
that male participants are more likely to be in managerial positions, are more likely to have 
higher mean salaries, and are also more likely to obtain higher mean bonus amounts than 
female participants. Interestingly, as there are no significant differences in bonus as a 
percentage of salary, this indicates that whilst male participants tend to have higher mean 
salaries and higher mean bonus payments than female participants, there are no significant 
differences in proportions of bonus pay to salary across genders. 
 
Considering differences in manager (N = 203) and non-manager (N = 396) participants 
Welch’s t-test was conducted to compare average scores. These scores are reported in 
Table 23, along with the mean, standard deviation, degrees of freedom and effect size (d) for 
each variable. Table 22 demonstrates that there are significant gender differences between 
managers and non-managers. A further analysis of the manager and non-manager 
populations shows that significant differences exist only in bonus amount and salary. There 
are no significant differences between managers and non-managers for justice, satisfaction 
or turnover intention measures. The effect size is small for differences in both gender and 
position, as indicated by Cohen’s d (also listed in Table 23), meaning that the separation of 
the group means is small in terms of their common standard deviations. These results 
indicate that managers tend to earn higher mean salaries than non-managers and that they 
tend to receive higher mean bonus pay (perhaps to be expected given the additional 
accountability involved in people management activities).  
 
In order to test if any significant differences exist in the choice of referents between male and 
female participants, and between managers and non-managers, further t-tests were 
conducted to compare average scores across referents. In terms of gender, significant 
differences exist between male and female participants for four referents; R1 – ‘What other 
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people in this company at my job level are paid’, R2 – ‘What other employers are paying for 
my kind of work’, R6 – ‘What I think I am worth’ and R7 – ‘What others in this company at a 
higher job level than mine are paid’. The results of the t-tests for these referents are shown 
in Table 24. Only differences which reach traditional levels of significance are included. In 
terms of means between managerial position where referent selection is concerned, only 
one referent shows a significant difference (R2 - ‘What other employers are paying for my 
kind of work’). This is shown in Table 25. Again, the effect size is small for differences in 
both gender and position related to referent selection as indicated by Cohen’s d, meaning 
that the separation of the two group means is small in terms of their common standard 
deviations. The findings show that male participants are more likely to compare their bonus 
pay with others in the same company at the same level, more likely to compare their bonus 
pay with what other employers are paying (though as male participants are also more likely 
to be managers this could indicate increased mobility of employment for managerial 
employees consistent with the research of Dornstein, 1988, as shown in Table 22), more 
likely to compare their pay with what they think they are worth, and more likely to compare 
their pay with others in the same company at a higher level than female participants.  
 
Table 22.  
Welch’s t-test and means across variables for male and female participants   
 
        
Variable Male 
(N = 323) 
Female 
(N = 276) 
t df d 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
Procedural Justice 3.15 0.63 3.15 0.66 -0.26 597 0.00 
Distributive Justice 3.05 1.15 3.01 1.10 0.34 597 0.00 
Interpersonal Justice 4.13 0.73 4.05 0.73 1.31 597 0.01 
Informational Justice 3.14 0.74 3.12 0.69 0.44 597 0.00 
Bonus Satisfaction 2.96 0.93 2.92 0.90 0.61 597 0.00 
Turnover Intention 3.06 0.85 3.10 0.83 -0.58 597 0.00 
Position 1.6 0.49 1.73 0.44 -3.44** 595 -0.01 
Bonus Percentage 9.88 7.38 8.77 6.58 1.92 597 0.01 
Bonus Amount 5.94 4.20 4.58 3.45 4.38** 596 0.02 
Salary 63.54 22.25 54.33 19.73 5.37** 596 0.02 
        
N = 599, *p < .05., **p < .01.  
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Table 23.  
Welch’s t-test and means across variables for manager and non-manager participants   
 
 
        
Variable Manager 
(N = 203) 
Non-manager 
(N = 396) 
t df d 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
Procedural Justice 3.14 0.61 3.15 0.66 -0.11 597 0.00 
Distributive Justice 2.98 1.09 3.06 1.15 -0.90 425 -0.01 
Interpersonal Justice 4.06 0.76 4.11 0.71 -0.87 597 0.00 
Informational Justice 3.10 0.68 3.14 0.74 -0.64 597 0.00 
Bonus Satisfaction 2.94 0.89 2.94 0.93 -0.06 597 0.00 
Turnover Intention 3.06 0.79 3.09 0.87 -0.46 445 0.00 
Bonus Percentage 9.37 6.38 8.87 7.37 1.06 597 0.01 
Bonus Amount 7.00 4.74 4.45 3.11 6.92** 294 0.04 
Salary 76.43 21.21 50.51 15.76 15.38** 320 0.09 
        





Welch’s t-test and means for male and female participants considering referent selection  
 
        
Referent Male 
(N = 323) 
Female 
(N = 276) 
 t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
R1 Others in this 
company at my level 
3.89 1.38 3.61 1.50 2.39** 564 .010 
R2 What other 
employers are paying 
2.20 1.26 1.99 1.13 2.24* 596 .030 
R6 What I think I am 
worth 
3.72 1.30 3.29 1.49 3.66** 552 .000 
R7 Others here at a 
higher level 
3.88 1.22 3.64 1.33 2.24* 564 .030 







Table 25.  
Welch’s t-test and means for manager and non-manager participants considering referent selection   
 
  
        
Referent Manager 
(N = 203 
Non-Manager 
(N = 396) 
t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
R2 What other 
employers are paying 
2.25 1.32 2.03 1.14 1.99* 361 .050 
        




These results show some interesting dynamics. Attitudes (in the forms of satisfaction, 
turnover and justice) do not vary for male and female participants yet bonus amount and 
salary do (though in proportion). This appears to indicate that though female participants are 
paid less in general than male participants, they are equally satisfied, believe that this is fair 
and are no more likely to leave the organisation because of this. There may be potential 
reasons for this in that male participants tend to be in managerial positions, and so 
consistent with equity rules are seen as having differences in organisational inputs 
consistent with their increased output (Adams, 1965). It is also interesting to note that the 
means returned for four referents vary significantly between male and female participants. 
The means for one referent varies significantly for manager and non-manager participants. 
Could these results identify a difference in appraisal paths between male and female 
participants when determining if a bonus is fair and whether they should be satisfied with a 
bonus? If female participants are paid less on average but are less likely to compare this pay 
with (as an example) others at the same level in the same company or others at a higher 
level, then perhaps these less frequent upwards or horizontal social comparison processes 
lead to differences in fairness and satisfaction appraisals. This is certainly one of the more 





5.18. Summary of findings 
 
Due to the diverse nature of the variables under investigation in this cross-sectional study, 
the results are broad. The findings of this investigation are summarised here, then discussed 
in more detail in the context of the absolute findings and findings related to previous 
research in the discussion section in Chapter 8. This summary begins with a review of the 
hypotheses this investigation seeks to address, followed by the findings related to bonus 
pay. The section then follows the relationship paths through to social comparison processes 
and referent selection, organisational justice appraisals (in their scale forms of distributive, 
procedural, interpersonal and interactional justice), bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. 
Each of these relationships is summarised in the following sections. 
 
5.18.1. Summary of Hypotheses 
 
A summary of the hypotheses addressed in this investigation is provided in Table 26. There 
is no support for hypothesis 1 as there is no evidence of a linear relationship between bonus 
amount (either as a percentage of salary or absolute amount) and bonus satisfaction, 
therefore the research provides support for the null hypothesis (though the nature of any 
potential complex relationship is also unclear from the analysis). There is support for 
hypotheses 2a and 2b as organisational justice is positively related to bonus satisfaction and 
negatively related to turnover intention, indicating that as perceptions of justice increase then 
satisfaction with the bonus increases and turnover intention decreases. There is partial 
support for hypotheses 3a and 3b as organisational justice mediates the relationships 
between both bonus amount as a percentage of salary and both bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention, but does not mediate the relationship between bonus as an absolute 
amount and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. These relationships become 
more complex when the individual justice scales of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
interpersonal justice and informational justice are considered, with mediating relationships 
apparent for some scales of justice but not others (seemingly dependent both on the scale of 
justice and the bonus pay variable considered). There is support for hypothesis 4 as where 
bonus pay is concerned distributive justice is a stronger predictor of bonus satisfaction than 
other scales of justice, though as the factor analysis in this research shows an item of the 
bonus satisfaction survey and an item related to distributive justice (from the organisational 
justice survey) load heavily onto the same factor (though further analysis provides support 
for keeping the original structure of the measures). Finally, the investigation finds no support 
for hypothesis 5a or 5b. The majority of participants suggested that one or fewer referent is 
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very important as a comparison point to their perceptions of fairness on receipt of their 
bonus (rather than multiple referents), and those in the same company at the same level are 
not most important in determining bonus satisfaction. The referent of ‘What the company 
promised it would pay me’ instead predicts more variance in bonus satisfaction, followed by 
‘what I think I am worth’. 
 
 
Table 26.  
Hypotheses addressed by cross sectional investigation with outcomes  
 
   
Hypothesis Description Comment 
 




H2a,2b Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and 
negatively related to (b) turnover intention. 
Support 
H3a,3b Organisational justice will at mediate the relationship between (a) 




H4 Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than 
procedural, interpersonal and informational justice components for 
bonus pay conditions. 
Support 
H5a,5b (a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of 
participants when engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their 
bonus. (b) The referent selected as being most important in 
determining bonus satisfaction will be those in the same company at 





5.18.2. Bonus amount  
 
The results of the investigation show that there are no significant direct relationships 
between bonus amount and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. This is one of the 
findings of this research which is contrary to findings in previous literature (e.g. Pokorny, 
2008; Gneezy, 2004; Pouliakas, 2010), where pay has been shown to have a complex 
relationship with bonus satisfaction, but a relationship nonetheless. Similarly, the 
relationships between bonus amount and organisational justice tend to be non-significant. 
Only relationships between bonus as a percentage of salary and both procedural and 
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informational justice and bonus as an absolute amount and interpersonal justice are 
significant (though each of these relationships is weak). This is certainly one of the more 
interesting findings within this research and offers interesting possibilities for future 
investigation. This raises a fundamental question as to why there is such a focus on the 
amount an individual receives as a bonus when clearly other processes (such as the social 
comparison processes which take place because of this bonus, or the injustice resulting from 
the bonus payment independent of the amount of bonus) have a stronger association with 
both satisfaction and turnover intention appraisals. Perhaps of special interest given the 
theoretical foundations of justice is the lack of significant relationship between bonus amount 
and distributive justice. Given the definition of distributive justice as ‘fairness associated with 
outcomes decisions and distribution of resources’ (Colquitt, 2001) it is perhaps surprising 
that there are no significant relationships between bonus amount and distributive justice. 
 
5.18.3. Referent Selection 
 
The results investigating the referents chosen by participants when their bonus is announced 
show some nuances when compared with previous pay research (albeit research broadly 
considering total pay or salary rather than the specific instance of bonus pay). In previous 
pay research investigators have suggested that multiple referents are generally used in pay 
satisfaction appraisals, but these groups are limited in size (e.g. Oldham, 1976; Goodman, 
1974; Law & Wong, 1998). This research finds that most participants suggest that one or 
fewer referents are very important in deciding whether their bonus is fair, rather than the use 
of multiple referents suggested in previous research (though 383 of the 599 participants 
suggest that more than one referent is ‘important’ to their fairness perceptions). While bonus 
amount has no direct relationship with bonus satisfaction or turnover intention, the referent 
chosen by participants accounts for a significant 17% of the variability in bonus satisfaction, 
6.4% of the variance in procedural justice, 12.2% in distributive justice, 6.6% in interpersonal 
justice, 9.3% in informational justice and 9.3% in turnover intention. The choice of referent 
used in fairness decisions therefore significantly predicts bonus satisfaction, all scales of 
organisational justice and turnover intention. In terms of justice appraisals, referent selection 
plays a greater role in determining the variance in distributive justice than other justice 
scales. Logically this seems sensible, as referents are perhaps less important to judgements 
associated with process (which is typically set by the organisation) than allocation and 
treatment appraisals (where comparison points are perhaps more subjective and open to 
variation dependent on individual actors). Of all referents ‘What this company promised it 
would pay me’ returns the highest standardised regression weight when predicting bonus 
satisfaction. Only five of the nine referents including in this research directly predict bonus 
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satisfaction, and interestingly none of these are current organisational referents other than 
that of a company promise (others are ‘the cost of living’, ‘my pay in previous jobs’, ‘what I 
think I’m worth’ and ‘my friends pay’).  
 
5.18.4. Organisational Justice 
 
Distributive, procedural and informational justice all significantly predict variation in bonus 
satisfaction, with the strongest effect being that between distributive justice and bonus 
satisfaction (β = .72, p < 0.01). This is more than four times the next strongest relationship 
between justice and bonus satisfaction (the relationship between procedural justice and 
bonus satisfaction, where β = .17, p < 0.01) indicating that distributive justice is more 
strongly associated with bonus satisfaction than other justice scales. Together these justice 
scales predict 83% of the variance in bonus satisfaction. Justice scales also predict turnover 
intention, with the strongest effect being between interpersonal justice and turnover intention 
(β = -.17, p < 0.01), followed by distributive justice (β = -.14, p < 0.01) and procedural justice 
(β = -.13, p < 0.01). This finding offers some support for the findings of Tremblay et al. 
(2000) who suggest that distributive justice perceptions are better predictors of pay 
satisfaction than procedural justice perceptions, broadening these findings to bonus pay as 
well as ‘general’ pay. It is also interesting to note comparisons with the findings of Colquitt 
(2001) who considered the relationships between justice scales and outcome satisfaction. In 
the Colquitt et al. (2001) meta-analysis the authors found that distributive justice was more 
strongly related to outcome satisfaction, but informational justice predicts the greatest 
percentage of variance. This is partially in-line with our findings, which are supportive of the 
position that distributive justice has the strongest relationship, but in our research this aspect 
of justice also predicts the greatest amount of variance in bonus satisfaction (with 
informational justice predicting a relatively small amount of 1% compared with the 78% 
predicted by distributive justice). 
 
Considering the potential mediating effects of justice in the relationship between bonus 
amount and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention also offers a complex set of 
relationships (shown in Tables 16 and 17). The findings of this thesis offer some consistency 
with those of Shaw et al. (2002), and DeConinck and Stilwell (2004) who suggest that pay 
(and pay dispersion) impacts outcomes through the mediating variable of organisational 
justice, though it adds granularity to this finding by considering the different scales of justice. 
Rather than simply stating that justice mediates pay-outcome relationships, this research 
shows that though organisational justice mediates the relationships between bonus as a 
percentage of salary and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, organisational 
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justice does not mediate the relationships between bonus as an absolute amount and either 
bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. This may suggest that different appraisal 
mechanisms are used by participants for these two different bonus amount constructs. 
Considering the individual scales of justice, the results also shows that whilst some justice 
scales mediate pay-outcome relationships others do not. Distributive justice does not 
mediate the relationship between bonus pay (either as a percentage of salary or as an 
absolute amount) and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention, whereas interpersonal 
justice does act as a mediator in these relationships. Procedural justice does not mediate the 
relationships between bonus as a percentage of salary and either bonus satisfaction or 
turnover intention but does mediate the relationships between bonus as an absolute amount 
and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. Conversely informational justice 
mediates the relationships between bonus as a percentage of salary and both bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention, but does not mediate the relationships between bonus as 
an absolute amount and either bonus satisfaction or turnover intention. 
 
5.18.5. Bonus satisfaction and turnover intention 
 
Bonus satisfaction forms the strongest predictor of variation in turnover intention. Together 
procedural and distributive justice account for more than 82% of the variation in bonus 
satisfaction. Interpersonal, procedural and distributive justice also have a direct effect on 
turnover intention, together predicting a further 4.5% of turnover intention than the 35% of 
the variance predicted by bonus satisfaction. As 17% of the variance in bonus satisfaction 
(the remainder not accounted for by justice scales) and 9.3% of the variance in turnover 
intention is predicted by referent selection this offers some interesting comparisons in terms 
of relative effects. When predicting variation in bonus satisfaction this gives a relative 
contribution from referents (17%) and justice (83%) components, and for turnover intention 
this gives a relative impact from justice (4.5%), referent (9.3%) and satisfaction (35%) 
components. All of the variance in bonus satisfaction is therefore accounted for by referent 
selection and organisational justice (with distributive justice proving the strongest predictor), 
and nearly half (48.8%) of the variance in turnover intention is accounted for by referent 
selection, justice directly, and bonus satisfaction (with bonus satisfaction proving the 





5.18.6. Gender and position differences 
 
The results demonstrate few differences overall across gender and position variables. 
Independent of gender or position, justice appraisals appear similar across groups and there 
are no significant differences between male and female or manager and non-manager 
participants across all justice scales. Similarly, no differences exist between participants 
when considering bonus satisfaction or turnover intention variables. In terms of significant 
differences, female participants tend more to be non-managers than male participants, and 
salary and bonus amounts for female participants tend to be lower than for male. Differences 
in bonus as a percentage of salary are non-significant, perhaps indicting that while salary 
and bonus amounts are lower, they are proportionally lower. Managers tend to earn 
significantly more than non-managers, and also receive higher bonus amounts than non-
managers. It is perhaps unsurprising that managers earn more than non-managers given the 
additional responsibilities present with more senior roles in an organisational hierarchy. It is 
perhaps comforting to know that these positions do not appear to alter our fundamental 
appraisals in terms of the degrees of justice we perceive. 
 
Another interesting finding from this research into intrapersonal difference is that there are 
significant differences in the referents chosen by participant groups. As bonus amount 
appears to play little role in justice, satisfaction and turnover intention appraisals, this thesis 
could be forgiven for concluding that groups follow similar appraisal processes. When the 
referents selected by gender and position groups are considered, however, the results show 
some significant differences. Male participants tend to choose ‘in this company at my job 
level’, ‘what other employers are paying for this type of work’, ‘what I think I am worth’ and 
‘others in this company at a higher level’ more frequently than female participants. The 
process of self-evaluation described above may therefore be different for male and female 
participants, which may contribute to similar perceptions of bonus satisfaction based on 
significantly different salary and bonus payments. There is also the possibility, however, that 
as more male participants tend to be in managerial positions than female participants then 
both genders identify the additional work and skill required from these roles, and so are 
satisfied with these pay and bonus differences. Consistent with other research (e.g. 
Goodman, 1974) managers tend to consider ‘what other employers are paying for my kind of 
work’ more frequently, with this finding perhaps indicating the increased inter-organisational 
mobility in management positions, and perhaps more information availability about the 




Having summarised the first (cross-sectional) research investigation method and results, this 
thesis can now turn its attention to the second (experience sampling) research investigation. 
In the next chapter the thesis will outline the paths, components and hypotheses the 
experience sampling research investigation seeks to address, and explains the method used 
in the research. The thesis then discusses the results of this investigation and gives a 
summary of the findings. Whereas in this first investigation relatively straightforward analysis 
such as correlation analysis and regression analysis were employed to investigate the 
relationships between variables and address the hypotheses, as the second investigation 
employs repeated measures and experience sampling methods, alternative data analysis 
techniques are used. These will be introduced along with the hypotheses and relationships 




6. Study 2: Workplace Events, Organisational Justice, Affect, Social Exchange Relationship 

















The second of the research investigations addressed by this thesis considers bonus pay as 
an organisational event. This study involves assessing the event, emotion, organisational 
justice, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention related to this event. The 
research considers not only bonus pay as a workplace event, but a range of other workplace 
events drawn from extant literature and validated with participants as being salient to their 
organisation. This allows the research to develop a picture of the events, emotions and 
association with social exchange relationship and turnover intention over the research 
period. By considering a period during which a bonus payment is announced, the research 
captures the type and strength of emotion elicited within the sample, and the association this 
has with perceptions of organisational justice, social exchange relationship quality and 
turnover intention not only in isolation for bonus pay as an event, but also in comparison with 
other workplace events. This will provide both a within-person view of bonus payment, where 
the bonus paid forms an event in relation to the others which occur during the period of 
research, and a between-person view of bonus payment, where the research can compare 
processes between participants to test the generalisability of reactions. The research will 
also reveal whether bonus pay can be considered an affective event by traditional standards, 
in that it exerts an additive direct emotional effect over and above a cognitive effect (using 
social exchange relationship quality as this cognitive measure) on levels of turnover 


















investigation address the overall hypotheses in Chapter 3, and Figure 20 highlights the 
relationships in this investigation, and how the hypotheses map to these relationships. This 
investigation addresses the research questions raised by Colquitt et al. (2013) with respect 
to the relationships between justice, social exchange relationship quality, affect (or emotions) 
and work outcomes (or in this case the proxy outcome of turnover intention). Over the next 
section the investigation will be introduced, and the method explained in more detail. This 
investigation will address the following hypotheses identified in the review of the literature 
(as also shown in Figure 20): 
 
H6a-6b: Organisational Justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are positively 
related to (a) positive emotions and negatively related to (b) negative emotions. 
 
H7: Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice perceptions 
triggered as a result of bonus pay. 
 
H8a and 8b: Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an 
affective event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a direct affective 
relationship with turnover intention and (b) a unique effect above and beyond that of 
social exchange relationship quality on turnover intention. 
 
H9: Organisational justice is positively related to social exchange quality, which in 
turn is negatively related to turnover intention. 
 
H10: The relationship between justice and both social exchange relationship quality 
and turnover intention is mediated by positive or negative state affect. 
 
6.2. Appropriateness of the Research Design 
 
Research designs which effectively assess affective (or emotional) responses are few in 
number, especially when interpersonal comparison is required. In order to investigate the 
range of variables using a controllable set of measures, to allow for the standardisation of 
information and to aid in our understanding of potential direction of relationship, a 
quantitative design is preferred. To build an understanding of size and potential direction of 
the event, affect, attitude-outcome formation linkage, an experience sampling method (ESM) 
using a repeated-measures, within-person difference capture approach was used. ESM 
offers five key epistemological and methodological advantages to researchers when 
considering the co-occurrence of emotional and cognitive appraisal. First, ESM provides 
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access to settings and subjective experiences we would otherwise have no means of 
assessing. Second, ESM offers proximity to and greater understanding of participants’ 
experiences. Data are collected about participants as events are happening or in close 
temporal proximity to events, thus reducing retrospective biases. Third, ESM offers the 
opportunity to acquire understanding of large numbers of events experienced by participants 
in ways that add to the scope of what we can learn through qualitative studies. Fourth, the 
method offers the ability to study within-person processes, placing thoughts, emotions, and 
behaviour in specific contexts. Finally, for quantitative researchers interested in issues of 
statistical power, the repeated-measures nature of ESM approaches affords a level of 
statistical power that is difficult to acquire in other quantitative approaches. The reasons 
behind some of these details will be further discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.2.1. Statistical Reasons for ESM 
 
For those engaged in quantitative research, statistical power can be increased either by 
increasing the number of participants or increasing the number of data points per person. 
The multiple repeated measures that characterize ESM add statistical power that enhances 
the ability to detect patterns of interest without large sample sizes. Repeated reports from 
each individual participant increase the reliability of the data, allowing researchers statistical 
power far greater than would normally be available without very large sample sizes. A 
“typical” but fairly modest ESM study might include 3 to 10 samplings per day for 1 to 4 
weeks, resulting in 15 to 200 data collection points per participant, enabling a high degree of 
reliability and statistical power. Thus, ESM allows for the statistical power to examine 
complex relationships that influence experiences that might otherwise require hundreds if not 
thousands of participants. It also enables the addition of variability or variance as a focus of 
the research. As an example, ESM allows researchers to study the variability of participant 
emotion over time, not just average levels of mood. As an example of the type of findings 
which rely on this Witte et al. (2005) found through ESM data that it was the variability in 
depressive affect, rather than the intensity that best predicted suicidal ideation and actual 
suicide attempts with a college sample.  
 
In terms of sample size and participant numbers, while there are no clear guidelines in the 
literature previous research offers some precedent for understanding research parameters. 
As sample size for ESM studies constitutes three levels: the number of subjects, the number 
of days observed and the number of measurements per day, power will depend on the 
combination of all three of these parameters. Adequate power is achievable with as few as 
30 participants but requires either a greater number of measurements per day over a shorter 
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study period or with more days of observation when sampling fewer times a day (Carter, 
2016). As such, simply increasing the number of participants is not the only way to increase 
power. Xanthopoulou et al. (2008) in an experience sampling investigation involving flight 
attendants used 44 participants over a three-month period (with data captured at 132 
occasions over this period) using event-contingent sampling. Participant numbers as low as 
20 have been used in other research conducted over 21 consecutive days (e.g. van Berkel 
et al., 2019) to effectively operationalise ESM research, with these 20 participants providing 
signal-contingent data six times daily leading to 2520 data points. In a clinical investigation 
Peters et al. (2012) used ESM to investigate symptoms in participants with psychosis using 
twelve participants completing an ESM questionnaire 10 times a day for six days. A similar 
protocol was used by Palmier-Claus et al. (2012), employing a sample of 27 individuals to 
investigate the association between instability of affect and suicidal ideation. As in the work 
of Peters et al. (2012), participants completed questionnaires 10 times a day for six days.  
 
6.2.2. Bias and Error Reasons for ESM  
 
By assessing participants’ experiences as they happen ESM research affords a substantial 
reduction in retrospective bias inherent in all self-report data (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). 
In other words, experience-sampling data reflect participants’ momentary affective, cognitive, 
and behavioural experience in a way that preserves the immediacy of the moment and gives 
participants less opportunity and motivation to present themselves as they might when 
reflecting retrospectively on earlier occurring experiences. For example, individuals typically 
misremember how much time they spent in or how they felt during different activities and 
contexts. When the immediacy of the moment is over, recollections of the experience are 
shaped and reshaped by a number of cognitive and reflective processes (Kahneman, 2011). 
There is substantial evidence that retrospective reports of past emotions, beliefs, and 
behaviour can be contaminated by memory errors, availability, recency, salience, implicit 
theories, and current affect (Schwarz et al., 2009). Although self-reported ESM data cannot 
eliminate all of the potential biases of self-report, research suggests that by asking people to 
report on their activities, affect, and actions in-situ and on many occasions, researchers may 
be able to get a more accurate picture than when asking participants to reflect backward 
over a period of time (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). Robinson and Clore (2002, p. 935) note 
that “any delay between an experience and its report necessarily means a loss of 
information.” Real-time reports of affect and experiences are considered more accurate than 
memory-based reports, with ESM being referred to as the “gold standard” for measuring 
state affect (Schwarz et al., 2009). ESM used longitudinally also allows us to study how 
individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped either by time or in response to 
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events or stimuli along the way (e.g. bonus payment and other workplace events). Through 
repeated assessments of individuals over time in a number of contexts, ESM data are 
particularly well suited to answering questions about how individual perceptions change over 
time and to help us pinpoint the sources of those changes. Careful orchestration of the 
timing and data collection mechanisms allows us to look for both naturally occurring changes 
(for example changes in workplace behaviour as a result of broader environmental changes 
and trends) and changes that occur as the result of workplace events.  
 
As well as the broad benefits of ESM already discussed, there are a number of drawbacks of 
the method, as summarised in Table 27. These drawbacks include potential for self-selection 
bias (a problem for all studies, but with the intensive nature of ESM there may be a 
propensity for certain types of individual to be over or under-represented), self-reporting bias 
(for example social desirability, cognitive biases and cultural norms influencing responses), 
and the need to motivate participants over the term of the study, with researchers 
discovering that some groups (e.g. those with poor concentration) may find it difficult to 
complete experience sampling studies (Wilson et al., 1997). Other drawbacks include the 
need to limit variables to reduce the burden of completing measures at numerous points 
during the day, and situational issues with data collection including quality of the data when 
collecting over multiple points in time. Some researchers (e.g. Stone et al., 1991) estimate 
that quality of data reporting declines after 2-4 weeks of data collection. Situational issues 
may also include selection problems, where participants may choose whether and what to 
respond to an experience sampling signal, and the potential for time lag between signal and 
response may introduce retrospective bias. Even for reasonably short periods of time 
research has demonstrated the attenuation of the intensity of emotion, and further research 
has shown that emotion has a significant effect on attitude formation (van den Berg et al., 
2006). Finally, reactivity can be a drawback in ESM studies. Reactivity refers to the potential 
for any phenomenon under study to change as a result of measurement or reporting 
(Wheeler & Reis, 1991). The nature of ESM and the repeated measures used may cause 
people to pay unusual attention to workplace events as well as their emotions and attitudes. 
This is one reason for including a number of workplace events during the investigation, so 
that no single event gains undue attention from participants which alters the reporting of that 
event. There is also some evidence (e.g. Thomas & Diener, 1990) that repeated assessment 







Table 27.  
Benefits and Drawbacks of Experience Sampling Methods. Source: Adapted from Scollon, 
Kim-Prieto, & Diener (2003) 
 
  
Benefits of ESM Drawbacks of ESM 
  
Investigates within-person processes Self-selection and self-reporting bias 
Provides ecological validity in real life Need to motivate participants over term 
Investigates contingencies of behaviours Limited number of variables 
Avoids certain bias (e.g. memory bias) Situational issues with data collection 
Provides for use of multiple methods Reactivity 
 
 
6.3. Research Design 
 
Due to the balance of reasons outlined in section 6.2. a quantitative, experience sampling 
method was used. ESM allows for a single repeated measure to be deployed at various 
points during the day over a given period. There are several decisions to be made in 
undertaking ESM research, such as the signal type (if any) which informs participants to 
complete the measure, the frequency of the measure, the length over which to collect data, 
and the user experience in engagement, deployment, and feedback around the measure. 
Various researchers have spelled out the critical dimensions and best practice for 
addressing these decisions, with the most effective being Fisher and To (2012), who list a 
number of factors to consider detailed in Table 28. As some of these factors are dependent 
on participant attitudes (such as willingness to respond) the research design was developed 
and tested with participants during an initial engagement workshop. While a pilot study was 
proposed to participants at the outset of the research, the heads of participating 
organisational functions felt that this would not be necessary, in favour of an engagement 
workshop to act as a ‘kick-off event’ for the research. This approach has been shown to be 
effective in other research (e.g. Lancaster, Dodd, & Williamson, 2004). Factors such as 
communication and engagement mechanisms, signal design, number of follow-up meetings, 
length of the questionnaire, time for completion of the questionnaire, the choice of measures 
which form the questionnaire and the selection of relevant workplace events to be 
considered in the research were all decided in this initial engagement workshop. It was felt 
that this co-design, bounded by a set of clear principles, would improve the rate of response 
(as suggested by Fisher & To, 2012). Provided with options related to communications and 
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engagement, participants chose to be contacted by email, with additional weekly 30-minute 
update conference calls (involving all participants) to provide feedback and answer any 
potential questions for the duration of the research period.  
 
Table 28.  
Best practice recommendations for conducting ESM and daily diary research (source: Fisher 
& To, 2012) 
 
 
Area Best Practice 
  
1 Plan a data collection schedule (reports per day, for how many days) and 
approach (interval, signal-based, event-based) that balances participant 
willingness to respond with the nature of the phenomenon being studied. 
2 Consider power at all relevant levels to determine the number of responses per 
participant and the number of participants needed. Allow for missed signals and 
the effect of missed signals on lagged analyses when planning sample sizes. 
3 Design short but reliable and construct valid measures that clearly specify the 
time interval on which to report (e.g., right now; since last signal) and that match 
the time frame in which the construct being measured would be expected to vary. 
Consider how best to provide reliability and validity evidence for these measures. 
4 Pilot test the measures for clarity and time to complete in a group of people 
similar to the intended participants for at least several days. Ask about reasons 
for missing or non-compliant reports and adapt procedures accordingly. 
5 Thoroughly pilot test the technology for signalling and capturing data, including 
having a small sample of participants try out the technology away from the 
laboratory. If using PDAs, have a few spares to replace those that fail or are lost. 
6 Train participants thoroughly on why compliance is important, what questions 
mean, how and when to respond, what to do if a signal is missed or equipment 
malfunctions, and whom to call for help. If possible, have participants complete a 
practice report in the presence of the researcher. 
7 Build a close and collaborative relationship with participants. Motivate them to 
respond regularly with gifts, incentives, encouragement, monitoring, feedback on 
response rate and survey progress, and means of preventing unduly delayed or 
batched responses. 
8 Obtain expert statistical advice or training on how best to use multilevel modelling 
to test hypotheses. 




Other decisions made during the initial engagement workshop constrained the research 
design to be interval contingent, with the researcher providing an appropriate signal via text 
message that measures should be completed (as this fitted with organisational norms and 
practices). An interval contingent design with an additional signal was preferred over event 
or interval-only contingent design as participants preferred the structured nature of this 
design (a balance struck in the research as this design is more prone to memory biases; 
Fisher & To, 2012). The frequency of this signal was agreed at every 2 hours due to the 
balance between the need to satisfy statistical power requirements, the need for granular 
data giving a rich picture of workplace events, and the pragmatism required in completing 
repeat measures. It was proposed that data collection be facilitated by technology such as 
mobile phone application, but as described in more detail below the sponsors of the 
research in participant organisations (due to data privacy concerns) preferred that data be 
collected using paper diaries. Participants suggested that diaries should be A5 size so to 
limit bulk if they were to be carried throughout the workday, and that each page be pre-
formatted with date and time information to reduce the burden of completion. Additionally, 
participants suggested limiting the number of workplace events to ’11-15’ when offered a 
choice between categories ‘0-5’, ‘6-10’, ’11-15’, or ’16-20’. When considering the content and 
length of the questionnaire used in the research, participants selected from a range of 
measures to assess emotion, social exchange relationship quality, organisational justice and 
turnover intention (a summary of these measures is included in Table 29). It was decided 
that the length of the questionnaire should not exceed 20 questions taking into account the 
advice of other ESM researchers (e.g. Fisher & To, 2012), and the time for completion be no 
more than 2 minutes (once initial learning curves have been considered) which naturally 
limited the choice of measures presented to participants for preference selection. Guidance 
was given by participating organisations which stipulated that the investigation not be overly 
time intensive (and so costly to the participating organisations), and that the cognitive effort 
to complete the measure should be minimised to prevent attention being drawn from daily 
work tasks. 
 
The principles developed which aided the design of the research are as follows:  
 
a) As the research is attempting to investigate identical reactions to variable events, 
it must deploy an identical measure both within – and across-person to capture 
each experience in an identical way. 
b) As the research is attempting to investigate emotions, the frequency must be 
tailored so as to capture the full impact of the event to reduce retrospective bias. 
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c) Measures must be chosen which sit within the 20-question limit yet allow for a 
valid and reliable representation of all variables. 
d) Whilst rigour is required in design and deployment of the measure, the research 
must recognise that, potentially, it will be conducted with a number of partner 
organisations, and therefore the design must be flexible enough to encompass 
differing organisational policies, practices and requirements. 
 
To further explain item d) above, an option for the deployment of the questionnaire used in 
the research was online administration (with responses via computer or mobile platforms). 
Following discussions with participating organisations it was determined that this was 
unfeasible. This was primarily due to data security concerns and issues with obtaining 
organisational approval for the use of third-party applications for capturing data. Although 
mobile applications have been shown to improve the user experience and participation in 
ESM research (Fusun & Zheng, 2013; Serrano-Puche, 2015; Isomursu, Tähti, Väinämö, & 
Kuutti, 2007) this choice of data collection technique was therefore discounted when 
designing this research. The application of principle d) meant that to gain the approval of 
partner organisations, the design reverted to printed paper-based diaries to capture data 
over the period of the study. Whilst this approach reduced efficiency and increased the need 
to enter data manually, it was a necessary concession to enable the sourcing of participants. 
Similarly, when co-designing the questionnaire with the first participant organisation, four of 
the items of the 8-item short form organisational justice scale (Elovainio et al., 2010) were 
modified or removed in the full questionnaire upon review by the head of function, reducing 
the number of items to 6. These modifications are discussed in more detail when considering 






Table 29.  
Measures tested during the initial engagement workshop 
 
  
Variable Measures used during user testing in engagement workshop 
  
  
State Affect  Product emotion measuring instrument - PrEMO (Desmet, 2005) 
State Affect Geneva Emotion Wheel – GEW (Sacharin, Schlegel, & Scherer, 2012) 
State Affect GRID instrument (Scherer, Fontaine, & Soriano, 2013) 
Social Exchange 9 Item Short Form SPOS (Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997) 
Social Exchange 7 Item LMX scale (Scandura & Graen, 1984) 
Social Exchange 4 Item Social Exchange Relationship Scale – SERS (Colquit et al., 2014) 
Turnover Intention 3 Item Measure (Irving, Coleman, & Cooper, 1997) 
Turnover Intention 4 Item Measure (Nissly et al., 2005) 
Turnover Intention 6 Item TIS-6 Measure (Bothma & Roodt, 2013) 
Org Justice 5 Item Relational Justice Scale (Kivimaki et al., 2004) 
Org Justice 10 Item Justice Scale (Gelens et al., 2014) 





Participants were sent an initial email from the head of function sponsoring the research two 
weeks prior to an initial engagement workshop, requesting their attendance at the 
engagement workshop (held on the premises of the participating organisation). At this initial 
engagement workshop the purpose of the research was shared, the research design was 
co-created, finalised and agreed with participants, and demographic and trait affect data was 
collected for each participant. While detailed analysis will not be included on trait affect in 
this investigation, it will be controlled for in this research due to the volume of previous 
literature which supports the link between trait and state affect (emotion). The initial 
demographic and trait affect data was collected using a paper survey consisting of 
demographic questions and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et 
al., 1988). This survey is shown in Figure 22 later in this section. Following the initial 
engagement workshop and beginning at the start of the next working week participants 
completed quantitative surveys four times daily for a period of one calendar month or 21 
working days (beginning at time T2 and ending at time T3 as shown in Figure 21). One-
month is the maximum suggested time for conducting experience sampling research before 
which data quality degrades (Stone et al., 1991). During this one-month period the bonus of 
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each participant was announced to them in a controlled manner, with the date and time of 
the announcement aligned with the research. Process data was collected using an in-vivo 
interval and signal-contingent experience sampling methodology, also using a paper-based 
diary approach. Due to the month of the bonus announcement being different in the two 
participant organisations, it was not possible to conduct the research in the same month 




Figure 21. Timeline of events in the launch of the method 
 
 
On each day during the research at the recurring times of 10:00, 12:00, 14:00 and 16:00 
each participant was sent a text message requesting the completion of a repeated-measures 
questionnaire comprising of a battery of individual measures. These text messages were 
automated to reduce administrative burden. Each participant was issued with a pre-
formatted diary consisting of 100 pages, with the date and time aligned with the research 
duration and pre-completed. Each diary entry spanned a single page (with a single page 
format demonstrated in Figure 25 in Section 6.6, where the measures and full questionnaire 
are discussed). Participants reported events from their work four times daily over a one-
month calendar period for each of the working days within that period. Upon receiving the 
text message participants were directed to record the event which they felt had the greatest 
impact on work performance during the preceding 2-hour period, using a list of categories 
developed from extant research and selected by participants during the engagement 
workshop (the identification of the events included is described in more detail later in this 
chapter). Participants then identified the dominant emotion and the strength of this emotion 
elicited by the event using the Geneva Emotion Wheel, prior to completing measures to 
assess attitudes related to organisational justice, social exchange relationship quality and 
T1 
2-Hour Workshop: 
Capture of demographic 
and trait affect 
measures 
T2 
Begin signal issue and 
ESM data collection 
T3 
Close study and 
collate results. 
T1 T2 T3 
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turnover intention at the time of the event. Whilst some questions in the survey are related 
specifically to the event (such as the emotion elicited and the justice appraisal made), others 
are related to broader aspects of the work relationship (such as social exchange relationship 
quality), therefore the order of the questions in the survey was not changed in order to 
maintain this grouping and prevent confusion as to the subject of the question. A natural 
formatting partition in the survey was made to identify these event-specific and general 
questions. The primary independent variables were a) the participant taking part in the 
research and b) the workplace event taking place during the analysis. Mediating variables 
analysed were the emotion and strength of emotion elicited by the event, organisational 





Participants were salaried, full-time employees aged 18 or over who had worked for their 
employer for more than 12 months (as required within both participating organisations to 
receive a bonus). Participants were recruited from within roles where performance 
contingent bonus payments are made once annually, and bonus payments traditionally form 
more than 5% of the salary earned. This homogeneity was ensured by approaching distinct 
organisational divisions or areas where recruitment criteria could be tested. Although this 
was felt to somewhat limit the generalisability of the research as participation is limited by 
both organisation and distinct functions within these organisations, the fact that the research 
was conducted in two unrelated divisions of two unrelated organisations offers some (though 
limited) support for the generalisability of the approach. Various organisations were 
approached to participate in the research. This approach was primarily made by directly 
emailing those in personal and co-worker networks in the author’s capacity as a 
management consultant. In total over three hundred prospective participants were emailed. 
Secondary meetings (either face to face or over the telephone) were then conducted with 
those who showed an interest in participation by responding to the initial email. In total 
sixteen secondary meetings were held with potential participant organisations. Of these 
sixteen organisations, the heads of function in two distinct functions in two distinct 
organisations agreed to participate in the research (named INSCO and MEDCO throughout 
this thesis as this refers to the primary industry the participants are involved in – insurance 
and medical devices respectively). As sensitive insight can be gained from the information 
provided, non-disclosure was a pre-requisite for the research, therefore the anonymity of 
participants is maintained throughout this thesis. Though many saw value in the research, 
the majority of those approached felt that the prevailing risk around the generating and 
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sharing of organisational data for research purposes, as well as the setting of expectations 
within the research participant population that organisational practices may change as a 
result of the research outweighed the clear informational and analytical benefits of 
participation. The research was conducted during a period of scrutiny on data privacy in 
organisations, with General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) developed but not yet 
implemented, increasing the perceived risk of participation. The two participating heads of 
function agreed to provide sponsorship and support both in terms of individual participant 
engagement, individual participant selection, and access to resources such as branding, 
systems and personal assistants. They also agreed to provide a short, anonymised 
description of their function and organisation and their main purpose for inclusion, shown in 
Table 30. This sponsorship supported the research as documents were able to be branded 
to enable materials to be consistent with participating organisations livery (and so be 
perceived as officially sponsored research), to gain access to internal systems for arranging 
conference calls for follow-up and feedback meetings, to gain access to participant 
calendars to minimise disruption and check holiday plans, and to arrange scheduling of 
signals directly with personal assistants therefore minimising the workload of individual 
participants.   
 
Individual participants were selected by each head of function in both organisational 
participants. It is difficult to judge how objective the selection was, though the head of 
function was given guidance for selection in the form of specific criteria listed below. The 
heads of function were also able to confirm that: 
 
a) all participants receive information about their bonus pay for the year at the same 
time (i.e. with the announcement made to individuals within a few days of each 
other), in the same format, and so consistency of process is maintained 
b) bonus pay is contingent on performance and job grade, and so differences in bonus 
pay amounts exist across and between participants  
 
Each head of function was asked to engage participants meeting certain criteria: 
 
a) They are able to commit to the research over the period, and so have no intersecting 
plans for holiday absence 
b) They have strong attendance and limited sickness absence during the past year 
c) A representative sample of gender, position and bonus award across the function 
d) Perceived high levels of conscientiousness, shown to predict the ability to maintain 




Initially forty-three people were selected as participants for the research, with organisation 1 
(INSCO) contributing 26 participants and organisation 2 (MEDCO) contributing 17. A 
breakdown of the participants is given in Table 31. 
 
Table 30.  










Our function is an underwriting function within a global insurance 
provider with about 120 people. We are a traditional organisation, 
slow to change, but with a strong brand and heritage with 
headquarters based in Switzerland. We mainly face inwards, 
servicing brokers and other parts of our organisation, rather than 
having direct customer relationships. The main pressures on our 
function are adoption of technology and constant search for 
efficiencies. Our job apart from that has not changed much in the 
past twenty years. Our people are getting older, and there are 
limited new entrants into our function. The new people we attract 
leave at quite high rates, so our reason for participating is to better 
understand the employee experience to begin to understand why 




We are the sales function of the orthopaedic division of a large 
global medical company. The company is a household name that 
has a strong history. In our particular part of the business we have 
350 people providing a full service to surgeons and hospitals 
wishing to use our medical devices. Most of our people are client 
facing and work in hospitals and clinics across the country, though 
they do come back to Head Office about once every couple of 
weeks. They tend to specialise in terms of the products they sell or 
support. Churn is high in our function, at about 30% per annum, 
which is a considerable drag on our profit and growth. It’s hard for 
us to see what people go through in our job, and what the source of 
discontent is so I think this will help us to build a richer picture for 




Table 31.  
INSCO and MEDCO Participants 
 
   
Participants INSCO MEDCO 
      
Total 26 17 
Manager 18 11 
Non-Manager 8 6 
Male 16 12 
Female 10 5 
    Note: N = 43 
 
 
Table 32.  
Final INSCO and MEDCO Participants 
 
   
Participants INSCO MEDCO 
      
Total 21 10 
Manager 18 9 
Non-Manager 3 1 
Male 14 7 
Female 7 3 





Whilst the research investigation began with 43 participants, due to the nature of ESM it was 
completed with 31 participants (21 from INSCO and 10 from MEDCO). Of the 12 participants 
who failed to complete the study, 4 cited illness for periods of more than 5 days, 3 explained 
that they had forgotten for a period, then lost motivation, and 4 contacted the author to 
withdraw due to additional workload (or the additional interruption and cognitive load the task 
introduced to the day). A single participant who failed to complete the study could not be 
contacted and therefore no information was provided as to reasons for non-completion. The 
final participant numbers are detailed in Table 32 along with their demographic details. 
Participants in the research tend to be in managerial positions, and more male than female 
participants took place in the research. While participant numbers are relatively low, they are 
in line with previous ESM research (e.g. Peters et al., 2012; van Berkel et al., 2018) and 
have a similar sample size when daily frequencies and timescales are considered with 2480 
data points gathered during the research. 
 
6.6. Instrument and Measures 
 
Due to the diverse nature of the constructs under investigation (event, affect, social 
exchange relationship quality, justice, turnover intention) a questionnaire was developed 
from a battery of measures. Because of methodological limitations in the number of variables 
allowed in ESM (as detailed in Section 6.2.), measures were selected for statistical 
properties (validity and reliability), length, number of scales and ease of completion. A range 
of appropriate measures were selected by the author to form a long-list, from which the 
actual measures used were selected by participants in an initial engagement workshop. 
Attention was paid to the way in which the data collection process was experienced by 
participants and testing and feedback was conducted during this workshop to allow for 
optimisation of design and delivery of the questionnaire. This process was conducted in the 
main due to the advice of Fisher and Tso (2012), detailed in Table 28, which suggests 
forming a collaborative relationship with participants and designing short but reliable and 
construct valid measures.  
 
Due to the interaction between trait and state affect in the literature (e.g. Merz & Roesch, 
2011) participants were assessed for their level of trait affect at the outset of the research 
(as well as capturing demographic data relating to participants). Trait affect by its definition is 
perceived to be a stable construct and an assumption was made in this research that 
assessing this once at the outset (as in previous research such as that conducted by Watson 
et al., 1988) would be sufficient. Rather than focusing here on each of the measures 
presented during the initial engagement workshop (detailed in Table 29), this thesis will 
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focus on the nature and properties of the measures selected by participants for the study 
proper. 
 
6.6.1. Demographics and Trait Affect 
 
Demographic information including age, gender, length of service and managerial position 
was captured at the outset of the investigation using a pre-formatted survey (time T1 as 
shown in Figure 21). This survey in included as Figure 22. These demographic data are 
chosen as they demonstrate relationships in existing literature with organisational justice and 
social exchange relationship quality and repeat those captured during previous research by 
Colquitt et al. (2013), thus allowing some comparison across research. Trait affect was also 
assessed at the outset (time T1) using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule scale 
(PANAS, Watson et al, 1988). The PANAS survey asks participants to rate how they 
generally feel across all situations using 20 affective terms (e.g. interested, guilty, proud, 
nervous, and active) with 10 terms positive and 10 negative. The measure uses a scale of 1 
to 5, where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 5 is ‘extremely’, and mean scores are developed for positive 
affect and negative affect across these terms. Watson et al. (1988) report Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients for the various time reference periods ranging from .86 to .90 for the Positive 
Affect scale and .84 to .87 for the Negative Affect scale. Test-retest correlations for an 8-
week period ranged from .47 to .68 for Positive Affect, .39 to .71 for Negative Affect. The 
scale authors also reported evidence for the validity of the PANAS. While this thesis will not 
discuss the relationships between trait affect and other variables to a great extent, it will 
control for this and provide details of relationships in the results as previous research has 











































Table 33.  
Workplace events reported in existing literature. 
 
  
Category of Affective Event Source 
  
  
Acts of Colleagues Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Acts of Management Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Goal Achievement Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Receiving Recognition Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Acts of customers Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Making mistakes Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Influence or control Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Involvement in decision making Basch & Fisher (2000) 
Pay system reform Tenhiala & Lount (2013) 
Any contact between a person and his/her environment Elfenbein (2007) 
Leadership behaviours Dasborough (2006) 
Economic events and conditions Brief & Weiss (2002) 
Temperature, noise, and aromas Isen & Baron (1991) 
Noise Isen & Baron (1991) 
Aromas Isen & Baron (1991) 
Colours and Symbols Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz (2004) 
External factors (such as family concerns) Brief & Weiss (2002) 
Identity challenges Boudens (2005) 
Fairness Boudens (2005) 
Discrimination Boudens (2005) 
Conflict Boudens (2005) 
Violations of norms and trust Boudens (2005) 
Ideology-based disagreements Boudens (2005) 
Actual or potential on-the-job death and injury Boudens (2005) 
Humiliation Boudens (2005) 
Accomplishment Mignonac & Herrbach (2004) 
Praise from Supervisors/Co-workers Mignonac & Herrbach (2004) 
Being assigned undesired work Mignonac & Herrbach (2004) 
Departure of a well-liked co-worker Mignonac & Herrbach (2004) 
Interpersonal conflicts with supervisors and co-workers Mignonac & Herrbach (2004) 
Verbally aggressive customers Grandey, Dickter, & Sin (2004) 
Technical Problems Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, Mann, & Hirst (2002) 
Insufficient staffing Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, Mann, & Hirst (2002) 
Funding shortages Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, Mann, & Hirst (2002) 













6.6.2. Workplace Events 
 
Participants recorded the workplace event which they felt had the greatest impact on their 
performance whilst at work over each successive two-hour period (at 10am, 12pm, 2pm and 
4pm). In order to enable repeatable assessment, categories of events in the workplace were 
developed from extant research. These categories, along with their sources, are listed in 
Table 33. A wide range of potential stimuli is listed including sensory stimuli such as aromas 
or noise, organisational stimuli such as system or process involvement, appraisals such as 
justice or humiliation, and specific actions related to organisational actors, such as acts of 
customers or acts of managers. The workplace events included in the research were 
determined in two stages, the first stage to gain agreement of how many workplace events 
to include in the research, and the second to prioritise the specific workplace events for 
inclusion. During the initial engagement workshop, participants selected ’11-15 events’ when 
asked how many to include when provided categories between 1 and 20 (with categories 
presented as 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20), therefore limiting the number of events for inclusion. 
To identify these 11-15 events workshop participants were asked to report the events which 
happened to them most frequently each day, and the events they felt had the most 
significant impact on their performance (either positive or negative) using a 5-point Likert 
type scale. These events presented to participants were drawn from Table 33. These two 
scores were then multiplied to provide an indication of the workplace events to be included. 
The measure for this is included as Figure 23. The data collected during the engagement 
workshop was aggregated and used to develop a short form measure of affective events 
occurring in the workplace.  
 
To operationalise the categories of workplace event in the research, participants were asked 
to identify the category which most accurately matched the source of event which had the 
strongest impact on the workplace performance of the participant over the previous 2 hours, 
and to indicate this by placing a mark in a box adjacent to this category. An additional space 
in the questionnaire was included for ‘other’ events though this space was not used by 
participants. Guidance was given to focus on only one event at a time every 2 hours. While 
participants selected 11-15 events as a preference, 13 events are included as the 
subsequent 4 events obtained the same score in the engagement workshop and so were 
omitted as this would have pushed the number of events up to 17 if included. Following the 
recording of the event, the participant was then asked to record the dominant emotion which 
this event elicited. The final format for input of the event is shown in the combined 




There are three limitations to this approach in developing workplace events for inclusion. 
The first is that self-reporting events which have an impact on performance may not be 
accurate, and different events may have a differential impact on various measures of 
performance. The second of the limitations of this research is that when MEDCO was 
recruited to the research, rather than seek to refresh this review of workplace events 
germane to the organisation, the head of function for MEDCO chose instead to use those 
events selected by INSCO participants. Whilst the drawbacks of using this approach were 
discussed with participants at the time it was felt that in order to effectively recruit MEDCO 
as a participant compromises were required, and this was in keeping with our research 
principles. The third limitation is that some workplace events listed may apply to a single 
situation and are not mutually exclusive. As an example, the workplace events of ‘acts of 
colleagues’ and ‘violation of trust’ are not mutually exclusive as certain acts of colleagues 
may in themselves be acts which violate trust. Guidance was therefore given to participants 
to select the most appropriate event in these circumstances, which could introduce bias. 
 
6.6.3. Affect (Emotion) 
 
In organisational settings affect (or emotion) measures typically consist of questionnaires 
which are customized for the objectives of the research (e.g. Doherty, 1997; Pekrun et al., 
2011; Scherer, 2001; Caicedo & van Beuzekom, 2006; Isomursu et al., 2007). These broadly 
represent a list of emotions (ranging in number from 12 to 40) from which participants are 
asked to choose the most relevant for the situation. In recent years there has been a move 
toward the creation of more complex emotion measures, incorporating not only type of 
emotion but also strength. For the purpose of this research the strength of emotional 
reaction is important, as is the granularity of the emotion under investigation. Affective 
events research in the past has often considered broad categories of affective events and 
emotions but has often missed critical variables, for example Basch and Fischer (2000) 
considered 20 emotions and 27 affective events in their investigation to develop an affective 
event-emotion matrix, though the researchers did not consider the additional dimension of 
strength of emotion. Similarly, Colquitt et al. (2013) considered the strength of ‘positive state 
affect’ and ‘negative state affect’ as emotional categories representing broad groups of 
emotions and their relationship to organisational justice but failed to investigate distinct 
emotions. There are few researchers who have considered all of these elements of multiple 
events, distinct emotional reactions and the strength of these emotions in existing research, 
especially when related to justice. If this thesis wishes to understand the nature of 
organisational events, especially specific events such as a bonus payment, then it must also 
understand the strength of specific emotions elicited by the event (Mikula et al., 1998). To be 
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able to say that one workplace event is an affective event, whereas another may not be an 
affective event, is to say that an event not only elicits an emotion, but that the emotion has 
an effect on outcomes, therefore suggesting strength may be an important variable (Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996).  
 
When choosing an effective measure of emotion which allows for an appropriate granularity 
of emotion and the ability to measure strength of emotion (as well as being preferred due to 
the clarity of structure and intuitive design) participants to the engagement workshop 
selected the Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW; Scherer, 2009). The measure (as shown in 
Figure 24) is an emotion self-report tool which assesses the type of emotion experienced 
across two axes: High control/Low control and Negative valence/Positive valence (Scherer, 
2009). There are 20 emotional terms listed in total situated in positions around the emotion 
wheel in relation to these two axes. The strength of each emotion can be assessed on a 
rating based on the position indicated on the wheel, from ‘no emotion felt’ or ‘other emotion 
felt’ (scored 0) to the maximum strength of emotion (scored 5). These relative strengths are 
indicated by circles with increasing areas, with the participant placing a mark in the most 
appropriate circle. The GEW has been used in studies across academic fields and in varied 
empirical settings. Tran (2012) used the GEW in a collective decision-making process, 
observing that team members used the measure to discuss their emotions and keep track of 
changes in the emotional climate. Other emotional research has deployed the measure 
when assessing reactions to social media (e.g. Sintsova et al., 2013) and internet videos 
(Bardzell et al., 2008) with success. There are instances of other more advanced pieces of 
neurological research which have linked self-report measures using the GEW to more 
advanced physiological measures of emotion such as EEG (Electroencephalogram) 
readings (Blaiech et al., 2013).  In marital research, the 3-week test-retest stability of the 
GEW has been shown to be above 0.9 consistently (Nilforooshan et al., 2013). Research 
using the measure has found Cronbach’s alpha values of between 0.80 and 0.86, higher 




















Figure 24. The Geneva Emotion Wheel. Source: Sacharin, Schlegel, & Scherer (2012) 
 
 
The GEW offers a measure of both the emotion type and emotion strength reported by 
participants during the investigation. This allows the investigation of discrete emotions 
elicited as a result of workplace events. The nature of the GEW however does not lend itself 
to analysis such as meditation and regression as it considers each emotion separately. In 
order to facilitate further analysis considering emotions therefore two additional mechanisms 
are used in the research. A combined emotion measure was developed from the GEW to 
provide a single measure of both type and strength of emotion. This measure is referred 
throughout the analysis as ‘Emotion Score’ and involves transforming the GEW results to 
provide a single score which describes both the emotion state and the emotion strength 
(though this crudely reduces the results returned by the GEW to a single scale of affect). 
Similarly, separate scores for positive and negative state affect are used to test relationships 
(similar to the analysis used by Colquitt et al., 2001), where positive affect represents all 
positive emotions, and negative affect all negative emotions. The inclusion of state positive 
and negative affect is made to counter the objection from some researchers that positive and 
negative emotions cannot be treated as polar states of emotion (therefore rendering the 
emotion score scale questionable theoretically) which are symmetrically distributed around 
the ‘no emotion’ condition (e.g. Watson & Tellegen, 1985), though this is disputed by some 
(e.g. Russell & Carroll, 1999) who maintain the existence of a single bipolar continuum for 
positive and negative feelings. While the inclusion of emotion score and positive and 
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negative affect variables will not allow the research to investigate the effect of discreet 
emotions, they will allow for the testing of Hypotheses 5, 7 and 9 which deal with the effects 
of emotion as broad construct rather than the effects of individual emotions. The GEW 
results are transformed into the Emotion Score by developing a continuous scale for emotion 
with negative emotions representing scores from 1-5 (with 1 being the strongest negative 
emotion strength and 5 the weakest negative emotion strength), followed subsequently by 
positive emotions representing scores from 6-10 (with 6 being the weakest positive emotion 




Table 34.  
GEW scores transformed into Emotion Score used to test the effect of emotion state and strength. 
 
 Strength of emotion for negative 
emotions (negative affect) 
Strength of emotion for positive 
emotions (positive affect) 
GEW (original 
results) 
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 
Emotion Score 
(transformed) 






6.6.4. Social Exchange Relationship Quality 
 
Assessing social exchange relationship quality provides a different challenge to other 
variables, not least because of the complexity involved in reconciling measures of social 
exchange relationship quality with the original construct describing social exchange 
relationships. Previous research points to two main sources of social exchange: individuals 
within the organisation (for example supervisors, managers) often conceptualised as leader 
member exchange (LMX), and the organisation itself (in terms of organisational behaviour, 
systems, processes etc) typically described as perceived organisational support (POS). 
Measures have therefore developed which have tended to specialise on one or the other of 
these sources (e.g. Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Wayne et al., 1997; Settoon et al., 1996). There 
is current research which demonstrates a lack of content validity with the construct of social 
exchange relationship quality as measured using common surveys related to POS and LMX 
(Colquitt et al., 2014). Colquitt et al. (2014) found that the majority of measures (and 
specifically perceived organisational support) were not content valid with Blau’s (1964) 
original concept of social exchange relationships. In their work investigating the content 
validity of commonly used social exchange relationship quality indicators Colquitt et al. 
(2014) found one measure to be more content valid than others, the Social Exchange 
Relationship Scale, or SERS (Colquitt et al., 2014). The SERS is a four-item measure 
consisting of a single statement and four items: my relationship with my organisation is 
characterized by - Mutual obligation, Mutual trust, Mutual commitment, and Mutual 
significance. Each of these four statements is assessed on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 
– ‘strongly disagree’, to 5 – ‘strongly agree’. It was selected by participants to the 
engagement workshop predominantly due to its brief and intuitive content and strong 
psychometric properties. The SERS measure is described as ‘a worthy option for future 





6.6.5. Turnover Intention 
 
Instead of trying to accurately and objectively assess performance impacts of workplace 
events and subsequent psychological mechanisms, the proxy indicator of turnover intention 
was chosen for reasons outlined in the review of the outcomes in existing literature in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Three measures of turnover intention were discussed with 
participants during the initial engagement workshop, with participants eventually selecting 
the short form 6-item measure (TIS-6; Bothma & Roodt, 2013) of the 15-item Turnover 
Intention Scale (TIS, Roodt, 2004) due to its intuitive nature, small number of items, and the 
perception that other measures were not content valid. This offers the research the 
opportunity to anchor the two separate investigations with a common measure, as the TIS-6 
is also the measure included in the first investigation (chosen for similar reasons that 
participants selected the measure in this case). The measure is therefore described in more 
detail in Section 4.6.4. A summary of the items is given in Table 35. 
 
 
Table 35.  




    
1a How often are you frustrated when not given the opportunity at work to achieve 
your personal work-related goals? 
2a How often have you considered leaving your job? 
3a How often do you dream about getting another job that will better suit your personal 
needs? 
4b How likely are you to accept another job at the same compensation level should it 
be offered to you? 
5c To what extent is your current job satisfying your personal needs? 
6d How often do you look forward to another day at work? 
 
    a - Scale: 1 = Never to 5 = Always  
    b - Scale: 1 = Highly unlikely to 5 = Highly likely  
    c - Reverse coding used. Item mean scale 1 = To a very large extent to 5 = To no extent.   





6.6.6. Organisational Justice 
 
The most commonly used measure of organisational justice is the organisational justice 
scale (OJS) developed by Colquitt (2001) and used in the first research investigation of this 
thesis. One of the main problems in evaluating co-occurrences of affective events and 
justice appraisals has been the lack of feasible short-form survey instrument for measuring 
organisational justice. This is especially important in assessing justice at points coincident 
with affective events (Elovainio et al., 2010). Due to this gap in available measures, 
especially when researching justice in large-scale epidemiologic investigations, a range of 
short justice measures have begun to appear in literature, though most are self-developed 
by the authors. Three of these which have received support and reach appropriate levels of 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha above 0.7) were tested with participants in the initial 
engagement workshop; the five-item relational justice scale (Kivimaki et al., 2004) as used in 
the Whitehall II Studies, the ten-item scale used by Gelens et al. (2014) and the eight-item 
short version of the OJS developed by Elovainio et al. (2010). In this workshop participants 
selected the short-form OJS as the most appropriate measure as it offers a complete view of 
justice as a construct and is both intuitive to complete and applicable in various event-driven 
situations. Both the OJS (Colquitt, 2001) and the short form version (the OJS-8; Elovainio et 
al., 2010) offer comparable psychometric properties of the scales and of their structure 
observed in two large, representative groups of working populations in Finland, in studies 
where selection effects are unlikely (goodness-of fit index > 0.90, adjusted goodness-of fit 
index > 0.90, root mean square error of approximation <0.8) (Elovainio et al., 2010). The 
items of the OJS-8 are shown in Table 36. Although the OJS was the preferred measure, 
when the final combined questionnaire was sent for approval to the head of function and 
research sponsor of INSCO (the initial participant organisation) changes were requested to 
the measure. While the OJS-8 contains 8-items and discriminates between distributive, 
procedural and informational justice scales, the head of function suggested that while items 
1-3 (shown in Table 36) were acceptable, items 4 and 5 should be combined to a single item 
‘Everyone was treated with dignity and respect’, and items 7 and 8 should be combined into 
a single item ‘I feel I get as much out of this as I put in’. The 8-item measure was therefore 
reduced to 6-items. This 6-item measure is represented in the combined questionnaire in 
Figure 25. One of the effects of altering the number of items of the measure was that it is not 
clear whether the measure effectively discriminates between justice scales (for example 
distributive justice as a scale is left with a single item). Instead of treating justice as the 
distinct scales of procedural, interpersonal and distributive justice as originally intended by 
the OJS-8 this research therefore reports the results as the aggregated construct of 
organisational justice without interrogating these distinct scales. 
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Table 36.  
The short form organisational justice scale (OJS-8) items. Source: Elovainio et al. (2010)  
 
   
Item Measure Summary 
   
   
1 Procedural  Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those 
procedures? 
2 Procedural Have those procedures been applied consistently? 
3 Procedural Have those procedures been free of bias? 
   4 Interpersonal Has your supervisor treated you with dignity? 
5 Interpersonal Has your supervisor treated you with respect? 
6 Interpersonal  Has your supervisor seemed to tailor his/her communications to individuals’ 
specific needs? 
   
7 Distributive  Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your work? 




6.6.7. Combined Questionnaire 
 
The combined questionnaire for capturing participant responses was delivered in a two-
staged process. The first stage captured demographic details and participant trait affect. This 
information was collected only once during the research, using a form similar to that shown 
in Figure 22 (though this form is unbranded for anonymity purposes in order to comply with 
non-disclosure requirements of participant organisations), in paper format at an initial 
engagement workshop for participants. The second stage involved the collection of data by 
participants every two hours over a one-month period using an experience sampling method, 
with data collection via a preformatted paper diary (with a single diary page shown in Figure 
25, again in an unbranded version). Each page of the paper diary formed a single 
questionnaire for completion, formatted to collect the following information: 
 
1. Temporal information, detailing the date and time of entry. As the date of initiation of 
the research is known, this was pre-completed to reduce participant effort. 
2. Workplace event, requesting participants to choose from a pre-formatted list of 13 




3. Emotion, asking participants to note on the Geneva Emotion Wheel the type and 
strength of dominant emotion elicited in conjunction with the workplace event. 
4. Organisational justice, asking participants to complete a shortened 6-item version of 
the short form OJS (initially 8 items), a 6-item measure using a 5-point Likert scale. 
5. Social Exchange Relationship, requesting participants to compete the social 
exchange relationship scale (SERS), a 4-item measure again operationalised in a 5-
point Likert scale. 
6. Turnover Intention, asking participants to complete the TIS-6, a measure consisting 
of 6 items using a 5-point Likert scale, though with varied scale extremes.  
 
In total, if the choice of event and completion of the GEW is considered each as a single 
item, the composite questionnaire contains 20 items. This length of questionnaire was 
acceptable to participants (as tested during our initial engagement workshop), and the 
completion of the survey did not require a marked increase in attention or cognitive effort 
and took less than two minutes for each entry. Conventional wisdom suggests that up to five 
signals per day for a week should require responses of no more than two to three minutes 
each (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). An anonymised (unbranded) version of 
the questionnaire is shown in Figure 25. Each questionnaire forms a single page of the diary 
issued to participants to collect data throughout the duration of the research. Items were 
reformatted and reworded in the final questionnaire following feedback from participants to 














6.7. Sampling, administration and limits 
All research was conducted in-situ in the everyday workplace of the participants, and though 
there is potential for bias to exist the author is unaware of any explicitly. There may be 
sampling bias present due to the nature of the sampling approach. The participant 
organisations were clear that one of their requirements from the research was to gain a 
deeper understanding of the workplace experiences of their workforce. They therefore 
retained the ability to select participants for the study. This was mitigated by providing 
directions and guidelines for selecting participants, and asking for participant organisations 
to confirm that these guidelines had been met (Sedgewick, 2013). Within naturally occurring 
work teams there may also be biases present, therefore in studying existing teams in-situ the 
research is naturally open to limitations (with some authors suggesting biases are required 
for the formation of group dynamics; Parks, 2018). There is also an increased risk of 
reactivity when sampling a whole team or function (as discussed in section 6.2.2.). Reactivity 
refers to the potential for any phenomenon under study to change as a result of 
measurement or reporting. The natural propensity for participants to discuss the research 
can change perceptions towards the study (Wheeler & Reis, 1991). In administration, in 
dealing with organisations, part of the benefit to the organisation is the learning gained about 
the theoretical underpinnings of the research. Both organisations were clear that as part of 
the engagement all participants were taken through the research in an engagement 
workshop prior to the research, including detailing expected outcomes. It is unclear whether 
this workshop would act as a mechanism to prime or influence outcomes, however this is 
one of the best practice undertakings in ESM research identified by Fisher and To (2012).  
 
6.8. Data analysis and tools used 
 
Data analysis was carried out with the use of Microsoft Excel version 1805 (which provides 
valuable assistance with case screening and other associated processes) and IBM SPSS 
version 24 (which provides the analysis engine for the descriptive statistics, analysis of 
relationships and multilevel modelling). While other packages exist for conducting multilevel 
modelling (e.g. R, MLwiN, Mplus) when the analysis includes only two levels SPSS has been 
shown to produce similar results without the need to employ additional software (Albright & 
Marinova, 2015). A summary of how the analysis plans to address each of the hypotheses 
pertinent to this research is given in Table 37. As noted by Elfenbein (2007) there is value to 
be gained in emotional research in reporting descriptive statistics such as the frequencies of 
workplace events and emotion, and so this thesis will also devote a part of the data analysis 
to less powerful, but no less revealing techniques. The data returned by experience 
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sampling methods or diary studies can be seen as ‘unbalanced and hierarchical, with 
uneven numbers of observations nested within participants’ (Fisher & To, 2012, p. 9). The 
authors, in their thorough review of data analysis techniques for experience sampling 
methods, point to a number of analytical pitfalls including suggesting that repeated 
responses returned by the same individual cannot be treated as if they are independent and 
the multilevel structure of the data must be taken into account in the analyses. Level 1 
observations are a function of both within-person and between-person factors, and the 
variance due to both sources must be carefully modelled. Fisher & To (2012) suggest that 2-
level models are most commonly used to analyse data returned by ESM, with Level 1 being 
within person and Level 2 being between person. The authors also note, however, that 3-
level models are sometimes required if (for example) persons who respond repeatedly are 
also nested within work groups such as INSCO and MEDCO participants in our research, or 
if signal-level reports are nested within days (where there are day-level variables and 
hypotheses) and days are nested within persons. With the multilevel approach a sufficient 
sample size is required at each level of analysis (Heck et al., 2014) therefore in this research 
given both INSCO and MEDCO provide small sample sizes at Level 3 the analysis will be 
limited to 2-levels. Each of the variables maps to one of these levels as shown in Table 38. 
 
Table 37.  
Hypotheses and proposed statistical procedure to be used 
 
   
Hypothesis Variables Statistical Procedure 
      
H6a, 6b Organisational justice, state 
positive affect, state negative affect 
• Correlation analysis.  
• Multilevel modelling 
H7 Emotion, Event • Frequency analysis 
• Chi Square Goodness of Fit 
H8a, 8b Event, Turnover intention, Social 
exchange quality  
• ANOVA 
• Frequency analysis 
• Multilevel modelling 
H9 Organisational justice, social 
exchange quality, turnover intention 
• Correlation analysis 
• Multilevel modelling 
H10 Organisational justice, Social 
exchange quality, Turnover 
intention, Emotion 
• Multilevel modelling 
• Bootstrapping (using PROCESS 
Macro for SPSS) 
213 
 
Table 38.  




    
Level 1 Event Type 
Level 1 Emotion Type 
Level 1 Emotion Strength 
Level 1 Emotion Score  
Level 1 Organisational Justice 
Level 1 Social Exchange Relationship  
Level 1 Turnover Intention 
Level 2 Participant  
Level 2 Age 
Level 2 Position 
Level 2 Gender 
Level 2 Organisation 
Level 2 PANAS Positive Score 
Level 2 PANAS Negative Score 
      Note: Number of L1 variables = 2480 (repeat measures), Number of L2 variables = 31 
 
 
In order to effectively analyse the multilevel data, this research will therefore use hierarchical 
linear models providing the data is suitable for multilevel modelling. In order to determine this 
an unconditional (no predictors) model was run on each Level 1 variable to find out how 
much of the variance in each is within-person versus between-person. This test is described 
in the results section detailed in the next chapter. As the test shows that considerable 
variance exists at both levels, multilevel modelling is appropriate and so will be used. To 
further confirm this finding, the chi squared values for the appropriate degrees of freedom for 
models with and without participants as subjects in a linear mixed model were compared. 
The analysis shows that significant variance exists between models with and without 
participants as a Level 2 variable, therefore supporting the view that multilevel modelling is 
appropriate. The following chapter describes the results of this modelling. Firstly, the results 
chapter covers case and variable screening, followed by the descriptive statistics and 
frequencies returned during the experience sampling research. The results chapter then 
provides detail of the multilevel modelling approach along with the estimates returned by the 
analysis for all events and for bonus pay (or financial recognition as it is coded in the 
analysis) as a specific event.  
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7. Results of Study 2: Experience Sampling Study 
 
Chapter 7 reports the results related to the experience sampling study. The chapter 
addresses both general findings and specific hypotheses which the research is designed to 
address (H6a and b, H7, H8a and b, H9 and H10, as detailed in Chapter 6 and highlighted in 
Figure 26). The chapter begins by explaining data screening procedures, then goes on to 
explain the descriptive statistics for the investigation including reporting the frequencies of 
both event and emotion reported by participants. The analysis then addresses the multilevel 
nature of the data collected, testing whether considerable variance exists at both levels 
considered in this research (level-2 being individual participant and level-1 the variables 
investigated at an individual level in the research). To further understand the variables to be 
addressed in this research a variable catalogue is included as Table 60 in Appendix 2. This 

















7.1. Case Screening 
 
Following the removal of all participants who were unable to complete the study responses 
were screened for missing data in each row, unengaged responses (or responses where 
participants have answered the same for each item), and outliers on the continuous 
variables (in this case age and length of service). An initial analysis of each participant 


















with only two missing items across all participants, meaning that no responses were required 
to be removed. An analysis of the standard deviation of each participant showed that only 
three participant responses (of a potential 2480) had standard deviations lower than 0.5 
(although an arbitrary number, this figure indicates when participant responses on each 
Likert scale tend to be the same for all items when recording an event and the subsequent 
appraisals). A further interrogation of these standard deviations of responses indicated a 
broadly engaged participant, so each of these three responses were retained. Finally, an 
interrogation of the continuous variables in the data set (age and length of service) showed 
no outliers. 
 
7.2. Variable Screening 
 
Considering all data, two missing values were observed for the variable of distributive justice 
(both missing values were in the responses of a single participant). In order to impute these 
responses surrounding values of the other indicators for the latent factor organisational 
justice were interrogated, and the mode value for that participant (and for that specific event) 
used to impute the missing values. The analysis is therefore continued with a complete data 
set. In terms of skewness and kurtosis, reasonably normal distributions were observed for 
the majority of indicators of latent factors and for all other variables in terms of skewness 
(e.g. age, sex, length of service). Mild skewness was, however, observed for indicators of 
procedural justice (OJ2 and OJ3 as described in our variable catalogue in Appendix 2, Table 
60), indicators of social exchange relationship quality (SE1) and for the variable of position 
(whether manager or non-manager). These skewness values ranged from -1.2 (for SE1) to 
2.2 (for position). Mild negative kurtosis was observed for emotion type and also for 
indicators of procedural justice (OJ1), distributive justice (distJ), and for indicators of turnover 
intention (TI3, TI5, TI6 and TI7) and social exchange relationship quality (SE3 and SE4). As 
well as indicators of latent variables, mild kurtosis was also observed for the variables of 
gender and position. These kurtosis values ranged from -1.6 (for SE3) to 2.9 (for position). 
While these values do violate strict rules of normality, they are within the range of more 
relaxed rules suggested by Sposito et al. (1983) who recommends 3.3 as the upper 





7.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Due to the array of measures, timescales and groups under investigation there is a vast 
potential pool of descriptive statistics that can be reported as a result of this research. As 
well as considering frequencies of event and emotion, differences across companies (to 
understand differences between INSCO and MEDCO participants), positions (manager or 
non-manager) and gender (male or female) can also be reported. This thesis will attempt to 
limit the statistics reported to those germane to the hypotheses. The mean, median, 
skewness and kurtosis statistics of the data is reported in Table 39. The mean age of 
participants is 36.97 years old. Average length of service of participants is 4.87 years. 
Participants in general reported higher levels of positive trait affect than negative trait affect, 
and in general (with a mean of 8.74, where positive emotions refer to the first ten items of 
the Geneva Emotion Wheel and negative emotions the last ten), the emotions elicited during 
the research are positive (though the standard deviation is large at 7.04 indicating a broad 
range). Emotional strength reported is on average 2.16 (out of a potential maximum of 5). 
Mean emotion score is 5.74 suggesting a very weak positive emotion on average when 
using the transformation criteria outlined in Table 34. In terms of the variables of 
organisational justice, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention, the mean 
values show an overall positive perception of justice (with a mean of 3.61), but slightly 
negative perceptions of social exchange relationship quality (with a mean of 2.84). As mean 
results for turnover intention are close to the ‘neutral’ position in the questionnaire (with a 
mean of 2.99 returned) this indicates that participants who tend to agree with statements 
related to turnover intention are balanced by those by tend to disagree, suggesting a 
moderate level of interest in turnover.  
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Table 39.  
Descriptive Statistics Showing Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness and Kurtosis Results a 
 
 
Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Level 1 (within person)          
Emotion Type1 1.00 20.00 8.74 5.00 7.04 .50 .05 -1.36 .10 
Emotion Strength 1.00 5.00 2.16 2.00 .94 .45 .05 -.55 .10 
Emotion Score 1.00 9.00 5.74 6.00 1.91 -.47 .05 -.79 .10 
Organisational Justice 1.00 5.00 3.61 3.83 .91 -.79 .05 .17 .10 
Social Exchange Quality 1.00 4.25 2.84 2.75 .67 .18 .05 -.61 .10 
Turnover Intention 1.00 5.00 2.99 3.00 .88 .01 .05 -.82 .10 
Level 2 (between person)          
Company 1.00 2.00 1.32 1.00 .47 .76 .05 -1.4 .10 
Age 26.00 58.00 36.97 35.00 8.91 .89 .05 -.15 .10 
Length of Service 1.00 12.00 4.87 4.00 2.86 .47 .05 -.66 .10 
Sex 1.00 2.00 1.32 1.00 .468 .76 .05 -1.42 .10 
Position 1.00 2.00 1.13 1.00 .34 2.22 .05 2.91 .10 
Positive Trait Affect 2.10 4.10 3.01 3.00 .51 .23 .05 -.94 .10 
Negative Trait Affect 1.80 3.30 2.63 2.60 .36 -.01 .05 -.25 .10 
a N (Level 1) = 2480, N (Level 2) = 31 
1Note:  Whilst variables such as emotion type are categorical, they reveal trends in emotion further explained in the text
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7.4. Frequency of Event 
 
Looking at overall event frequency for the total sample detailed in Table 40, ‘Acts of 
colleagues’ appears as the most frequent event reported by participants, with 27.7% of 
participants reporting this as the event most impactful to performance to have occurred over 
the preceding two hours of organisational life, followed by ‘Acts of managers’, with a 
frequency of 19.6% of the total number of events, and ‘Acts of customers’ with 12.5%. The 
cumulative percentage of these three events is 59.9%. Subsequent events contribute only 
single figure percentage to the cumulative and can also be seen in Table 40, with ‘Process 
involvement’ the next highest frequency (with 9% of events) followed by Development (with 
5.7% of event) and ‘Financial recognition’ (the coding for bonus pay in this research with 
5.1% of events). It is interesting to note that although financial recognition is only a one-off 
event, with bonus pay announced only once to each participant over the research period and 
therefore 31 times (as there are 31 participants), it is reported at a higher frequency (with 
127 incidences) than events such as ‘Ability to influence’ and ‘Non-financial recognition’. 
This indicates that as an event it is reported on average 4.1 times per participant (with 12 
participants reporting the event 3 times, 8 participant 4 times, 7 participants 5 times and 4 
participants 6 times), which indicates (given that there are 4 events recorded per day) that 
bonus pay is an event which remains the most important to performance for participants on 
average for more than 24 hours, as they continue to report it on average more than 4 times 
after it has been announced.  
 
In order to investigate whether event types reported are significantly different across groups 
a series of independent sample t-tests were conducted. The analysis is conducted for 
company and gender only as groups as numbers of non-managers is small (at four) 
therefore findings for this group may be unreliable. The results of the t-tests for participants 
of the different companies is shown in Table 41 and for male and female participants in 
Table 42. Significant differences exist between companies for the frequency of response of 
Acts of colleagues, Acts of managers and Acts of customers, as well as Goal achievement 
as events. Participants from INSCO reported significantly higher frequency of Acts of 
Colleagues, Acts of Managers and Goal Achievement, but significantly fewer Acts of 
Customers than participants from MEDCO. This would perhaps be expected given the 
summaries in Table 30, describing the nature of INSCO as inward-facing but MEDCO as 
customer-facing. Male and female participants do not report significant differences in the 
frequencies of any of the events researched suggesting that there are no significantly 
meaningful differences in the events experienced by different genders in the research. 
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Table 40.  















    
Event Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
    
Acts of Colleagues 687 27.7 27.7 
Acts of Managers 487 19.6 47.3 
Acts of Customers 311 12.5 59.9 
Non-financial recognition 69 2.8 62.7 
Financial Recognition 127 5.1 67.8 
Fairness or Discrimination 71 2.9 70.6 
Violation of trust 39 1.6 72.2 
Conflict 96 3.9 76.1 
Ability to influence 101 4.1 80.2 
Process Involvement 224 9.0 89.2 
Technical involvement 62 2.5 91.7 
Development 142 5.7 97.4 
Goal Achievement 64 2.6 100.0 
Total 2480 100.0  
Note: N = 2480    
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Table 41.  
Welch’s t-test and means for INSCO (N = 21) and MEDCO (N=10) responses for frequency of event 
 
      
Event INSCO 
(N = 21) 
MEDCO 
(N = 10) 
t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
Acts of Colleagues 25.00 5.80 16.20 2.25 6.06** 28.35 .000 
Acts of Managers 17.38 2.64 12.20 2.20 5.38** 29 .000 
Acts of Customers 5.00 5.05 20.60 2.37 -11.71** 29 .000 
Non-financial recognition 2.33 1.28 2.00 0.67 0.95 28.62 .348 
Financial Recognition 4.24 1.09 3.80 1.03 1.06 29 .297 
Fairness / Discrimination 2.00 1.82 2.90 2.38 -1.17 29 .253 
Violation of trust 1.24 1.51 1.30 1.06 -0.12 29 .908 
Conflict 2.81 1.60 3.70 0.68 -1.68 29 .104 
Ability to influence 3.29 1.52 3.20 1.14 0.16 29 .876 
Process Involvement 6.81 3.30 8.10 1.73 -1.43 28.58 .164 
Systems Involvement 2.19 1.60 1.60 1.27 1.02 29 .315 
Development 4.86 2.41 4.00 1.56 1.02 29 .316 
Goal Achievement 2.86 2.41 0.40 0.52 4.46** 23.55 .000 
 
Note: N = 2480 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  
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Table 42.  
Welch’s t-test and means for Male (N = 21) and Female (N = 10) responses for frequency of event  
 
      
Event Male 
(N = 21) 
Female 
(N = 10) 
t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
Acts of Colleagues 21.86 6.14 22.80 7.32 -0.38 29 .710 
Acts of Managers 15.62 3.15 15.90 4.28 -0.21 29 .838 
Acts of Customers 10.57 8.57 8.90 8.96 0.50 29 .620 
Non-financial recognition 2.33 1.20 2.00 0.94 0.77 29 .447 
Financial Recognition 4.10 1.09 4.10 1.10 -0.01 29 .991 
Fairness / Discrimination 2.62 2.04 1.60 1.90 1.33 29 .194 
Violation of trust 1.52 1.50 0.70 0.82 1.97 28.24 .059 
Conflict 3.05 1.40 3.20 1.55 -0.27 29 .786 
Ability to influence 3.14 1.24 3.50 1.72 -0.66 29 .513 
Process Involvement 6.71 2.22 8.30 3.95 -1.19 11.79 .259 
Systems Involvement 2.33 1.65 1.30 0.82 1.86 29 .073 
Development 4.24 2.34 5.30 1.70 -1.28 29 .212 
Goal Achievement 1.90 2.12 2.40 2.76 -0.55 29 .585 
 
Note: N = 2480 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  
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7.5. Frequency of Emotion 
 
Frequencies, strengths and standard deviations related to the distinct forms of emotion 
elicited during the research are detailed in Table 43. Results are provided for all events in 
aggregate as well as for the specific event of financial recognition (the event coding in the 
research for bonus pay). Pleasure is the most frequent emotion elicited in participants across 
all events (with 17.5% of emotions reported being Pleasure), followed by Anger (17.4%), 
Disappointment (14.1%), Interest (12.9%) and Pride (12.8%). A number of emotions are 
reported relatively few times and have a frequency below 1% including Love (with 0% 
frequency), Hate (with a frequency of 0.2%), Compassion (with 0.4% frequency), both Guilt 
and Shame (with a frequency of 0.6% each) and Fear (with a frequency of 0.9%). The 
remaining emotions contribute only single figure frequencies to the cumulative total. When 
considering cumulative percentages, 61.3% of reported emotions are positive and 38.7% 
negative. In terms of mean strength of emotion for all events Love returns the highest result 
with a mean strength of 4, though this is based on a single occurrence. The subsequent 
strongest mean emotions are reported for Fear (Mean = 3.52, SD = 0.59), Disgust (Mean = 
3.50, SD = 0.86), Hate (Mean = 3.50, SD = 1.00) and Shame (Mean = 3.27, SD = 0.59).  
 
Considering all emotional responses to financial recognition as an event, 21.2% of 
responses are positive emotionally, with 78.8% of responses indicating negative emotion. 
These figures slightly overstate the negative reactions to bonus pay at the individual level 
where 22.6% of the initial emotional reactions to financial recognition were positive and 
77.4% were negative. These differences indicate that negative emotions tend to be reported 
for longer than positive emotions as a result of financial recognition. The most frequent 
positive emotion elicited is Contentment, with 10.2% of responses. Anger (with 31.5% of 
emotions reported) and disappointment (with 44.9%) make up the majority of emotions 
reported as a result of bonus pay. It is interesting how stark the frequency of negative 
emotion is when comparing bonus pay to workplace events taken as a whole. Over 78% of 
emotions are negative for bonus pay, compared with just over 38% for all events. In terms of 
the mean strength of emotion for financial recognition as an event, Pleasure returns the 
highest mean (Mean = 4.00, SD = 0), though this is based on only two responses. The 
subsequent strongest mean emotions are reported for Anger (Mean = 3.85, SD = 0.70), Joy 
(Mean = 3.75, SD = 0.50), Disgust (Mean = 3.67, SD = 0.58), Relief (Mean = 3.67, SD = 
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Table 43.  
Frequency and strength of emotion reported for all events and for financial recognition as a distinct event
  For All Events (N = 2480) For Financial Recognition (N = 127) 
Emotion 
Mean 




Strength SD Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Interest 2.01 0.75 321 12.9 12.9 0 0 0 0.0 0 
Amusement 2.06 0.73 233 9.4 22.3 0 0 0 0.0 0 
Pride 2.24 0.89 317 12.8 35.1 3.60 0.55 5 3.9 3.9 
Joy 2.57 0.98 54 2.2 37.3 3.75 0.50 4 3.1 7 
Pleasure 1.72 0.79 435 17.5 54.8 4.00 0 2 1.6 8.6 
Contentment 2.47 0.63 45 1.8 56.7 2.92 0.49 13 10.2 18.8 
Love 4.00 0 1 0.0 56.7 0 0 0 0.0 18.8 
Admiration 2.39 0.65 36 1.5 58.1 0 0 0 0.0 18.8 
Relief 2.67 0.81 70 2.8 61.0 3.67 0.58 3 2.4 21.2 
Compassion 1.67 0.50 9 0.4 61.3 0 0 0 0.0 21.2 
Sadness 1.94 0.70 48 1.9 63.3 0 0 0 0.0 21.2 
Guilt 2.69 0.87 16 0.6 63.9 0 0 0 0.0 21.2 
Regret 2.85 1.01 26 1.0 65.0 0 0 0 0.0 21.2 
Shame 3.27 0.59 15 0.6 65.6 0 0 0 0.0 21.2 
Disappointment 2.13 0.97 349 14.1 79.6 3.49 0.83 57 44.9 66.1 
Fear 3.52 0.59 23 0.9 80.6 0 0 0 0.0 66.1 
Disgust 3.50 0.86 26 1.0 81.6 3.67 0.58 3 2.4 68.5 
Contempt 3.15 0.93 20 0.8 82.4 0 0 0 0.0 68.5 
Hate 3.50 1.00 4 0.2 82.6 0 0 0 0.0 68.5 
Anger 2.34 1.12 432 17.4 100.0 3.85 0.70 40 31.5 100.0 
Note: N (all events) = 2480, N (Financial Recognition) = 127        
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Although considering the frequencies and strengths of emotion can provide valuable insight, 
it is also worth investigating the multilevel nature of emotional responses to a single event in 
more detail. While the bonus award is only announced once for each of the 31 participants in 
the research, the number of responses to financial recognition is 127. This suggests that 
financial recognition is reported as a salient event more than four times on average for each 
participant. The emotional responses to financial recognition are reasonably complex as can 
be seen in Table 44. This shows that emotions change over time, and whilst anger (for 
example) may be the primary emotion elicited, this emotion changes in nature to become 
disappointment in subsequent recordings. Similarly, though joy can be the initial emotional 
response, this can change in time to become contentment. The difference between these 
primary and overall emotional responses will be discussed during the testing of hypotheses 
6 (anger will be the most frequent emotional response as a result of bonus pay) in section 
7.6. While not the focus of this research this time-based emotional response may offer a 
valuable avenue of research for future study. 
 
As with the recording of events, group differences in the type and strength of emotion elicited 
in the workplace can also be considered as part of this research. Differences in frequencies 
of emotion and strength of emotion between companies (INSCO and MEDCO) for all events 
are shown in Tables 45 and 46. Differences in frequencies and strength of emotion between 
gender (male and female) are shown in Tables 47 and 48 respectively for all events. Again, 
differences in position (whether manager or non-manager) are omitted due to the low 
number of manager participants. Only significant differences are shown in these tables due 
to the number of emotion variables across groups. As the results show, there are significant 
differences in the types of emotion between companies. INSCO employees in general report 
the emotions of Joy, Pleasure, Disgust and Anger more frequently than MEDCO employees, 
who in turn report the emotions of Interest, Contentment, Relief, Regret and Disappointment 
more frequently than INSCO employees. INSCO participants report generally stronger 
emotions of Shame and Disappointment than MEDCO employees, but weaker emotions of 
Interest, Pride, Joy, Pleasure, Admiration, Regret, Disgust and Anger. The gender of 
participants appears to have less of an influence on the significant differences in frequency 
of emotion reported, with male participants reporting increased frequency of only one 
emotion, that of Regret, when compared with female participants. While female participants 
report generally stronger levels of the emotion Interest than male participants, male 





Table 44.  








1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Anger Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - 
2 Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment - - 
3 Disappointment Disappointment Anger Disappointment - - 
4 Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment - - 
5 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - - 
6 Disgust Disgust Disgust - - - 
7 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - - 
8 Anger Anger Anger - - - 
9 Pride Pride Contentment - - - 
10 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - - 
11 Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment  
12 Contentment Contentment Contentment - - - 
13 Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - 
14 Anger Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment 
15 Anger Anger Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment 
16 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - 
17 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment Anger - 
18 Anger Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment 
19 Pride Pride Pride Contentment Contentment - 
20 Relief Relief Contentment Contentment Contentment - 
21 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment Anger - 
22 Joy Joy Contentment Contentment Contentment - 
23 Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment - - 
24 Anger Anger Anger Anger Disappointment Disappointment 
25 Pleasure Pleasure Contentment - - - 
26 Anger Anger Anger - - - 
27 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - - 
28 Relief Joy Joy - - - 
29 Anger Anger Anger Disappointment - - 
30 Disappointment Disappointment Disappointment - - - 
31 Anger Anger Anger Disappointment - - 
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Table 45.  
Welch’s t-test for INSCO (N = 21) and MEDCO (N=10) responses for frequency of emotion 
 
      
Emotion INSCO 
(N = 21) 
MEDCO 
(N = 10) 
t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
        
Interest 8.48 5.65 14.70 4.11 -3.11** 29 .004 
Joy 2.29 1.62 0.80 1.03 2.65* 29 .013 
Pleasure 18.05 11.52 5.90 3.28 4.47** 25.74 .000 
Contentment 0.62 0.92 2.70 2.75 -2.44* 9.97 .042 
Relief 0.81 0.93 5.10 2.08 -6.24** 10.75 .000 
Regret 0.48 1.08 1.60 1.27 -2.57* 29 .016 
Disappointment 10.05 5.11 13.20 2.82 -2.21* 28.17 .036 
Disgust 1.14 1.20 0.30 0.68 2.07* 29 .048 
Anger 15.38 5.66 10.60 2.01 3.44** 27.69 .002 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .01. 
 
      
 
Table 46.  
Welch’s t-test for INSCO and MEDCO responses for strength of emotion 
 
Emotion INSCO MEDCO t df p 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD    
Interest 174 1.91 0.80 147 2.14 0.68 -2.76** 319 .006 
Pride 227 2.05 0.87 90 2.72 0.75 -6.44** 315 .000 
Joy 46 2.39 0.91 8 3.63 0.74 -3.63** 52 .001 
Pleasure 376 1.60 0.71 59 2.51 0.80 -8.95** 433 .000 
Admiration 15 1.87 0.52 21 2.76 0.44 -5.62** 34 .000 
Regret 10 2.30 1.06 16 3.19 0.83 -2.38** 24 .026 
Shame 8 3.63 0.52 7 2.86 0.38 3.24* 13 .006 
Disappointment 217 2.22 1.05 132 2.00 0.80 2.17* 329.85 .031 
Disgust 23 3.43 0.90 3 4.00 0.00 -3.03** 22.00 .006 
Anger 323 2.12 1.10 106 3.01 0.91 -8.32** 212.98 .000 






Table 47.  
Welch’s t-test for Male (N = 21) and Female (N = 10) responses for frequency of emotion  
 
      
Emotion Male 
(N = 21) 
Female 
(N = 10) 
t df p 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
Regret 1.14 1.39 0.20 0.42 2.85** 26.30 .008 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .01.       
 
 
Table 48.  
Welch’s t-test for Male and Female responses for strength of emotion 
 
Emotion Male Female t df p 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD    
Interest 208 1.94 0.76 113 2.14 0.73 -2.28 319 .023 
Fear 12 3.75 0.45 11 3.27 0.65 2.07 21 .049 
Anger 304 2.41 1.13 128 2.16 1.10 2.07 430 .039 







7.6. Testing Hypothesis 7: anger will be the most frequent emotional response as a result of 
bonus pay 
 
Hypothesis 7 (that anger will be the most frequent emotional response as a result of bonus 
pay) can be tested by considering the frequency of emotion related to the specific event of 
financial recognition reported by participants. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 
43. For financial recognition as an event ‘disappointment’ is the most frequent emotion (with 
44.9% of events involving financial recognition associated with disappointment), followed by 
‘anger’ (with 31.5% of events involving financial recognition associated with this emotion). 
This finding is however somewhat as a result of multiple emotions being recorded by 
individual participants for financial recognition as an event. As Table 44 demonstrates, 
although ‘disappointment’ is the most frequent emotion when considering all emotions 
related to financial recognition, ‘anger’ is the most frequent primary emotion (i.e. the first 
emotion) recorded by participants as a result of their bonus award. At this specific point 
45.2% of emotions are reported as anger, followed by 29.0% reported as disappointment 
(with 6.5% reported as both pride and relief, and 3.2% as joy, pleasure, contentment and 
disgust). These initial emotions change over time, with 12 of the 31 participants initially 
feeling anger, only for this emotion to migrate to become disappointment over time (perhaps 
as a result of this initial anger dissipating or allowing time for participants to reappraise their 
bonus award). In order to test whether these frequencies are significant, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test was performed. As this test relies on assumptions of independence and 
mutual exclusivity the test was performed on the primary emotion only. The results indicate a 
significant difference in emotion as a result of financial recognition, (X2 = 43.581, N = 31, df = 
7, p < .01) providing partial support for hypothesis 7. Anger is the most frequent primary 
emotional response as a result of bonus pay, and this response is significantly different to 
other responses. It is not however the most frequent emotional response as a result of 





7.7. Relationships Between Variables 
 
Table 49 shows correlations between the variables included in this research. Demographic 
variables show some expected and unexpected relationships. There is a reasonably strong 
relationship between age and length of service (r = .79, p < .01) and a weaker relationship 
between age and managerial position (r = -.33, p < .01) which would perhaps be expected 
(in terms of direction if not magnitude). Age is also to a small magnitude significantly 
negatively related to positive trait affect (positive TA), indicating that as participants get older 
their levels of positive trait affect decrease (r = -.30, p < .01). Other significant relationships 
exist between age and remaining variables, but the magnitude of relationships are small 
enough to be almost negligible. Length of service has a small negative relationship with 
position (r = -.12, p < .01) with those serving longer more likely to be in a management 
position (as perhaps would be expected), and a small to moderate negative relationship with 
positive trait affect (r = -.43, p < .01) indicating that as length of service increases levels of 
positive trait affect decrease. The relationships between gender and position and other 
variables is similar, with both gender and position demonstrating significant but small 
positive relationships with each other (r = .15, p < .01), and with positive trait affect and 
distributive justice. Remaining relationship strengths (other than the relationship between 
position and perceptions of social exchange relationship quality which is negative and small), 
are negligible. 
 
In terms of emotion, justice, social exchange and turnover intention variables, relationships 
can also be interrogated using Table 49. Emotion score is significantly related to age (r = -
.05, p < .05), length of service (r = -.03, p < .05) and positive trait affect (r = .08, p < .01), 
though these relationships are weak. Emotion score is also significantly positively related to 
organisational justice (r = .77, p < .01) and social exchange relationship quality (r = .51, p < 
.01), and significantly negatively related to turnover intention (r = -.42, p < .01). These 
relationships are moderate in strength, though the relationship between emotion score and 
justice is the strongest significant relationship returned in the analysis. The relationship 
between justice and social exchange relationship quality is significant, positive and moderate 
(r = .49, p < .01). The relationships between both justice and social exchange relationship 
quality and turnover intention are significant, negative and moderate in strength. To further 
understand the relationships between emotion and justice, turnover and social exchange 
relationship quality each emotion researched can also be considered separately rather than 
looking just at emotion score (which describes whether the emotion is positive or negative 
and the strength of the emotion, but not the type of emotion). These results are discussed in 




Table 49.  
Correlations between variables along with significance level 
 






Score OJS TIS-6 SERS 
Age2 1.00          
LoS2 .79** 1.00         
Sex2 -.09** -.02 1.00        
Position2 -.33** -.12** .15** 1.00       
Positive TA2 -.30** -.43** .19** .14** 1.00      
Negative TA2 -.01 .11** -.05* .03 -.36** 1.00     
Emotion Score1 -.05* -.03* .01 .02 .08** .01 1.00    
OJS1 -.05* -.05* .04* .07** .06** -.06** .77** 1.00   
TIS-61 .01 .09** -.05* -.09** -.10** .08** -.42** -.50** 1.00  
SERS1 .03 -.03 -.05* -.11** .14** -.06** .51** .49** -.54** 1.00 





7.8. Emotional Relationships 
 
Considering individual emotions (and the strength of these emotions) and relationships 
between emotion and the other variables investigated, Table 50 reveals a range of positive 
and negative relationships. In general, the relationships between emotions are weak. The 
emotions of love and compassion have no significant relationships with other variables 
(perhaps as a result of few incidences of these emotions reported by participants), and so 
are omitted. Significant relationships exist between various emotions and organisational 
justice, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention. Considering 
organisational justice, the emotions of pride and pleasure have the strongest significant 
positive relationships (and are the only two significant positive emotions for which r > .2). 
The emotions of anger (r = -.51, p < .01) and disappointment (r = -.33, p < .01) have the 
strongest emotional relationships with organisational justice, and these are negative, 
indicating that as levels of anger and disappointment increase perceptions of justice 
decrease. For social exchange relationship quality and emotion, the strength of relationships 
is generally weaker than with organisational justice (perhaps indicating that justice is a more 
emotive construct). As with organisational justice, when we consider social exchange 
relationship quality the emotions of pride (r = .19, p < .01), disappointment (r = -.23, p < .01) 
and anger (r = -.31, p < .01) are the emotions with the strongest relationships, and these 
relationships have the same direction as those for organisational justice.  
 
Consistent with these findings and expectations, the relationships between emotion and 
turnover intention are negative for positive emotions, and positive for negative emotions 
(which reverses the relationships found between emotion and justice and social exchange 
constructs as would be expected). As with justice and social exchange relationship quality, 
the strongest emotional relationships exist between turnover intention and anger (r = .28, p < 
.01) and disappointment (r = .18, p < .01), followed by disgust (r = .13, p < .01), pleasure and 
pride (r = -.12, p < .01 for both emotions). The directions of these relationships are as 
expected, with turnover intention increasing with negative emotions, and decreasing with 
positive emotions (though relationships are generally weak). Another finding worth note 
when considering emotion is the relationship between emotion and trait affect. Though 
significant relationships exist between some emotions and both positive and negative trait 
affect, the magnitudes of these relationships are small (with the magnitude of r < .1 for all 
relationships). This indicates that trait affect is only weakly related to the more granular 
emotion recorded by participants. It is therefore worth considering the relative associations 
between event and emotion. If not influenced in a major way by trait affect, is emotion 
therefore situationally or event-driven?   
- 232 - 
 
Table 50.  
Relationships between emotion, trait affect and both predictor and dependent variables 
 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .01. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Interest (1) 1.00                                             
Amusement (2) -.11** 1.00                                           
Pride (3) -.13** -.11** 1.00                                         
Joy (4) -.05* -.04* -.05* 1.00                                       
Pleasure (5) -.15** -.13** -.15** -.06** 1.00                                     
Contentment (6) -.05* -.04 -.04* -.02 -.05* 1.00                                   
Admiration (8) -.04* -.04 -.04* -.02 -.05* -.02 1.00                                 
Relief (9) -.06** -.05* -.06** -.02 -.07** -.02 -.02 1.00                               
Sadness (11) -.05* -.04* -.05* -.02 -.06** -.02 -.02 -.02 1.00                             
Guilt (12) -.03 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 1.00                           
Regret (13) -.04 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.04* -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 1.00                         
Shame (14) -.03 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 1.00                       
Disappointment (15) -.13** -.11** -.13** -.05* -.15** -.05* -.04* -.06** -.05* -.03 -.04 -.03 1.00                     
Fear (16) -.03 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.04* -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03 1.00                   
Disgust (17) -.04 -.03 -.04 -.01 -.04* -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.01 1.00                 
Contempt (18) -.03 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01 1.00               
Hate (19) -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.01 -.00 -.00 -.00 1.00             
Anger (20) -.15** -.12** -.14** -.06** -.17** -.05* -.05* -.07** -.05** -.03 -.04 -.03 -.15** -.04 -.04* -.04 -.02 1.00           
OJS (21) .19** .15** .29** .11** .26** .08** .07** .04* -.04* -.05* -.07** -.09** -.33** -.19** -.23** -.17** -.09** -.51** 1.00         
TIS-6 (22) -.11** -.08** -.12** -.09** -.12** -.07** -.08** .01 .06** .05** .03 .06** .18** .10** .13** .06** .05* .28** -.50** 1.00       
SERS (23) .10** .10** .19** .12** .11** .07** .05** .06** -.08** -.03 -.06** -.06** -.23** -.12** -.14** -.10** -.04* -.31** .49** -.54** 1.00     
Positive Trait Affect 
(24) 
.06** .09** .01 -.00 -.01 -.00 .00 .03 -.03 -.01 .00 -.01 .02 -.01 -.03 -.01 .01 -.03 .06** -.1** .14** 1.00   
Negative Trait Affect 
(25) 
.04* .03 .03 .01 -.03 .02 -.02 .01 .08** -.02 .03 .04* -.01 .03 .02 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.06** .08** -.06** -.36** 1.00 
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7.9. Multilevel Modelling 
 
In order to understand within- and between-group components of the experience sampling 
research, multilevel modelling (using IBM SPSS v24) was employed. This method explains 
whether there is ‘sufficient’ variance in outcomes between groups and therefore multilevel 
modelling is required, or whether there is little or no variation between groups (or levels) and 
therefore single level regression can be employed (using for example ordinary least squares 
or OLS). ‘Sufficient’ variance is subjective but is suggested by some authors (e.g. Heck et 
al., 2014) to be a value higher than 5%, suggesting that if between group variance is less 
than 5% then single-level regression can be used, but more than 5% multilevel modelling 
should be employed. Unlike single level (OLS) regression where there is a basic assumption 
that random errors are independent, are normally distributed, and have constant variance, in 
multilevel models the error structures are more complex. Individual errors are dependent 
within each unit as they are common within that unit, errors do not have constant variance 
(as the residual components describing intercepts and slopes may also vary across units), 
and the estimation of these unknown random parameters associated with intercepts and 
slopes may also depend on data characteristics, the type of analysis and the measurement 
scale of dependent variables (Heck et al., 2014).   
 
The sequence of tests in the multilevel model follows the somewhat ‘standard’ stages of 
multilevel modelling reported by Field (2013), Heck et al. (2014), Hox et al. (2010) and 
others. These involve: (a) specification of the null (or no predictors) model. This enables the 
testing of the levels of variance at Level 1 and Level 2 to indicate the nature of the analysis 
to be employed (i.e. whether the model is single or multi-levelled); (b) specification of the 
Level 1 model; and (c) specification of the Level 2 model. Step (c) is where the thesis 
includes the model to explain both intercepts and randomly varying slopes and compares the 
-2 log likelihood to obtain the best model fit. The model with the best fit is then used for the 
full analysis of the relationships between variables. This thesis will report each of these 
stages in turn and offer some indication of the decisions made during the analysis, and 
reports the results consistent with the research of Xanthopoulou et al. (2008) who use 
multilevel modelling in their diary study on work engagement. This is somewhat due to the 
nature of multilevel modelling where the complexity of random parameters means that in 
some cases judgements must be made (Hox et al., 2010). Firstly, the thesis must define the 
levels pertinent to the analysis in a little more detail, before it can go on to develop the null 
model to consider the relative strengths of both the within- and between-person effects in the 
analysis, therefore justifying the use of the multilevel approach for this investigation. 
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7.9.1. The Levels in the Multilevel Model  
 
In this section the levels in the analysis are discussed. Previous researchers suggest that a 
sufficient sample size is required at each level of analysis (Heck et al., 2014), and in this 
analysis there is an insufficient sample size (with INSCO contributing 21 participants and 
MEDCO 10 participants) to extend the analysis to the third level of ‘company’. The multilevel 
model analysed in this thesis therefore consists of two levels. The first level consists of the 
variables of event, emotion (in terms of specific emotion type, emotion strength and the 
transformed variable of emotion score), organisational justice, social exchange relationship 
and turnover intention. The variables of emotion score, organisational justice, social 
exchange relationship and turnover intention are centred on the grand mean, as the analysis 
seeks to understand the effect of Level 2 variables controlling for Level 1 (which group mean 
centring does not facilitate; Field, 2013). The second level (Level 2) consists of the individual 
participant (with the Level 1 variables nested within Level 2) as well as the age, position, 
gender, organisation and both the negative and positive trait affect returned by each 
participant. These variables, along with their levels, are detailed in the method section in 
Table 38. This approach of using individual response scales nested within individual 
participants as Level 1 and Level 2 variables for experience sampling research has been 
used by previous authors (e.g. Xanthopoulou et al., 2008) using repeat-measure diary 
studies. In order to support these decisions, and to examine the variance components at 
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7.9.2. The Null Model 
 
The null model provides an estimated mean score on each measure for all participants. It 
also provides a partitioning of the variance between Level 1 and Level 2 by means of the 
intraclass correlation (or ICC) which describes the proportion of variance that is common to 
each participant, as opposed to variation that is associated with each of the measures within 
the questionnaire associated with each participant. It can be thought of as the population 
estimate of the amount of variance in the outcome explained by the nested structure of Level 
1 and Level 2 variables (Hox et al., 2010). The ICC can be represented by: 
 
ρ = σ2B / (σ2B + σ2W),   
 
where σ2 represents the variance and B and W stand for between person and within person, 
respectively (Heck et al., 2014). The null model for this analysis uses all participant data 
reported for all events rather than only bonus pay as an event. This enables the testing of 
both Level 1 and Level 2 effects across all of the data. It also allows for the comparing of like 
for like model fit criteria (namely -2 log likelihood) across models while testing for variance in 
turnover intention due to event groups in later analyses. As some event groups have 
relatively small sample sizes decisions related to the analysis must take this into account. In 
smaller group samples the difference in estimation between ML (maximum likelihood) and 
REML (restricted maximum likelihood) results in a downward bias in variance components 
estimated with ML compared to REML. With small group samples, therefore, we generally 
prefer REML estimation (Heck et al., 2014). As the results consider predictor variables for 
turnover intention for each of the events researched (as the thesis seeks to understand 
predictor variables for turnover intention for bonus pay specifically, and other events in order 
to develop comparison points) the group sizes and number of cases are small for some 
events. We therefore use REML estimation in the analysis. 
 
The intercept or grand mean for turnover intention reported by participants is estimated as 
2.998. This represents the average level of turnover intention across the 31 participants (and 
is identical to the unadjusted mean). The -2* log likelihood for this 2-Level model is 4689.478 
(this indicates an improvement in model fit over a model with a single level predicting 
turnover intention which returns a -2 log likelihood of 6474.799, a highly significant difference 
comparing the chi2 difference with two degrees of freedom). The variance component output 
indicates that the proportion of variance in turnover intention that lies between participants 
(i.e. the ICC) is 0.548 or 54.8%. This is shown in Table 51. The results of the null or no-
predictors model therefore suggest that the development of a multilevel model is warranted. 
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The residual parameter indicates that there is significant variance to be explained within 
participants (residual estimate = .366, p<.001). Similarly, the intercept parameter indicates 
that the intercepts vary significantly across the sample of participants (intercept estimate = 
.443, p<.001). Because intercepts vary significantly across participants and the ICC 
suggests that about 54.8% of the total variability in turnover intention lies between 
participants there is reason to develop a multilevel model to explain this variability in 
intercepts within and between participants. The reliability of the sample mean as an estimate 
for its population mean can also be assessed with information drawn from the variance 
components and proves to be high, perhaps expectedly given that the grand mean and 
unadjusted mean are identical (λ = 0.974).  
 
7.9.3. The Level 1 Random Intercept Model 
 
The multilevel model used in the null model includes variables at both levels (participant for 
Level 2 and the dependent variable of turnover intention for the Level 1 variable). Adding the 
additional Level 2 variables and Level 1 predictor variables as fixed effects in turn and 
assessing model fit provides a further iterated model. Model fit in this case is optimal without 
the inclusion of Level 2 variables (which are controlled for), and with the Level 1 predictor 
variables of centred emotion score, centred social exchange relationship and centred 
organisational justice included, here named the Level 1 random intercept model and 
included as Model 1 in Table 51. This model will provide an understanding of the significant 
effects of these predictor variables in turn on turnover intention. The inclusion of these 
predictor variables as fixed effects improves model fit considering the -2 log likelihood 
change between this model (-2LL = 3067.661) and the previous null model (-2LL = 
4689.478). The change in degrees of freedom between the two models is 4 (provided by 
subtracting the total number of parameters for each model, so 7 - 3), and therefore the 
difference in -2LL (1621.817) is highly significant as it is greater than the critical values for 
the chi-square statistic with 4 degrees of freedom (between 9.488 for p < .05 and 13.277 for 
p < .01). This provides evidence of improved fit for this model against the null model. The 
residual parameter indicated that there is significant variance to be explained within groups 
(residual estimate = .188, p<.001) and the intercept parameter indicates that the intercepts 
vary significantly across the sample of participants (intercept estimate = .340, p<.001). The 
ICC = .644 (also reported in Table 51). 
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Table 51.  
Estimates and other variables returned by the multilevel model predicting turnover intention 
 
 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .001.
Model Null 1 2 3 
Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept -0.002 0.120 -0.017 0.419 0.115 3.628* 0.490 0.010 4.935** 0.457 0.105 4.349** 
SERS    -0.413 0.026 -15.738** -0.431 0.074 -5.858** -0.444 0.070 -6.332** 
OJS    -0.162 0.017 -9.762** -0.133 0.037 -3.575* -0.136 0.038 -3.566* 
Emotion Score    -0.073 0.010 -8.859** -0.087 0.016 -5.487** -0.085 0.016 -5.435** 
Event Type          0.004 0.004 1.167 
Model Fit Characteristics     
-2LL 4689.478 3067.661 2000.683 1961.655 
Δ-2LL  1621.817 1066.978 39.028 
df 3 7 9 11 
Residual estimate 0.366** 0.188** 0.112** 0.108** 
Intercept estimate 0.443** 0.340** 0.243* 0.279* 
ICC 0.548 0.644 0.685 0.721 
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7.9.4. The Random Slope and Intercept Model 
 
In the case of the random slope and intercept model (described as Model 2 in Table 51) the 
fixed parameters are identical to the previous model (the Level 1 random intercept model). In 
the real application of this data, it does not make sense that predictor variables should have 
a fixed effect but no random effect, since levels of justice, social exchange and emotion also 
have the potential to vary by person. In the random slope and intercept model the analysis 
therefore includes these predictor variables as random effects and continues to control for 
Level 2 variables. Since scores on individual measures are significantly related to turnover 
intention (as can be seen in the results in Table 50), the analysis can indicate if the slope for 
these measures varies across participants. Model 2 shows improved model fit compared to 
Model 1 when considering the -2-log likelihood difference (Δ-2LL = 1066.978). The residual 
parameter indicates that there is significant variance to be explained within groups (residual 
estimate = .112, p<.001) and the intercept parameter indicates that the intercepts vary 
significantly across the sample of participants (intercept estimate = .243, p<.001). The ICC is 
0.685 and is again reported in Table 51. 
 
Adding all predictor variables in to the model one at a time as random parameters and noting 
the -2 log likelihood statistic for model fit allows for the development of an appropriate model 
for conducting further analysis. The most effective model fit comes with the addition as 
random parameters of all predictor variables, including event type as a categorical variable 
(though little can be summarised from the inclusion of this variable other than whether event 
type has a significant effect on either predictor or dependent variables). The variables of 
gender, position and company are controlled for along with negative and positive trait affect 
but are not included as predictors as this reduces overall model fit (as was the case for 
models 1 and 2). This model is shown as Model 3 in Table 51. The -2 log likelihood statistic 
for this model (-2LL = 1961.655) shows a significant decrease from the previous model when 
considering the chi2 difference. The residual parameter indicates that there is significant 
variance to be explained within participants (residual estimate = .108, p<.001) and similarly 
the intercept parameter indicates that the intercepts vary significantly across the sample of 
participants (intercept estimate = .279, p<.05). As Model 3 has the best model fit, this model 
is used to understand the strength of the relationships in the analysis. Table 51 also shows 
the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) which describes the proportion of variance that is 
common to each participant, as opposed to common across measures. This therefore gives 
an indication of the proportion of variance in turnover intention that lies between participants. 
As the model increases in model fit more variance in achievement lies between participants, 
with the null model indicating that 54.8% of variance lies between participants and Model 3 
- 239 - 
 
indicating 72.1%. This demonstrates that as the model improves in accuracy with more 
predictor variables added then less variance is accounted for within participants rather than 
between participants. 
 
7.9.5. Strengths of Relationships 
 
In terms of the estimates returned by Model 3 in Table 51, there are observations which can 
be drawn directly from the data. Social exchange relationship, organisational justice and 
emotion score all have significant relationships with turnover intention considering all events 
in aggregate. The estimate for SERS as a predictor of turnover intention is the strongest 
significant relationship and is negative (B = -.444, p<0.001). The strength of this relationship 
is more than double that of the next strongest relationship between organisational justice 
and turnover intention, which is also negative (B = -.136, p<0.05) indicating that as 
perceptions of justice increase turnover intention decreases. Considering the strength of 
relationships using all data (i.e. for all aggregated events) proves useful not only in 
determining whether a multilevel model should be employed instead of considering the 
analysis at a single level, it also provides a useful baseline for the comparison of reactions to 
specific events (such as bonus pay) which are considered later in this chapter. While the 
results for the model involving turnover intention as a dependent variable are detailed in 
Table 51, the remaining relationships (i.e. when social exchange, emotion score and 
organisational justice are considered dependent variables) are shown in Table 52, with 
estimates summarised in Figure 27. This provides an overview of the paths, estimates and 
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Table 52.  
Estimates and other variables returned by the multilevel model predicting Emotion Score, Justice, Social Exchange Relationship and Turnover Intention for all 
workplace events reported. 
 
 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .001. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Emotion Score Organisational Justice Social Exchange Relationship Turnover Intention 
Predictor Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept 5.691 0.207 27.532** -1.667 0.085 -19.511** -0.416 0.087 -4.780** 0.457 0.105 4.349** 
SERS 1.24 0.159 7.806** 0.211 0.063 3.344* - - - -0.444 0.070 -6.332** 
OJS 1.100 0.094 11.757** - - - 0.066 0.019 3.412* -0.136 0.038 -3.566* 
TIS-6 -0.664 0.133 -4.996** -0.239 0.055 -4.314** -0.370 0.057 -6.453** - - - 
Emotion Score - - - 0.279 0.015 18.155** 0.085 0.011 7.881** -0.085 0.016 -5.435** 
Event Type -0.003 0.006 -0.536 0.009 0.004 2.400* 0.005 0.003 1.732 0.004 0.004 1.167 
Residual estimate 0.837**   0.229**   0.071**   0.111**   
Intercept estimate 1.232*   0.131*   0.195*    0.371*   
ICC 0.595   0.636   0.733   0.770   
- 241 - 
 
7.9.6. Level 2 Predictors 
 
Considering Level 2 predictors in the multilevel analysis demonstrates the relationships 
between gender, position, age, company, trait positive affect and trait negative affect and 
turnover intention (as well as their respective relationships with event, emotion score, 
organisational justice and social exchange relationship). Firstly, the effects of these Level 2 
variables in the model for all events can be considered. It is noteworthy then when these 
variables are added to the random slope and intercept model described in section 7.9.4 that 
the model fit decreases when compared to the model without these Level 2 predictors (as 
measured by considering the chi-squared difference in the -2 log likelihood of models 
including and excluding the Level 2 variables). The values of estimates for Level 2 predictor 
variables show that positive trait affect has the strongest relationship with turnover intention, 
though this relationship does not meet traditional levels of significance (B = -.283, p > 0.05). 
The direction of the relationship indicates that as participants report higher levels of positive 
trait affect their turnover intention decreases. It is interesting to note that no Level 2 predictor 
variable demonstrates a significant relationship with turnover intention, social exchange 
relationship quality or organisational justice. Considering the effects of Level 2 variables on 
the remaining Level 1 variables in the research presents some interesting results. Neither 
Age, Gender nor Position form significant predictors of Level 1 variables. Summarising the 
significant estimates, the analysis shows that company (whether INSCO or MEDCO) 
significantly predicts emotion score, but no other Level 1 variable. This relationship is 
moderate in strength (B = .237, p < 0.05). Positive trait affect significantly predicts emotion 
score (a relationship which is also moderate in strength with B = .323, p < 0.05). Negative 
trait affect significantly predicts event type (B = .527, p < 0.05). These relationships are 
reported in Table 53 and demonstrate that few of the relationships between Level 2 and 
Level 1 variables reach traditional levels of significance. 
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Table 53.  
Level 2 estimates predicting Level 1 dependent and predictor variables for all events. 
 
 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .001.
Dependent Variable Event Type Emotion Score Organisational Justice Social Exchange Relationship Turnover Intention 
Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept 2.359 1.235 1.910 3.934 0.720 5.463** -0.237 0.762 -0.311 -0.214 1.460 -0.147 0.912 1.893 0.482 
Age -0.009 0.010 -0.940 -0.003 0.006 -0.431 -0.001 0.006 -0.177 0.001 0.012 0.085 -0.006 0.015 -0.411 
Gender 0.069 0.172 0.401 -0.011 0.104 -0.106 0.034 0.103 0.328 -0.098 0.205 -0.478 -0.058 0.270 -0.216 
Position  0.193 0.265 0.728 0.092 0.156 0.589 0.254 0.154 1.648 -0.297 0.292 -1.015 -0.189 0.504 -0.374 
Company  0.021 0.179 0.115 0.237 0.110 2.158* 0.098 0.108 0.910 -0.054 0.233 -0.231 0.115 0.298 0.385 
Positive Trait Affect 0.280 0.177 1.584 0.323 0.106 3.051* 0.043 0.105 0.413 0.228 0.205 1.113 -0.283 0.260 -1.091 
Negative Trait Affect 0.527 0.239 2.206* 0.198 0.140 1.411 -0.120 0.146 -0.824 0.011 0.279 0.038 0.117 0.385 0.303 
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7.9.7. Relative Relationships for All Events 
 
Considering the events reported in the research separately and their relative estimates when 
predicting turnover intention, some interesting observations can be drawn (these 
relationships are shown in Table 54). Due to the small sample size for violation of trust as an 
event the estimates cannot be calculated. For all remaining events the results show that 
emotion score does not form a significant relationship with turnover intention for any events. 
Adhering to the definition of an affective event in which emotion directly predicts turnover 
intention above and beyond social exchange relationship quality the results therefore 
suggest that none of the events included in the research can be considered an affective 
event as the relationships do not reach traditional levels of significance. This is perhaps 
surprising, as when considering the effect of emotion score on turnover intention for all 
events in aggregate emotion score does form a significant predictor of turnover intention, 
though this relationship is very weak (as can be seen in Table 54, where B = -.085, p < 
0.001). 
 
Considering the predictive effects of social exchange relationship and organisational justice 
on turnover intention, the strength of the relationships vary for each event though the 
relationships between both social exchange relationship and organisational justice and 
turnover intention are generally negative. This indicates that as perceptions of both social 
exchange relationship quality and organisational justice increase turnover intention 
decreases. The only positive relationship between these variables is that involving justice 
and turnover intention for the event of fairness or discrimination, though this does not reach 
traditional levels of significance. The relationships between social exchange relationship and 
turnover intention are stronger than between organisational justice and turnover intention, 
with the strongest significant relationship between social exchange relationship and turnover 
intention being for ‘fairness or discrimination’ as an event (B = -.620, p < 0.05), and between 
organisational justice and turnover intention being for ‘financial recognition’ as an event (B = 
-.401, p < 0.001). The relationships between variables for financial recognition as an event 
will be considered in more detail in the next section as distinct relationships for bonus pay 
(coded as financial recognition in the research) are considered in more detail. It is interesting 
to note that the between-person variance for financial recognition returns a value lower than 
for other events (with Level 2 variance 63.1% for this event as measured by the ICC as 
shown in Table 54), meaning that while the majority of the variance exists at Level 2 for each 
event, for financial recognition there is more variance explained at Level 1 (within person) 
than for other events included in the research. 
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Table 54.  
Estimates and variables returned by the multilevel model for individual events predicting turnover intention 
 
 
Note: N = 2480, *p < .05., **p < .001. 
 
  




Acts of Colleagues 687 -0.060 -0.038 -0.174* -0.452* 0.832 0.085** 0.420* 
Acts of Managers 487 -0.022 -0.037 -0.280* -0.323* 0.844 0.079** 0.428* 
Acts of Customers 311 -0.007 -0.014 -0.391* -0.594* 0.975 0.016** 0.633* 
Non-financial Recognition 69 0.310 -0.095 -0.264 -0.508* 0.795 0.063* 0.245 
Financial Recognition 127 0.211 -0.042 -0.401** -0.600** 0.631 0.076** 0.130* 
Fairness or Discrimination 71 0.383* -0.008 0.036 -0.620* 0.998 0.001** 0.448* 
Violation of trust 39 Insufficient sample size 
Conflict 96 0.345* -0.037 -0.035 -0.218 0.970 0.014** 0.446* 
Ability to influence 101 -0.150 -0.016 -0.078 -0.144* 0.997 0.003* 0.857* 
Process Involvement  224 -0.013 0.004 -0.241 -0.318* 0.986 0.006** 0.424* 
Technical involvement  62 0.215 -0.022 -0.288 -0.560* 0.997 0.001* 0.395 
Development 142 -0.016 0.002 -0.201* -0.314* 0.923 0.037** 0.440* 
Goal Achievement 64 -0.209 -0.041 -0.050 -0.322** 0.940 0.034** 0.537* 
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Table 55.  
Estimates showing relationships between variables including emotion score for bonus pay as an event 
 
Note: N = 127, *p < .05., **p < .001.  
  
Dependent Variable Emotion Score Organisational Justice Social Exchange Relationship Turnover Intention 
Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept 4.477 0.296 15.104** -0.565 0.168 -3.368* -0.254 0.106 -2.383* 0.211 0.184 1.837* 
SERS 0.659 0.172 3.829** 0.003 0.070 0.049 - - - -0.600 0.078 -7.720** 
OJS 0.486 0.231 2.105* - - - 0.302 0.108 2.798* -0.401 0.096 -4.176** 
TIS-6 -0.547 0.211 -2.594* -0.402 0.094 -4.295** -0.566 0.069 -8.229** - - - 
Emotion Score - - - 0.077 0.032 2.446* 0.266 0.037 7.268** -0.042 0.038 -1.103 
Residual estimate 0.203**   0.026**   0.102**   0.076**   
Intercept estimate 0.236*   0.188*   0.185*   0.130*   
ICC 0.917   0.879   0.645   0.631   
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7.10. Strength of Relationships for Bonus Pay as an Event 
 
In order to consider the specific path relationships for bonus pay as an event to allow the 
testing of the remaining hypotheses in this thesis, the process described earlier to develop 
the most effective model considering the predictor variables and turnover intention, social 
exchange relationship, emotion and justice in turn was repeated. Rather than detail the 
model development process (as the process follows that described in detail for all events in 
Section 7.9.) the analysis for the event of financial recognition (or bonus pay) will summarise 
the final model with the most effective model fit for each dependent variable in turn in Table 













Figure 28. Estimates for relationships for bonus pay as an event (*p<0.05, **p<0.01). 
 
 
Considering bonus pay as an event in isolation (or financial recognition as it is coded in this 
research) allows this thesis to focus on the relationships between predictor and dependent 
variables. This is the event at the centre of this research, and while comparison with other 
events offers an understanding of the relative strengths of relationships (with results shown 
in Table 54), focussing on financial recognition allows for the testing of further hypotheses 
(for example hypothesis 8, that Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be 
considered an affective event as per the tenets of AET). An interrogation of Figure 28 allows 
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score (B = .49, p < 0.001) is significant and stronger than for organisational justice and social 
exchange relationship quality (B = .30, p < 0.05). Emotion score is a moderate significant 
predictor of social exchange relationship quality (B = .27, p < 0.01), however the relationship 
between emotion score and turnover intention is weak and does not reach traditional levels 
of significance (B = -.04, p > 0.05). The relationships between organisational justice and 
emotion score and emotion score and social exchange relationship quality are both positive 
as perhaps would be expected. The strongest significant predictor of turnover intention for 
bonus pay as an event is social exchange relationship quality (B = -.60, p < 0.01) followed by 
organisational justice (B = -.40, p < 0.01). Both of these relationships are negative, indicating 
that as justice and social exchange increase then turnover intention decreases consistent 
with hypothesis 9. 
 
7.10.1. Bonus Pay, State Affect and Turnover Intention 
 
Emotion score as a scale can be seen as a crude attempt to create a single emotion scale 
with positive and negative emotions as polar states. While some scholars (e.g. Russell & 
Carroll, 1999) maintain a single bipolar continuum for positive and negative feelings, there 
are many emotion scholars who suggest that positive and negative emotions do not sit at 
each end of a continuum, but rather are two independent dimensions (e.g. Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985). More consistent therefore with previous research (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001) 
is to provide an analysis of the relative relationships between predictor and dependent 
variables for cases involving strength of positive affect and negative affect separately. This 
analysis can therefore substitute emotion score for positive affect in the first instance, and 
negative affect in the second, and test the relationship between the strength of these 
variables and justice, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention variables. 
These relationships are shown in Tables 56 and 57, and in Figures 29 and 30 for positive 
affect and negative affect relationships respectively. 
 
By inspecting Figures 29 and 30 some differences can be seen between affective 
relationships across variables in the research. Focussing on the relationships between affect 
and both turnover intention and social exchange relationship quality can exemplify this. The 
relationship between positive affect and turnover intention and negative affect and turnover 
intention are both significant, are directionally consistent with expectations (with an increase 
in positive affect negatively related to turnover intention, and an increase in negative affect 
positively related), but show dramatically different effect sizes when predicting turnover 
intention (B = -0.37, p < 0.05 for positive affect and B = 0.02, p < 0.05 for negative affect). 
This indicates that an increase in positive affect is associated with a greater decrease in 
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turnover intention than is associated with a similar decrease in negative affect. While the 
relationship between strength of affect and social exchange is of the same order of 
magnitude for both positive and negative affect (B = -0.62, p < 0.001 for positive affect and B 
= -0.52, p < 0.001 for negative affect) there are some further differences in relationship 
strengths (if not directions) between other variables. The relationship between positive affect 
and social exchange relationship quality is approximately one third of the strength of the 
relationship between negative affect and social exchange relationship quality and different 
directionally (B = 0.11, p < 0.001 for positive affect and B = -0.35, p < 0.001 for negative 
affect). This indicates that stronger negative emotions are associated with a decrease in 
social exchange relationship quality, and as positive emotions strengthen social exchange 
relationship quality also increases. The direction is perhaps as to be expected, though the 
asymmetric strength of relationship indicating that negative relationships have three times 
the strength of effect on the relationship with social exchange relationship quality is 
interesting, especially as positive affect has a stronger relationship with turnover intention 
than negative affect.  
 
Inspecting the remaining paths in Figures 29 and 30 show that the strengths of relationships 
between organisational justice and both positive affect and negative affect are again 
directionally consistent with expectations, but exhibit different effect sizes (B = 0.19, p < 0.05 
for positive affect and B = -0.52, p < 0.05 for negative affect). Similarly, the relationships 
between justice and both turnover intention and social exchange relationship quality for the 
two models in Figures 29 and 30 are directionally consistent with expectations but exhibit 
varying effect sizes (the relationship with turnover intention returning B = -0.24, p < 0.001 for 
positive affect and B = -0.40, p < 0.05 for negative affect; the relationship with social 
exchange relationship quality returning B = 0.18, p < 0.05 for positive affect and B = 0.39, p 
< 0.05 for negative affect). This would indicate contrasting changes in emotion and 
appraisals with appraisals of organisational justice, dependent on whether positive or 
negative affect is experienced by the participant. In the case of negative affect an increase in 
perceptions of justice is associated with a stronger increase in social exchange relationship 
quality, and stronger decrease in turnover intention than a similar increase in perceptions of 
justice in the case of positive affect. These findings are consistent with previous research 
(e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001; Judge & Ilies, 2004; Eagley & Chaiken, 1993) which suggests that 
emotional states can alter cognitive processes differentially, and that positive and negative 
affective states can bias the processing of information to influence decision making to 
different degrees (Shaller & Cialdini, 1990; Worth & Mackie, 1987).     
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Table 56.  
Estimates showing relationships between variables including positive affect for bonus pay as an event 
 
Note: N = 27, *p < .05., **p < .001.  
  
Dependent Variable Positive Affect Organisational Justice Social Exchange Relationship Turnover Intention 
Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept 0.905 0.326 2.775* 0.267 0.079 3.400* 0.702 0.175 4.009* 1.024 0.196 5.226** 
SERS 0.443 0.329 1.346 0.067 0.087 0.769 - - - -0.624 0.163 -6.731** 
OJS 0.186 0.131 0.805* - - - 0.177 0.108 2.170* -0.238 0.449 -0.531* 
TIS-6 -0.605 0.227 -2.667* 0.016 0.065 0.246 -0.624 0.113 -5.536** - - - 
Positive Affect - - - 0.110 0.047 2.367* 0.105 0.087 1.005** -0.368 0.117 -3.140* 
Residual estimate 0.178**   0.017**   0.049*   0.075**   
Intercept estimate 0.236*   0.188*   0.160*   0.132*   
ICC 0.917   0.829   0.694   0.568   
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Table 57.  
Estimates showing relationships between variables including negative affect for bonus pay as an event 
 
Note: N = 100, *p < .05., **p < .001.  
  
Dependent Variable Negative Affect Organisational Justice Social Exchange Relationship Turnover Intention 
Variables Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE t 
Intercept 0.391 0.129 3.030* -0.282 0.077 -3.673** 0.087 0.085 1.014 0.289 0.089 3.261* 
SERS -0.903 0.131 -6.868** 0.148 0.094 1.585 - - - -0.518 0.094 -5.495** 
OJS -0.517 0.160 -3.235* - - - 0.386 0.101 2.334** -0.396 0.102 -3.880** 
TIS-6 0.074 0.135 0.548 -0.379 0.094 -4.023** -0.404 0.077 -5.235** - - - 
Negative Affect - - - -0.211 0.060 -3.504* -0.350 0.052 -6.794** 0.121 0.075 1.255* 
Residual estimate 0.063**   0.059**   0.086**   0.103**   
Intercept estimate 0.236*   0.188*   0.185*   0.212*   
ICC 0.857   0.829   0.645   0.514   
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7.11. Testing Hypotheses 6a and 6b: organisational justice is positively related to positive 
emotions, and negatively related to negative emotions. 
 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b, that organisational justice is positively related to positive emotions 
and negatively related to negative emotions can be tested by referring to the multilevel 
analysis in Tables 56 and 57. In these tables discreet positive emotions captured by 
completion of the Geneva Emotion Wheel (Scherer, 2009) are grouped as positive state 
affect, and discreet negative emotions grouped as state negative effect. Table 56 shows that 
positive affect is significantly and positively related to organisational justice (B = 0.19, p < 
0.05), indicating that organisational justice is positively related to positive emotions. 
Similarly, Table 57 shows that negative affect is significantly negatively related to 
organisational justice (B = -0.52, p < 0.05), indicating that organisational justice is negatively 
related to negative emotions. This analysis therefore provides support for hypotheses 6a and 
6b. 
 
7.12. Testing Hypothesis 2b: organisational justice is negatively related to turnover intention. 
 
Hypothesis 2b suggests that organisational justice is negatively related to turnover intention. 
This suggests that as positive perceptions of fairness increase, employees are less likely to 
want to leave the organisation. Though this hypothesis was tested in the first investigation, 
we can also consider this relationship in the experience sampling investigation as both of 
these constructs are included in this research. The hypothesis can be investigated by 
interrogating the multilevel model in Table 55 (also detailed in Figure 28) where justice is 
indeed a negative predictor of turnover intention (B = -.401, p<0.05). As perceptions of 
justice improve therefore, turnover intention decreases, and similarly as perceptions of 
justice deteriorate then turnover intention increases. The relationship between organisational 
justice and turnover intention is not only negative for financial recognition as an event, but 
also for all other events included in the research (other than fairness and discrimination as 
an event) though not all of these relationships reach traditional levels of significance. The 
estimates for the predictor variable of justice and dependent variable of turnover intention for 
all events are shown in Table 54.  
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7.13. Testing Hypothesis 8a and 8b: Bonus Payment will be a work event which can a) be 
considered an affective event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore b) have a direct 
affective relationship and a unique effect above and beyond those of social exchange 
relationship quality effects on turnover intention. 
 
These hypotheses can be tested by considering the path diagrams in Figures 28, 29 and 30 
and the results returned in Tables 55, 56 and 57. There is no significant direct predictive 
relationship between emotion score and turnover intention and therefore no unique effect 
above and beyond that of social exchange relationship quality (B = -.04, p >.05). When the 
more theoretically consistent variables of positive and negative state affect are considered 
however, each has a significant relationship with turnover intention (B = -0.37, p < 0.05 for 
positive affect and B = 0.02, p < 0.05 for negative affect). This thesis can therefore conclude 
that bonus pay is an affective event, though this categorisation does not hold if the analysis 
considers emotion score rather than positive affect and negative affect to represent emotion 
variables in the analysis. This finding perhaps also extends to the other events considered in 
the research, which demonstrate that emotion score does not significantly predict turnover 
intention for any of the events (as shown in Table 54). There may be potential in future 
research to include positive and negative affect as variables for these events to investigate 
whether there are also significant relationships once these are substituted for emotion score. 
 
7.14. Testing Hypothesis 9: Organisational justice is positively related to social exchange 
quality, which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention. 
 
By interrogating the direction of the relationships in the paths shown in Figure 27 (and Table 
52) for all events, and Figure 28 (and Table 55) for financial recognition as an event this 
thesis can test hypotheses 9. The analysis demonstrates that justice is significantly positively 
related to social exchange relationship quality (B = 0.07, p < 0.05), which in turn is 
significantly negatively related to turnover intention (B = -0.44, p < 0.01) for all events, and 
that justice is significantly positively related to social exchange relationship quality (B = 0.30, 
p < 0.05) which in turn is significantly negatively related to turnover intention (B = -.60, p < 
0.01) for financial recognition as an event. This hypothesis can be further tested by 
considering the estimates in Figures 29 and 30 (and Tables 56 and 57) to ensure that this 
hypothesis holds for the inclusion of both positive and negative affect variables in place of 
emotion score. In the case of positive affect the relationship between justice and social 
exchange relationship quality is significant and positive (B = 0.18, p < 0.05), and the 
relationship between social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention is significant 
and negative (B = -0.62, p < 0.01). Similarly, in the case of negative affect the relationship 
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between justice and social exchange relationship quality is significant and positive (B = 0.39, 
p < 0.01), and the relationship between social exchange relationship quality and turnover 
intention is significant and negative (B = -0.52, p < 0.01). This provides support for 
hypothesis 9 for all events, and for financial recognition as a specific event. 
 
7.15. Testing Hypothesis 10: The relationship between justice and both social exchange 
relationship quality and turnover intention is mediated by positive or negative state affect. 
 
In order to test the potential mediating relationships of positive and negative state affect on 
organisational justice and both social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention 
bootstrapping was employed using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (version 3.4, Hayes, 
2017). Bootstrapping was used (instead of, for example the Sobel test) as the assumption 
that the indirect effect is normally distributed within the sample cannot be verified. 
Considering state positive affect and state negative affect as potential mediators allows for 
the testing of hypothesis 10 and facilitates the calculation of both direct effects of justice on 
social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention, and also indirect effects via 
positive and negative state affect. For the relationships predicting social exchange 
relationship quality shown in Figure 31 application of the PROCESS method (CI = 95%, 
number of bootstrap samples = 5000) provides the regression coefficients detailed in Table 
58. The regression coefficient between organisational justice and both positive and negative 
state affect (path a in Figure 31) is significant, as are the regression coefficients between 
both positive and negative state affect and social exchange relationship quality (path b in 
Figure 31). The regression coefficient between organisational justice and social exchange 
for both positive and negative affect (the direct effect identified by path c in Figure 31) does 
not reach traditional levels of significance. The results in Table 58 demonstrate that while 
negative affect mediates the relationship between organisational justice and social exchange 
relationship quality, positive affect does not. The standardised indirect effect when 
considering negative affect (through paths a and b) is greater in magnitude that the direct 
effect (β = .323 for the indirect effect compared with β = -.231 for the direct effect) indicating 
that most of the effect of justice on social exchange comes through the indirect path. 
 
Similarly, the effect of positive and negative state affect as potential mediators of the 
relationship between organisational justice and turnover intention can be considered (as 
outlined in Figure 32). The regression coefficients returned during the PROCESS method 
(again with CI = 95%, number of bootstrap samples = 5000) indicate that while negative 
affect mediates the relationship between organisational justice and turnover intention, 
positive affect does not, therefore providing additional partial support for hypotheses 10 (with 
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results shown in Table 58). Unlike with the relationships between organisational justice and 
social exchange relationship quality, when turnover intention is considered as the dependent 
variable the standardised indirect effect (through paths a and b) is smaller in magnitude that 
the direct effect (β = -.174 for the indirect effect compared with β = -.372 for the direct effect) 
indicating that the majority of the effect of organisational justice on turnover intention does 
not come through the indirect path, but rather the direct path. Together these two tests 
provide partial support for hypothesis 10 and suggest that the relationship between justice 
and both social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention is mediated by negative 



















Figure 32. Paths considering justice-state affect-turnover intention relationships 
 
 
While the analysis in this section uses the aggregated variable of state affect (where all 
discreet positive emotions are considered representative of positive state affect, and all 
discreet negative emotions representative of native state affect), the potential mediating 
relationships of distinct emotions on justice and social exchange relationships, and justice 
and turnover intention relationships are included in Appendix 2, Section 11.2.3. This 
appendix provides some additional granularity to the understanding of which specific 
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Table 58.  
Mediating effects of state positive and negative affect on justice and both social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention for financial recognition 
as an event. 
 
          
Relationship 









          
OJS – Positive Affect – SERS1 .239* 1.959* 0.220* 0.857 0.432 0.470 -0.428 1.402 No Mediation 
OJS – Negative Affect – SERS2 .449** -0.754** -0.475** -0.102 0.358 0.067 0.230 0.491 Mediation 
OJS – Positive Affect – TIS61 .228* 1.959* -0.528* -0.856 -1.035 0.678 -0.905 0.066 No Mediation 
OJS – Negative Affect – TIS62 .254** -0.754** 0.261** -0.225* -0.197 0.042 -0.284 -0.116 Mediation 
 
Note: N1 = 27, N2 = 100; *p < .05., **p < .001.
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7.16. Summary of Findings 
 
The findings related to the experience sampling investigation in this research are 
summarised in this section. This summary begins by considering bonus pay as an event in 
comparison with other events included in the investigation, then considers the relationships 
between the predictor and dependent variables in the research. The results are summarised 
for all events and for bonus pay as a specific event, considering the effects of event as well 
as the predictor variables of justice, emotion score, positive state affect, negative state affect 
and social exchange relationship quality on turnover intention. 
 
7.16.1. Summary of Hypotheses 
 
A summary of the hypotheses addressed in this investigation is provided in Table 59. There 
is support for hypothesis 6a and 6b as the relationship between organisational justice and 
positive state affect is significant and positive, and the relationship between organisational 
justice and negative state affect is significant and negative, indicating that as perceptions of 
justice increase the strength of positive emotions increases and the strength of negative 
emotions decreases. There is some support for hypothesis 7, but there is also some nuance 
with this hypothesis. While anger is the most frequent primary emotion elicited as a result of 
bonus pay, when all of the emotional responses to bonus pay are considered 
disappointment is the most frequent. This is due to the type of emotion changing over time, 
with the emotion of anger becoming the emotion of disappointment over time for many 
participants. There is support for hypothesis 8a or 8b (though only when positive or negative 
state affect are considered as variables in place of emotion score) as where bonus pay is 
concerned both positive affect and negative affect significantly directly predict turnover 
intention and therefore meet the standards of an affective event. It is perhaps interesting 
however that if the predictor variable of emotion score is included in the place of positive or 
negative affect then bonus pay would not be considered an affective event as emotion score 
does not significantly directly predict turnover intention. This classification of being an 
affective event is therefore dependent on the variables considered in its definition and 
testing. There is support for hypothesis 9 as organisational justice is positively related to 
social exchange quality, which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention. Consistent 
with this relationship justice is also negatively related to turnover intention showing that as 
justice increases social exchange relationship quality increases, and turnover intention 
decreases. The investigation also finds partial support for hypothesis 10. Negative state 
affect mediates the relationships between organisational justice and both social exchange 
relationship quality and turnover intention, however positive state affect does not.  
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Table 59.  
Hypotheses addressed by experience sampling investigation with outcomes  
 
   
Hypothesis Description Comment 
 
H6a,6b Organisational Justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are 
positively related to (a) positive emotions and negatively related to 
(b) negative emotions. 
Support 
H7 Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice 
perceptions triggered as a result of bonus pay. 
Partial 
Support 
H8a,8b Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an 
affective event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a 
direct affective relationship and (b) a unique effect above and beyond 
those of social exchange relationship quality effects on turnover 
intention. 
Support 
H9 Organisational justice is positively related to social exchange quality, 
which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention. 
Support 
H10 The relationship between justice and both social exchange 
relationship quality and turnover intention is mediated by positive or 





7.16.2. Workplace events 
 
Considering all events reported as part of the experience sampling investigation, the majority 
of events constitute acts of colleagues, acts of managers and acts of customers (with a 
cumulative frequency of 59.9% of all events covered by these three categories). The total 
number of events recorded during the analysis is 2480, of which 127 are reported as 
financial recognition (or 5.1% of all events). As there are 31 individuals participating in the 
research, there is therefore an average of 4.1 financial recognition events reported per 
participant (with the maximum number of reports 6 and the minimum 3). This indicates that 
though financial recognition is announced only once per participant, it is reported as an 
event on average for more than 24 hours by participants (as there are 4 salient events 
recorded per 24-hour period). The event which happens least frequently over the research 
period is ‘violation of trust’ with only 39 occurrences of this event across all participants (or 
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1.6% of the total events) followed by ‘Technical involvement’ (with 2.5% of the total events) 
and ‘Goal achievement’ (with 2.6%).  
 
Considering the relative differences between events when predicting turnover intention 
several interesting comparisons can be made. In terms of the variance explained at different 
levels of analysis, there is a lower level of between person (Level 2) and higher level of 
within person (Level 1) variance identified for financial recognition as an event than for other 
events, with 63.1% attributed to Level 2 variance for financial recognition compared to above 
78% for all other events (or at least those with a sufficient sample size to be included in the 
analysis). There are also differences in values of predictor variables for specific events, with 
social exchange relationship quality a stronger predictor of turnover intention for fairness or 
discrimination (β = -.62, p < 0.05) than for all other events, with the next strongest 
relationship between social exchange relationship and turnover intention for financial 
recognition as an event (β = -.60, p < 0.001). The event with the weakest significant social 
exchange relationship quality – turnover intention predictive relationship is ‘ability to 
influence’ (β = -.144, p < 0.05). Organisational justice is a stronger predictor of turnover 
intention for financial recognition than for all other events (β = -.401, p < 0.001) followed by 
acts of customers (β = -.391, p < 0.05). The event with the weakest significant justice – 
turnover intention predictive relationship is ‘acts of colleagues’ (β = -.174, p < 0.05). Emotion 
score does not form a significant predictor of turnover intention for any of the individual 
events considered but does predict turnover intention for all events in aggregate (though this 
relationship is negative and weak; β = -.085, p < 0.001).  
 
7.16.3. Emotional responses to workplace events 
 
Emotional responses to all aggregated events are positive with 61.7% of reported emotions 
positive and 38.2% negative. This can be compared to financial recognition as an event 
where 21.2% of reported emotions are positive, and 78.8% of responses negative. The most 
frequent emotion as a result of all events is pleasure (with 17.7% of events eliciting pleasure) 
followed by anger (17.3%). For the case of financial recognition, the most frequent emotion 
is disappointment (with 44.9% of emotions being disappointment for financial recognition), 
followed by anger (31.5%). For financial recognition the predominant emotions in terms of 
frequency are therefore negative, compared to predominantly positive emotions for all 
events in aggregate. The most frequent primary emotion for financial recognition (i.e. the 
immediate emotion as a result of the bonus announcement) is anger, however for many 
participants (12 of the 14 participants who report anger as the primary emotion), anger does 
not persist and becomes disappointment over time, showing that as time passes it is not only 
- 260 - 
 
the strength of emotion which changes, but also the type of emotion elicited as a result of 
bonus pay as an event. Considering the frequency of emotion related to each event in 
isolation would miss such dynamics. 
 
7.16.4. Relationships between emotion, justice, social exchange and turnover intention 
 
Using the transformed variable of emotion score as well as the more traditional variables of 
positive and negative state affect allow for the investigation of the relationships between 
emotion, organisational justice, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention. 
Emotion score displays a moderate positive correlation with social exchange relationship 
quality (r = .51, p < 0.01) and a strong positive correlation with organisational justice (r = .77, 
p < 0.01). Emotion score also displays a moderate negative correlation with turnover 
intention (r = -.42, p < 0.01). As organisational justice and social exchange relationship 
quality increase, therefore, emotions become positive and stronger, whereas as emotions 
become negative and stronger turnover intention increases. When considering individual 
emotions separately the strongest correlations exists between anger and organisational 
justice (r = -.51 p < 0.01), anger and social exchange relationship quality (r = -.31, p < 0.01) 
and anger and turnover intention (r = .28, p < 0.01). Though other significant correlations 
exist between distinct emotions and these three variables they are weaker than the 
relationships with anger. 
 
Considering the effect of emotion score and positive affect and negative affect when 
predicting variance in organisational justice, social exchange and turnover intention variables 
also reveals some interesting relationships. Focussing efforts on financial recognition as an 
event, emotion score is a significant predictor of variance in justice (B = 0.077, p<0.05) and 
social exchange relationship quality (B = 0.266, p<0.05) but is not a significant predictor of 
variance in turnover intention (B = -0.042, p>0.05). In fact emotion score does not form a 
significant predictor of variance in turnover intention for any event when events are 
considered separately. Positive affect is a significant predictor of variance in justice (B = 
0.110, p<0.05), social exchange relationship quality (B = 0.105, p<0.01) and turnover 
intention (B = -0.368, p<0.05). Negative affect is a significant predictor of variance in justice 
(B = -0.211, p<0.05), social exchange relationship quality (B = -0.350, p<0.01) and turnover 
intention (B = 0.121, p<0.05). These findings suggest that positive and negative affect have 
differential predictive effects on different variables in the research, with positive affect 
predicting turnover intention to a greater extent than negative affect, but the reverse true 
when predicting social exchange relationship quality. This also suggests that given the 
definition of an affective event as having a direct emotional effect on turnover intention 
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above and beyond the more cognitive effect of social exchange relationship quality, that 
financial recognition should not be considered an affective event if emotion score is used as 
a variable, however when positive and negative state affect are used financial recognition as 
an event does classify as an affective event. This may be due to weaknesses in the 
construct of emotion score as a variable attempting to describe positive and negative 
emotions as polar states, when some researchers have suggested this is theoretically 
unsound (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). 
 
7.16.5. Emotion as a mediator in justice relationships 
 
In terms of the relationships between organisational justice and social exchange relationship 
quality and organisational justice and turnover intention for financial recognition as an event, 
there are differential mediating effects from positive and negative affect. Positive affect does 
not mediate the relationship between organisational justice and either social exchange 
relationship quality or turnover intention, as indicated by tests using bootstrapping with 
results shown in Table 58. Negative affect does however mediate these relationships. In the 
case of negative affect mediating the relationship between justice and social exchange 
relationship quality the indirect effect is stronger than the direct effect, and in the case of the 
relationship between justice and turnover intention the direct effect is stronger. Whilst in the 
existing literature emotion and social exchange are often seen as two separate lenses for 
viewing justice-outcome relationships, these results showing emotion mediating the 
relationship between justice and social exchange (albeit only for negative emotion), suggest 
a more complex relationship. Rather than treating these emotion and social exchange 
relationship lenses as separate, this research suggests that they are inter-related, and with 
techniques such as experience sampling now open to researchers to understand their 
relationships the nature and strength of these relationships is a potential avenue for future 
research. 
 
7.16.6. Differences in groups 
 
There are some differences in the workplace events which are reported by groups under 
investigation, though these differences are limited to company. The frequency of some 
events (such as acts of colleagues, acts of managers, acts of customers and goal 
achievement) vary significantly across INSCO and MEDCO. INSCO reports higher 
incidences of acts of colleagues, acts of managers and goal achievement, and fewer 
incidences of acts of customers, as would perhaps be expected from the summaries 
provided to each company (where INSCO is described as inward facing and having little 
- 262 - 
 
contact with external customers, whereas MEDCO participants are described as spending 
much of their time with customers). There are no significant differences in the frequency of 
events experienced by different genders. This indicates that though working for a different 
company in a different industry can alter the general work experience (at least related to the 
events which participants report), this experience does not vary significantly by gender in 





8.1. Introduction and aims of the research 
 
The aim of this research is to contribute evidence to the current understanding of bonus pay, 
and the impact bonus pay has as an event which provokes a justice appraisal in 
organisational life. The thesis adds to the current knowledge in two ways, the first by 
extending the relationships found in existing literature around pay, justice, satisfaction and 
turnover intention to bonus pay as a specific form of remuneration, and the second by 
considering the relationships between emotion, social exchange relationship quality, justice 
and turnover intention for bonus pay as a workplace event. While previous research has 
suggested that fairness is a primary reason for counterproductive outcomes where pay (and 
bonus pay) is concerned, the relationship between bonus pay, organisational justice and 
organisational outcomes has received little attention in the existing literature, especially in 
research conducted in-situ in the workplace. In considering bonus pay in a cross-sectional 
investigation this thesis seeks to further understand relationships between bonus pay and 
perceptions of justice (and the distinct scales of procedural, distributive, interpersonal and 
informational justice), satisfaction with a bonus and turnover intention. It also seeks to 
investigate the social comparison referents selected in bonus situations, and the relationship 
between this selection and bonus satisfaction. Finally the thesis uses an experience 
sampling investigation to consider the two common lenses for viewing justice appraisals in 
the justice literature, the emotional lens which suggests that people ‘feel’ emotion as a result 
of justice which then leads to downstream attitudes (Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011), 
and the social exchange relationship lens which suggests that justice is a key indicator of 
social exchange relationship quality on a more cognitive level (Colquitt, 2008). This research 
considers the effects of emotion on both justice-social exchange relationship quality and 
justice-turnover intention relationships and analyses the potential mediating relationships 
involved in both of these paths. By considering bonus pay as an event in the context of other 
events which happen in the workplace the research seeks to understand the relative effects 
of bonus pay compared with these other events. It therefore seeks to understand the 
differential effects of justice, emotion and more cognitive appraisal mechanisms such as 
social exchange relationship quality when predicting turnover intention (both for bonus pay 
and for other workplace events). The relationships and hypotheses this research addresses 
are summarised in Figures 31, 32 and 33 along with comments related to levels of support 











Hypothesis Description Comment 
H1 Bonus amount will demonstrate a linear relationship with bonus satisfaction No 
Support 
H2a,b Organisational justice is positively related to (a) bonus satisfaction and 
negatively related to (b) turnover intention 
Support 
H3a,b Organisational justice will mediate the relationship between a) bonus amount 
and bonus satisfaction and b) bonus amount and turnover intention 
Partial 
Support 
H4 Distributive justice will be a better predictor of bonus satisfaction than 
procedural, interpersonal and informational justice components 
Support 
 
Figure 33. Outline of the first figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, organisational 








Hypothesis Description Comment 
H5a,b a) Multiple referents will be very important to the majority of participants when 
engaging in social comparisons on receipt of their bonus. b) The referent 
selected as being most important in determining bonus satisfaction will be 




Figure 34. Outline of the second figure describing the relationships between bonus pay, social 







































Hypothesis Description Comment 
H6a,b Organisational justice appraisals as a result of bonus pay are positively related 
to (a) state positive affect and negatively related to (b) state negative affect 
Support 
H7 Anger will be the most frequent emotional response to justice perceptions 
triggered as a result of bonus pay 
Support 
H8a,b Bonus Payment will be a work event which can be considered an affective 
event as per the tenets of AET and will therefore have (a) a direct affective 
relationship on turnover intention and (b) a unique effect above and beyond 
that of social exchange relationship quality on turnover intention. 
No Support 
H9 Organisational justice as a result of bonus pay is positively related to social 
exchange quality, which in turn is negatively related to turnover intention 
Support 
H10 For bonus pay the relationship between justice and both social exchange 
relationship quality and turnover intention is at least partially mediated by 
positive or negative state affect. 
Support 
 
Figure 35. Outline of the third model showing proposed workplace event, organisational justice, social 
exchange and emotional responses and turnover intention relationships. 
 
8.2. Discussion of the findings 
 
To effectively discuss the extent of the findings this discussion will refer once again to the 
relationships underpinning the research, summarised in Figures 31, 32 and 33. As the 
research is concerned with bonus pay as an organisational event, the main focus will be on 
the findings considering bonus pay both in the context of the relationship between bonus 
amount and the associated justice, satisfaction and turnover intention appraisals made by 
participants, and in the context of bonus pay as an event during which emotional, justice, 
social exchange relationship and turnover intention appraisals are made. In this section the 
thesis will consider each of the relationships and hypotheses in Figures 31, 32 and 33 in 
turn, and describe the findings of this research and how they sit within the current literature. 


















justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention (i.e. the relationships described in Figure 
31). It then considers bonus pay as an organisational event in the context of other workplace 
events, considering the relative relationships between bonus pay and emotion, social 
exchange relationship quality, justice and turnover intention for bonus pay and other 
workplace events (i.e. the relationships described in Figure 33), before finally considering the 
referents selected in bonus pay situations and their relative associations with organisational 
justice and bonus satisfaction (the relationships described in Figure 32). Finally, the section 
will consider the implications of the findings and evaluate the theoretical contribution this 
thesis makes to the current literature, before providing an evaluation of the methodologies 
used and suggesting directions for future research. 
 
8.2.1. Bonus pay, referent selection and justice 
 
The amount of bonus paid, either in terms of absolute amount or as a percentage of salary, 
demonstrates no significant relationship with the choice of referent. Position (whether 
manager or non-manager) is however significantly related to a single referent (those at the 
same level in the same organisation) though this relationship is weak. This is consistent with 
other research which shows that patterns of referents are reasonably stable and more 
dependent on social, educational, situational or positional differences (Goodman, 1974). 
Contrary to previous research considering referents and pay which suggest that multiple 
referents are used when determining whether a pay award is fair (e.g. Hills, 1980; Brown, 
2001; Bygren, 2004; Koop & Johnson, 2012) this thesis shows that in bonus situations the 
majority of participants suggest that one or fewer referents are very important to determining 
fairness. The referents selected by participants are, however, related and the choice of 
referent influences bonus satisfaction and turnover intention differently. Relationships exist 
between most referents to a lesser or greater extent. A discussion of some of the stronger of 
these relationships will highlight this.  
 
If participants choose ‘what this company promised to pay me’ they are also significantly 
more likely to choose ‘what other employers are paying for my kind of work’, but significantly 
less likely to use internal referents (i.e. those in the same company at the same, higher or 
lower levels). This could indicate that promises of a bonus are linked to the external market 
through comparisons with other employers, and that these promises make internal 
comparisons less likely by clearly setting expectations (therefore negating the need for 
participants to seek information within the organisation by investigating comparisons with 
internal referents). This is consistent with findings in the research which suggest that when 
bonus amount is framed as a percentage of salary (a common practice when a bonus is 
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promised) informational justice becomes a mediator of bonus amount - bonus satisfaction 
relationships, whereas when bonus pay is framed as an absolute amount procedural justice 
becomes a mediator. Participants choosing ‘cost of living’ comparisons are more likely to 
compare their bonus with ‘what other employers are paying’ and ‘previous pay’, and less 
likely to use internal referents. These internal referents are also related, with job level 
comparisons (specifically between same job level and higher job level, and higher job level 
and lower job level internal comparisons) forming the strongest relationships.  
 
The relationships between referents selected and justice appraisals where bonus pay is 
concerned adds to the existing literature, as there are few incidences of studies investigating 
these relationships. Internal comparisons at the same level negatively predict perceptions of 
justice related to treatment (interpersonal justice), though this relationship is weak. Justice is 
not directly predicted by internal comparisons with those in higher or lower positions in the 
same organisation, which is perhaps surprising and contrary to general pay research which 
suggests these reference points are important in determining satisfaction (e.g. Law & Wong, 
1998). This finding could potentially be explained by the findings in previous referent 
research which demonstrates that both upwards and downwards comparisons are important 
to fairness perceptions through the process of self-evaluation (Wheeler et al., 1982). 
Considering all referents, those which predict justice are internal company promises, the 
cost of living, previous pay and sense of self-worth. The selection of these referents predicts 
different scales of justice, a finding which in itself provides new insight. Company promises 
of a bonus predicts procedural, distributive and informational justice, though these 
relationships are weak. The cost of living negatively predicts procedural and distributive 
justice, with the relationship between ‘cost of living’ as a referent and distributive justice 
strongest of all referent relationships predicting justice. This may offer insight into the relative 
dissatisfaction with bonus pay across participants. If the strongest predictor of injustice is 
comparisons with the cost of living these negative attitudes may be predicated on the lag in 
earnings growth in comparison with the growth in the economy, and therefore the rising cost 
of living compared to pay. Previous job and self-worth comparisons predict similar justice 
relationships (distributive, interpersonal and informational) and to a similar degree. The only 
difference is that previous job comparisons negatively predict justice (so as this referent is 
selected more, justice decreases) whereas self-worth comparisons positively predict justice. 
This may indicate differences in sources of expectation around bonus pay. Self-worth 
correlates moderately with the referent of bonuses paid in previous jobs as we would 
potentially expect, as evaluations of self-worth must be drawn from somewhere in order to 
anchor expectations. There may be many reasons why comparing the bonus to that 
awarded in previous jobs would decrease fairness perceptions, including positive biases 
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associated with past events, memory distortions as well as attenuation of emotional 
influences on appraisals made at the time. 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this research (which is contrary to much of the social 
comparison research involving pay in general) is the finding that organisational justice is 
more strongly predicted by comparisons with external referents than internal (Wade et al., 
2006; Law & Wong, 1998; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). This is more interesting given that 
internal referents tend to be selected more frequently in comparisons, with ‘those at the 
same level’ and ‘those at a higher level’ the most frequently reported ‘important’ or ‘very 
important’ referents. Why are these internal referents chosen more frequently if they have no 
direct effect on justice appraisals? One possible mechanism suggested by this and other 
research (e.g. Gardner et al., 2004) is that social comparison processes using workplace 
referents exist in two stages. Participants may use internal referents to develop a sense of 
self-worth, which is then used to determine levels of justice when compared to external 
referents. Self-worth is related to other external and internal referents, therefore there is the 
potential that internal referents such as those at a higher job level do influence fairness 
through the process of evaluation of self-worth. When direct effects are considered, 
however, the majority of these significant effects exist between external referents and justice 
scales. Another interesting finding is the surprising lack of predictive effect when internal 
referents are chosen. The combined direct effects of same level, higher level and lower level 
internal comparisons on justice are negligible. When internal referents are used justice does 
not become an issue in general and this referent type does not predict variation in justice. 
When external referents are used, however, justice does become an issue. Rather than a 
bonus being a signal for comparisons with internal referents from which sources of 
unfairness are drawn, a bonus therefore would appear to be more of a signal to evaluate 
external comparisons which lead to perceptions of justice. The pathways related to referent 
selection where bonus pay is concerned is an area of potential future study in order to fully 
test these stages of evaluation. 
 
8.2.2. The relationships between bonus pay, justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover 
intention 
 
The research considering bonus pay (both in terms of absolute amount and as a percentage 
of salary) shows some interesting and perhaps surprising results. The amount of bonus paid 
(both in terms of absolute amount and as a percentage of salary) does not significantly 
predict bonus satisfaction or turnover intention directly. Whilst there are plausible reasons as 
to why bonus amount should not be directly related to outcomes (such as expectancy-based 
269 
 
theories and heuristics such as anchoring biases) this is contrary to much of the research 
suggesting a complex relationship between pay and outcomes, but a relationship 
nonetheless (e.g. Gneezy, 2004; Gneezy & Rusticini, 2000; Pokorny, 2008; Grandey et al., 
2002; Pouliakas, 2010). Due to this lack of a significant predictive relationship between 
bonus amount and both satisfaction and turnover intention directly, the analysis of 
relationships between bonus pay and justice becomes more relevant. Bonus as a 
percentage of salary does predict variance in both procedural justice and informational 
justice, though not distributive or interpersonal justice. Similarly, bonus in terms of absolute 
amount predicts interpersonal justice but no other justice scale. While it may appear 
surprising that there is no direct significant relationship between bonus amount and 
distributive justice (as the definition of distributive justice describes the fairness related to 
how rewards are allocated; Colquitt, 2001), this may be because perceptions of distributive 
justice relate to the difference between expected bonus amount and actual amount and not 
to the actual amount. The significant relationships between bonus amount and the other 
types of justice may suggest that procedural and informational justice are more important in 
an organisation where the proportion of pay based on performance is higher, or where the 
instrumentality of the bonus is greater and so is more likely to draw justice appraisals. 
Similarly, interpersonal justice is also likely to increase with bonus amount as organisations 
may be more likely to be careful about how they treat high value employees. While 
distributive justice predicts variation in bonus satisfaction more than other scales of justice, 
there is some slight overlap in the measures, with an item of the bonus satisfaction survey 
loading equally onto each measure in a factor analysis. 
 
The mediating effects of different justice scales also demonstrate interesting findings. 
Interpersonal justice mediates the relationships between bonus amount (in terms of 
percentage of salary and absolute amount) and both bonus satisfaction and turnover 
intention suggesting that this element of justice mediates all relationships in the analysis and 
is therefore important to all appraisals. Procedural justice mediates relationships only where 
bonus as an absolute amount is considered. This may be a result of organisational 
procedures related to the bonus. If a bonus is promised to an employee and communicated 
as a percentage of their salary (a category in our list of organisational referents), then the 
procedure is made transparent and clear and may be seen as the communication of a 
promise of a bonus. If the bonus is provided as an absolute amount then this may lead 
employees to investigate the procedures by which this amount was arrived at, therefore 
making procedural justice a more relevant scale of justice. Informational justice follows an 
inverse pattern to procedural justice, mediating the relationships between bonus as a 
percentage of salary and both bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, but not mediating 
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the relationships between bonus as an absolute amount and either bonus satisfaction or 
turnover intention. This may indicate that when bonus is calculated as a percentage of salary 
the information provision and communication mechanisms become more important to 
employees in determining bonus satisfaction and turnover intention (perhaps as the process 
for calculating the bonus is already clear). For bonus as an absolute amount (where the 
process is perhaps less clear) informational justice does not mediate relationships with either 
bonus satisfaction or turnover intention whereas procedural justice does, perhaps indicating 
that when the process is unclear then procedural clarity (and therefore procedural justice) 
becomes more of a focus for employees than informational justice. 
 
In terms of the relationships between justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention, there 
are both similarities and differences when compared with previous research. Consistent with 
the research of Folger & Konovsky (1989), Shaw et al. (2002), Tremblay et al. (2000) and 
DeConinck and Stilwell (2004) amongst others, this thesis shows that as perceptions of 
justice increase so does pay satisfaction (though in this case the specific form of bonus 
satisfaction is considered, therefore adding to the existing research). Similarly, this thesis 
shows that as perceptions of justice increase then turnover intention decreases, consistent 
with the research of Grant et al. (2007) and Mason and Watts (2009). In terms of the types of 
justice considered, the work of Colquitt et al. (2013) suggests that distributive justice is a 
stronger direct predictor of task performance than other forms of justice, but that 
informational justice is a stronger direct predictor of organisational citizenship behaviours 
and counterproductive work behaviours than other forms of justice. The results in this thesis 
suggest that while distributive justice is a stronger direct predictor of bonus satisfaction than 
other forms of justice, interpersonal justice is a stronger direct predictor of turnover intention 
than other justice scales. This may, however, be because the effect of distributive justice on 
turnover intention comes as much through bonus satisfaction as it does directly, as 
distributive justice explains the majority of the variance in bonus satisfaction, which in turn 
has the greatest effect on turnover intention of all of the variables under investigation. It may 
also be because of the differences in outcome measures considered, as previous research 
has shown that different scales of justice are related to different outcome measures (e.g. 
Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013). In order to see whether the results of Colquitt et al. 
(2013) are repeatable the research would therefore need to consider the same outcome 
measures. As the work of Colquitt et al. (2013) is a meta-analysis and the author has 
previously called for dynamic research into justice, social exchange relationships and 
emotion this thesis provides an example of how such research can be conducted. While this 
thesis has contributed to the existing research by demonstrating the relative associations 
between different scales of justice and the variables of bonus satisfaction and turnover 
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intention, a potential fruitful area for future research would be to replicate the variables 
considered in the meta-analysis of Colquitt et al. (2013) using an in-situ experience sampling 
investigation. 
 
These results indicate that employers seeking to maximise satisfaction and minimise 
turnover intention as a result of bonus pay should focus on a number of areas. Considering 
all relationships, it would appear that an improvement in perceptions of distributive justice is 
related to an improvement in bonus satisfaction, which is in turn related to a reduction in 
turnover intention. This path has both the strongest and most highly significant relationships 
in the research. As there is no relationship between bonus amount and distributive justice 
the practical implications of this are, however, unclear. Choosing whether to frame a bonus 
as a percentage of salary or as an absolute amount has a significant effect on organisational 
justice appraisals (and which justice scales are used in appraising satisfaction). These 
justice scales in turn have a range of different strengths of relationship with bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention. In all cases a focus on improving interpersonal justice 
and the treatment employees receive when a bonus is announced improves satisfaction and 
decreases turnover intention due to its role as a mediator in all justice-dependent variable 
relationships. Dependent on whether the bonus is framed as a percentage of salary or as an 
absolute amount, the results suggest that employers should focus on information provision 
or clarifying procedures used in allocating the bonus respectively. This provides strong 
guidance in determining remuneration strategies used by organisations when paying a 
bonus. Traditionally there has been a focus on the amount paid and an assumption that 
distributive justice is more important in generating justice appraisals related to the amount 
received in a bonus. This research suggests that distributive justice is not related to the 
amount paid, and that a focus on the treatment, information provision and process elements 
of a bonus announcement can play a significant role in improving satisfaction and 
decreasing turnover intention when the bonus amount is taken into account. The strength of 
relationship between distributive justice and bonus satisfaction, but lack of relationship 
between bonus amount and distributive justice is a potential area for further investigation 
and raises some interesting questions about how distributive justice perceptions are 
developed by participants if not based on the amount of bonus. Including an additional 
question in the research related to how well expectations of a bonus were met may help to 
address differences in expectations versus actual reward in future research and may help to 





8.2.3. Bonus pay as a workplace event 
 
Researching bonus as a specific event within a range of other events occurring in the 
workplace allows for an understanding of the relative relationships between bonus pay and 
other variables included in the research in comparison with other events. Workplace events 
are in general associated with positive emotions, though bonus pay as a specific event is 
generally associated with negative emotions. These emotions are unstable over time. While 
the most frequent primary emotion elicited (i.e. the first emotion recorded by participants) as 
a result of bonus pay is anger, this emotion does not persist over subsequent diary entries 
related to financial recognition. Anger as a resulting primary emotion in justice research has 
been a focus for many authors (e.g. Barclay & Kiefer, 2019; Gibson & Callister, 2010) and 
this thesis supports this focus. The most frequent emotion overall, however, as a result of 
bonus pay is disappointment indicating that for many participants anger turns to 
disappointment over time. This finding is interesting in itself as previous researchers suggest 
that as a result of pay emotion strength attenuates over time becoming less acute (e.g. 
Mikula et al., 1998), but few researchers have investigated how emotion type changes over 
time as a result of pay, or bonus pay specifically. Investigating how distinct emotions change 
over time (both in terms of strength and type of emotion) as a result of different workplace 
events is another avenue for potential future research. Previous researchers (e.g. Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996; Basch & Fisher, 2000) have considered emotional reactions to 
workplace events, but have treated these emotions as relatively stable over time once 
elicited. The finding of this thesis are more consistent with the work of Elfenbein (2007) who 
suggests that various reappraisal and feedback loops may serve to alter an emotion over 
time once the initial event has taken place. In this research 10 of the 31 participants report 
consistent emotion as a result of bonus pay (i.e. the first emotion they report is the same as 
subsequent emotions reported as a result of bonus pay), with 21 reporting emotions related 
to bonus pay which differ over time.  
 
Comparing the relative relationships between each predictor variable and turnover intention 
for each event in isolation allows for a direct comparison of workplace events. More variance 
occurs within participants than between participants for financial recognition (with an ICC of 
0.631) compared with other events covered in the research (where the ICC ranges from 
0.795 to 0.998), suggesting that reactions to bonus pay are more uniform across participants 
than for other events. There is no significant relationship between emotion score and 
turnover intention for any of the events researched, suggesting that none of the events 
included is an affective event by traditional definitions (in that emotion does not directly 
predict turnover intention above and beyond cognitive elements such as social exchange 
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relationship quality). This finding is contrary to existing research which suggests that direct 
emotional responses may be as important or more so than social exchange relationship 
when determining outcomes (e.g. Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). This finding may, however, 
be due to methodological weaknesses in the development of the emotion score scale (as for 
financial recognition as an event emotion score has no significant relationship with turnover 
intention but the more theoretically consistent scales of positive state affect and negative 
state affect do have significant relationships with turnover intention). Justice has a significant 
relationship with turnover intention for 5 of the 13 events researched, with the strongest 
relationship being for financial recognition as an event indicating that for all events 
considered financial recognition (or bonus pay) generates the strongest justice effect when 
predicting variance in turnover intention. Social exchange relationship quality is significantly 
related to turnover intention for all events other than conflict, with the strongest relationship 
being for fairness or discrimination as an event (followed by financial recognition).  
 
Social exchange relationship quality has a stronger relationship with turnover intention than 
the other variables considered in this research for all events, though it is worth noting that 
when all events are considered in aggregate both emotion score and justice significantly 
predict social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention, perhaps indicating 
complex relationships between the constructs. The potential limitations associated with the 
methodology, and specifically the choice of events and treatment of emotion in this research 
will be discussed in a later section. It is possible that bonus pay may be coded as either 
‘financial recognition’ or ‘fairness or discrimination’ as events by participants which may 
influence these results. The lack of direct significant relationship between emotion score and 
turnover intention for any individual event can be further investigated by considering the 
more granular (and some researchers would suggest more theoretically consistent) 
measures of positive state affect and negative state affect, albeit for the single event of 
financial recognition. For this event when state affect is included there are significant direct 
relationships between both positive and negative affect and turnover intention (with the 
relationship between positive affect and turnover intention stronger than the relationships 
between both positive affect and social exchange relationship quality and justice and 
turnover intention, and the relationship between negative affect and turnover intention 
weaker than these relationship with other variables). This indicates that positive and 
negative affect have a somewhat asymmetrical relationship with other variables in the 
investigation. These are relationships which would have been missed had the research 
considered only emotion score as a variable. This can be highlighted by considering the 
mediating role played by affect in justice and social exchange and justice and turnover 
intention relationships. While positive affect does not mediate the relationships between 
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justice and social exchange relationship and justice and turnover intention, negative affect 
does. In the case of social exchange relationship quality, the indirect effect is stronger than 
the direct effect, whereas in the case of turnover intention the direct effect is stronger, 
providing additional support for the finding that bonus pay can be considered an affective 
event. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that though turnover intention has been selected as a proxy 
outcome for turnover in this research, turnover intention is an attitude rather than a 
behaviour (i.e. it represents intent to leave the organisation rather than actually leaving). The 
tests in this research considering whether an event is an affective event may therefore be 
misleading as this classification is dependent on both the dependent variable chosen, and 
the treatment of emotion as a variable. When developing the hypothesis, the choice of social 
exchange relationship quality as a cognitive measure and turnover intention as the 
dependent variable (and proxy outcome) was made in part to sit within the research 
parameters of the thesis and provide some consistency with the findings of previous 
investigations. Similarly, the use of emotion score as a measure was designed to unify a 
complex emotion scale into a single measure for ease of analysis. Substituting these 
variables (i.e. social exchange relationship for turnover intention as a dependent variable in 
the case of emotion score, and substituting emotion score for state affect in the case of 
turnover intention as a dependent variable) changes the outcome of this hypothesis.  In 
order to test whether bonus pay (and the other events considered in this thesis) are truly 
affective events a further analysis including positive and negative state affect as emotion 
variables, and the inclusion of real outcomes rather than the use of proxy outcomes would 
be warranted and may provide a further avenue of research. 
 
8.2.4. Justice, emotion, social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention  
 
A primary aim of the research is to contribute to the understanding of the co-occurrence of 
emotional and cognitive processes in justice appraisals, and to test their relative 
associations with turnover intention. While both emotional and cognitive components of 
justice have been researched (along with their relative impact) in meta-analyses (e.g. 
Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002), it is 
difficult to draw comparisons of relationship effects as data is not collected at the same 
points based on the same events using the same measures. Considering therefore the 
differential relationships between emotion, social exchange relationship quality and turnover 
intention attempts to address this gap in the current literature. For financial recognition as an 




Significant relationships between positive and negative state affect and social exchange 
relationship quality. This may suggest that rather than being complimentary viewpoints for 
considering justice these emotional and cognitive components are more closely related than 
the treatment of them as separate lenses suggests. This thesis therefore lends support to 
the numerous calls in the existing literature to treat emotion and social exchange as co-
occurring phenomena (e.g. Skitka et al., 2003; Greenberg et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2013). 
It also provides some support for the research of Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) which 
suggests proximal organisational events are a source of emotional reactions, which in turn 
influence attitudes, behaviour and outcomes. This is consistent with attitude formation 
theories (e.g. Eagley & Chaiken, 1993) which suggest that emotions precede cognition and 
attitudes which in turn lead to behaviour and outcomes. Rather than being truly co-occurring 
it may indicate support for the event-emotion-attitude-behaviour pathway suggested by both 
Weiss and Cropanzano (1996), and Eagley and Chaiken (1993). While this thesis provides 
some evidence for the direction of relationships, further analysis will be required to truly test 
whether these relationships are causal. 
 
8.2.5. Organisational differences 
 
While the majority of the findings in this thesis are discussed at the general level, there are 
some pronounced differences in the data returned by participants from each company 
researched. There are no conclusions regarding company differences to be drawn from the 
cross-sectional study as this was not a variable recorded, however the salary and bonus 
figures returned by participants would suggest that there are a range of practices used by 
companies which can all sit under the remit of bonus pay. Both an employee paid a salary of 
£35,000 (but with a bonus of £30,000) and an employee paid £60,000 (but with a bonus of 
£5,000) are categorised as receiving a bonus. The differences in instrumentality of these 
sums to the participant may lead to different attitudes and reactions from employees. Using 
mean scores to understand the bonus paid to employees may obscure these differences. 
When this thesis considers the workplace events recorded in different organisations it sees 
some (though not extensive) differences. As an example, there are differences for acts of 
customers and acts of managers both in terms of their frequency and relationships with 
turnover intention across organisations (which are consistent with the descriptions of the 
organisations provided by the sponsor in each organisation). Certain events can lead to 
different emotions in different organisations (e.g. conflict elicits the emotion of pride in one 
organisation and fear in another) which may speak to the source of the conflict as much as 
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the event itself, or a lack of consistent understanding about the nature of conflict as a 
category.  
 
One of the clear weaknesses in this research related to using a checklist of multiple events 
is the ability of participants to select those which are closer to their understanding of the 
actual event occurring in the workplace. Whilst financial recognition is relatively clear as a 
category, and the research was timed so that only one incidence of financial recognition 
occurred during the research period, it is possible that if participants judged their bonus to be 
unfair that they selected ‘fairness or discrimination’ as a category. Other events (e.g. an 
argument with a co-worker) could easily be coded as ‘acts of colleagues’, ‘conflict’, ‘fairness 
or discrimination’ or a selection of other events dependent on the viewpoint of the 
participant. It is therefore difficult to truly understand the nature of the events which occur in 
the workplace using this system of coding and analysis. This is a further limitation in the 
research if each event is considered in isolation and could be mitigated in future research 
either by developing clearer categories of event or by sharing tangible examples of the 
meaning of each category of event included. This may also potentially explain differences in 
the emotion elicited by the same event in different organisations. Organisational norms may, 
for example, lead some participants to code an event where positive challenge as a result of 
differing viewpoints as ‘conflict’ (albeit productive conflict), leading to the emotion of pride. 
Participants in this organisation may be primed to see positive conflict as beneficial and a 
behaviour which the organisation rewards and recognises. In another organisation any type 
of conflict which disturbs the status quo (either positive or negative) may be seen as harmful, 
and therefore elicit fear. These differences have not been investigated in this thesis. 
 
8.2.6. Gender differences 
 
Differences in responses between male and female participants exist across this research 
and offer some interesting insight. There are significant differences reported in position 
(whether manager or non-manager), salary and bonus across male and female participants. 
Perhaps interestingly female participants report lower salaries and lower amounts in bonus 
paid as an absolute amount compared to male participants, though there is no significant 
difference in bonus as a percentage of salary. This indicates that female participants tend to 
be non-managers and are paid lower and receive lower bonuses than male, but they receive 
proportionally the same bonus in relation to their salary as male participants. In terms of the 
events and emotions reported by male and female participants in the research there exist 
some though not extensive differences. There are no significant differences in the events 
reported by male and female participants, though female participants report lower mean 
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incidences of regret as an emotion, and differences in mean strength of the emotions of 
interest, fear and anger than male participants (with female participants reporting higher 
mean strength of interest, but lower mean strength of fear and anger).  
 
Though there are some differences in position, salary, bonus amount, event and emotion 
variables, there are no significant differences between male and female participants 
considering bonus satisfaction, justice or turnover intention variables, indicating that male 
and female participants perceive similar levels of justice and satisfaction and are similarly 
likely to have turnover intentions. Another interesting difference between male and female 
participants is in the referents selected in order to arrive at these justice perceptions. Male 
participants are more likely to choose ‘others in this company at my level’, ‘what other 
employers are paying’, ‘what I think I am worth’ and ‘others in this company at a higher level’ 
than female participants. It may be possible that though male and female participants arrive 
at similar levels of justice, satisfaction and turnover intention that the way in which these 
appraisals are made differ as the groups use different sets of referents to determine justice. 
This finding may also highlight some interesting aspects related to a potential gender pay 
gap (Blau & Kahn, 2007). While in this research female participants earn less in salary and 
bonus, they tend to find this equally fair and be equally satisfied in relation to male 
participants. This may be because female participants use different sets of referents with 
which to compare their pay, or may be because female participants judge these differences 
in pay to be fair as a result of differences in the roles played by each gender in the 
workplace (as male participants tend to be managers more often than female). As a result, 
female participants have no more intention to leave the organisation than male participants. 
 
8.3. Discussion of the implications 
 
The implications of this research investigation are broad. Bonus pay has become more 
popular as a reward practice in many industries in recent years, and this research questions 
the perceived direct relationship between bonus pay (in terms of the amount paid) and 
attitudes such as bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. Rather than the amount of bonus 
paid, this research suggests that other variables included such as justice, affect and social 
exchange relationship quality are more strongly related to attitudes such as bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention. Justice partially mediates bonus amount – satisfaction 
and bonus amount – turnover intention relationships, but only when bonus as a percentage 
of salary is considered. It does not mediate these relationships when bonus as an absolute 
amount is considered, indicating that how a bonus is framed and calculated is important in 
determining whether a recipient is satisfied, and whether they intend to leave the 
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organisation. These effects can be further seen by interrogating the mediating effects of 
different scales of justice, which suggest that if a bonus is framed as a percentage of salary 
then interpersonal and information elements of justice mediate bonus amount-attitude 
relationships, whereas if a bonus is framed as an absolute amount procedural and 
interpersonal justice scales mediate bonus amount-attitude relationships. Viewing justice as 
a single construct would miss these nuances. 
 
For practical implications, these findings suggest that the way in which a bonus is framed is 
important (whether as a percentage of salary or absolute amount). Interpersonal justice is 
important as it mediates both bonus-satisfaction and bonus-turnover intention relationships, 
and depending on the framing of a bonus organisations should focus on either clarifying 
processes used to determine the award (in the case of framing bonus as an absolute 
amount) or providing information and communication related to the bonus award (in the case 
of framing bonus as a percentage of salary). A further implication of the research considers 
the control which organisations have in directing social comparison mechanisms. If an 
organisation becomes more transparent around bonuses and makes a promise of a bonus 
(sometimes in practice coding the amount into total pay in the form of a promise dependent 
on performance) it is less likely that employees will then seek internal referents with which to 
compare their bonus to judge whether their bonus is fair or not. These internal referents 
appear to be important for self-worth evaluations, which may then be used by employees as 
a comparison against external referents to make turnover intention judgements. These 
results suggest that by offering more information and certainty over bonus amounts in the 
form of a promise these reference dependent processes can be altered and somewhat 
controlled. As referent selection predicts justice, bonus satisfaction and turnover then 
controlling which referents are selected may have beneficial outcomes. This may be 
especially important when considering gender pay issues in the workplace as the research 
suggests that there are significant differences in the referents selected by male and female 
participants, though levels of justice, satisfaction and turnover intention as a result of bonus 
pay are not significantly different. 
 
There are further practical implications related to the experience of the workplace addressed 
in the research. As experience sampling is used it offers a rich view of the events, emotions, 
justice appraisals and social exchange relationships in the workplace. This provides 
managers with an understanding of the emotions experienced by employees as a result of 
organisational stimuli, and the effects of these emotions on workplace attitudes. It also 
provides a framework for the interrogation of the effects of these distinct events. The 
differences in emotion and the relationships between variables returned for financial 
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recognition are different for other events included in the research, as an example, and the 
subsequent relative relationships between emotion, justice and social exchange relationship 
and turnover intention are different for each event. By understanding the pathways in this 
research and the relative effects of each event managers can seek to optimise the employee 
experience to improve social exchange relationships in the workplace and retain employees. 
They can also begin to understand the different events which make up a ‘typical’ experience 
for employees and begin to tailor organisational support mechanisms to better help 
employees cope with workplace events. As an example, the research has demonstrated 
differences between organisations and genders in terms of workplace events and emotions 
recorded which may require different coping mechanisms to be employed (for example 
managing the effect of acts of colleagues as an event may involve different practices than 
managing the effect of acts of customers). By using the analytical framework in this research 
managers can better tailor the support provided to these specific aspects of the employee 
experience. 
 
As well as implications for how the bonus is framed and communicated, and which elements 
of justice should be the focus in bonus pay situations, there are also implications for bonus 
pay as an event. This research suggests that of all the workplace events studied, justice is 
the strongest predictor of turnover intention for financial recognition as an event, and social 
exchange relationship quality is a stronger predictor of turnover intention for the events of 
fairness or discrimination and financial recognition than for the other events included in the 
research. Financial recognition therefore appears to be a particularly salient event where 
turnover intention is concerned as a result of stronger justice and social exchange 
relationships effects on turnover intention for this event. The research also suggests 
implications for how organisations reward and recognise individuals. While for events such 
as non-financial recognition the relationship between justice and turnover intention are non-
significant, social exchange relationship does form a significant relationship with turnover 
intention. Both financial and non-financial recognition therefore have the power to alter the 
social exchange relationship to an extent where employees consider their future with the 
organisation, possibly through a re-evaluation of their standing and worth in the organisation. 
Financial recognition, however, has an additional direct justice effect on turnover intention (as 
well as a potential effect of justice through social exchange relationship quality) which 
suggests different appraisal mechanisms are used by employees for these different means of 
recognition. These are effects which should be carefully considered by managers and reward 





A further implication addresses the purpose at the outset; to contribute evidence to the 
current understanding of pay, bonus pay, and to investigate the relationships between 
variables for bonus pay as an event in the context of other events experienced in 
organisational life. Many of the relationships addressed in this research are not consistent 
with those in existing literature considering pay as a general concept (for example the 
complex relationships between pay and outcomes and the social comparison referents 
selected in pay situations) which demonstrates the need to consider bonus pay as a separate 
and unique form of remuneration than pay level or salary. This thesis is consistent with 
existing research which suggests that organisational justice mediates the relationship 
between pay and turnover intention (e.g. Grant et al., 2007; Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller, 
1999). This finding is both consistent with broad panel data which suggests a mediating role 
for justice on pay (and bonus pay in particular) and performance relationships found in the 
economics literature (where other mediating effects are typically not considered), and also 
helps to explain some of the more complex relationships between pay and performance 
found in the psychology literature (through the mediating effects of justice). The question for 
reward strategists and organisations in general is whether the positive effects of bonus pay 
as a reward strategy in terms of potentially increasing performance are worth both the 
negative emotions associated with bonus pay and the changes to employees social 
exchange relationships, which in turn are associated with turnover intention. The general 
feelings of anger and disappointment elicited in employees appears to harm the social 
exchange relationships within the workplace, which while perhaps improving performance in 
the short term may introduce longer term perverse consequences. This is worthy of further 
study. 
 
8.4. Evaluation of theoretical contribution 
 
This thesis has sought to contribute to theoretical domains in a number of areas as well as 
addressing limitations in the current literature. There is little direct research considering 
bonus pay and subsequent attitudes conducted in-situ in the workplace. In the past bonus 
research (e.g. Gneezy & Runsticini, 2000; Pokorny, 2008) has been concerned with students 
as participants, or has taken place in laboratory conditions. The generalisability of the results 
to workplace situations has therefore been questioned. This thesis has contributed to the 
growing body of work considering workplace events, expanding the number of events 
considered in current literature using experience sampling methods, and investigating the 
emotions associated with distinct workplace events. Certainly, the findings that bonus pay is 
an affective event (albeit when state affect is considered rather than emotion score) 
contributes to the literature, and the use of affective events theory as a lens to view bonus 
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pay is a novel approach. These findings also raise questions about the treatment of events 
as affective events in general, as the results have shown that none of the events researched 
in this thesis can be classified as affective events by the definitions in this thesis, and that the 
classification of being an affective event is dependent on the variable chosen as an outcome 
or outcome proxy and the treatment of emotion when analysing these relationships. 
 
Similarly, there is a lack of research into the social comparison mechanisms used when a 
bonus payment is announced (as previous research favours pay in general). This thesis has 
therefore contributed to the literature by considering the referents used when bonus pay 
comparisons are made. The findings showing which referents are selected, and also which 
referents when selected have a significant relationship with attitudes provide practical 
guidance for remuneration professionals when defining organisational policies around pay. 
They also provide interesting findings which play into a very real discussion on the gender 
pay gap and highlight the pathways different genders potentially use when making bonus 
satisfaction and turnover intention appraisals. The research has also contributed to the field 
of organisational justice, which although one of the most widely researched constructs in 
recent years still offers areas for investigation. It has augmented this body of research by 
considering justice relationships in the context of bonus pay (and other events which have 
been under-researched, such as systems involvement), and the relationships between 
bonus pay and the justice scales of procedural, distributive, interpersonal and informational 
justice which show that nuances such as how a bonus is framed can play a significant role in 
predicting the scales of justice used by participants to judge satisfaction with a bonus. The 
thesis has also contributed to the understanding of the relative emotional and cognitive 
aspects of justice. Justice and emotion researchers have highlighted the gaps in the 
literature considering the co-occurrence of both emotional and cognitive elements of 
attitudes for a number of years, with more recent justice researchers directly pointing to a 
need to research emotion and cognitive effects using experience sampling methods (ESM). 
By linking research into workplace events, justice, the distinct emotions associated with 
these events and the subsequent relationships with turnover intention this thesis has added 
depth to a range of existing research and set a path for future investigation. 
 
8.5. Evaluation of the methodologies used 
 
The methodologies used in the research were fit for purpose to effectively investigate the 
relationships highlighted in this thesis. Given the number and nature of the variables under 
investigation it was appropriate to segment the research. The cross-sectional investigation 
was deployed consistently and with the same levels of information and engagement. The 
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experience sampling investigation maintained high engagement and had the full involvement 
of the participating organisations. There are, however, limitations in a number of areas. The 
cross-sectional survey was generally conducted in corporate organisations and generally 
used middle- to upper-level management employees, therefore the generalisability of the 
findings to other groups within the workplace may be questionable. The method used self-
report measures of pay, referents and attitudes and relied on disclosure of personal 
information, which may be open to error. The survey was conducted over a number of years, 
and conditions in the market or environment could potentially have changed leading to a 
general change in attitudes towards bonus pay in the intervening period. While the majority of 
data gathered in the cross-sectional investigation used proven measures, the collection of 
data related to social comparison referents offers some limitation. In the literature review two 
conditions are required for selection of a referent; information availability and relevance. By 
asking participants to choose which referents are important to fairness perceptions the thesis 
attempts to mitigate some of the limitations present in previous pay and referent research 
(where the frequency of referent selection is taken as importance of the referent to attitudes), 
but makes the assumption that referents which have high importance have met the two 
conditions of information availability and relevance. This is an assumption which may not be 
met. It is unclear whether participants have information on the salary or bonus received by 
others, so while they may be considered important as comparison points (and may be 
relevant), the absence of information may mean that they are not actually used as referents. 
These limitations do not invalidate the results but offer some examples of the risks of taking 
the data at face value. 
 
In terms of the experience sampling investigation, limitations were more numerous. The need 
to work with participant organisations meant that all data capture processes were required to 
clear participant internal risk processes. This led to some measures being iterated (both in 
item number and syntax), though they maintained their meaning in light of the original 
measures. Participants were chosen by the sponsors within each of the organisations 
included, which typically introduces bias if they are not selected at random. Both 
organisations who agreed to participate preferred the use of paper diaries to capture data, 
rather than the suggested method of a mobile-enabled survey tool. Though this was not a 
clear limitation it did mean that participants were required to carry paper diaries at all times 
during the research, and that additional work was required in data entry stages. In order to 
limit the complexity of recording multiple events and multiple emotions participants were 
asked to record only the dominant event and dominant emotion associated with this event. 
This prioritisation may be a difficult task in itself after a difficult workplace event. In terms of 
the workplace events included, some events can be coded in a number of ways as 
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mentioned earlier in this thesis. As an example ‘acts of managers’ refers to the person the 
event relates to whereas ‘fairness or discrimination’ refers to the nature of the event, but if an 
event such as a manager rejecting a holiday request takes place it may be coded as both of 
these events in practice, with the participant coding the event based on their own preference. 
The workplace events included in the research were chosen from extant literature and tested 
in engagement workshops rather than conducting a-priori analysis of actual workplace 
events, and therefore there may be bias as employee’s perceptions of events were included 
rather than actual events which occur in the workplace. The recording of workplace events 
and emotions may also act as a priming mechanism which makes events more salient to 
each participant and alters the meaning of subsequent events. This is also a limitation.    
 
When emotions are considered, workplace events have been shown in current literature to 
be associated with a range of emotions rather than a single ‘dominant’ emotion. The 
necessity to select a single emotion may introduce error in two ways. Firstly, it may not be 
apparent to the participant which emotion is dominant as it can be difficult to self-select 
distinct emotions, especially when they are of similar strength. Secondly, many researchers 
have suggested that emotions are pre-cognitive, and that by the time an individual has 
registered an emotion a number of cognitive processes have introduced bias into these 
appraisals. As entries in the diary could be made up to 2 hours following the workplace event 
a number of cognitive processes and biases may take place in the time between the event 
and the recording of the event which seek to alter the perception of the experience. As 
suggested in the literature review (and as confirmed in the results regarding the emotions 
associated with bonus pay) emotions change over time in terms of their type and strength, 
and the closer the capture of the emotion is to the event the more accurate the record. There 
are naturally practical limitations to this, however it is a limitation in the research, 
nonetheless. Finally, the treatment of emotion as a measure in the research introduces a 
limitation. While researchers have suggested the existence of a single bipolar continuum for 
positive and negative feelings which would support the development of the emotion score 
measure (Russell & Carroll, 1999), there are others who maintain that positive and negative 
emotions cannot be treated as polar states of emotion (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). This may 
indicate that the emotion score scale is questionable theoretically. The results in this thesis 
would seem to support this, as when emotion score is used as a variable there is no direct 
significant relationship with turnover intention, but there are direct significant relationships 
between positive and negative state affect and turnover intention. In future research a more 




The remaining measures used as part of our experience sampling research offer both 
strengths and limitations. It was perceived that the high levels of face-to-face engagement 
used when initially engaging participants, and the levels of autonomy given to participants 
when choosing appropriate research measures contributed to participant engagement over 
the duration of the research. Each of the measures is acceptable both in terms of its 
psychometric properties and suitability for the research methods, however their use as a 
battery of measures was not fully tested for internal consistency. The battery of measures 
incudes questions specific to the event which has occurred, and questions related to the 
general organisational relationships (for example questions in the social exchange 
relationship scale include ‘my relationship with my organisation is characterised by mutual 
trust’). These thematic changes are clearly evident in the questionnaire, and it was therefore 
difficult to randomise the questions in the measure (shown in previous research to improve 
accuracy; Siminski, 2008). Changes to specific measures (e.g. the short form organisational 
justice measure) were made to retain participants rather than for any clear statistical benefits. 
The first investigation in this thesis (the cross-sectional investigation) demonstrates that 
using the global construct of organisational justice may overlook critical differences related to 
the different scales of justice (e.g. procedural, distributive and informational justice), however 
changes to this measure meant that these scales could not be interrogated at a granular 
level. The length and duration of the completion of the full questionnaire was also tailored to 
participant requirements rather than for measurement rigour and constrained the use of 
measures in some instances. 
 
There are other limitations in the data available and the ability of the tools used to process 
this data. Due to the number of events and the number of emotions investigated there are 
relatively few data points related to some of our findings. Certain events (e.g. fairness or 
discrimination) and emotions (e.g. love or hate) were not selected often enough by 
participants to provide an adequate sample size for inclusion in the analysis by event or 
emotion at a granular level. Some infrequent workplace events also have an effect on 
attitudes much greater than frequent events, and low sample sizes and differences in power 
for these events may therefore have a disproportionate influence on the results. While there 
are over two hundred thousand data points in our experience sampling investigation, only 
seven female participants reported incidents of ‘violation of trust’ as an event. Four non-
managers reported ‘violation of trust’ as an event. Six non-managers reported ‘acts of 
customers’, all of which limit the ability to draw conclusions for these events related to certain 





8.6. Suggested directions for future research  
 
This thesis and associated results open a number of potential directions for future 
investigation. While the research has included a number of potential events, it has not 
studied the nature of these events. Acts of colleagues, as an example, is a broad category 
which could involve a number of ‘acts’, and further research into the constituent activities of 
each of the events included could offer opportunity for analysis. The research offers insight 
into bonus pay, being the first to the author’s knowledge to present findings that the amount 
of bonus pay has no direct relationship with turnover intention or bonus satisfaction, however 
the potential for further research is great. ‘Bonuses’ as a term clearly covers a broad range of 
pay practices and percentages of variable pay in relation to salary. Research considering 
these differential pay strategies may be a further avenue, as well as the differential impact of 
these strategies on justice perceptions. The relationships between workplace attitudes 
related to justice may also be worth further investigation. Turnover intention, bonus 
satisfaction and social exchange relationship quality are all related to organisational justice 
but differentially (and with some variables at least partially mediating others). A more in-depth 
analysis of covariance relationships between these variables (as well as emotion as a 
variable) may clarify the directions and strengths of the associations between these 
variables. In terms of emotion, while this thesis has transformed distinct emotions into the 
variable of emotion score in this thesis, considering the relationships between variables and 
state affect as well as distinct emotions may also be an opportunity for further analysis (and 
may mitigate against objections that emotion score as a theoretically consistent measure). 
The attitudes considered in this research are limited to justice, social exchange relationship 
quality, bonus satisfaction and turnover intention. There is an opportunity to consider different 
attitudes related to justice to understand the effects of fairness perceptions on other 
workplace attitudes and behaviours such as commitment, innovation, organisational 
citizenship behaviours and counterproductive work behaviours if these constructs are 
identified as specific organisational needs. This thesis offers a productive framework for 
conducting such research. 
 
The findings of this research have demonstrated that complex relationships exists between 
the types of event which occur in the workplace, organisational justice appraisals, emotions 
and attitudes such as social exchange relationship quality and turnover intention. The thesis 
has considered thirteen workplace events, yet the potential number of workplace events is far 
broader. This offers another further avenue for research, with potentially more impactful 
events omitted from this research. Similarly, though the research has considered two (albeit 
different) functions in different organisations, there is also the option to broaden the research 
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to many more functions and types of organisation. The two companies studied have 
demonstrated that they are sufficiently different in terms of the events, emotions and attitudes 
under investigation to begin to consider different organisations, and whether there are 
elements of the organisational climate which make the probability of certain events more 
likely (or indeed become norms in those organisations). The relatively small participant 
numbers in the experience sampling investigation (though producing many data points due to 
the nature of experience sampling) and also the inclusion of single functions from these 
organisations may also be unrepresentative of the organisation at large. As an example, this 
thesis has considered fewer than twenty-five employees in an underwriting function of an 
insurance company whose workforce totals more than fifty thousand, covering functions as 
diverse as claims, customer service, human resources, marketing, finance, product 
development etc. It is possible that all of these functions, due to their diverse work outputs, 
will be subject to different interactions and experiences. In a similar vein, this research has 
included manager and non-manager responses, yet there is an opportunity to consider a 
broader range of employees at different organisational levels or role types in future research. 
Understanding the differential workplace events which occur within process workers, 
knowledge workers, executive workers and innovation workers for example, may aid in the 
understanding of the fundamental practical and emotional workplace experience of these 
types of workers. 
 
With the advent of broad organisational data collection practices the opportunity to automate 
many of the aspects of experience sampling research offers researchers opportunity to link 
psychometric with real performance data. By including tangible outcomes in the analysis 
rather than proxy outcomes (such as turnover intention) such analysis can also test the real 
effects of justice on behaviour rather than attitudes alone. Cloud based software such as 
Office 365 (© Microsoft) has the capability of recording data in real-time such as productivity 
data, networking data and keystroke data which are more tangible aspects of performance, 
and less open to self-report biases. By using technology to enable experience sampling in 
future bonus research, investigators can seek to capture a range of self-report and 
performance data coincidentally. There are natural limitations to the research in this area. 
Not all employees who have increased turnover intention will leave their role (intention to 
leave is not the same thing as leaving). There is no clear evidence that turnover intention 
increases cognitive load and reduces performance in our sample, or leads to increased 
incidences of counterproductive work behaviours. Any suggestions for future research would 
incorporate less manual recording techniques, and attempt to link the findings directly to 




Finally, the data collected offers a rich experiential landscape to further investigate 
workplace events, justice and attitudes. Whilst this thesis has not considered all of the 
potential analyses related to the data collected during the investigations (as this thesis seeks 
to investigate specific hypotheses), further modelling could provide additional insights. The 
methods used have led to the collection of a rich, time-based data set comprising event, 
emotional and attitude variables across a relatively long period in terms of experience 
sampling (for example other investigations such as Illes and Judge (2002) use a two-week 
window for data collection rather than one-month). This time-based intrapersonal journey, 
and the influence of workplace events on subsequent workplace events and attitudes is also 
a rich avenue for potential study. It is possible that if (for example) conflict is an event which 
becomes normalised through increased incidences of conflict, then appraisals will alter 
because of this. It is also possible (as demonstrated by previous researchers such as 
Harrison et al., 2006) that there are significant influences of time-based sequences on 
behaviour (i.e. certain decisions and behaviours are more likely at different times during the 
day) which could also offer a rich avenue for further investigation. The treatment in this 
thesis of the data as multi-level and hierarchical has outlined the potential methods for 
considering these different variables within levels in a multi-level model, and further analysis 
incorporating these variables and levels would add depth to the understanding of not just the 
momentary emotional and attitudinal effects of events, but also the inter-related nature of 
these events, emotions and attitudes.  
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9. Final conclusions 
 
Bonus pay is a form of remuneration which is becoming more popular in reward strategies, 
yet there is little evidence related to the effects of bonus on either performance or other 
organisational constructs such as organisational justice and social exchange relationship 
quality. This thesis has added to this body of evidence, with results which are both novel and 
add practical guidance to reward strategists and practitioners when considering bonus pay as 
a particular form of pay. Bonus pay appears to act as a signal for an employee to engage in 
an organisational justice appraisal, which in turn is associated with both satisfaction with the 
bonus and turnover intention. Bonus satisfaction is the strongest significant predictor of 
turnover intention, and distributive justice is the strongest predictor of bonus satisfaction (out 
of all four of the justice scales of distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational 
justice). Bonus satisfaction predicts 35% of the variance in turnover intention, whereas justice 
predicts 4.5% directly. Justice does, however, predict 83% of the variance in bonus 
satisfaction. There are complex mediating relationships of justice on both bonus amount and 
bonus satisfaction, and bonus amount and turnover intention relationships and these appear 
to depend on the scale of justice (i.e. distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational) 
and type of bonus amount considered (i.e. whether considered as a percentage of salary or 
absolute amount). One of the novel findings of this research, however, is that neither bonus 
amount as a percentage of a recipient’s salary nor bonus as an absolute amount predict 
bonus satisfaction or distributive justice directly. Bonus pay as an amount does predict other 
forms of justice, but these relationships are weak. This raises the question of how distributive 
justice appraisals are arrived at by participants if this is not predicted by bonus amount.  
 
The referent selected by participants is directly associated with justice scales (with 12.2% of 
the variance in distributive, 6.4% of procedural, 6.6% of interpersonal and 9.3% of 
interpersonal justice predicted by referent selection), as well as both bonus satisfaction and 
turnover intention (with 17% of the variance in bonus satisfaction and 9.3% of turnover 
intention predicted directly by referent selection). Referent selection offers some novel insight 
as the referents identified in previous pay research as having the greatest effect on justice 
and turnover (i.e. those in the same company at the same level) are selected as most 
important most frequently in this study, but do not predict variance in either justice or bonus 
satisfaction directly. Other referents (such as the cost of living or sense of self-worth) do, 
however, predict this variance. This finding is consistent with other researchers who have 
suggested that internal referents may be used to arrive at a sense of self-worth, which is then 
used as a referent against external market referents to determine satisfaction and turnover 
intentions. It is also interesting to note that when participants use certain referents such as 
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the promise of a bonus, they are less likely to make comparisons with other internal 
referents. This suggests that reward practitioners may be able to limit the use of certain 
referent groups by making information about others more available, consistent with the 
current research identifying both information availability and relevance as necessary 
conditions for comparisons with referents. This research provides additional support to assist 
reward strategists with understanding which of these referents are positively and negatively 
related. 
 
This thesis also offers insight into the role of bonus pay as a workplace event in comparison 
with other workplace events. Compared to all events in aggregate, where the emotion 
associated is generally positive, for bonus pay the emotions associated are overwhelmingly 
negative, with anger being the most frequent primary emotion (i.e. the first emotion felt as a 
result of the event) and disappointment being the most frequent overall emotion elicited (as 
anger changes into disappointment for many participants over time as a result of bonus pay). 
For bonus pay and fairness (or discrimination) as workplace events compared to the others 
included in the research both justice and social exchange relationship quality form the 
strongest relationships with turnover intention, indicating that these may be particularly 
salient events in the formation of organisational attitudes. Social exchange relationship 
quality forms the strongest direct predictor of turnover intention, though justice is also a 
significant and moderate direct predictor of social exchange relationship quality for all events 
in aggregate and for bonus event specifically. Justice is also a significant positive predictor of 
emotion score, which in turn is a moderate positive predictor of social exchange relationship 
quality. Emotion score for events in aggregate is a significant though weak negative predictor 
of turnover intention (indicating that as emotions become more strongly positive then 
turnover intention decreases), however the use of emotion score has some methodological 
limitations. When positive and negative state affect are included as variables they 
demonstrate different asymmetric relationships with outcomes, perhaps indicating that the 
theoretical concerns with the use of emotion score ( as a score representing polar emotional 
opposites symmetrically distributed) are warranted. 
 
Given the breadth of the findings in this thesis centred around organisational justice 
research, but providing specific findings related to both bonus pay in terms of amount and 
bonus pay as an organisational event, it offers a range of insights to inform reward 
practitioners and researchers in a practical and theoretical sense. The thesis provides insight 
into the effects of bonus pay (both in terms of amount and as an event in comparison with 
other workplace events), referent selection, and the effects of justice (both as a global 
construct and considering the individual justice scales of distributive, procedural, 
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interpersonal and informational justice) on bonus satisfaction. It provides a deeper 
understanding of the emotional and social exchange relationship effects of justice, and the 
effects of justice, emotion, social exchange relationships and bonus satisfaction on turnover 
intentions as a result of bonus pay. It also provides an operationalisation of a theoretical 
framework suggested by previous researchers who have identified a need to integrate 
emotion and social exchange relationship constructs related to justice to test their mediating 
effects where organisational outcomes are considered, providing support for the suggestion 
that emotions mediate justice-outcome relationships. This not only contributes to the 
evidence related to bonus pay, justice, emotion, social exchange relationships and turnover 
intention, but also offers a guide for future investigations researching the performance effects 
of bonus pay in the workplace. As bonus pay is becoming an increasingly popular 
mechanism of reward this thesis uncovers some of the perhaps unintended (though perhaps 
intended if distress mediation hypotheses are considered) consequences of bonus pay in the 
workplace related to justice, emotion, social exchange and turnover intention, and provides 
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11.1. Appendix 1: Communications 
 
The following pages contain relevant communications and engagement materials used with 
participants during the research. Included are the emails sent to participants in the cross-
sectional survey to engage participants at all points during the process, and engagement 
materials outlining the process used in the experience sampling method to introduce the 
research to potential participants. 
 




















































11.2. Appendix 2: Results and Measures 
 
The following pages are appendices to the methods and results sections in the thesis, where 
interesting though not critical information has been placed to support the findings. This 
section firstly shows histograms from the cross-sectional study to support distribution 
assumptions and provide additional information related to referent selection, and then 
provides a variable catalogue for the experience sampling investigation to augment the 
research method discussed in section 6.  
 












                                     
Figure 42. Referent histograms
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11.2.2. Item-level Catalogue for the Experience Sampling Measure (detailed in Section 6) 
 
 
Figure 43. Combined ESM questionnaire complete with legend identifying each measure 
  
Legend Description 
GEW Scale of the Geneva Emotion Wheel (20 emotions measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
OJS Measure of organisational justice consisting of 6 items 
SERS Measure of social exchange relationship quality consisting of 4 items 










Table 60.  
Item level variable catalogue for the experience sampling investigation 
Variable Item Description 
Event Type 13 item descriptions Various events 
Interest Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Amusement Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Pride Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Joy Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Pleasure Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Contentment Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Love Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Admiration Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Relief Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Compassion Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Sadness Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Guilt Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Regret Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Shame Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Disappointment Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Fear Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Disgust Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Contempt Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Hate Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
Anger Single item Part of the Geneva emotion wheel 
OJS Organisational Justice Scale Latent variable for organisational justice 
OJ1 Item 1 of the OJS-8 I was able to express my views and feelings 
OJ2 Item 2 of the OJS-8 I feel that I was treated consistently 
OJ3 Item 3 of the OJS-8 Things were handled in a way that was free of bias 
OJ4 Items 4 and 5 of the OJS-8 Everyone was treated with dignity and respect 
OJ5 Item 6 of the OJS-8 I was communicated with in an appropriate manner  
DistJ Items 7 and 8 of the OJS-8  I feel that I get as much out of this as I put in 
SERS Social Exchange Relationship Scale Latent variable for social exchange relationship 
SE1 Item 1 of the SERS Relationship characterised by mutual obligation 
SE2 Item 2 of the SERS Relationship characterised by mutual trust 
SE3 Item 3 of the SERS Relationship characterised by mutual commitment 
SE4 Item 4 of the SERS Relationship characterised by mutual significance 
TIS6 Turnover Intention Scale Latent variable for turnover intention 
TI1 Item 1 of the TIS6 Frustration with not achieving work related goals 
TI2 Item 2 of the TIS6 I have often considered leaving my job 
TI3 Item 3 of the TIS6 I’m likely to accept another job at the same money 
TI4 Item 4 of the TIS6 My current job is satisfying my personal needs 
TI5 Item 5 of the TIS6 I often look forward to another day at work 
TI6 Item 6 of the TIS6 I often dream about a job that suits me better 
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11.2.3. Appendix to Hypothesis 9: The relationship between justice and both social 
exchange relationship quality and turnover intention is mediated by participants’ emotions. 
 
The following summary provides additional detail related to Hypothesis 9. In this section a 
summary of the specific emotions which mediate the relationships between justice and social 
exchange relationship quality, and justice and turnover intention is provided in Tables 61 and 
62. As with the analysis in Section 7.15 in the main text, this analysis was generated using 
the PROCESS Method (CI = 95%, number of bootstrap samples = 5000) for SPSS (version 
3.4, Hayes, 2017). Paths in the analysis in Table 61 and 62 are consistent with Figures 42 









































Table 61.  
Mediating effects of distinct emotions on justice and turnover intention for all events. 
 
          
Relationship 









          
OJS – Interest – TIS6 .254** 0.155** -0.018 -0.487** -0.003 0.004 -0.010 0.004 No Mediation 
OJS – Amusement – TIS6 .254** 0.104** -0.004 -0.490** 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.004 No Mediation 
OJS – Pride – TIS6 .254** 0.255** 0.032 -0.498** 0.008 0.005 -0.001 0.018 No Mediation 
OJS – Joy – TIS6 .255** 0.050** -0.080* -0.486** -0.004 0.002 -0.008 -0.001 Mediation 
OJS – Pleasure – TIS6 .254** 0.213** 0.021 -0.494** 0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.013 No Mediation 
OJS – Contentment – TIS6 .254** 0.029** -0.079 -0.488** -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.001 No Mediation 
OJS – Admiration – TIS6 .255** 0.022** -0.134* -0.487** -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 Mediation 
OJS – Relief – TIS6 .254** 0.021* 0.057 -0.491** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 No Mediation 
OJS – Compassion – TIS6 .254** 0.001 -0.056 -0.490** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 No Mediation 
OJS – Sadness – TIS6 .255** -0.013* 0.131* -0.488** -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 Mediation 
OJS – Guilt – TIS6 .254** -0.012* 0.113 -0.489** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 No Mediation 
OJS – Regret – TIS6 .254** -0.023** -0.023 -0.491** 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.004 No Mediation 
OJS – Shame – TIS6 .254** -0.024** 0.059 -0.489** -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.002 No Mediation 
OJS – Disappointment – TIS6 .254** -0.278** 0.024 -0.483** -0.007 0.006 -0.017 0.005 No Mediation 
OJS – Fear – TIS6 .254** -0.071** 0.024 -0.488** -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.003 No Mediation 
OJS – Disgust – TIS6 .254** -0.091** 0.041 -0.486** -0.004 0.003 -0.010 0.003 No Mediation 
OJS – Contempt – TIS6 .255** -0.055** -0.093 -0.495** 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.013 No Mediation 
OJS – Hate – TIS6 .254** -0.014** 0.015 -0.490** -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 No Mediation 
OJS – Anger – TIS6 .254** -0.559** 0.022 -0.478** -0.012 0.011 -0.034 0.010 No Mediation 
Note: N = 599, *p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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Table 62.  
Mediating effects of distinct emotions on justice and social exchange relationship quality for all events. 
          
Relationship 









          
OJS – Interest – SERS .235** 0.155** 0.008 0.357** 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.006 No Mediation 
OJS – Amusement – SERS .236** 0.104** 0.036* 0.355** 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.008 No Mediation 
OJS – Pride – SERS .239** 0.255** 0.050** 0.346** 0.013 0.004 0.006 0.020 Mediation 
OJS – Joy – SERS .239** 0.050** 0.103** 0.354** 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.008 Mediation 
OJS – Pleasure – SERS .236** 0.213** -0.016 0.362** -0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.004 No Mediation 
OJS – Contentment – SERS .236** 0.029** 0.071 0.357** 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.004 No Mediation 
OJS – Admiration – SERS .236** 0.022** 0.046 0.358** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 No Mediation 
OJS – Relief – SERS .236** 0.021* 0.051* 0.358** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 Mediation 
OJS – Compassion – SERS .235** 0.001 0.063 0.359** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 No Mediation 
OJS – Sadness – SERS .238** -0.013* -0.134* 0.357** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 Mediation 
OJS – Guilt – SERS .235** -0.012* -0.013 0.359** 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 No Mediation 
OJS – Regret – SERS .236** -0.023** -0.060 0.357** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 No Mediation 
OJS – Shame – SERS .236** -0.024** -0.043 0.358** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 No Mediation 
OJS – Disappointment – SERS .241** -0.278** -0.070** 0.339** 0.019 0.004 0.012 0.027 Mediation 
OJS – Fear – SERS .236** -0.071** -0.066 0.354** 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.009 Mediation 
OJS – Disgust – SERS .236** -0.091** -0.063 0.353** 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.011 Mediation 
OJS – Contempt – SERS .236** -0.055** -0.039 0.357** 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.006 No Mediation 
OJS – Hate – SERS .235** -0.014** 0.006 0.359** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 No Mediation 
OJS – Anger – SERS .241** -0.559** -0.061** 0.325** 0.034 0.008 0.019 0.050 Mediation 
Note: N = 599, *p < .05.  **p < .01.
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This page represents the end of this thesis. 
 
